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INTRODUCTION: The COVID-19 pandemic will test the capacity of health systems worldwide and especially so in low- and middle-income countries. The objective of this study was to assess the surge capacity of the Kenyan of the Kenyan health system in terms of general hospital and ICU beds in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. METHODS: We assumed that 2% of the Kenyan population get symptomatic infection by SARS-Cov-2 based on modelled estimates for Kenya and determined the health system surge capacity for COVID-19 under three transmission curve scenarios, 6, 12, and 18 months. We estimated four measures of hospital surge capacity namely: 1) hospital bed surge capacity 2) ICU bed surge capacity 3) Hospital bed tipping point, and 5) ICU bed tipping point. We computed this nationally and for all the 47 county governments. RESULTS: The capacity of Kenyan hospitals to absorb increases in caseload due to COVID-19 is constrained by the availability of oxygen, with only 58% of hospital beds in hospitals with oxygen supply. There is substantial variation in hospital bed surge capacity across counties. For example, under the 6 months transmission scenario, the percentage of available general hospital beds that would be taken up by COVID-19 cases varied from 12% Tharaka Nithi county, to 145% in Trans Nzoia county. Kenya faces substantial gaps in ICU beds and ventilator capacity. Only 22 out of the 47 counties have at least 1 ICU unit. Kenya will need an additional 1,511 ICU beds and 1,609 ventilators (6 months transmission curve) to 374 ICU beds and 472 ventilators (18 months transmission curve) to absorb caseloads due to COVID-19. CONCLUSION: Significant gaps exist in Kenya's capacity for hospitals to accommodate a potential surge in caseload due to COVID-19. Alongside efforts to slow and supress the transmission of the infection, the Kenyan government will need to implement adaptive measures and additional investments to expand the hospital surge capacity for COVID-19. Additional investments will however need to be strategically prioritized to focus on strengthening essential services first, such as oxygen availability before higher cost investments such as ICU beds and ventilators.

Abstract Background Priority setting and resource allocation in healthcare organizations often involves the balancing of competing interests and values in the context of hierarchical and politically complex settings with multiple interacting actor relationships. Despite this, few studies have examined the influence of actor and power dynamics on priority setting practices in healthcare organizations. This paper examines the influence of power relations among different actors on the implementation of priority setting and resource allocation processes in public hospitals in Kenya. Methods We used a qualitative case study approach to examine priority setting and resource allocation practices in two public hospitals in coastal Kenya. We collected data by a combination of in-depth interviews of national level policy makers, hospital managers, and frontline practitioners in the case study hospitals ( n = 72), review of documents such as hospital plans and budgets, minutes of meetings and accounting records, and non-participant observations in case study hospitals over a period of 7 months. We applied a combination of two frameworks, Norman Long's actor interface analysis and VeneKlasen and Miller's expressions of power framework to examine and interpret our findings Results The interactions of actors in the case study hospitals resulted in socially constructed interfaces between: 1) senior managers and middle level managers 2) non-clinical managers and clinicians, and 3) hospital managers and the community. Power imbalances resulted in the exclusion of middle level managers (in one of the hospitals) and clinicians and the community (in both hospitals) from decision making processes. This resulted in, amongst others, perceptions of unfairness, and reduced motivation in hospital staff. It also puts to question the legitimacy of priority setting processes in these hospitals. Conclusions Designing hospital decision making structures to strengthen participation and inclusion of relevant stakeholders could improve priority setting practices. This should however, be accompanied by measures to empower stakeholders to contribute to decision making. Strengthening soft leadership skills of hospital managers could also contribute to managing the power dynamics among actors in hospital priority setting processes.

Abstract Background Priority setting and resource allocation in healthcare organizations often involves the balancing of competing interests and values in the context of hierarchical and politically complex settings with multiple interacting actor relationships. Despite this, few studies have examined the influence of actor and power dynamics on priority setting practices in healthcare organizations. This paper examines the influence of power relations among different actors on the implementation of priority setting and resource allocation processes in public hospitals in Kenya. Methods We used a qualitative case study approach to examine priority setting and resource allocation practices in two public hospitals in coastal Kenya. We collected data by a combination of in-depth interviews of national level policy makers, hospital managers, and frontline practitioners in the case study hospitals (n = 72), review of documents such as hospital plans and budgets, minutes of meetings and accounting records, and non-participant observations in case study hospitals over a period of 7 months. We applied a combination of two frameworks, Norman Long's actor interface analysis and VeneKlasen and Miller's expressions of power framework to examine and interpret our findings Results The interactions of actors in the case study hospitals resulted in socially constructed interfaces between: 1) senior managers and middle level managers 2) non-clinical managers and clinicians, and 3) hospital managers and the community. Power imbalances resulted in the exclusion of middle level managers (in one of the hospitals) and clinicians and the community (in both hospitals) from decision making processes. This resulted in, amongst others, perceptions of unfairness, and reduced motivation in hospital staff. It also puts to question the legitimacy of priority setting processes in these hospitals. Conclusions Designing hospital decision making structures to strengthen participation and inclusion of relevant stakeholders could improve priority setting practices. This should however, be accompanied by measures to empower stakeholders to contribute to decision making. Strengthening soft leadership skills of hospital managers could also contribute to managing the power dynamics among actors in hospital priority setting processes.

Background: Priority setting and resource allocation in healthcare organizations often involves the balancing of competing interests and values in the context of hierarchical and politically complex settings with multiple interacting actor relationships. Despite this, few studies have examined the influence of actor and power dynamics on priority setting practices in healthcare organizations. This paper examines the influence of power relations among different actors on the implementation of priority setting and resource allocation processes in public hospitals in Kenya. Methods: We used a qualitative case study approach to examine priority setting and resource allocation practices in two public hospitals in coastal Kenya. We collected data by a combination of in-depth interviews of national level policy makers, hospital managers, and frontline practitioners in the case study hospitals (n = 72), review of documents such as hospital plans and budgets, minutes of meetings and accounting records, and non-participant observations in case study hospitals over a period of 7 months. We applied a combination of two frameworks, Norman Long's actor interface analysis and VeneKlasen and Miller's expressions of power framework to examine and interpret our findings Results: The interactions of actors in the case study hospitals resulted in socially constructed interfaces between: 1) senior managers and middle level managers 2) non-clinical managers and clinicians, and 3) hospital managers and the community. Power imbalances resulted in the exclusion of middle level managers (in one of the hospitals) and clinicians and the community (in both hospitals) from decision making processes. This resulted in, amongst others, perceptions of unfairness, and reduced motivation in hospital staff. It also puts to question the legitimacy of priority setting processes in these hospitals. Conclusions: Designing hospital decision making structures to strengthen participation and inclusion of relevant stakeholders could improve priority setting practices. This should however, be accompanied by measures to empower stakeholders to contribute to decision making. Strengthening soft leadership skills of hospital managers could also contribute to managing the power dynamics among actors in hospital priority setting processes

BACKGROUND: Vaccines are considered the path out of the COVID-19 pandemic. The government of Kenya is implementing a phased strategy to vaccinate the Kenyan population, initially targeting populations at high risk of severe disease and infection. We estimated the financial and economic unit costs of procuring and delivering the COVID-19 vaccine in Kenya across various vaccination strategies. METHODS: We used an activity-based costing approach to estimate the incremental costs of COVID-19 vaccine delivery, from a health systems perspective. Document reviews and key informant interviews(n = 12) were done to inform the activities, assumptions and the resources required. Unit prices were derived from document reviews or from market prices. Both financial and economic vaccine procurement costs per person vaccinated with 2-doses, and the vaccine delivery costs per person vaccinated with 2-doses were estimated and reported in 2021USD. RESULTS: The financial costs of vaccine procurement per person vaccinated with 2-doses ranged from $2.89-$13.09 in the 30% and 100% coverage levels respectively, however, the economic cost was $17.34 across all strategies. Financial vaccine delivery costs per person vaccinated with 2-doses, ranged from $4.28-$3.29 in the 30% and 100% coverage strategies: While the economic delivery costs were two to three times higher than the financial costs. The total procurement and delivery costs per person vaccinated with 2-doses ranged from $7.34-$16.47 for the financial costs and $29.7-$24.68 for the economic costs for the 30% and 100% coverage respectively. With the exception of procurement costs, the main cost driver of financial and economic delivery costs was supply chain costs (47–59%) and advocacy, communication and social mobilization (29–35%) respectively. CONCLUSION: This analysis presents cost estimates that can be used to inform local policy and may further inform parameters used in cost-effectiveness models. The results could potentially be adapted and adjusted to country-specific ...

BACKGROUND: Kenya has prioritized the attainment of universal health coverage (UHC) through the expansion of health insurance coverage by the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). In 2015, the NHIF introduced reforms in premium contribution rates, benefit packages, and provider payment methods. We examined the influence of these reforms on NHIF's purchasing practices and their implications for strategic purchasing and health system goals of equity, efficiency and quality. METHODS: We conducted an embedded case study with the NHIF as the case and the reforms as embedded units of analysis. We collected data at the national level and in two purposively selected counties through 41 in-depth interviews with health financing stakeholders, facility managers and frontline providers; 4 focus group discussions with 51 NHIF members; and, document reviews. We analysed the data using a Framework approach. RESULTS: The new NHIF reforms were characterized by weak purchasing actions. Firstly, the new premium contribution rates were inadequately communicated and unaffordable for certain citizen groups. Secondly, while the new benefit packages were reported to be based on service needs, preferences and values of the population, they were inadequately communicated and unequally distributed across different citizen groups. In addition, the presence of service delivery infrastructure gaps in public healthcare facilities and the pro-urban and pro-private distribution of contracted health facilities compromised delivery of, and access to, these new services. Lastly, the new provider payment methods and rates were considered inadequate, with delayed payments and weak links to financial accountability mechanisms which compromised their ability to incentivize equity, efficiency and quality of healthcare delivery. CONCLUSION: While NHIF sought to expand population and service coverage and reduce out-of-pocket payments with the new reforms, weaknesses in the reforms' design and implementation limited NHIF's purchasing actions with negative implications for the health system goals of equity, efficiency and quality. For the reforms to accelerate the country's progress towards UHC, policy makers at the NHIF and, national and county government should make deliberate efforts to align the design and implementation of such reforms with strategic purchasing actions that are aimed at improving health system goals.

: Background In 2013, Kenya transitioned into a devolved system of government with a central government and 47 semi-autonomous county governments. In this paper, we report early experiences of devolution in the Kenyan health sector, with a focus on public county hospitals. Specifically, we examine changes in hospital autonomy as a result of devolution, and how these have affected hospital functioning. Methods: We used a qualitative case study approach to examine the level of autonomy that hospitals had over key management functions and how this had affected hospital functioning in three county hospitals in coastal Kenya. We collected data by in-depth interviews of county health managers and hospital managers in the case study hospitals (n = 21). We adopted the framework proposed by Chawla et al (1995) to examine the autonomy that hospitals had over five management domains (strategic management, finance, procurement, human resource, and administration), and how these influenced hospital functioning. Findings: Devolution had resulted in a substantial reduction in the autonomy of county hospitals over the five key functions examined. This resulted in weakened hospital management and leadership, reduced community participation in hospital affairs, compromised quality of services, reduced motivation among hospital staff, non-alignment of county and hospital priorities, staff insubordination, and compromised quality of care. Conclusion: Increasing the autonomy of county hospitals in Kenya will improve their functioning. County governments should develop legislation that give hospitals greater control over resources and key management functions.

BACKGROUND: How health facilities are financed affects their performance and health system goals. We examined how health facilities in the public sector are financed in Kenya, within the context of a devolved health system. METHODS: We carried out a cross-sectional study in five purposely selected counties in Kenya, using a mixed methods approach. We collected data using document reviews and in-depth interviews (no = 20). In each county, we interviewed county department of health managers and health facility managers from two and one purposely selected public hospitals and health center respectively. We analyzed qualitive data using thematic analysis and conducted descriptive analysis of quantitative data. RESULTS: Planning and budgeting: Planning and budgeting processes by hospitals and health centers were not standardized across counties. Budgets were not transparent and credible, but rather were regarded as "wish lists" since they did not translate to actual resources. Sources of funds: Public hospitals relied on user fees, while health centers relied on donor funds as their main sources of funding. Funding flows: Hospitals in four of the five study counties had no financial autonomy. Health centers in all study counties had financial autonomy. Flow of funds to hospitals and health centers in all study counties was characterized by unpredictability of amounts and timing. Health facility expenditure: Staff salaries accounted for over 80% of health facility expenditure. This crowded out other expenditure and led to frequent stock outs of essential health commodities. CONCLUSION: The national and county government should consider improving health facility financing in Kenya by 1) standardizing budgeting and planning processes, 2) transitioning public facility financing away from a reliance on user fees and donor funding 3) reforming public finance management laws and carry out political engagement to facilitate direct facility financing and financial autonomy of public hospitals, and 4) assess health facility ...

Background: Informal payments limit equitable access to healthcare. Despite being a common phenomenon, there is a need for an in-depth analysis of informal charging practices in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) context. We conducted a systematic literature review to synthesize existing evidence on the prevalence, characteristics, associated factors, and impact of informal payments in SSA. Methods: We searched for literature on PubMed, African Index Medicus, Directory of Open Access Journals, and Google Scholar databases and relevant organizational websites. We included empirical studies on informal payments conducted in SSA regardless of the study design and year of publication and excluded reviews, editorials, and conference presentations. Framework analysis was conducted, and the review findings were synthesized. Results: A total of 1700 articles were retrieved, of which 23 were included in the review. Several studies ranging from large-scale nationally representative surveys to in-depth qualitative studies have shown that informal payments are prevalent in SSA regardless of the health service, facility level, and sector. Informal payments were initiated mostly by health workers compared to patients and they were largely made in cash rather than in kind. Patients made informal payments to access services, skip queues, receive higher quality of care, and express gratitude. The poor and people who were unaware of service charges, were more likely to pay informally. Supply-side factors associated with informal payments included low and irregular health worker salaries, weak accountability mechanisms, and perceptions of widespread corruption in the public sector. Informal payments limited access especially among the poor and the inability to pay was associated with delayed or forgone care and provision of lower-quality care. Conclusions: Addressing informal payments in SSA requires a multifaceted approach. Potential strategies include enhancing patient awareness of service fees, revisiting health worker incentives, strengthening accountability mechanisms, and increasing government spending on health.

BACKGROUND: Health sector priority setting in Low and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) entails balancing between a high demand and low supply of scarce resources. Human Resources for Health (HRH) consume the largest allocation of health sector resources in LMICs. Health sector decentralization continues to be promoted for its perceived ability to improve efficiency, relevance and participation in health sector priority setting. Following the 2013 devolution in Kenya, both health service delivery and human resource management were decentralized to county level. Little is known about priority setting practices and outcomes of HRH within decentralized health systems in LMICs. Our study sought to examine if and how the Kenyan devolution has improved health sector priority setting practices and outcomes for HRH. METHODS: We used a mixed methods case study design to examine health sector priority setting practices and outcomes at county level in Kenya. We used three sources of data. First, we reviewed all relevant national and county level policy and guidelines documents relating to HRH management. We then accessed and reviewed county records of HRH recruitment and distribution between 2013 and 2018. We finally conducted eight key informant interviews with various stakeholder involved in HRH priority setting within our study county. RESULTS: We found that HRH numbers in the county increased by almost two-fold since devolution. The county had two forms of HRH recruitment: one led by the County Public Services Board as outlined by policy and guidelines and a parallel, politically-driven recruitment done directly by the County Department of Health. Though there were clear guidelines on HRH recruitment, there were no similar guidelines on allocation and distribution of HRH. Since devolution, the county has preferentially staffed higher level hospitals over primary care facilities. Additionally, there has been local county level innovations to address some HRH management challenges, including recruiting doctors and other ...

Background: In 2004, The Kenyan government removed user fees in public dispensaries and health centers and replaced them with registration charges of 10 and 20 Kenyan shillings (2004 $US 0.13 and $0.25), respectively. This was termed the 10/20 policy. We examined the effect of this policy on the coverage, timing, source, and content of antenatal care (ANC), and the equity in these outcomes. Methods: Data from the 2003, 2008/9 and 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys were pooled to investigate women's ANC care-seeking. We conducted an interrupted time series analysis to assess the impact of the 10/20 policy on the levels of and trends in coverage for 4+ ANC contacts among all women; early ANC initiation and use of public facility-based care among 1+ ANC users; and use of public primary care facilities and receipt of good content, or quality, of ANC among users of public facilities. All analyses were conducted at the population level and separately for women with higher and lower household wealth. Results: The policy had positive effects on use of 4+ ANC among both better-off and worse-off women. Among users of 1+ ANC, the 10/20 policy had positive effects on early ANC initiation at the population-level and among better-off women, but not among the worse-off. The policy was associated with reduced use of public facility-based ANC among better-off women. Among worse-off users of public facility-based ANC, the 10/20 policy was associated with reduced use of primary care facilities and increased content of ANC. Conclusions: This study highlights mixed findings on the impact of the 10/20 policy on ANC service-seeking and content of care. Given the reduced use of public facilities among the better-off and of primary care facilities among the worse-off, this research also brings into question the mechanisms through which the policy achieved any benefits and whether reducing user fees is sufficient for equitably increasing healthcare access.

BACKGROUND: Purchasing in health care financing refers to the transfer of pooled funds to health care providers for the provision of health care services. There is limited empirical work on purchasing arrangements and what is required for strategic purchasing in low‐ and middle‐income countries. We conducted this study to critically assess the purchasing arrangements of the county departments of health (CDOH) who are the largest purchasers of health care in Kenya. METHODS: We used a qualitative case study approach to assess the extent to which the purchasing actions of the CDOH in Kenya were strategic. We purposively sampled 10 counties and collected data using in‐depth interviews (n = 81), focus group discussions (n = 4), and documents review. We analyzed data using a framework approach. RESULTS: County departments of health did not practice strategic purchasing. The government's (national and county) role as a steward for the purchasing function was characterized by poor accountability and inadequate budgetary allocations for service delivery. The absence of a purchaser‐provider split between the CDOH and public health care providers undermined provider selection based on performance and quality. Poor public participation and ineffective complaints and feedback mechanisms limited public accountability and responsiveness to the needs of the people. CONCLUSION: Our findings show that while there are frameworks that could promote strategic purchasing of the CDOH, strategic purchasing is impaired by poor implementation of these frameworks and the inherent weaknesses of a public integrated purchasing system that lacks purchaser‐provider split.

Health policy and systems research (HPSR) is increasingly being funded and conducted worldwide. There are currently no specific guidelines or criteria for the ethical review and conduct of HPSR. Academic debates on HPSR ethics in the scholarly literature can inform the development of guidelines. Yet there is a deficiency of academic bioethics work relating to justice in HPSR. This gap is especially problematic for a field like HPSR, which can entail studies that intervene in ways affecting the social and health system delivery structures of society. In this paper, we call for interpreting the principle of justice in a more expansive way in developing and reviewing HPSR studies (relative to biomedical research). The principle requires advancing health equity and social justice at population or systems levels. Drawing on the rich justice literature from political philosophy and public health ethics, we propose a set of essential justice considerations to uphold this principle. These considerations are relevant for research funders, researchers, research ethics committees, policymakers, community organisations and others who are active in the HPSR field.

Health policy and systems research (HPSR) is increasingly being funded and conducted worldwide. There are currently no specific guidelines or criteria for the ethical review and conduct of HPSR. Academic debates on HPSR ethics in the scholarly literature can inform the development of guidelines. Yet there is a deficiency of academic bioethics work relating to justice in HPSR. This gap is especially problematic for a field like HPSR, which can entail studies that intervene in ways affecting the social and health system delivery structures of society. In this paper, we call for interpreting the principle of justice in a more expansive way in developing and reviewing HPSR studies (relative to biomedical research). The principle requires advancing health equity and social justice at population or systems levels. Drawing on the rich justice literature from political philosophy and public health ethics, we propose a set of essential justice considerations to uphold this principle. These considerations are relevant for research funders, researchers, research ethics committees, policymakers, community organisations and others who are active in the HPSR field.