The Royal Navy and the Lessons of the Invergordon Mutiny

In: War in history, Volume 12, Issue 1, p. 75-92

Abstract

This article examines the Royal Navy's efforts to understand the underlying causes of the Invergordon mutiny. Previous studies of this event have tended to focus on the Admiralty's attempt to conceal its own failures by finding scapegoats in the Atlantic Fleet. However, the navy's treatment of the senior personnel involved in the mutiny is less important than its efforts to identify and correct systemic problems within the service that were believed to be undermining the foundations of naval discipline. The Invergordon mutiny was regarded by most naval officers as evidence of a collective failure by the officer corps to gain the confidence of the lower deck. Class tensions undoubtedly existed within the navy during this period, but they were not a significant factor in the mutiny, and were not regarded as matters requiring the navy's urgent attention. Instead, the Admiralty sought ways to develop the leadership skills of its junior officers and non-commissioned officers so that future crises could be dealt with before they escalated to the point of mutiny.