Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Humiliation, Collaboration, Resistance, Liberation: France, 1940 – 44 -- Chapter 3 The 'Anglo – Saxon' New World Order and the French riposte, 1940 – 1946 -- Chapter 4 Europe: Reconstruction and Integration, 1945 – 1952 -- Chapter 5 Unreliable Allies: Empire -- Chapter 6 Conclusion: De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons, 1958-1961.
Zugriffsoptionen:
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"Why is France so often neglected in the study of international relations? This book seeks to redress this balance, providing an in-depth insight into the relationship between the two Anglo-Saxon Powers, the United States (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK), and France from 1900 to the Fall of France in 1940. Drawing on a range of sources and archival material, Williams links the evolution of this complex relationship to the parallel evolution of the study and practice of international relations and suggests that the Anglo-Saxon bias within international relations has obscured the vital contribution made by France to our thinking about the subject. The differing reaction in France, the UK and the USA over the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq shows just how contemporary a topic this is, and its continued relevance to global politics"--
Abstract Many people assume that Franco-American relations since 1776 have been far more harmonious than those of the United States' relationship with Great Britain. After all, France fought on the side of the new aspiring republic in the American War of Independence against a colonial power. Although still a country ruled by a king, France itself became a republic shortly after the American Declaration of Independence was ratified. But in fact, France and the United States (and the colonies that preceded them) have often had poor relations. In his book Sister Republics: Security Relations between America and France, David Haglund asks why security relations between France and the United States been so fractious since the beginning of the American republic, and even well before it. He debunks the generally accepted mythology and its attendant symbology of two sister republics. The French-built and donated Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor and the statue of General Lafayette on the Seine opposite the Quai d'Orsay in Paris are misleading. In truth any special relationship between France and the United States has been special on the whole in its lack of mutual liking, even respect. Haglund traces this difficult, even suboptimal, relationship over three centuries and shows how the weight of history still continues to upset Franco-American relations regularly.
As is often the case when a concept gets a new lease of life in the newspapers there has been a resurrection of interest in recent times in the concept of 'reconstruction'. The current American administration has now undertaken not one but two major wars that have resulted in the need for reconstruction since 2001 when George W. Bush took up office in the White House. In the previous few years there were major reconstruction efforts undertaken in Bosnia (after the 1995 Dayton Accords) and in Kosovo (after the war of 1999), to name but the most obvious. Historians have to some extent taken up this cue and have been producing edited books and even full length monographs on the 'lessons' that we might learn from historical reconstruction efforts. There has also been a great use of conscious historical analogy by President George W. Bush. One classic example of the recent past by President Bush in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute elicited an indignant response from a number of historians in the Financial Times on the dangers of historical analogy.
