Suchergebnisse

This article addresses the impact of substantive policy on federal arrangements in the regulation of Canadian loan and trust companies. It is argued that reliance on market-suppressing policies (flat-rate based deposit insurance and selective bail-outs of depositors in the event of institutional failure) has undermined the value of competitive federalism in this area, and has spawned highly contentious policy initiatives such as Ontario's Equals Approach. To redress the federalism problems in the regulation of loan and trusts, a useful starting point would be the enhancement of market forces in substantive policy. Here, it is argued that the commitment to secrecy regulation by financial institution regulators has impeded this enterprise.

Rethinking the Welfare State offers a comprehensive and comparative analysis of social welfare policy in an international context, with a particular emphasis on the US and Canada.The authors investigate the claim that a decentralized delivery of government supported goods and services enables policy objectives to be achieved in a more innovative and efficient way, but at a lower cost. Secondly they examine the effectiveness of the voucher system as a solution to problematic welfare concerns. While this system has shown much promise in improving welfare, there have been problems for institution

Cover; Contents; Tables; List of research assistants; 1. The relationship of the rule of law to development; 2. The judiciary; 3. Police; 4. Prosecution; 5. Correctional institutions; 6. Tax administration; 7. Access to justice; 8. Legal education; 9. Professional regulation; 10. Rethinking rule of law reform strategies; Index.

This book offers a comprehensive and comparative analysis of social welfare policy and explores the effectiveness of the voucher system as a solution to problematic areas in the welfare programme.

Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy