Suchergebnisse

Samspillet mellem kommunernes tilpasning til lokale forhold, lokale politiske valg og den førte politik har længe været et centralt tema i decentraliserings- og kommunalforskningslitteraturen. Men hvilken betydning har de lokale styringsvilkår for de danske kommuners økonomiske styring efter kommunalreformen? Og hvordan påvirkes dette af et stærkt nationalt sanktionsregime? Artiklens empiriske analyse viser, at det er vanskeligere at skabe budgetbalance, hvis en kommune har vanskelige økonomiske grundvilkår, oplever en forværring af de økonomiske grundvilkår eller har et ustabilt indbyggertal. Men også at sanktionslovgivningen har påvirket sammenhængen mellem de lokale styringsforudsætninger og den lokalt førte styringspolitik. Sanktionslovgivningen lægger bindinger på kommunernes styringspolitik, som betyder, at den økonomiske styring knyttes tættere til de lokale styringsvilkår. Efter sanktionslovgivningen har det ikke længere signifikant betydning for budgetbalancen, hvor velstående kommunen er, og den økonomiske styring kobles tættere til ændringer i befolkningstallet.

The impact of local social, economic, environmental and political constraints (SEEP) on local government policy has long been a central theme of the decentralization and local government literature. How do local SEEP factors affect the fiscal management of Danish municipalities after a major structural reform in 2007? Does a tough sanction-based expenditure limitation regime affect the relationship between local external constraints and municipal fiscal policy? The fiscal management of Danish municipalities has improved significantly after the economic crisis and a sanction regime implemented by the national government in 2011. This empirical analysis shows that economic constraints and especially changes in economic constraints significantly affect the fiscal policy but that also environmental instability in terms of population changes make it harder to balance the budget. In addition, a sanction regime seems to place constraints on local authorities' fiscal management policy, which reduces the importance of environmental factors.

The impact of local social, economic, environmental and political constraints (SEEP) on local government policy has long been a central theme of the decentralization and local government literature. How do local SEEP factors affect the fiscal management of Danish municipalities after a major structural reform in 2007? Does a tough sanction-based expenditure limitation regime affect the relationship between local external constraints and municipal fiscal policy? The fiscal management of Danish municipalities has improved significantly after the economic crisis and a sanction regime implemented by the national government in 2011. This empirical analysis shows that economic constraints and especially changes in economic constraints significantly affect the fiscal policy but that also environmental instability in terms of population changes make it harder to balance the budget. In addition, a sanction regime seems to place constraints on local authorities' fiscal management policy, which reduces the importance of environmental factors.

The Danish Local Government Reform in 2007 reduced the number of municipalities from 271 to 98 and the number of Regions from 14 to 5 along with major changes in tasks, finances and the equalisation scheme. One of the objectives of the reform was to realize administrative economies of scale. Measured by administrative costs, this article concludes that the amalgamated municipalities so far have not realized the expected administrative economies of scale. It is, however, also shown that the potential economies of scale prior to the Reform was inflated in a Reform legitimating process. Before as well as after the Reform, administrative economies of scale exist if analysing on administrative costs. Technically administrative costs by decentralised agencies, however, cannot be calculated and are therefore not included in the analysis. Basing the analysis instead on administrative personnel, including administrative staff employed at schools, kindergartens etc., the conclusion is that larger municipalities do not spend less resources on administration than smaller municipalities.

The Danish Local Government Reform in 2007 reduced the number of municipalities from 271 to 98 and the number of Regions from 14 to 5 along with major changes in tasks, finances and the equalisation scheme. One of the objectives of the reform was to realize administrative economies of scale. Measured by administrative costs, this article concludes that the amalgamated municipalities so far have not realized the expected administrative economies of scale. It is, however, also shown that the potential economies of scale prior to the Reform was inflated in a Reform legitimating process. Before as well as after the Reform, administrative economies of scale exist if analysing on administrative costs. Technically administrative costs by decentralised agencies, however, cannot be calculated and are therefore not included in the analysis. Basing the analysis instead on administrative personnel, including administrative staff employed at schools, kindergartens etc., the conclusion is that larger municipalities do not spend less resources on administration than smaller municipalities.

The proposition that amalgamation reforms lead to a common-pool problem is strongly supported; governments are incentivized to overspend before the merger is implemented. However, existing literature helps little in understanding why some governments do not overspend in the pre-merger period, and why hoarders do not overspend more than they do. One explanation hitherto overlooked is the moderating effect of social norms. Two hypotheses regarding the importance of social norms are tested with data from a survey experiment conducted on over 3,000 Norwegian local elected officials. The analysis supports both: Support for hoarding is lower when hoarding is debt-financed than when financed by savings. Support for hoarding is also lower when others in the amalgamation are anticipated not to hoard than when they are. That pre-merger hoarding varies with different levels of social obligations vis-à-vis the amalgamation has implications for common-pool theory and for reformers of the structure of government.

Budgetinstitutioner og organisering har ifølge budgetlitteraturen stor betydning for offentlige organisationers økonomiske resultater. Men kan en bestemt administrativ organisering være med til at styrke en kommunes produktivitet? Empirisk viser analysen, at både kommunernes økonomiske grundvilkår og administrative organisering har betydning for produktiviteten. Produktiviteten er lavere, jo mindre økonomisk presset kommunen er, jo mindre kommunen er, og/eller hvis kommunen er organiseret med en direktionsmodel uden opdelt administrativt ansvar. En direktionsmodel kan ifølge tidligere undersøgelser styrke tværgående, strategiske og overordnede økonomistyringshensyn i form af budgetbalance og udgiftsstyring. Indeværende analyse peger på, at direktionsmodellens – intenderede – afkobling til de faglige miljøer og medarbejdere omvendt ser ud til at svække hensynet til den kommunale produktivitet. Valget af administrativ organisering ser dermed ud til at indebære et trade-off mellem en stærk udgiftsstyring og en høj produktivitet.

According to the budget literature, budget institutions and administrative organization are of great importance for public organizations' financial results. But can a particular kind of administrative organization contribute to improving a municipality's efficiency? Empirically, the analysis shows that both the local fiscal environment and the administrative organization of municipalities affect efficiency. The efficiency is lower, the less hard-pressed the municipality is financially, the smaller the size of the municipality and/or if the municipality is organized according to an executive model without separate administrative responsibility. According to previous studies, executive models can strengthen financial steering in the form of budget balance and expenditure control. The present analysis indicates that, conversely, the executive model's – intended – separation from the professional environments and employees seems to reduce municipal efficiency. Thus, the choice of administrative organization seems to involve a trade-off between strong expenditure control and high efficiency.

It is becoming difficult to maintain consensus in a period of economic austerity, and this possibly challenges the ability of democratic institutions to take decisions on tough economic questions. In order to find out how political consensus influences fiscal outcomes, this article sets out to analyse the association between political consensus and public expenditure growth. The results show that political consensus is positively associated with both budgeted and actual expenditure growth, but also negatively associated with budget overruns. This indicates that political consensus comes at a cost, while at the same time politicians may be better at sticking to budgets if political consensus exists. The analysis is based on a pooled regression analysis of the local governments in Denmark in the years 2008 and 2009 using a data set combining survey data with administrative data on the local governments. Adapted from the source document.