Comparing Public Procurement Auctions
In: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Band (2), S. 391-419
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In: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Band (2), S. 391-419
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In: International Economic Review, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 391-419
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In: European journal of political economy, Band 35, S. 122-127
ISSN: 1873-5703
In this paper we theoretically analyse effects of corruption in public procurements within a scoring-auction framework. A corrupt politician, who acts on behalf of the public sector, receives a kickback from the winning bidder. The politician selects the scoring rule. The paper shows that such corruption always leads to lower quality and lower price. Given a level of corruption, a higher bargaining power of the politician in extracting bribes does not affect the quality but leads to higher price. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 35, S. 122-127
In: Review of Industrial Organization, Forthcoming
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In: Management Science, Band 61, Heft 12, S. 2945–2962
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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 49, Heft 2, S. 398-426
ISSN: 1756-2171
AbstractWe analyze a regime change from beauty contests to first‐price sealed‐bid and scoring auctions, using Swedish data on public procurement of cleaning services. In beauty contests, the lowest bid often lost, leaving substantial money on the table. The procurement costs were similar before and after the regime change: (i) Entry strongly decreases the procurement cost but did not change. Entry would have decreased had the municipalities not adjusted the objects of auctions. (ii) Municipalities favored in‐house suppliers in the old regime, leading to more aggressive bidding by others. With favoritism reduced, these changes balanced each other out.
In this dissertation, I investigate how different aspects of the procurement process and evaluation affect bidding behavior. In essay 1, we attempt to map public procurements in Sweden by gathering a representative sample of procurements. We find that framework agreements and multiple-contract procurements represent a very large share of total government spending. The total value procured by government authorities, municipalities and counties accounts to 215 BSEK yearly, which we believe is an underestimate due to data issues. Essay 2 suggests a simple method for of estimating bidding costs in public procurement, and are empirically estimated to be approximately 2 percent of the procurement value using a comprehensive dataset and approximately 0.5 percent for a more homogeneous road re-pavement dataset. Our method provides reasonable estimates with, compared to other methods, relatively low data requirements. Essay 3 investigates the effect of quality evaluation on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Contrary to common belief, SMEs' participation does not increase when evaluating quality, and their probability to win procurements decreases compared with that of large firms. In essay 4, the bidders' decision to apply for a procurement review "appeal" is investigated. Contrary to procurers' beliefs, evaluating quality is found not to have any statistically significant effect on the probability of appeals. Instead, I empirically confirm theoretical prediction of the 1st runner-up's decision to claim the evaluation to be redone, as well as free-riding in appealing. In essay 5, we test whether spatial econometrics can be used to test for collusion in procurement data. We apply this method on a known cartel and test during and after the period the cartel was active. Our estimates support the proposition that spatial econometrics can be used to test for collusive behavior.
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In: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-107910
Throughout the world, green public procurement (GPP) has become an established environmental policy instrument. Advocates of this purchasing policy argue that the public sector can use its buyer power to incentivize industries into becoming less environmentally damaging. I study how GPP is organized in Sweden and the potential supplier's response to varying buyer market shares. The level of GPP stringency is found to vary systematically with authority type, buyer market share, and political coalition in the relevant council or the Swedish Parliament. The results indicate quite substantial dispersion in GPP stringency and suggest a low degree of coordination when implementing the policy. After controlling for GPP stringency and other covariates, buyer market share is positively associated with the probability of potential suppliers submitting a bid. ; Manuskriptet tidigare publicerat i serien: Umeå Economic Studies; Nr 913, Tuesday, August 25, 2015.
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In: Journal of economic development, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 35-57
ISSN: 2636-0578
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 914-934
ISSN: 1756-2171
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in public procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a general characterization of both mechanisms based on public scrutiny requirements and show—contrary to conventional wisdom—that an intransparent negotiation always yields higher social surplus than a transparent auction. Moreover, there exists a lower bound on the number of sellers such that the negotiation also generates a higher buyer surplus.
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In: Annals of public and cooperative economics, Band 77, Heft 4, S. 395-399
ISSN: 1467-8292
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