In this paper we develop an overlapping generations model in which child care matters for human capital accumulation. We investigate whether an increase in labor supply brought about by a reduction in taxes is always associated with a reduction in parental time devoted to children, which modifies their human capital accumulation process. We show that the result critically depends on the assumptions on the altruistic motives behind the choice of devoting time to children.
The paper characterizes the optimal tax policy and the optimal quality of day care services in a OLG model with warm-glow altruism where parental choices over child care arrangements affect the probability that the child becomes a high-skilled adult in a type-specific way. With respect to previous contributions, optimal tax formulas include type-specific Pigouvian terms which correct for the intergenerational externality in human capital accumulation. Our numerical simulations suggest that a public policy that disregards the effects of parental time on children's human capital entails a welfare loss that ranges from 0:2% to 5:7% of aggregate consumption
Abstract The paper studies the effects on factor prices and welfare of the integration in a perfect world capital market of countries that differ in the degree of funding of their pension systems. It focuses on two large economies running respectively a pay-as-you-go and a fully funded pension system and it first analyzes the open economy implications of the different pension designs under the assumption that the pay-as-you-go system is balanced and in steady state equilibrium. It then elaborates on the institutional structure of the pay-as-you-go system to analyze how its degree of maturity, its expenditure profile and the presence of debt financing affect factor prices and welfare in open economy. Finally, it focuses on pension reform issues. The paper shows that, under perfect capital mobility, the differences in the degree of funding of the pension systems cause divergent welfare effects across generations and across countries. It shows that the design features of the pay-as-you-go scheme play a role in the world equilibrium and it identifies which of them can amplify or reduce the open economy linkages operating through the pension schemes.
In: CESifo economic studies: a joint initiative of the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 1-6
In: CESifo economic studies: a joint initiative of the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 148-164
