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This paper compares a psychological explanation of support for a ban on headscarves in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands. This study examines how perceptions of threat posed by Muslims and Islam and the overall attitude towards Muslims explain support for a ban on headscarves. In addition, cross-national comparisons are made to study how these relations are affected by contextual differences. Analyses are based on the 2005 survey on Islamic extremism by the Pew Research Center. Results show that the countries have a large influence on whether someone supports the ban on headscarves, indicating that contextual differences matter. In addition, having a negative attitude towards Muslims makes it more likely to support a ban on headscarves. In general, perceived threat contributes to stronger support, although there are slight differences in effect between the countries. Finally, perceived threat equally influences support for the ban on headscarves among prejudiced and non-prejudiced people. Adapted from the source document.

There is an ongoing debate whether anti‐Muslim prejudice in Western countries is more widespread than prejudice towards other ethno‐cultural groups or general ethnic prejudice. Previous research used different methodologies and yielded contradictory results. In this article, we combine a population‐based split‐sample survey experiment (N = 1,323), where half of the respondents judged items about Muslims and the other half statements about strangers, with an open question probing which groups respondents thought of when thinking about "strangers." We furthermore extend previous research by not only focusing on general ethnic prejudice, but to differentiate between perceived trustworthiness, economic, cultural, and security threat. Our results strongly support the idea that the difference between the "chronic" and "contextual" salience of the target of prejudice should be taken into account.

What are the attitudes towards the European Union (EU), the United States, Russia and Japan among Chinese urban citizens, and how can we explain these attitudes? These are the intriguing questions that we want to answer in this article. The image, social identity, trust, and political socialization theories proposed the various explanatory variables. We assessed their explanatory powers by analysing survey data from more than 2000 Chinese urban citizens. Most empirical evidence is found for the image theory: positive perceptions of the people (trustworthy and peaceful) and the bilateral relationship (friendly) clearly contribute to positive attitudes.

What is the attitude of Chinese urban citizens towards the European Union? Are Chinese citizens optimistic about the future relationship between China and the European Union? How can we explain these attitudes? These are the key questions we want to answer in this contribution. The predictive model is based on the theories that have been successful in explaining attitudes towards out-groups in general: direct contact, knowledge, image, conflict perception, trust, social identity, and political socialization theory. We used data from the 2010 'Chinese Views of EU' research project (N = 2,410). Our findings indicate that a great majority of Chinese urban citizens have a positive attitude towards the EU and are optimistic about the future relationship between China and the EU. Regression analyses show most empirical evidence for the image theory; attitude towards the EU and optimism about the China-EU relationship correlate most with the images of the EU and EU citizens. Because personal experiences with EU countries or citizens are limited, attitudes and the images that underlie these attitudes must be mainly based on informative and affective messages from relevant others and mass media. The respondents indicate that television which in China is heavily controlled by political leaders - is their most important source of information about EU countries. Mediation analyses support this expectation, and show that the effect of mass media on attitudes and optimism is mediated by perceptions of the EU and EU citizens. Implications of our research for Chinese political elites and EU public diplomacy in China are discussed. Adapted from the source document.

Do Western anti‐Muslim attitudes reflect Islamophobia as a general, ethnoreligious prejudice that does not distinguish between persons and ideas, values, or behavior, or are they limited to issues perceived to be in conflict with Western liberal values? In two experiments, we measured discrimination as decreased willingness to help a Muslim versus non‐Muslim to undertake an action that was either neutral or possibly in conflict with Western liberal values. As opposed to general discrimination, the participants displayed conditional, anti‐Muslim discrimination: The two targets were treated equally when the cause was neutral, but there was less willingness to help the Muslim when the cause was conflicting (protesting against the headscarf ban and against gay rights). However, participants did demonstrate subtle discrimination by showing less willingness to help the protesting Muslim compared to the protesting non‐Muslim target. Individual differences moderated these effects with multiculturalism predicting conditional outgroup prosociality, ethnocentrism predicting global outgroup discrimination, and proatheism attitudes predicting both conditional outgroup prosociality and unprejudiced rejection of value‐conflicting behavior.

This survey experiment examined national majority group members' reactions to immigrants' citizenship status with a focus on dual citizenship. A sample of 779 participants ( nFinland = 174; nNetherlands = 377; nGermany = 228) was used to examine whether immigrants' citizenship status affects trust towards immigrants, willingness to accept immigrants in strategic positions, and support for immigrants' social influence in society. Perceived group loyalties were expected to mediate these relationships. Compared to national citizens, dual citizens were perceived as having lower national loyalty and higher foreign loyalty. Compared to foreign citizens, dual citizens were perceived to have higher national loyalty but equally high foreign loyalty. Higher national loyalty was further associated with higher trust, acceptance, and support, whereas higher foreign loyalty was associated with lower trust, acceptance, and support. These findings are discussed in relation to societal debates on dual citizenship and the limited social psychological research on this topic.