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This paper proposes and argues for sensemaking practices as fundamentally decentred. Sensemaking has been, at least since the late 1980s, an enduring subject for organisation studies researchers, and much longer for organisational practitioners. This research tradition has, however, tended to have a particular understanding of temporality (as divisible), tended to be centred on the human sense-makers, and privileged as more valid that which can be made present, through deliberative sensemaking practices, at the expense of that which is absent, and perhaps ineffable. In short, by locating sensemaking in the deliberative sensemaking practices of humans other significant constitutive conditions of sensemaking became obscured from view. The main thrust of the paper is to develop a notion of sensemaking that is decentred – not simply at the disposal of human subjects – and where sense is always and already given and made simultaneously. That is, where every human attempt at framing is itself already enframed, significantly. We show how this reimagining of sensemaking, as decentred, has the potential to open up new avenues of research in sensemaking practices – avenues that are more sensitive to temporal flow, the more-than-human, immanence, and the precarity of such practices. This shift is significant theoretically but also practically.

Algorithms, or rather algorithmic actions, are seen as problematic because they are inscrutable, automatic, and subsumed in the flow of daily practices. Yet, they are also seen to be playing an important role in organizing opportunities, enacting certain categories, and doing what David Lyon calls "social sorting." Thus, there is a general concern that this increasingly prevalent mode of ordering and organizing should be governed more explicitly. Some have argued for more transparency and openness, others have argued for more democratic or value-centered design of such actors. In this article, we argue that governing practices—of, and through algorithmic actors—are best understood in terms of what Foucault calls governmentality. Governmentality allows us to consider the performative nature of these governing practices. They allow us to show how practice becomes problematized, how calculative practices are enacted as technologies of governance, how such calculative practices produce domains of knowledge and expertise, and finally, how such domains of knowledge become internalized in order to enact self-governing subjects. In other words, it allows us to show the mutually constitutive nature of problems, domains of knowledge, and subjectivities enacted through governing practices. In order to demonstrate this, we present attempts to govern academic writing with a specific focus on the algorithmic action of Turnitin.

The purpose of this study was to create a profile of Mutual Self-Help participants in Utah, measure their satisfaction with the program, and identify factors that lead to the willingness of participants to refer the program to others. The sample consisted of program participants at Neighborhood Nonprofit Housing Corporation and Rural Community Development Corporation from 2002 to 2009. A survey instrument was used to collect the data from the 114 responses. Descriptive statistics were used to create the profile of clients, satisfaction scores were analyzed with a t test, and a logistic regression was used to identify factors that contribute to participant referrals. Clients were on average White, had 2.4 dependents, and had at least some college or vocational education. Most were first-time homeowners, had more than $20,000 in equity, and had never missed a payment. The majority of clients reported high levels of satisfaction with the program, their home, and the neighborhood. Satisfaction with their home proved to be the major predictor of referring the program to others, significant at less than .01. The findings indicate that program participants are satisfied with the program. They have high levels of satisfaction, are likely to refer the program to others, and have derived significant benefits from the program in terms of equity and stability. This information can be used by nonprofits who administer the program, the USDA Rural Development who funds the program, and legislators who determine funding levels to assess the inputs and outputs of the program and better serve their clients.

This paper is about the phenomenon of encoding, more specifically about the encoded extension of agency. The question of code most often emerges from contemporary concerns about the way digital encoding is seen to be transforming our lives in fundamental ways, yet seems to operate 'under the surface' as it were. In this essay I suggest that the performative outcomes of digital encoding are best understood within a more general horizon of the phenomenon of encoding – that is to say as norm- or rule-governed material enactments accepted (or taken for granted) as the necessary conditions for becoming. Encoded material enactments translate/extend agency, but never exactly. I argue that such encoded extensions are insecure, come at a cost and are performative. To illustrate this I present a brief discussion of some specific historical transitions in the encoding of human agency: from speech to writing, to mechanical writing, and finally to electronic writing. In each of these translations I aim to show that agency is translated/extended in ways that have many unexpected performative outcomes. Specifically, through a discussion of the digital encoding of writing, as reuse, I want to suggest the proposition that all agency is always borrowed (or 'plagiarized') – i.e. it is never originally human. As encoded beings we are never authors, we are rather more or less skilful reusers. To extend agency we have to submit to the demands of encoding and kidnap that encoding simultaneously – enabling constraints in Butler's language. Our originality, if there is any, is in our skill at kidnapping the code and turning it into an extension of our agency, that is to say, our skill at resignification – to be original we need to be skilful 'parasites', as suggested by Serres.

This article is about our relationship with things; about the abundant material geographies that surround us and constitute the very possibility for us to be the beings that we are. More specifically, it is about the question of the possibility of an ethical encounter with things ( qua things). We argue, with the science and technology studies tradition (and Latour in particular), that we are the beings that we are through our entanglements with things, we are thoroughly hybrid beings, cyborgs through and through — we have never been otherwise. With Heidegger we propose that a human-centred ethics of hybrids will fail to open a space for an ethical encounter with things since all beings in the sociomaterial network — humans and non-human alike — end up circulating as objects, enframed as `standing reserve', things-for-the-purposes-of the network. We suggest that what is needed is an ethos beyond ethics, or the overcoming of an ethics — which is based on the will to power — towards an ethos of letting be. We elaborate such a possibility with the help of Heidegger, in particular with reference to the work of Graham Harman and his notion of `tool-being'. From this we propose, very tentatively, an ethos that has as its ground a poetic dwelling with things, a way of being that lets being be ( Gelassenheit). We show how such a poetic dwelling, or ethos of Gelassenheit, may constitute the impossible possibility of a very otherwise way of being with things — an ethos of a `community of those who have nothing in common' as suggested by Alphonso Lingis.

Provides a critique of teleological information systems development methodologies. Argues that these methodologies lead to "dead" systems that make very little sense to their users. Presents the work of the architect Christopher Alexander as an example from another discipline of ateleological development. Using principles gleaned from his work, presents some ideas of how information systems development may become more ateleological. Narrative, metaphor and myth seem to provide some indicators of how such ateleological development may be achieved. Acknowledges that there is no simple answer to the issues involved, except for the conviction that more precision or automation in teleological development methodologies would not do much to solve the enormous problems occurring in practice today.

The purpose is to indicate the potential impact, be it positive or
negative, of information technology on the effective management of the
logistics function. This is achieved by defining the concepts of
logistics, management, information and technology to create a base of
understanding. A framework is then suggested to guide the integration of
information technology effectively into the logistic function. In
conclusion the important aspect of building commitment as a key success
factor in the effective management of information technology in
logistics is examined.

Presents a critical review of the role of laboratory experiments in information systems research. In an attempt to highlight the issues raised by laboratory experiments, presents a thought experiment of such an experiment. The thought experiment indicates the problem of distinguishing between that which is done to complete the task and that which is done to complete the requirements of the experiment. Further develops an understanding of this problem by presenting the work of Heidegger, Merleau‐Ponty and others. From this discussion, shows that people develop styles for coping in the world that do not allow them to "break up" the world into discrete objects, events, persons, and so forth. Based on this discussion, argues that it is impossible for the observer as well as the observed to know whether their style of coping in the experiment is a style of coping with the world or a style of coping with the requirements and constraints of the experiment. From this discussion, concludes that most laboratory experiments in information systems research have neither internal nor external validity. As such, they should be actively discouraged.

Provides a critique of method‐ism ‐ the view that methodology is necessary and sufficient for information systems' development success; method‐ism presupposes also that systems developers understand the value of methodology and will prefer to work with it rather than without it. Argues, against method‐ism, that method flows from understanding, and not the reverse. Hence method cannot be a substitute for understanding. Discusses the way in which humans tend to interact with the world by means of ready‐to‐hand tools, using the ideas of Heidegger and Ihde. Shows that tools are used only if available (ready‐to‐hand) in the world of doing. If a methodology is not ready‐to‐hand, it will break down and be ignored in the pragmatics of getting the job done. Presents a number of arguments why methodologiesby designwill tend to break down (not be ready‐to‐hand) and hence be discarded.