Suchergebnisse

What is the representation of East Asia in Latin American legislatures? Existing studies have focused on individual politicians of East Asian descent such as Alberto Fujimori, former president of Peru, but no systematic research has been done on the political representation of East Asia in Latin America. In order to fill this gap, this study analyzes the descriptive and substantive aspects of East Asian representation in Latin America. For the descriptive dimension, this article reviews the composition of legislators of East Asian descent in each Latin American country and finds that people of Japanese descent are "overrepresented" in the Peruvian and Argentine lower houses, while people of Korean and Chinese descent are underrepresented. Using the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies as an example, this study also reveals that deputies of East Asian descent differ from other deputies in terms of their political careers. As for the substantive dimension, this study focuses on Brazilian deputies' responses to the Twin Ocean Railroad project, one of the largest Chinese infrastructure projects in Latin America. The statistical test performed in this study shows that the deputies tend to be members of the Brazil–Peru–China Pro-Twin Ocean Railroad Caucus if they are affiliated with the Brazil–Japan Caucus, if they are from a wealthier state, or if their performance in the last election was good. In addition, they are not likely to be members of the caucus if they are affiliated with the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), an important opposition party.

What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators' decisions on national policies? Do legislators' own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors' parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators' office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small. Adapted from the source document.

What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators' decisions on national policies? Do legislators' own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors' parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators' office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small. (JPLA/GIGA)