Suchergebnisse

This dissertation studies traditional and popular music of the Wixárika (a.k.a. Huichol) people of western Mexico, focusing especially on the phenomenon of Wixárika musicians who intentionally represent themselves as indigenous "Huichol" people yet perform popular Mexican music primarily for non-indigenous audiences. This phenomenon markets ethnic identity within regional and transnational music industries, following in the footsteps of Wixárika people who have successfully inserted their arts and crafts into global markets. The process of becoming indigenous cosmopolitan capitalists is partly the result of direct assimilatory projects directed by early Mexican anthropologists and the indirect outcome of over a century of Huichol identity construction for consumption, aided greatly by foreign ethnographers and other outsiders. On one hand, the commodification of identity through handicrafts, art, and music generates income for the Wixárika people, and the resultant visibility—sometimes international in scale—may strengthen them politically as Indigenous people. Conversely, the process simultaneously supplants some of the very elements they consider central to Wixárika culture. Musicians often leave their homelands to pursue their craft, making it difficult or impossible to participate in community affairs and ceremonies, and leaving their children bereft of Wixárika language and "customs." Such people who represent the "customs" but do not practice them are sometimes disparaged as "half disqualified" or "Huichol de pirata" (pirated Huichol), illuminating identity's commodity form. As the first English-language study of Wixárika music, this dissertation examines the paradox of identity commodification, developing a tripartite model of identity that shows the vital (albeit sometimes inadvertent) role of ethnography in defining the essence of the commodity form of Huichol identity.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Chapter I. Of the Manner of providing for the Poor previous to the Statute 43 Eliz. c. 2. -- Chapter II. Of the Divisions by which the Poor are to be maintained. -- Part II. Of appointing Overseers, and their Duties. -- Of The Poor's Rate. -- Chapter III. Of making, allowing, and publishing the Rate. -- Chapter IV. Of the Time for which the Rate is to he made. -- Chapter V. Of the general Purposes to which the Rate is to be applied. -- Chapter VI. Of Persons and Property to be rated. -- Sect. I. Of rating Land, Houses, and Profits annexed thereto. -- Sect. II. Incorporeal Hereditaments per fe. -- Sect. III. Titbes. -- Sect. IV. Coal Mines. -- Sect. V. Saleable Underwoods. -- Chapter VII. Of real Property exempted by particular Statutes. -- Chapter VIII. Of the Ratcability of Personal Property. -- Chapter IX. Of the Profit necessary. -- Sect. I. Of the Profit necessary. -- Sect. II. Of the Occupation necessary. -- Chapter X. Of Rating double. -- Chapter XI. Property, in what Place rateable. -- Chapter XII. Of the Principles upon, and Proportions in which the Rate is to be made. -- Chapter XIII. Of rating Parishes in Aid. -- Chapter XIV. Of levying and distraining for the Poor's Rate. -- Chapter XV. Of ascertaining what Poor the the Parish are bound to maintain. -- Chapter XVI. Of the several Kinds of Settlements, and General Rules which govern them. -- Chapter XVII. -- Sect. I. Of the Settlement by Marriage. -- Sect. II. Of the Proofs necessary to establish a Settlement by Marriage. -- Chapter XVIII. Of the Settlement of Legitimate Children by Birth. -- Chapter XIX. Of the Settlement of Illegitimate Children by Birth. -- Sect. I. Of the Settlement -- Sect. II. Of the Proofs.

List of Illustrations; Acknowledgments Introduction Chapter 1. Franco-German Relations, 18981914: A Sketch; Chapter 2. Hereditary Enemies? The Once and Future War; Chapter 3. Production and Reproduction: Economy, Fertility, and Consumption; Chapter 4. The Elusive Alsatian; Chapter 5. Shades of Opinion: The Political Spectrum Conclusion Bibliography; Index

International investment by State-controlled entities (SCEs) is on the rise. State-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially from Europe, have long been active players in the world FDI market. They have been joined, in the past few years, by a wide range of SOEs and sovereign wealth funds from emerging markets, including from China, Russia, and Singapore. Parallel to the rise of international investment, investors have become more assertive in pursuing their rights under international investment agreements. The result has been a rise in treaty-based international investment disputes. It can be expected that the number of international arbitrations initiated by SCEs, while currently limited, will likely grow in coming years as well. This, in turn, leads to the question as to what specific issues may arise in international arbitrations if a claimant is a State or a State-controlled entity. On March 19, 2010, CCSI hosted a Roundtable on States and State-Controlled Entities as Claimants in International Investment Arbitration. The Roundtable reviewed cases brought in the past by SCEs and the issues that were discussed in their context, and it looked at the experience gained in commercial arbitrations as regards SCEs. From there, the Roundtable moved on to a number of specific issues that appear to be most relevant in the context of SCEs as claimants, namely issues related to the initiation of claims, forum selection, parallel proceedings, counterclaims, and third-party financing. Understanding the new environment in which SCEs may operate as parties to international arbitrations, as well as the principal issues relating to disputes involving them, becomes an increasingly important matter for anyone interested in international investment law and arbitration.

While most working people are in employment, there is little realisation that this relationship is inefficient and inequitable due to mis-aligned incentives – employers, as residual claimants, have an incentive to elicit greater than socially optimal effort from workers, thus generating conflict and exploitation, while workers have no 'voice' and 'exit' is costly. Workplace democracy combines efficiency and equity, aligning incentives and giving workers their natural right of self-determination, but is relatively rare due to the historically constructed power of concentrated capital owners. We show how workplace democracy can be established without expropriating capital owners, yielding efficiency and welfare gains.

Modern economies deprive workers of natural democratic rights and any share of the surplus they produce, with most of the benefits of growth appropriated by capital owners. Worker wellbeing and job satisfaction are ignored unless they contribute directly to profitability, while precarious employment and underemployment, with stagnant or declining real wages, have persisted over four decades, despite recent low official unemployment. For economic democracy and social justice, we propose redistributive tax and welfare reform, extended codetermination, subsidised profit sharing and employee buyouts.