Suchergebnisse

"This book explores the work of the European Ombudsman and her or his contribution to holding the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to account, through examination of complaints on maladministration, own-initiative inquiries and other proactive efforts. It considers the Ombudsman's current institutional and constitutional position and her or his 'method' of dealing with complaints, and unravels the depth of subject matters that fall under the Ombudsman's remit. A separate chapter focuses on transparency and access to documents. The last part of the book critically reflects upon the present mandate and practice of the Ombudsman, and discusses a number of possible proposals for improvement. This work has interdisciplinary appeal and will engage scholars in law, political science and public administration, as well as EU and national policy-makers."--

This book explores the work of the European Ombudsman and her or his contribution to holding the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to account, through examination of complaints on maladministration, own-initiative inquiries and other proactive efforts. It considers the Ombudsman's current institutional and constitutional position and her or his 'method' of dealing with complaints, and unravels the depth of subject matters that fall under the Ombudsman's remit. A separate chapter focuses on transparency and access to documents. The last part of the book critically reflects upon the present mandate and practice of the Ombudsman, and discusses a number of possible proposals for improvement. This work has interdisciplinary appeal and will engage scholars in law, political science and public administration, as well as EU and national policy-makers.

This article critically evaluates the right to petition the European Parliament, a right which has not managed, to date, to constitute a credible alternative for citizens' participation in the EU. It argues that there are two main reasons for the shortcomings of this right. First, before Maastricht, the Petitions' Committee suffered the consequences of a broader decline of parliamentary petitions within and beyond Europe. Second, after Maastricht and Lisbon, the petition right was affected by the (partly complementary and partly divergent) rights to complain to the European Ombudsman and to sign or support a European citizens' initiative. In addition, and possibly as a consequence of the above reasons, throughout its life, the petition right and the Committee on Petitions more generally have not benefited from significant resources, while their visibility has been very limited. A comparative examination of the three rights (petitions, European Ombudsman, citizens' initiative) in terms of access, scope, user-friendliness and outcome is undertaken. Looking at the future of the petition right, in an era marked by the resurgence of online petitions, the article argues that the Petitions' Committee should strategically focus on areas which are not covered by the two aforementioned rights, namely the national level and broader policy choices in the EU, in order to maximize its input and relevancy within the EU's decision-making world.

Abstract
This article explores how the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the right to interpretation under Article 6(3)(e) ECHR—a topic which, despite its significance for the rule of law and access to justice, has received, to date, very limited scholarly attention. The key finding is that we are witnessing a 'cautious evolution': the Court has progressively—yet simultaneously cautiously—developed the standards and guarantees of this right, which is one of the rights of defence under Article 6(3) ECHR and a requirement of the fair trial. The analysis focuses, in particular, on (i) how general interpretative techniques that have been developed by the Strasbourg Court were applied by the Court in its jurisprudence concerning the said provision; (ii) on the interplay between the overall fairness of the trial and Article 6(3)(e) ECHR; and (iii) on Article 6(3)(e) ECHR and the relationship between legal assistance/legal aid and the right to interpretation. In addition, the article identifies possible areas of further development of this right.

Abstract
This article critically evaluates the right to petition the European Parliament, a right which has not managed, to date, to constitute a credible alternative for citizens' participation in the EU. It argues that there are two main reasons for the shortcomings of this right. First, before Maastricht, the Petitions' Committee suffered the consequences of a broader decline of parliamentary petitions within and beyond Europe. Second, after Maastricht and Lisbon, the petition right was affected by the (partly complementary and partly divergent) rights to complain to the European Ombudsman and to sign or support a European citizens' initiative. In addition, and possibly as a consequence of the above reasons, throughout its life, the petition right and the Committee on Petitions more generally have not benefited from significant resources, while their visibility has been very limited. A comparative examination of the three rights (petitions, European Ombudsman, citizens' initiative) in terms of access, scope, user-friendliness and outcome is undertaken. Looking at the future of the petition right, in an era marked by the resurgence of online petitions, the article argues that the Petitions' Committee should strategically focus on areas which are not covered by the two aforementioned rights, namely the national level and broader policy choices in the EU, in order to maximize its input and relevancy within the EU's decision-making world.

This article considers the independence of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) from a formal, legal perspective. It argues that the primary constitutional justification behind such independence is the ECA's need to act on behalf of and defend the EU interest. The paper discusses several dimensions of independence, including the appointment process, the number of ECA Members, and independence in the ECA's functions (both from the Member States and the EU institutions). Proposals for amendment of the existing legal framework are also explored, the most important being to put the European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council in the appointment process. Underlining that independence should not be conflated with inaccessibility, the ECA is invited to further improve its communication policy and disseminate its findings in a more effective way.

AbstractThe purpose of this contribution is to provide a critical overview of issues of principle related to the 'significant disadvantage' admissibility criterion under 35(3)(b) ECHR, in light of the ongoing debate on the Court's reform. It argues that the admissibility criterion: undermines direct access to justice at the international level; affects the right of individual petition to the Strasbourg Court; constitutes a misunderstanding of the subsidiarity principle within the Convention machinery; urges the Court to consider the merits during the admissibility stage in a sensitive area of adjudication such as human rights; and entails the risk of an indirect classification of rights on the basis of the financial damage suffered by the applicant. The article links these points with the discussion on the Court's reform and considers alternative proposals to reduce its workload. It concludes by underlining that the 'significant disadvantage' criterion could be a suitable opportunity to address questions related to the Court's legitimacy, including the ECtHR's precise role and function within the Convention.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the communication strategy of the European Ombudsman (EO), focusing on the evolution of the Annual Reports (ARs) of the office from 1995 to 2010. The EO was created to bridge the gap between citizens and the EU Institutions; therefore the EO office may be seen, inter alia, as a vehicle of European communication per se. The ARs are the Ombudsman's main instrument of political pressure and an opportunity to communicate the outcomes of the preceding year to a broad audience. It is shown that the ARs have improved significantly in terms of layout and structure, while the EO now uses a dynamic logo and website. The various communicative activities presented in the ARs are proof of the EO's efforts to improve the office's public image, thereby strengthening the Ombudsman's so-called 'moral authority' in the context of a rather limited mandate. In terms of the legal and political messages of the ARs, the article focuses particularly on the evolution of the notion of maladministration, inter-institutional relations and the creation of a European Network of Ombudsmen. Another section addresses the similarities and differences of the two office-holders of the period under examination regarding their perception of the mandate. The article generally assesses the EO's efforts in the communication field positively. However, from a communication-policy perspective, it is doubtful that the EO could respond to the possible preference of some citizens to contact him/her on issues which concern a national entity implementing EU law when such matters are excluded from the EO's jurisdictional ambit.

This article proceeds to a normative claim that the potential of the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) – an instrument expected to increase democratic legitimacy in the EU – should be evaluated in the light of the post-Lisbon Community method and not as an additional 'opportunity structure for citizens' participation'. The first section explains why the Community method is primarily a mechanism of 'output legitimacy', even after the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the legal framework of the ECI (notably the Regulation 211/2011 but also the Commission's Green Paper preceding the adoption of the Regulation) is provided. The evaluation section concludes that the ECI's legislative framework, far from an instrument of direct democracy, perhaps an additional 'opportunity structure', cannot affect the Community method nor seriously increase democratic legitimacy at the EU level due to the – simultaneous – presence of two thresholds: the intactness of the Commission's legislative monopoly and the burdensome formalities imposed upon citizens and organisers.

This Special Issue aims at interrogating the judicial and extra-judicial challenges that arise from the EU complex administrative framework, which can be characterized as both multi-level—arising from the vertical cooperation between EU and national authorities—and cross-level—arising from horizontal cooperation between national authorities themselves. It starts from the premise that there may be decisions affecting natural and legal persons which cannot be easily reviewed judicially, whereas in extra-judicial cooperation, the lack of common standards or practices across Member States may undermine the effectiveness of EU policies and objectives. This Special Issue focuses on various mechanisms of horizontal and vertical cooperation, such as regulatory patterns giving rise to transnational administrative acts and mutual recognition systems, case studies of composite procedures in the field of the genetically modified organisms regime and information sharing in asylum policy, as well as multi-level inspection activities for the enforcement of EU law. It further complements the analysis on the judicial challenges arising from those cooperative structures with an examination of extra-judicial avenues of control in the EU administrative framework, namely the "EU queries" process and the cooperation of ombud offices, as well as the audit of the EU budget. This Special Issue reflects on ways to overcome the current challenges of, and seeks to prompt further research on, the multi-layered EU system of administrative cooperation.