Open Access BASE2015

Political corruption as a form of state crime : A case study on electoral donations

Evertsson, Nubia

Open Access

Abstract

In this chapter, I analyze how state crimes emerge when incumbents utilize their offices to reciprocate electoral donors with undue benefits, favorable regulations, contracts, and job appointments. The problem, as it is seen here, is that (a) while electoral donations are cloaked with legality, they facilitate corruption, and (b) the delivery of undue benefits creates social harm, because it diverts the allocation of public resources and destroys confidence in the political system. Thus, I argue and demonstrate how the money delivered as electoral donations constitutes a corrupt incentive that should be classified as illegal.

Report Issue

If you have problems with the access to a found title, you can use this form to contact us. You can also use this form to write to us if you have noticed any errors in the title display.