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This study takes the hitherto understudied perspective of local executive politicians as crucial stakeholders spanning the boundaries of representative and participatory democracy. It aims to examine their legitimacy perceptions of different participatory arrangements. The research was conducted by means of a vignette study in which we included a representative arrangement and six participatory arrangements for which we differentiated for types of initiator (government or citizens) and three types of citizen involvement (consultative, co-decisive and decisive). We found that executives assessed government-initiated arrangements as more legitimate than citizen-initiated ones. Moreover, they perceived the co-decisive arrangement as the most legitimate.

The last few decades governments have operated in a challenging environment which increasingly calls for extended citizen participation. The aim of the article is to demonstrate that representative and participatory democracy are not two distinct realities, but that politicians' opinions about their representative roles are associated with their attitudes about participatory democracy. To this end, the present paper links representative styles (partisan-delegate-trustee) with support for (1) the amount of citizen participation and (2) the type of citizen participation. Elected politicians traditionally perceive their representative roles either as 'partisan' (party-driven), 'delegate' (voter-driven) or 'trustee' (driven by their own judgement). We conducted a large-scale survey among Flemish (Belgium) local councillors ( N = 791). We show the biggest differences in support being between 'delegates' and 'partisans'. The first group seems to be more receptive to (far-reaching) citizen participation and we explain that by their general orientation towards citizens.

AbstractPolicy decision‐making modes in governance contexts have become increasingly participatory. This raises questions about legitimacy, and how to measure this concept. The current article advances a multifaceted measurement of perceived legitimacy of policy decision‐making modes in participatory governance, capturing the three components of legitimacy (input, throughput, and output) with two items each. This six‐item measure was tested in a vignette survey (total N = 4583), which was administered among four types of democratic stakeholders: politicians, civil servants, civil society, and citizens. Respondents completed the scale for four different policy decision‐making modes (representative, consultative, co‐decisive, and decisive). Our six‐item scale shows excellent internal consistency as an encompassing measure, while at the same time also allowing for fine‐grained analyses on difference patterns in the input, throughput, and output components of legitimacy. As such, it provides a relevant and parsimonious tool for future research that requires a multifaceted measurement of the perceived legitimacy of participatory governance.

AbstractIn the aftermath of a product failure, companies often offer a financial compensation. The present research compares the effects of equal compensation (i.e., a refund that is equivalent to the purchase price) and large overcompensation (i.e., a refund that is five times larger than the purchase price) on customer loyalty, which was hypothesized to be moderated by individual differences in self‐interest and fairness sensitivity. Our results, first of all, revealed that, overall, large overcompensation does not result in higher customer loyalty than equal compensation. Although overcompensation does not appear to be a worthwhile strategy in general, our results also showed that large overcompensation nonetheless entails positive effects for a particular type of customer. Indeed, relative to equal compensation, overcompensation had an incremental effect on customer loyalty for customers low on perpetrator fairness sensitivity and for customers high on victim fairness sensitivity. Variables related to self‐interest (i.e., materialism and greed) did not demonstrate such a moderation effect. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

AbstractCompanies sometimes employ a "lowest price or more than the difference back" policy (i.e., a price‐beating guarantee). We investigated whether such a policy is more effective to attract and retain customers than when the exact price difference is promised (i.e., a price‐matching guarantee). The first study revealed that about 60% of the marketers and shop owners in our sample thought that beating price differences is a more effective strategy than matching price differences. However, the four subsequent studies challenged this assumption. Specifically, the advertisement as well as the provision of price‐beating refunds did not have an incremental positive effect on customers' general attitudes in terms of trust, brand perception, loyalty, and shopping intentions beyond the level that was already reached by price‐matching refunds. Moreover, our mediation analyses revealed that the null effect of price‐matching versus price‐beating was mediated by fairness perceptions. From a theoretical perspective, these results are in line with a fairness account, which holds that people do not only evaluate the economic value of an outcome, but also take equality considerations into account. Because price‐beating is literally more expensive than price‐matching, from a practical point of view, companies should be informed that the employment of a price‐beating guarantee is a cost‐ineffective advertisement strategy and compensation policy.

Is political radicalization a product of increased issue position polarization, by which left and right‐wing attitudes become ever more extreme? We argue that this is not the best explanation. Indeed, radical left and right supporters are not so much "left" or "right" in terms of their ideological attitudes. Instead, we argue that political cynicism is a relevant ideological attitude, with radicals being characterized by distinctly high levels, making them truly distinct from moderates. Radicals are primarily driven by anger, more than by anxiety, meaning that their information processing is heavily focused on consistency and closure. We discuss that political cynics have become highly effective as a political force, and we offer suggestions for how traditional parties may overcome the "trust crisis" in politics. It is concluded that issue‐position polarization is a phenomenon that operates to an equal extent in moderate voters than in adherents of radical and populist parties. The abyss between moderates and radicals concerns whether or not "to be in the political system" at all.

Abstract: Prior studies have linked societal threats to a surge in conservative attitudes. We conducted three studies ( N = 1,021) to investigate whether hypothetical threat situations impact peoples' attitudes toward democracy or alternative systems. Study 1 shows that individuals under threat devaluate representative and participatory government types and show relatively stronger endorsement of less democratic alternatives. Study 2 clarifies that extranational threats elicit a greater shift toward nondemocratic 'solutions' than intranational threats and that citizens generally find a just process less important in times of crisis. Study 3 shows that the effect of threat on support for technocracy can be explained by heightened anticipated anxiety. We find no evidence that anticipated emotions consistently account for the observed shifts in government preferences under threat.

Transgressions and injustice are an inevitable part of social life, both in interactions between individuals and between groups. But whereas conflict between individuals typically impacts only few, conflict between groups can be harmful to many – as is illustrated by disputes between nations, political parties, and social groups. For this reason, it is crucial to understand how such transgressions can be restored. In interpersonal contexts, there is considerable evidence that apologies can restore transgressions and enable victims and perpetrators to reconcile. It is unknown, however, to what extent their remedial effectiveness may translate to conflicts between groups. The present research illuminates this question. In an experimental study (N = 272), we compared the effectiveness of apologies for restoring trust after transgressions between individuals or groups. Results revealed that both in interpersonal and intergroup contexts, apologies significantly increased trust. However, their impact was greater in interpersonal interactions (where they fully restored trust to its pre-transgression level) than in intergroup interactions (where they failed to fully restore trust). Furthermore, the effectiveness of apologies was shaped by their emotional content. In disputes between individuals, only apologies with secondary emotions fully restored trust. Conversely, in disputes between groups, neither apologies with primary emotions nor those with secondary emotions fully restored trust. This was explained by greater skepticism of apologies in intergroup contexts, particularly of apologies with secondary emotions. These findings underline that intergroup interactions are more competitive and distrusting than interpersonal interactions, and suggest that more extensive remedies may be required to reduce intergroup tensions.

Transgressions and injustice are an inevitable part of social life, both in interactions between individuals and between groups. But whereas conflict between individuals typically impacts only few, conflict between groups can be harmful to many – as is illustrated by disputes between nations, political parties, and social groups. For this reason, it is crucial to understand how such transgressions can be restored. In interpersonal contexts, there is considerable evidence that apologies can restore transgressions and enable victims and perpetrators to reconcile. It is unknown, however, to what extent their remedial effectiveness may translate to conflicts between groups. The present research illuminates this question. In an experimental study (N = 272), we compared the effectiveness of apologies for restoring trust after transgressions between individuals or groups. Results revealed that both in interpersonal and intergroup contexts, apologies significantly increased trust. However, their impact was greater in interpersonal interactions (where they fully restored trust to its pre-transgression level) than in intergroup interactions (where they failed to fully restore trust). Furthermore, the effectiveness of apologies was shaped by their emotional content. In disputes between individuals, only apologies with secondary emotions fully restored trust. Conversely, in disputes between groups, neither apologies with primary emotions nor those with secondary emotions fully restored trust. This was explained by greater skepticism of apologies in intergroup contexts, particularly of apologies with secondary emotions. These findings underline that intergroup interactions are more competitive and distrusting than interpersonal interactions, and suggest that more extensive remedies may be required to reduce intergroup tensions.

Effective citizen participation in policy decision making depends on the support of all democratic actors involved: citizens, but also politicians and civil servants. Drawing on data from over 4,000 respondents, we explore the existence of so-called 'multi-actor clusters', that is, groups of people who are characterised by a positive (or negative) stance towards different modes of local policy decision making, irrespective of their formal-institutional role (politician, civil servant or citizen). Cluster analysis shows two large clusters of respondents that clearly prefer participatory over representative policy decision making. The analysis also highlights a substantial cluster of respondents who clearly prefer representative policy decision making modes over participatory ones. Further analysis shows that a democratic actor's cluster membership is better predicted by individual (ideological) variables (such as left-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), compared to contextual variables (like governing capacity, democratic quality, and social capital of the municipality in which the actors work and/or live). This research is important because it challenges the assumption that citizen participation is to be considered primarily as (part of) the solution for local governance problems like a lack of governing capacity, low social capital or decreased democratic quality in/of specific local communities. In this way, it contributes to our understanding of participatory forms of governance.