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AbstractThis paper empirically analyzes the origins of currency crises for a group ofOECDeconomies from 1970 through 1998. We apply duration analysis to examine how the probability of a currency crisis depends on the length of non‐crisis periods, contagion channels, and macroeconomic fundamentals. Our findings confirm the negativeduration dependenceof a currency crisis—the likelihood of speculative attack sharply increases at the beginning of non‐crisis periods and then declines over time until it abruptly rises again. The results also indicate the hazard of a crisis increase with high values of the volatility of unemployment rates, inflation rates, contagion factors—which mostly work through trade channels, unemployment rates, real effective exchange rate, trade openness, and size of economy. To address concerns regarding validity of the identified crisis episodes, we exploit crisis episodes that are identified by a more objective approach based on the extreme value theory. Our results are robust under various specifications including two different crisis event sets that are identified on monthly and quarterly basis.

Abstract
This paper examines the role of partisanship at the provincial and federal levels in relation to the functioning of the Canadian economy. At the provincial level (1976–2019), we find no evidence of a traditional partisan effect but do find evidence weakly consistent with a rational partisan cycle a′ la Alesina. At the federal level (1870–2020), we also find no evidence consistent with a distinctive expansion in output arising when the government is controlled by the left-leaning (Liberal) political party although we again find evidence of a weak rational partisan effect. The former result is reinforced by finding the absence of evidence of partisan changes in federal spending and/or taxation. But while the data do not support a theory of left-right partisan policy over the entire post-Confederation (1867) period of Canada's history, the data do support distinctive periods of partisan influence on aggregate output. The first is consistent with Sir John A. MacDonald's post-Confederation conservative government's adoption of a policy of nation-building based on the railway, immigration, and tariffs. The second is the period between 1885 and 1933 where traditional left-right partisanship is evident and the third is the period following the Great Depression where a distinction between the outcomes arising under left- versus right-leaning parties is no longer apparent.

Two margins of political party life in Canada since Confederation (1867) are analyzed—the extensive margin involving entry and exit (together with party turnover or churning) and the intensive margin determining survival length. The results confirm many hypotheses advanced to explain entry and exit—the importance of social and religious cleavage, election institutions, and economic circumstance. More novel are the findings that public election funding and periods with larger immigration flows have reinforced established parties at the expense of entrants and smaller sized parties. The intensive margin uses a discrete hazard model with discrete finite mixtures to confirm the Duverger-type presence of two distinct long-lived political parties surrounded by a fringe of smaller parties. Both parametric and semi-parametric models concur in finding that public funding and higher immigration flows are as successful in extending the life of established parties as in discouraging entry and exit.

AbstractThe objectives of this study are twofold: first, we assess what factors "anchors" are keeping immigrants in their current place of residence, and what variables drive immigrants to move out of their community. Second, we also look at how the effects of these factors on migration differ by whether or not immigrants are living in ethnic enclaves and by the macro-level economic environment. We find that the conventional "anchors" of mobility are less powerful for immigrants living in co-ethnic regions. Results also show that under depressed economic conditions, migration decisions are largely driven by economic factors, and that socio-demographic factors like marital status are less consequential. Conversely, when general economic conditions are better for immigrants, marital status will weigh more heavily on migration decisions.

This paper examines the empirical regularity that in Canada business cycle peaks and federal elections have tended to arise together over the long post-Confederation time period following 1867. We argue that rather than being simultaneous, the two events are related sequentially and that causality can be identified properly if the selection issue associated with observed events is addressed carefully. Our results suggest that business cycle peaks lead federal elections rather than the other way around. Such a finding reinforces the hypothesis of strategic election timing for such countries and is insightful in helping to explain why the presence of a political business cycle is harder to establish for parliamentary governments where the date of the next election is under the control of the incumbent governing party than in democratic systems where governing durations and election dates are fixed. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

Abstract This paper asks whether Canadian data is consistent with the predicted effects of political opportunism, partisanship, and political competition on real output growth since Confederation. Using annual data from 1870 to 2005 we find new support for an opportunistic electoral cycle in Canadian data but only if the actual election date used in most studies is replaced by an estimate of the incumbent governing party's subjectively held likelihood of an election arising. In our case the estimate is generated from a Cox‐proportional hazard model. The paper explores in detail the issues raised by using a generated regressor to approximate a subjectively held expectation versus an observable proxy and argues that these conditions are met in our case. Finally we also find evidence consistent with partisan cycles in the data but much less evidence consistent with the hypothesis that changes in the degree of political competition have affected real output growth.

Abstract.In this paper we examine the length of political tenure in Canadian federally elected parliamentary governments since 1867. Using annual data on tenure length, we categorize the distribution of governing tenures in terms of a hazard function: the probability that an election will arise in each year, given that an election has not yet been called. Structuring the election call as an optimal stopping rule, we test whether that distribution responds predictably to characteristics of the political and/or economic environment. The results of using the continuous Cox and Gompertz models together with the discrete semi-parametric proportional hazard model suggest that governing parties in Canada do engage in election timing and that the only economic policy measure that is used consistently in conjunction with election timing is fiscal expenditure.Résumé.Dans cet ouvrage, nous examinons la durée d'un régime parlementaire canadien depuis la Confédération de 1867. Nous utilisons des données annuelles et nous représentons la distribution de durée de vie d'un gouvernement par une fonction de hazard, c'est-a-dire, la probabilité qu'une élection soit déclenchée durant une année spécifique étant donné qu'elle ne l'a pas encore été jusqu'à présent. Nous modélisons un déclenchement d'élection par une règle d'arrêt optimal el nous testons si la distribution dépend des caractéristiques de l'environnement politique et économique tel que prédit selon la théorie. Nous résultats basés les modèles de hazard proportionnel continu de type Cox et Gompertz et discret semi-paramétrique révèlent que les partis fédéraux au pouvoir au Canada choisissent le moment opportun pour déclencher une élection. De plus, les dépenses fiscales sont la seule variable de politique économique qui y soit systématiquement relié.