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Working paper
In: Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions, Jennifer Gandhi and Rubén Ruiz-Rufino, eds., April 2015
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In: British Journal of Political Science, Forthcoming
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In: APSA Comparative Democratization Newsletter (June 2013).
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In: Political Economist (Winter 2011): 7-9.
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In: American political science review, Band 102, Heft 2, S. 153-168
ISSN: 1537-5943
I present a new empirical approach to the study of democratic consolidation. This approach leads to new insights into the determinants of democratic consolidation that cannot be obtained with existing techniques. I distinguish between democracies that survive because they areconsolidatedand those democracies that arenot consolidatedbut survive because of some favorable circumstances. As a result, I can identify the determinants of two related yet distinct processes: the likelihood that a democracy consolidates, and the timing of authoritarian reversals in democracies that are not consolidated. I find that the level of economic development, type of democratic executive, and type of authoritarian past determine whether a democracy consolidates, but have no effect on the timing of reversals in democracies that are not consolidated. That risk is only associated with economic recessions. I also find that existing studies greatly underestimate the risk of early reversals while simultaneously overestimating the risk of late reversals, and that a large number of existing democracies are in fact consolidated.
In: American political science review, Band 102, Heft 2, S. 153-168
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
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In: American journal of political science, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 909-925
ISSN: 1540-5907
This article characterizes how incentives to lie affect international cooperation and the design of cooperation agreements. I study the optimal structure of cooperation agreements in an environment where the costs of cooperation fluctuate over time. Cooperation is complicated by the fact that the costs of cooperation are private information and participants can benefit from lying about them. When the extent of asymmetries of information between the cooperating governments can be measured in terms of the transparency of the political process, democracies face greater contracting opportunities than authoritarian regimes. However, this article shows that even under asymmetries of information, a limited extent of cooperation can be achieved when the design of cooperation agreements recognizes incentives to lie.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 909-925
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Cambridge studies in comparative politics
"What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule -- the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule -- the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008"--