Abstract The Constitutional Court declared in its ruling 22/2016 (XII 5) that by exercising its competences, it can examine whether the joint exercise of competences under Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary infringes human dignity, other fundamental rights, the sovereignty of Hungary, or Hungary's self-identity based on its historical constitution.
Abstract This paper argues that what has happened with and led to the 4th amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary adopted in 2013 (and to the 5th amendment of the same year) is a reasonable and simple consequence of the technique of the political power that has been exercised in Hungary since 2010 in the course of amending the former Constitution and of the preparation and adoption of the new one. In order to understand why the change is so drastic and radical, it is inevitable to assess constitutional politics between 1989 and 2010 from a perspective of the constitution-changing and -making powers and the methods and techniques employed. The outcomes of constitutional politics between 1989 and 2010 gave rise to political criticism and the developments related to the Constitution (Act XX of 1949) were also surrounded by evident dissatisfaction. Yet, what has been happening since 2010 is far more problematic in the light of constitutionalism and democratic values.
In the paper the new Hungarian constitutional regulation and related statutes on the right to conscience and religion and establishment of churches are examined and compared to the previous regulatory framework. The comparism seems necessary as in 2011 the Hungarian Parliament adopted a new Fundamental Law and new statute on these fundamental rights. Due to the changed constitutional framerwork concerning the establishment of churches, it seems possible that in Hungary there may be a serious deficit in promoting human rights. ; El objeto del trabajo consiste en comparar la nueva regulación del derecho a la libertad religiosa en Hungría con la que existía antes. Los autores del artículo sugieren que los cambios referentes a la libertad de culto pueden suponer un atentado a la dimensión promocional de los derechos fundamentales.
The argumentation in this paper is based on the proposition that constitutions play a key role in defining the approach to women's social status, not just by determining ordinary legislation and public policy, but also through constitutional review. The focus is on Hungary, a country that is not famous in Europe for a high level of equality between men and women, surrounded by a (liberal) international political discourse which asserts a backlash and claims that women's equal rights are being curtailed even more during the era of Orbán's illiberal government. Against this discursive backdrop, the paper highlights a counterintuitive phenomenon: since the democratic transition (1989–1990) all the key constitutional disputes related to equality between the sexes have been initiated by men claiming instances of discrimination against men, as if women were too privileged in Hungary. A relevant contextual feature is that while equal legal standing for the sexes is guaranteed (due partly to the heritage of state socialism, then to efforts related to EU integration), affirmative measures for women are also constitutionally ensured. The Constitutional Court has deployed surprisingly poor-quality reasoning in these disputes, suggesting that it never considered equality between the sexes to be an important issue. This leads us to claim that certain persistent features have characterized this field since the 1990s, not the dynamics of reversal since the 2010s. With our empirical findings, we aim to contribute to the academic discourse in a way that challenges the backlash narrative regarding developments in Hungary from a specific perspective.
Constitutional identity, as enshrined in Article 4(2) TEU might theoretically open up the possibility for EU Member States to refuse fulfilling certain obligations under EU law by referencing certain, as if yet not clearly defined elements of constitutional identity. Member States' constitutional identity, which is to be respected by the EU does not appear in positive law. Having regard to multilevel constitutionalism, it may be assumed that national constitutional identity will be elaborated in dialogues between national (constitutional) courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Based on previous practice however, the national and European interpretations of identity differ significantly. To achieve necessary convergence, the Court of Justice and national courts must cooperate in interpreting the concept of constitutional identity. This raises the necessity of examining whether the procedural prerequisites of this cooperation are given in national and EU public law. The questions to be examined are 1) whether the preliminary ruling procedure has already been used in identity-related cases, 2) what the position of constitutional courts/supreme courts (courts engaged in constitutional interpretation) is regarding the preliminary ruling procedure and 3) whether this may be considered the appropriate procedure when applying Article 4(2) TEU or would it require modification?
In 2015, the Croatian Constitutional Court suspended the Family Act (2014) without a final decision in the judicial review proceedings and ordered the reenactment of a more than ten-year old regulation Family Act (2003). The article considers Croatian Constitutional Court's decision as an opportunity to examine the conditions for a re-enactment of formerly repealed law, and additionally the temporal effects of judgments of some European constitutional courts from a comparative law perspective. Thus, the article first deals with the (historical) legal situation in Austria and Germany and the criteria that would generally justify the re-enactment of former law in their legal systems. Finally, the development of these countries' legal systems has been reconsidered in the Croatian context. ; Godine 2015. Ustavni sud RH suspendirao je Obiteljski zakon (2014) i naložio primjenu prethodnog Obiteljskog zakona (2003), starog više od deset godina, a da nije proveo postupak i donio odluku o neustavnosti suspendiranog Zakona. Potaknuti ovom odlukom hrvatskog Ustavnog suda, u radu se komparativno ispituju uvjeti za vraćanje na snagu prijašnjeg propisa stavljenog izvan snage, kao i vremensko djelovanje odluka odabranih europskih ustavnih sudova. Stoga ovaj rad pruža priliku čitatelju da se upozna s praksom austrijskog i njemačkog ustavnog suda, kao i uvjetima na temelju kojih je moguće vratiti na snagu prijašnji propis u njihove pravne sustave, ukazujući na pravnopovijesne razloge postojanja ovakvog rješenja. Zaključno se u radu austrijski i njemački sustav razmatraju u aktualnom hrvatskom kontekstu.
Godine 2015. Ustavni sud RH suspendirao je Obiteljski zakon (2014) i naložio primjenu prethodnog Obiteljskog zakona (2003), starog više od deset godina, a da nije proveo postupak i donio odluku o neustavnosti suspendiranog Zakona. Potaknuti ovom odlukom hrvatskog Ustavnog suda, u radu se komparativno ispituju uvjeti za vraćanje na snagu prijašnjeg propisa stavljenog izvan snage, kao i vremensko djelovanje odluka odabranih europskih ustavnih sudova. Stoga ovaj rad pruža priliku čitatelju da se upozna s praksom austrijskog i njemačkog ustavnog suda, kao i uvjetima na temelju kojih je moguće vratiti na snagu prijašnji propis u njihove pravne sustave, ukazujući na pravnopovijesne razloge postojanja ovakvog rješenja. Zaključno se u radu austrijski i njemački sustav razmatraju u aktualnom hrvatskom kontekstu. ; In 2015, the Croatian Constitutional Court suspended the Family Act (2014) without a final decision in the judicial review proceedings and ordered the re-enactment of a more than ten-year old regulation Family Act (2003). The article considers Croatian Constitutional Court's decision as an opportunity to examine the conditions for a re-enactment of formerly repealed law, and additionally the temporal effects of judgments of some European constitutional courts from a comparative law perspective. Thus, the article first deals with the (historical) legal situation in Austria and Germany and the criteria that would generally justify the re-enactment of former law in their legal systems. Finally, the development of these countries' legal systems has been reconsidered in the Croatian context.
"The book begins from the general presumption that the Rule of Law, since its emergence, has been a universal European value, a political ideal and legal conception. It also acknowledges that the EU has been struggling in the area of value enforcement, even if the necessary mechanisms are available and, given an innovative outlook and more political commitment, could be successfully used. The authors appreciate the different approaches toward the Rule of Law, both as a concept and as a measurable indicator, and while addressing the core question of the volume, widely rely on them. Ultimately, the book provides a snapshot of how the Rule of Law ideal has been dismantled and offers a theory of the Rule of Law in illiberal constitutionalism. It discusses why voters keep illiberal populist leaders in power when they are undeniably acting contrary to the Rule of Law ideal"--
Abstract Although it is almost common sense in Brazil that far-right leaders typically deploy impolite language as part of their rhetoric, the issue is still understudied and lacks empirical evidence. We explore the trendiest hashtags and their accompanying posts used as replies to the Brazilian Supreme Court's official Twitter/X account between October 2021 and October 2022, which covers a year before the 2022 presidential election. After analyzing 414,652 posts, our results showed that shameless impolite language was deployed in 94.9% of the hashtags. The data confirms that online verbal attacks on the judiciary were a common posting practice on Twitter/X. The strategy's main element has been combining impolite language with lies and manipulation to defame perceived opponents and attract followers.
