Rents from Power for a Dissident Elite and Mass Mobilization
In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 584-604
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In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 584-604
SSRN
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 584-604
ISSN: 1467-9485
AbstractPopular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent's rent‐seeking activities.
In: Economics & politics, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 181-215
ISSN: 1468-0343
We provide a game‐theoretical model of manipulative election campaigns with two political candidates and a Bayesian voter. The latter is uncertain about how good the candidates are. Candidates take unobservable, costly actions to manipulate voter's opinion about their positions. We show that if the candidates differ in campaigning efficiency, and the voter receives the biased campaign messages with some noise, then the cost‐efficient candidate can win the election with higher probability than her opponent even when she is ex‐post an inferior choice for the voter. Our paper offers a novel informational justification for imposing limits on campaign spending and encouraging diversity in the supply of political information.
In: Economics & politics, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 181-215
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: Economics & Politics, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 181-215
SSRN