Suchergebnisse

The democratization of a national government is only a first step in diffusing democracy throughout a country's territory. Even after a national government is democratized, subnational authoritarian 'enclaves' often continue to deny rights to citizens of local jurisdictions. Gibson offers new theoretical perspectives for the study of democratization in his exploration of this phenomenon. His theory of 'boundary control' captures the conflict pattern between incumbents and oppositions when a national democratic government exists alongside authoritarian provinces (or 'states'). He also reveals how federalism and the territorial organization of countries shape how subnational authoritarian regimes are built and how they unravel. Through a novel comparison of the late nineteenth-century American 'Solid South' with contemporary experiences in Argentina and Mexico, Gibson reveals that the mechanisms of boundary control are reproduced across countries and historical periods. As long as subnational authoritarian governments coexist with national democratic governments, boundary control will be at play

The article is an introduction to the topic featured in JPLA 2/2010 "Subnational Authoritarianism and Democratization in Latin America." It discusses the papers by Carlos Gervasoni, Agustina Giraudy, Julián Durazo Herrmann, Alfred P. Montero, and Tracy Beck Fenwick that follow in this issue. Why feature the topic "subnational authoritarianism and democratization" in the Journal of Politics in Latin America? Because despite widespread agreement that subnational jurisdictions in Latin America vary considerably in the democratic character of their politics, political scientists are still largely in the dark about how to conceptualize and measure this situation, and have scant knowledge about mechanisms that sustain and undermine it. This collection of articles makes major headway toward clearing our methodological and theoretical ignorance of these topics. (GIGA)

Introduces a special journal issue devoted to addressing methodological & theoretical issues related to the topic of Latin American "subnational authoritarianism & democratization." At issue is the measurement & conceptualization of variations in democracy across nation-state jurisdictions & the key mechanisms of continuity & change in subnational authoritarianism in nationally democratic countries. Contributions are discussed in this light. D. Edelman

This article considers the political situation of an authoritarian province in a nationally democratic country. The objective is to uncover strategies that incumbents (in this article, governors) pursue to perpetuate provincial authoritarian regimes, as well as dynamics that can undermine such regimes. A central insight is that controlling the scope of provincial conflict (that is, the extent to which it is localized or nationalized) is a major objective of incumbents and oppositions in struggles over local democratization. Authoritarian incumbents will thus pursue "boundary control" strategies, which are played out in multiple arenas of a national territorial system. The articlefleshesout these processes via comparative analysis of two conflicts over subnational democratization in 2004: the state of Oaxaca in Mexico and the province of Santiago del Estero in Argentina.

This article considers the political situation of an authoritarian province in a nationally democratic country. The objective is to uncover strategies that incumbents (in this article, governors) pursue to perpetuate provincial authoritarian regimes, as well as dynamics that can undermine such regimes. A central insight is that controlling the scope of provincial conflict (that is, the extent to which it is localized or nationalized) is a major objective of incumbents and oppositions in struggles over local democratization. Authoritarian incumbents will thus pursue "boundary control" strategies, which are played out in multiple arenas of a national territorial system. The article fleshes out these processes via comparative analysis of two conflicts over subnational democratization in 2004: the state of Oaxaca in Mexico and the province of Santiago del Estero in Argentina. (World Politics / SWP)

The institution of federalism impacts politics & the quality of life for those living under it. The contributions to this book, summarized here, examine these impacts in the Latin American context where the three largest countries -- Brazil, Mexico, & Argentina -- plus Venezuela have federal constitutions. The essays present definitions of federalism, conceptual approaches to studying federal systems, the politics of democratization, & interactions between federalism & democratization. The essays also examine issues related to political decentralization & the changing balance of power between the federal governments & subnational territorial units in recent years. 33 References. M. Pflum

Governing parties face two fundamental tasks: they must pursue policies effectively, and they must win elections. Their national coalitions, therefore, generally include two types of constituencies—those that are important for policy-making and those that make it possible to win elections. In effect, governing parties must bring together a policy coalition and an electoral coalition. This distinction sheds light on how the transitional costs of major economic policy shifts can be made sustainable in electoral terms. It also provides a starting point for analysis of how two of Latin America's most important labor-based parties, the Peronist party in Argentina and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, maintained electoral dominance while pursuing free-market reforms that adversely affected key social constituencies. Peronism and the PRI are conceived of as having encompassed historically two distinctive and regionally based subcoalitions: a metropolitan coalition that gave support to the parties' development strategies and a peripheral coalition that carried the burden of generating electoral majorities. This framework permits a reconceptualization of the historic coalitional dynamics of Peronism and the PRI and sheds light on the current process of coalitional change and economic reform.

Examines the coalitional dynamics of Peronism in Argentina and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico.

A few weeks after Argentina had held elections on 14 May 1989, the UCEDE, with a mere 6% of the national vote, had become a highly visible member of the configuration of forces that would shape the politics of the Peronist government of Carlos Menem. This essay examines the efforts of the party to become the new face of conservatism in Argentine democratic politics

On the evening of 14 May 1989, hours after Argentina had held its first elections for a presidential succession in 60 years, the atmosphere at the Buenos Aires headquarters of the Unión del Centro Democrático(UCEDE) was lugubrious. The electoral news flowing into the computer terminals harbingered a resounding victoiy for Carlos Menem, the Peronist presidential candidate, and a remote third place showing of 6% for Alvaro Alsogaray, the presidential candidate of the young conservative party. Even in the capital city of Buenos Aires, where the UCEDE had led in the polls for congressional elections right up to election day, it trailed in third place. Would-be congressmen wandered the headquarters floor bewildered.