Deterrence during disarmament: deep nuclear reductions and international security
In: Adelphi 417
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In: Adelphi 417
World Affairs Online
In: International security, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 56-99
ISSN: 1531-4804
Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict. This form of "entanglement" between nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities creates the potential for Chinese or Russian nonnuclear strikes against the United States or U.S. strikes against either China or Russia to spark inadvertent nuclear escalation. Escalation pressures could be generated through crisis instability or through one of two newly identified mechanisms: "misinterpreted warning" or the "damage-limitation window." The vulnerability of dual-use U.S. early-warning assets provides a concrete demonstration of the risks. These risks would be serious for two reasons. First, in a conventional conflict against the United States, China or Russia would have strong incentives to launch kinetic strikes on U.S. early-warning assets. Second, even limited strikes could undermine the United States' ability to monitor nuclear attacks by the adversary. Moreover, cyber interference with dual-use early-warning assets would create the additional danger of the target's misinterpreting cyber espionage as a destructive attack. Today, the only feasible starting point for efforts to reduce the escalation risks created by entanglement would be unilateral measures—in particular, organizational reform to ensure that those risks received adequate consideration in war planning, acquisition decisions, and crisis decisionmaking. Over the longer term, unilateral measures might pave the way for more challenging cooperative measures, such as agreed restrictions on threatening behavior.
In: International security, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 56-99
ISSN: 0162-2889
World Affairs Online
In: Science & global security: the technical basis for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation initiatives, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 191-219
ISSN: 1547-7800
In: The nonproliferation review: program for nonproliferation studies, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 141-154
ISSN: 1746-1766
In: Science & global security: the technical basis for arms control and environmental policy initiatives, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 191
ISSN: 0892-9882, 1048-7042
In: Intelligence and national security, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 341-356
ISSN: 1743-9019
In: FP, Heft 206
ISSN: 0015-7228
By 2003. as military planners had become worried that the country's long-range conventional weapons, such as cruise missiles, might be too slow to reach hypothetical distant targets that needed to be struck urgently. So the Pentagon launched the Prompt Global Strike initiative to develop conventional weapons that could reach targets anywhere in the world within minutes or hours. The US has since tested such weapons, but it hasn't actually purchased them. Unfortunately, China and Russia view Washington's interest in the weapons as a done deal. Consequently, both countries have begun their own research and development efforts, potentially sparking a risky new arms race. And in the meantime, American research and development efforts have prompted Russia and China to pursue similar weapons of their own that could be deployed in as little as a decade, starting an arms race that could place the continental US at risk. Adapted from the source document.
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 37-53
ISSN: 1530-9177
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 37-53
ISSN: 0163-660X, 0147-1465
World Affairs Online
In: Adelphi series, Band 50, Heft 417, S. 109-127
ISSN: 1944-558X
In: Adelphi series, Band 50, Heft 417, S. 101-106
ISSN: 1944-558X
In: Adelphi series, Band 50, Heft 417, S. 39-56
ISSN: 1944-558X
In: Adelphi series, Band 50, Heft 417, S. 25-38
ISSN: 1944-558X
In: Adelphi series, Band 50, Heft 417, S. 71-82
ISSN: 1944-558X