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Trillions for Military Technology explains why the weapons purchased by the U.S. Department of Defense cost so much, why it takes decades to get them into production even as innovation in the civilian economy become ever more frenetic, and why some of those weapons don't work very well despite expenditures of many billions of dollars. It also explains what do about these problems. The author argues that the internal politics of the armed services make weapons acquisition almost unmanageable. Solutions require empowering civilian officials and reforms that will bring choice of weapons "int

This paper makes three primary claims. First, the so-called military-industrial complex (MIC) has its roots in the United States during World War I, when the army and navy turned to private firms for design of aircraft, and not, as some analysts have proposed, in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Second, theMICtook on its current shape during the 1950s. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's famous warning, in effect, expressed recognition of and perhaps something like dismay at his own creation. Finally, despite the broad shift in responsibility for design, development, and production of military systems from government to industry in the middle of the last century, the armed forces remain the dominant partner in theMICby reason of their control over the technical requirements that shape and constrain weapons system design. This leaves the defense industry a junior partner.

Management in government differs fundamentally from private sector management, the more so in defense, which differs from other US government missions in that very large sums are spent on high-technology systems and equipment to meet the unknowable contingencies of an uncertain future. Because of technological complexity, the difficulties of program selection, contracting, and oversight exceed those in other parts of government. An underappreciated set of problems aggravates these difficulties, notably a lack of metrics for assessing the performance of military systems. In the absence of such metrics, and given the elastic meanings attached to national security, civilian officials have been unable to exercise effective oversight of defense acquisition, leaving discretionary choices by military leaders largely unchecked. For such reasons, common prescriptions for acquisition reform, such as adoption of "proven business practices," are unrealistic. Meaningful reform would begin by increasing the influence of civilian officials over acquisition decisions and reducing that of the armed forces.