Suchergebnisse

The concept of organised crime' is constructed and mobilised by a milieu of complex factors and discourses including a politics of law and order, and international insecurity, combined with the vested interests and priorities of scholars, politicians, government officials, and policing authorities. This book challenges existing assumptions and accepted understandings of organised crime, and explores the ways in which it is amplified and reconstructed for political purposes. This book critiques how the constitution of the organised crime problem' in academic and political discourse provides the conditions necessary for the development of an extensive and international architecture of law, policing, surveillance and intelligence. It examines emerging challenges and future directions including the impact of technology on new problems, and for transnational policing, such as the ease with which the Internet enables crime to be committed across borders, and for electronic communications to be protected with strong encryption hampering interception. No other text presents an integrated and comprehensive study of both the politicisation and policing of organised crime, while questioning the outcomes for society at large. Drawing on international fieldwork and interviews with senior national and supranational policing personnel, this book compares and contrasts various narratives on organised crime. It will be of interest to students and researchers engaged in studies of criminology, criminal justice, organised crime, policing, and law.

This article presents a detailed case study of "RoboDebt" in Australia and examines the political rationalities that underpin automated welfare surveillance systems. First, it is argued that neoliberal political rationalities shape the bureaucratic strategies enacted by agencies established to administer neoliberal welfare policy. Second, it is shown that neoliberal political rationalities influence the design and deployment of new surveillance technologies, and therefore they are embedded with and within politics too. Third, it is argued that the political architecture of the welfare state and associated use of information communication technologies has consequences for social justice. This article demonstrates that information communication technologies are implicated in the neoliberal governance of poverty but are not responsible for it. The article concludes by reflecting on the relevance of critical qualitative inquiry as one possible political intervention to advance social (and data) justice agendas.

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The rise of digital information communication technology has major implications for how states wield coercive power beyond their territorial borders through the extraterritorial geographies of data flows. In examining the geopolitics of data, transnational surveillance, and jurisdiction, this collection makes a significant contribution to the field of global internet governance. It shows how the internet is a forum for geopolitical struggle with states weaponising jurisdiction and exerting power beyond their own borders directly, and via infrastructures owned and operated by transnational technology companies. These dynamics challenge existing conceptual and theoretical categories of contemporary law across the fields of international relations, criminology, and digital media, and raise urgent questions about if and how individual rights can be protected in an era of ubiquitous transnational surveillance conducted by private companies and governments alike.

1. Foundations of biometric identification -- 2. Fingerprint biometrics 3. DNA identification 4. Facial recognition -- 5. New and developing forms of biometric identification -- 6. Biometrics in criminal trials -- 7. Biometrics in criminal appeals and post-conviction reviews.

In this article, we examine the rise of contact-tracing apps during the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic as a new form of technological solutionism – a technological or techno-social fix that can be deployed at national scale in response to an urgent, supranational problem. A dystopian view saw the rapid development and proliferation of COVID-19 contact-tracing apps as a vanguard technology for surveillance. Expediently deployed as a technological fix to the pandemic, contact-tracing was seen to threaten to transform a state of emergency into a state of exception, under which accepted or constitutional laws and norms might be suspended. Here, we extend early critiques of the contact-tracing app as a 'technofix' to argue the growing intervention of global technology corporations in digital governance and affairs of national sovereignty throughout the COVID-19 pandemic represents a new frontier of state–industrial surveillance that exploits people's pre-investment in and dependence on technology corporations. We exemplify this with the 'technofix' of the Google–Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN) framework and critically examine the notion of a decentralised and privacy-preserving Bluetooth-based contact-tracing framework proposed by global technology corporations that may threaten state sovereignty when determining public health responses to current or future crises.

AbstractThe expansive growth of consumer internet of things (IoT) has created a range of concerns around privacy, security, and their broader societal impacts. This article reports on findings from interviews with 32 key stakeholders from the fields of information security, policy and regulation, the IoT industry, consumer and privacy law, and academia in Australia. It details a broad variety of issues and concerns that go beyond the well‐recognised issue of privacy or the technical standards of information security, to encompass a wider set of issues regarding the implications for vulnerable communities, the environment and industrial standards of IoT production. Most key stakeholders expressed the view that more robust regulation is required in Australia, but no clear regulatory priority or strategy was identified by our sample. The implications of these findings for further regulation of consumer IoT and future regulatory strategies are considered.

This article examines developments regarding encryption law and policy within 'Five Eyes' (FVEY) countries by focussing on the recently enacted Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Cth) in Australia. The legislation is significant both domestically and internationally because of its extraterritorial reach, allowing the development of new ways for Australian law enforcement and security agencies to access encrypted telecommunications via transnational designated communications providers, and allowing for Australian authorities to assist foreign counterparts in both enforcing and potentially circumventing their domestic laws. We argue that Australia is the 'weak link' in the FVEY alliance as - unlike other FVEY members - has no comprehensive enforceable human rights protections. Given this, there is a possibility for regulatory arbitrage in exploiting these new surveillance powers to undermine encryption via Australia.

This article examines developments regarding encryption law and policy within 'Five Eyes' (FVEY) countries by focussing on the recently enacted Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Cth) in Australia. The legislation is significant both domestically and internationally because of its extraterritorial reach, allowing the development of new ways for Australian law enforcement and security agencies to access encrypted telecommunications via transnational designated communications providers, and allowing for Australian authorities to assist foreign counterparts in both enforcing and potentially circumventing their domestic laws. We argue that Australia is the 'weak link' in the FVEY alliance as - unlike other FVEY members - has no comprehensive enforceable human rights protections. Given this, there is a possibility for regulatory arbitrage in exploiting these new surveillance powers to undermine encryption via Australia.