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In: Mathematics and Politics; Textbooks in Mathematical Sciences, S. 96-113
In: Political studies, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 301-310
ISSN: 0032-3217
A review of books by John Bonner, Politics, Economics and Welfare (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986); Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland [Eds], Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge U Press, 1986); & Michale Laver, Social Choice and Public Policy (Oxford & New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986 [see listings in IRPS No. 43]). Bonner's work introduces the main elements of social choice theory to undergraduates, & presents the concepts of social welfare, utility, rationality, interpersonal comparisons, &, especially, the issue of deriving aggregate or collective welfare functions. Laver's work is also directed toward undergraduates, but its somewhat novel approach should give it a wider audience. The problem of collective action is at the core of the text. A framework for a general comparative discussion of policy outcomes in different systems is developed. The Elster & Hylland work is a collection of essays addressing substantive issues in social choice theory. F. Rasmussen
In: Journal of Economic Surveys, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 369-392
SSRN
In: Public choice, Band 83, Heft 1-2, S. 198-200
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Studies in Economic Design
Theory of social choice mechanisms is a comparatively new theory. The first results were obtained as early as the beginning of the seventies. The book contains the most important results of the theory. In two main topics the book describes what mechanisms allow equilibrium solutions at any agents` preference profiles, and what outcomes can be implemented. The answer depends on the equilibrium concept. Furthermore the four equilibrium concepts Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium, equilibrium in dominant strategies, and the core were described in detail
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 1-39
In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, S. 731-831
In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, S. 335-366
Intro -- Social Choice Theory -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Guide to Chapter Dependencies -- To the Student -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 0. What is Social Choice Theory? -- Chapter 1. Simple Majority Voting -- Chapter 2. The Voting Paradox -- Chapter 3. Single-Peakedness -- Chapter 4. Chaos -- Chapter 5. Other Voting Extensions -- Chapter 6. Social Choice Rules -- Chapter 7. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- Chapter 8. Power -- Chapter 9. Rights -- Chapter 10. Strategy-Proofness -- Chapter 11. Counterthreats -- Chapter 12. Approval Voting -- Chapter 13. Mistakes -- Mathematical Appendix -- Answers and Hints to Selected Exercises -- Subject Index.
In: Mathematics and Politics; Textbooks in Mathematical Sciences, S. 241-272