Shock the system: Emergency powers and political capacity

In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Volume 34, Issue 2, p. 457-474

Abstract

AbstractStates that grant their leaders extraordinary powers in times of emergency do so to protect the nation against dramatic shocks. Implicit in this choice is the assumption that the government will better retain its capacity when confronted with an emergency situation if the leader can invoke emergency powers. This remains an untested proposition. In this article, we challenge this assumption and argue that the relationship between emergency powers and political capacity depends on both the nature of the emergency itself and the type of capacity in question. We find that emergency powers better allow the government to extract resources from the public during periods of emergency. However, it is only in national political emergencies where these resources are well allocated. After extra‐territorial emergencies, increased emergency power strength leads to inefficient government allocation. This suggests that emergency powers are not a panacea guarding against the ills of crisis.