What happens when democracy produces 'bad' outcomes? Is democracy good because of its outcomes or despite them? This 'democratic dilemma' is one of the most persistent, vexing problems for America abroad, particularly in the Middle East - we want democracy in theory but not necessarily in practice. To look then at the democratic dilemma is to consider a deeper set of questions around why we believe democracy is good as well as whether we think it is good for other nations and cultures. Shadi Hamid offers an ambitious reimagining of this ongoing debate and argues for 'democratic minimalism' - democracy without expecting that Western-style liberalism will accompany it - as a path to resolving democratic dilemmas in the Middle East and beyond.
In 1989, Francis Fukuyama famously announced the ""end of history."" The Berlin Wall had fallen; liberal democracy had won out. But what of illiberal democracy--the idea that popular majorities, working through the democratic process, might reject gender equality, religious freedoms, and other norms that Western democracies take for granted? Nowhere have such considerations become more relevant than in the Middle East, where the uprisings of 2011 swept the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups to power. In Temptations of Power, Shadi Hamid draws on hundreds of interviews with leaders an
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"In 1989, Francis Fukuyama famously declared that we had reached "the end of history," and that liberal democracy would be the reigning ideology from now on. But Fukuyama failed to reckon with the idea of illiberal democracy. What if majorities, working through the democratic process, decide they would rather not accept gender equality and other human rights norms that Western democracies take for granted? Nowhere have such considerations become more relevant than in the Middle East, where the Arab uprisings of 2011 swept the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties into power. Since then, one question has been on everyone's mind: what do Islamists really want? In Temptations of Power, noted Brookings scholar Shadi Hamid draws on hundreds of interviews with Islamist leaders and rank-and-file activists to offer an in-depth look at the past, present, and future of Islamist parties across the Arab world. The oldest and most influential of these groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, initially dismissed democracy as a foreign import, but eventually chose to participate in Egyptian and Jordanian party politics in the 1980s. These political openings proved short-lived. As repression intensified, though, Islamist parties did not -- as one may have expected -- turn to radicalism. Rather, they embraced the tenets of democratic life, putting aside their dreams of an Islamic state, striking alliances with secular parties, and reaching out to Western audiences for the first time. When the 2011 revolutions took place, Islamists found themselves in an enviable position, but one they were unprepared for. Up until then, the prospect of power had seemed too remote. But, now, freed from repression and with the political arena wide open, they found themselves with an unprecedented opportunity to put their ideas into practice across the region. Groups like the Brotherhood combine the features of political parties and religious movements. However pragmatic they may be, their ultimate goal remains the Islamization of society and the state. When the electorate they represent is conservative as well, they can push their own form of illiberal democracy while insisting they are carrying out the popular will. This can lead to overreach and, at times, significant backlash, as the tragic events in Egypt following the military takeover demonstrated. While the coup and the subsequent crackdown were a devastating blow for the Islamist "project," premature obituaries of political Islam, a running feature of commentary since the 1950s, usually turn out to be just that -- premature. In countries as diverse as Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen, Islamist groups will remain an important force whether in the ranks of opposition or the halls of power. Drawing from interviews with figures like ousted Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi, Hamid's account will serve as an essential compass for those trying to understand where the region's varied Islamist groups have come from, and where they might be headed"--
Islamism and Revolution across the Middle East: Transformations of Ideology and Strategy after the Arab Spring, edited by Khalil al-Anani. London: I. B. Tauris, 2021. 184 pages. £63 cloth, £26.09 paper, £15.65 e-book. Classless Politics: Islamist Movements, the Left, and Authoritarian Legacies in Egypt, by Hesham Sallam. New York: Columbia University Press, 2022. 472 pages. $140 cloth, $35 paper, $34.99 e-book.
The recent turmoil in the Middle East may lead to the Arab world's first sustained experiment in Islamist government. But the West need not fear. For all their anti-American rhetoric, today's mainstream Islamist groups tend to be pragmatic -- and ready to compromise if necessary on ideology and foreign policy. Adapted from the source document.
Abstract1980s postmodernism provided a viable theoretical alternative to existing discourses. Where pre-postmodern second-wave feminism subscribed to prescriptive notions of what a woman should or should not be, postmodern feminists (or post-feminists) instead articulated a much more diverse, malleable, morally and culturally relative notion of what it means to be a woman. This new relativist approach meant that feminists were now making a conscious effort to engage with third-world women in a way that acknowledged cultural particularities. Today Muslim women are struggling to find a place for themselves. Western feminists have the potential to play an important role in the process of change in the Muslim world. The nature of this role has yet to be determined. In recent decades, Western feminists have had a tendency to superimpose their own culturally specific notions of equality on the Muslim world. Now, there is the risk that a new generation of postmodern intellectuals will decide to slowly disengage. With this in mind, finding the middle ground has never been more urgent.
AbstractMuslims in Europe and North America face high rates of discrimination and hostility. Less clear are the consequences of this prejudice on Muslims' political attitudes. Leveraging a survey of 1,330 Muslims in Germany, we show that Muslims who have personally experienced discrimination exhibit higher anti‐system tendencies: more supportive of violence, more supportive of Islamism, and less supportive of democracy and secularism. We also find that these patterns are concentrated among Muslims who believe they "suffer alone," not believing other Muslims experience similar hostility. Finally, through a priming experiment, we find causal evidence that German Chancellor Angela Merkel's inclusive rhetoric and policies toward Muslims may help mitigate these dynamics, reducing perceptions of discrimination and in turn producing pro‐system sentiments.