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This article discusses about trend positivism and non-positivism paradigm in jurisprudence. This topic is important because discourse in social philosophy always relies on the rationality of whole arguments. The argument of justification is preceded through deductive reasoning, starting from paradigmatic premise that will be used to justify conclusion. Paradigmatic premise is the basic principles of truth which is believed to be the real truth. The real truth derives from personal experience in reflecting facts found in daily activities. In contemporary context of jurisprudence, there is a fierce battle between legal profesionals with its positivist paradigm (legal or formal law approach) and legal profesionals with its non-positivistic paradigm (legal morale substance approach). Many critics on positivism were responded by efforts to reform law through social movements. Social realist movement derives from diverse reality of socio-cultural configuration, within national life, will be significant when the movement is massively done, and supported by two pilars of civil society and political power. This opposition movement shall be continuously done to against the established side. The well established community has authority upon whole legal institution and usually will utilize all its power structures in order to maintain their interest.

Cover -- Titel -- Table of Contents -- Einleitung -- Robert Alexy - Gustav Radbruchs Rechtsbegriff -- Andreas Funke - Abschied von der Positivismus/Nicht-Positivismus-Schablone? Zugleich: hermeneutische Potentiale in der Rechtsphilosophie Gustav Radbruchs -- Carsten Bäcker - Legal Certainty or Justice. From Radbruch's Formula. Back to the Primacy of Legal Certainty -- Júlio Aguiar de Oliveira - Radbruch's Formula and Judicial Decision-Making -- Martin Borowski - Die Radbruchsche Formel und die Menschenrechte -- Jan-Reinard Sieckmann - Gustav Radbruch und Robert Alexy: Gemeinsamkeiten und Differenzen -- Julian Rivers - The Reception of Robert Alexy's Work in Anglo-American Jurisprudence -- Alejandro Nava Tovar - Contemporary German Non-Positivism. Robert Alexy and the Rehabilitation of Moral Correctness -- Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno - Der Begriff des extremen Unrechts und der subinklusive Nichtpositivismus -- Volker Haas - A Critical Appraisal of Robert Alexy's Non-Positivistic Concept of Law -- Ruben Hartwig - Die Sonderfallthese im System der Rechtsphilosophie Robert Alexys. 40 Jahre Theorie der juristischen Argumentation -- Po-Jung Su - Eine Kritik an Robert Alexys Begründung der positiven Menschenrechte. Das Erkenntnisproblem und das Demokratieargument -- Peter Koller - Rechtsgeltung, Normativität und Moral -- Kenneth Winston - The Ideal Element in Law Revisited -- Hubert Rottleuthner - Die Vermessung von Recht und Moral -- Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword - Is There Really Anything Wrong with an Absolute Principle? -- Autorenverzeichnis.

The object of this research is Immanuel Kant's philosophy of law, more specifically, the controversy over the nature of Kant's concept of law. Thus, the central concepts of Kant's moral philosophy, which are in connection with his idea of law, and, secondly, the most important aspects of Kant's thought regarding legal philosophy, are analyzed. It aims a definition of the most appropriate way to understand Kant's philosophy of law, whether it represents a radical positivism or a super-inclusive non-positivism.

This article contributes to a movement to interrogate the history and foundation of sociology. The current hegemonic narrative credits a few European men for establishing sociology as a mechanism for using science to understand social conditions amid the rise of industrialization and modern capitalism. This hegemonic story defines positivism as a central concern in the foundation of the discipline, justifying its continued dominance in U.S. sociology and using binary logic to position non-positivist approaches as subordinate and unscientific. In this article, we explore the ways early Black sociologists integrated positivist and non-positivist approaches in their work to arrive at truth and discuss ways that transcending binary distinctions facilitated rich developments in their understanding of social relations and institutions. We draw on existing scholarship to argue that privileging binary logic helped justify these scholars' marginalization in the sociological canon and conclude with recommendations to move the discipline beyond the positivism/non-positivism binary as an important mechanism for transformation. In so doing, we contribute to the growing body of scholarship aimed at correcting the history of sociology and reimagining the foundational works and epistemological approaches to foster liberation within the discipline.

(Originally published in John A. Hall & Ian C. Jarvie's [Eds], Transition to Modernity, 1992 [see abstract 93c01707].) Ernest Gellner's criticism of the Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy (Words and Things, a Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology [1959]) is buttressed by his defense of an empirical positivism built on the work of Immanuel Kant & Karl Popper. Gellner's sociological works can all be construed as philosophical works that endorse positivism. Gellner borrows from Paul Fayerabend the argument that science is not a content-free methodology, but a substantive moral commitment. Gellner thinks that such a commitment is unavoidable in modern society; his reasons for believing in this unavoidability are defended. Empiricism is argued to be highly plausible, & sociology to be adept at making sense of social practice. The difference between modern & premodern societies' worldviews is emphasized. The neutrality of scientific language continues its inexorable expansion. Positivism is not dependent on an other-worldly justification. The problem of a philosophy of experience is considered, & the Socratic method is offered as a solution. 11 References. H. von Rautenfeld

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION -- INTRODUCTION -- I. Philosophy and Its History -- II. Positivism in Mexican Circumstances -- III. The Positivism of Auguste Comte -- IV. Mexican Positivism -- SECTION ONE: THE BIRTH -- I. The Positivist Interpretation of Mexican History -- II. Historical Circumstances in Mexico, 1867 -- SECTION TWO: THE ORIGINS -- I. The Forces of Progress and Reaction -- II. Mexican Liberalism's Ideals of Education and Government -- III. The Ideology of the Mexican Bourgeoisie in Its Combative Phase -- SECTION THREE: THE DEVELOPMENT, "GABINO BARREDA" -- I. Gabino Barreda and the Problem of Freedom -- II. Barreda's Defense of the Interests of the Mexican Bourgeoisie -- III. Gabino Barreda's Plan of Education -- IV. Barreda's Defense of His Plan of Education -- SECTION FOUR: THE DEVELOPMENT, "THE DISCIPLES" -- I. The Positivists and the Construction of the New Order -- II. The Application of the Positivist Method -- III. The Theory of Some Positivists concerning the Social Order -- IV. The Creation of the Social Order -- SECTION FIVE: THE UTOPIA -- I. Freedom of Conscience and Positivism -- II. The Ideal of a New Positivist Spiritual Power -- III. The Struggle for Spiritual Power -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

'Judging Positivism' is a critical exploration of the method and substance of legal positivism. The book focuses primarily but not exclusively on the writings of prominent legal positivist Joseph Raz. Martin argues that Raz's theory has changed over time and that these changes have led to deep inconsistencies and incoherencies in his account

Post-positivism presents a materialist, holist, monist, cognitivist theory of law and justice. It argues that positivism and natural law are complementary, not conflicting, and that normative inference (is-to-ought) can be a valid form of logical reasoning. These are two key breaks from 20th Century legal theory, which wrongly assumed that normative inferencing was logically flawed and consequently that positivism and natural law were logically contradictory. David Hume never rejected normative inferencing. Hume's counsel was that whoever wishes to make a normative inference must express their implicit premises. Normative propositions can be recast as logical conditionals and thus be used as premises of syllogisms. Laws are best understood as logical conditionals (if-then statements). Logic consists of two branches, theoretical rationality and practical reasoning. The inadequacy of binary logic to accurately describe law is seen in several logical paradoxes about law, which can be avoided by multivariate logic. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Method: Ontology, Epistemology, Axiology -- 2. Legal Theory in Antiquity: Aristotle -- 3. Pre Modern Theory: Medieval Scholasticism and the Universals (1400-1600) -- 4. Into Modernity: Natural Law and Normative Inference -- Introduction: The Contemporary View - The False Dichotomy of Either Positivism or Natural Law but not Both - Normative Inferencing -- 5. Modernity: Social Contract and Natural Law -- Natural Rights - Social Contract Theory - Contemporary Social Contract Theorists - Libertarians - Criticisms of the Social Contract - Conclusion: Explaining the Success of the Theory of Social Contract Theory -- 6. Late Modernity: Legal Realism -- Introduction - The Judicial »Revolution« - Post War: Co-opting Radicalism to Serve Global Hegemony - Conclusion -- 7. Beyond legal Realism (1950-1980) -- Introduction: The

R.D. critique le positivisme juridique, spécialement dans la version de Hart. Selon cette théorie, le droit est un système de règles. Or, il comporte en réalité d'autres standards, notamment des principes. D'autre part, selon les positivistes, les juges doivent, en l'absence d'une règle applicable, trancher les litiges en usant de leur pouvoir discrétionnaire. En réalité, ils sont liés par les principes. R.D. examine alors de quelle manière les principes peuvent être et sont en fait appliqués.