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The experimental approach in economics is a driving force behind some of the most exciting developments in the field. The 'experimental revolution' was based on a series of bold philosophical premises which have remained until now mostly unexplored. This book provides the first comprehensive analysis and critical discussion of the methodology of experimental economics, written by a philosopher of science with expertise in the field. It outlines the fundamental principles of experimental inference in order to investigate their power, scope and limitations. The author demonstrates that experimental economists have a lot to gain by discussing openly the philosophical principles that guide their work, and that philosophers of science have a lot to learn from their ingenious techniques devised by experimenters in order to tackle difficult scientific problems
In: Journal of social ontology, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 265-279
ISSN: 2196-9663
Abstract
The folk conception of money as an object is not a promising starting point to develop general, explanatory metaphysical accounts of the social world. A theory of institutions as rules in equilibrium is more consistent with scientific theories of money, is able to shed light on the folk view, and side-steps some unnecessary puzzles.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 375-382
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
Hindriks' paper raises two issues: one is formal and concerns the notion of 'cost' in rational choice accounts of norms; the other is substantial and concerns the role of expectations in the modification of payoffs. In this commentary I express some doubts and worries especially about the latter: What's so special with shared expectations? Why do they induce compliance with norms, if transgression is not associated with sanctions?
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 48, Heft 6, S. 630-645
ISSN: 1552-7441
I answer the questions raised by commentators, and clarify what Understanding Institutions tried to achieve.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 48, Heft 6, S. 539-549
ISSN: 1552-7441
Understanding Institutions offers a theory that is able to unify the two dominant approaches in the scientific and philosophical literature on institutions. Moreover, using the 'rules-in-equilibrium' theory, it tackles several ancient puzzles in the philosophy of social science.
In: Revue d'économie politique, Band 128, Heft 3, S. 355-372
ISSN: 2105-2883
Adam Morton a avancé l'idée qu'un type particulier de simulation, nommé « raisonnement par solution », permet d'expliquer comment les joueurs se coordonnent avec succès dans une interaction stratégique. Dans cet article, je développe l'idée de Morton et suggère que (i) la simulation explique comment un point focal peut générer des croyances communes, et (ii) les individus engagent dans une forme particulière de simulation lorsqu'ils raisonnent en équipe. Un aspect essentiel du raisonnement par solution est que les croyances communes sont un output , et non un input , de la coordination. Cela suggère que le rôle des croyances dans le maintien de la coordination puisse être moindre que ce qui est traditionnellement supposé dans la littérature.
In: Journal of social ontology, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 135-147
ISSN: 2196-9663
AbstractThe distinction between anchors and grounds is one of the most innovative contributions of The Ant Trap. In this commentary I will argue that the distinction suffers from an ambiguity between tokens and types. This leads Epstein to endorse pluralism about anchors and grounds, a position that is not justified in the book and to which there are plausible alternatives.
In: Journal of Economic Methodology (Forthcoming)
SSRN
Working paper
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 190, Heft 15, S. 3107-3122
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 244-264
ISSN: 1552-7441
Infallibilism and apriorism are still influential in the philosophy of social science. Infallibilists about human kinds claim that there are features of institutional entities about which we cannot possibly be wrong. But infallibilism is not implied by the theory of collective intentionality that supposedly grounds it. Moreover, it fails to account for the mode of existence of important institutional kinds, including the paradigmatic example of money.
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 331-333
ISSN: 1467-9981