SUBSIDY IN LICENSING: OPTIMALITY AND WELFARE IMPLICATIONS*
In: The Manchester School, Band 73, Heft 3, S. 281-299
ISSN: 1467-9957
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In: The Manchester School, Band 73, Heft 3, S. 281-299
ISSN: 1467-9957
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 48, Heft 2, S. 223-233
In: The Manchester School, Band 72, Heft 5, S. 618-625
ISSN: 1467-9957
We show that a welfare maximizing planner in a Cournot oligopoly can easily implement the socially optimal outcome by offering the firms a per unit subsidy in return for upfront fees. The planner announces a subsidy and auctions it off to a limited number of firms. It is shown that if at least one firm is excluded and not subsidized, the socially optimal outcome can be achieved while the planner runs no deficit. The planner does not impose any regulation on the firms. They accept his offer willingly and voluntarily. Yet, every firm makes zero net profit and consumers extract the entire surplus.
In: The Manchester School, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 150-163
ISSN: 1467-9957
In this paper, we focus on price competition between several multiproduct firms which produce differentiated systems, each consisting of two complementary products. It is shown here that if firms are restricted to pure component pricing (bundling is not allowed) whenever components produced are compatible, pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. With the use of bundling strategies, pure strategy equilibrium always exists. For the pure component pricing case we provide a full characterization for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
In: 5th Communication Policy Research South Conference (CPRsouth5), Xian, China
SSRN
Working paper
In: China & World Economy, Band 17, Heft 5, S. 104-120
SSRN
In: International journal of operations & production management, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 106-129
ISSN: 1758-6593
PurposeThis study aims to empirically identify investment incentive preference segments for international logistics zones from the manufacturer's perspective.Design/methodology/approachEight critical investment incentives were identified, based on the following factors: cost, agglomeration, resource, port, policy, political stability, location and transport, and economic. Cluster analysis was subsequently performed to group respondents on the basis of their factor scores. Three groups or segments were identified: firms that preferred political stability and location factors; those which preferred low‐cost and port‐related factors; and those which preferred agglomeration effect and resource factors. Six factors, i.e. cost, agglomeration effect, resource, port, policy, and political stability, differed significantly across the three segments.FindingsResults suggest that political stability is the most important incentive, followed by corporate tax incentives, government administration efficiency, labor cost, and energy cost.Originality/valueThis study is a first attempt to understand investment incentive preferences for an international logistics zone from the manufacturers' perspective and to segment investors into different groups.