Dual-process theories in moral psychology: interdisciplinary approaches to theoretical, empirical and practical considerations

Prologue: Morality -- Part I: On the Relationship Between Ethics and Empirical Sciences -- Part II: Empirical Approaches in Recent Moral Psychology Research -- Part III: Reassessments of Established Terminology in Modern Debates -- Part IV: Societal Implications of Dual-Process Theories in Moral Psychology -- Epilogue: The Word Thief.

Intro -- Contents -- Morality -- Preface -- Part I On the Relationship Between Ethics and Empirical Sciences -- Dimensions of Moral Intuitions - Metaethics, Epistemology and Moral Psychology -- 1 Struggling With Intuitions -- 2 How Moral Intuitions Fit Into the Metaethical Picture -- 3 Dual Process Theories in Moral Psychology -- 3.1 On the Psychological Level of Explanation -- 3.2 On the Justificatory Level of Explanation -- 3.3 On the Normative Level of Explanation -- 4 Adequacy -- 5 A Brief Look Into the Future -- 6 References -- Where and When Ethics Needs Empirical Facts -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Empirical Facts as Parts of Applied Ethics -- 3 Empirical Facts from a Foundationalist Perspective -- 4 Empirical Elements in 'Operationalizing' Principles -- 5 Empirical Elements in Non-Foundationalist Approaches -- 6 Conclusion -- 7 References -- Normativity of Moral Intuitions in the Social Intuitionist Model -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) -- 3 Normativity and Reasons -- 4 Unconscious Rules -- 5 Moral Heuristics -- 6 Conflicts Between Intuitions -- 7 Varieties of Moral Intuitions -- 8 Conclusion -- 9 References -- Psychology Instead of Ethics? Why Psychological Research Is Important but Cannot Replace Ethics -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Explaining Reasoning -- 2.1 'Reasoning' from a Common Sense Perspective -- 2.2 'Reasoning' from a Moral Rationalist Perspective -- 3 Explaining Moral Judgment: The Heuristic Approach -- 3.1 Application of Heuristics in Probability Tasks -- 3.2 Application of Heuristics in Moral Settings -- 4 The Need for a Baseline Criterion: Moral Philosophy -- 4.1 Application of Moral Principles -- 4.2 Psychology Needs Philosophy -- 5 Reinterpreting Empirical Findings -- 5.1 Concerns Regarding the Truth Source of Our Moral Judgments -- 5.1.1 Intuition- and Emotion-Based Judgments.

This anthology offers a unique collection of contributions focusing on the discussion about the so-called dual-process theories within the field of moral psychology. In general, dual-process theories state that in cognitive systems, two sorts of processes can be differentiated: an affective, associative process and an analytical, rule-based process. This distinction recently entered the debate on the relationship between intuitive and rational approaches to explaining the phenomenon of moral judgment. The increasing interest in these theories raises questions concerning their general impact on social contexts. The anthology aims at presenting stepping-stones of an analysis of the merits and drawbacks of this development. For that purpose, the authors discuss general questions concerning the relationship between ethics and empirical sciences, methodological questions, reassessments of established terminology and societal implications of dual-process theories in moral psychology. Contents On the Relationship Between Ethics and Empirical Sciences.- Empirical Approaches in Recent Moral Psychology Research.- Reassessments of Established Terminology in Modern Debates.- Societal Implications of Dual-Process Theories in Moral Psychology. Target Groups - Lecturers and students of philosophy - Philosophy teachers Editor Cordula Brand is a philosopher who is working at the International Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (IZEW, University of Tuebingen)

"This anthology offers a unique collection of contributions focusing on the discussion about the so-called dual-process theories within the field of moral psychology. In general, dual-process theories state that in cognitive systems, two sorts of processes can be differentiated: an affective, associative process and an analytical, rule-based process. This distinction recently entered the debate on the relationship between intuitive and rational approaches to explaining the phenomenon of moral judgment. The increasing interest in these theories raises questions concerning their general impact on social contexts. The anthology aims at presenting stepping-stones of an analysis of the merits and drawbacks of this development. For that purpose, the authors discuss general questions concerning the relationship between ethics and empirical sciences, methodological questions, reassessments of established terminology and societal implications of dual-process theories in moral psychology."--Publisher description