In: Morgenstern, Scott; Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Juan Javier Negri. "Parliamentary Opposition in Non-Parliamentary Regimes: Latin America," Journal of Legislative Studies. 2008, 14:1-2: 160-89.
AbstractThis article clarifies the intellectual origins of Canadian parliamentary government by situating Confederation within a specific strand of liberal political thought. My argument is that the Fathers of Confederation adhered to the political theory of parliamentarianism. Though liberal constitutionalists, the Fathers of Confederation expressly defended a parliamentary political framework that they considered superior to the American system of checks and balances—one characterized by a powerful elected assembly restrained by an unelected upper house, responsible ministers serving in Parliament, and a constitutional monarch. In elucidating the theory of parliamentarianism that underlies the political project of Confederation, my goal is not only to examine a problem in nineteenth-century Canadian political thought but to ground our current political situation within a larger historical perspective.
Presidential research commonly focuses on the most prominent cases of going public by presidents in semi-presidential regimes: such as expressing a lack of trust in the cabinet members. However, it is also important to understand the day-to-day functioning of semi-presidential republics and routine efforts by the presidents to insert themselves into government decisions. Moreover, presidents in parliamentary republics may also try to influence the government through the power of the public word. In this article, we conceptualize going public as an instance when a president weighs in on the performance of the cabinet and/or individual minister in the media. We analyze the focus and intensity of these instances in semi-presidential (Lithuania) and parliamentary (Latvia) regimes. Our main finding is that on average, presidents are more routinely active in public under semi-presidentialism. We also find that the intensity and focus of presidential attention on the cabinet are highly correlated to the media attention. Furthermore, presidents go public more often during the first year of their terms and pay more attention to foreign and defense policy than to other areas. Our results tend to support the presidency-centered arguments that emphasize the institutional prerogatives and political culture in the explanation of presidential activism.
The article presents considerations on the advantages of Parliamentary regimes over presidential and semi-presidential ones, in relation with the preservation of democratic systems. However, in the specific case of Peru, it does not seek to demonstrate that, if such a regime were adopted, it would constitute the most advisable option, nor that the forceful overthrowing of democratic governments will be avoided. Rather, it is claimed that parliamentary regimes provide a more flexible framework for resolving political crises, and therefore diminish the likelihood of the disruption of democracy. ; El artículo presenta consideraciones sobre las ventajas que el régimen parlamentario tendría con respecto a los regímenes presidencial y semi-presidencial en lo concerniente a la preservación del Sistema democrático. No se señala que, en el caso concreto del Perú, lo más recomendable sea implementar un régimen parlamentario, ni que, de adoptarse por dicho régimen, se evitará nuevos golpes de Estado. Sugiere simplemente, que por sus características, el régimen parlamentario parece ser más flexible para la solución de las crisis políticas y, por ello, menos proclive a la ruptura del sistema democrático.
The article presents considerations on the advantages of Parliamentary regimes over presidential and semi-presidential ones, in relation with the preservation of democratic systems. However, in the specific case of Peru, it does not seek to demonstrate that, if such a regime were adopted, it would constitute the most advisable option, nor that the forceful overthrowing of democratic governments will be avoided. Rather, it is claimed that parliamentary regimes provide a more flexible framework for resolving political crises, and therefore diminish the likelihood of the disruption of democracy. ; El artículo presenta consideraciones sobre las ventajas que el régimen parlamentario tendría con respecto a los regímenes presidencial y semi-presidencial en lo concerniente a la preservación del Sistema democrático. No se señala que, en el caso concreto del Perú, lo más recomendable sea implementar un régimen parlamentario, ni que, de adoptarse por dicho régimen, se evitará nuevos golpes de Estado. Sugiere simplemente, que por sus características, el régimen parlamentario parece ser más flexible para la solución de las crisis políticas y, por ello, menos proclive a la ruptura del sistema democrático.