Product Differentiation
In: Markets and Organization, S. 487-505
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In: Markets and Organization, S. 487-505
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 235-261
ISSN: 1935-1704
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impacts of product differentiation in general oligopolistic equilibrium with trade. With constant wages, when product differentiation increases, the extensive margins of home and foreign exports decrease, and the domestic and foreign scopes of variety in each industry increase unambiguously. However, the impact of product differentiation on the labor requirement of each firm is mixed. In general equilibrium, an increment of product differentiation increases the wage rate unambiguously if the total variety of goods is large enough in all industry. However, if all firms are single-product ones, an increment of product differentiation increases the wage rate unambiguously in general equilibrium.
The effects of the delegation of control to managers are investigated in a duopolistic market for differentiated goods. It appears that delegation is profitable to shareholders under Cournot competiton, provided that the rival firm maximizes profit.
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In: Bulletin of economic research, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 1-28
ISSN: 1467-8586
In: Journal of economics, Band 142, Heft 1, S. 1-43
ISSN: 1617-7134
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In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 84, Heft 3, S. 691-701
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In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 1611-1619
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
In this paper, we study how input prices affect product differentiation in network industries. In particular, we study whether the principle of vertical differentiation (Choi and Shin 1992, "A Comment on a Model of Vertical Product Differentiation." The Journal of Industrial Economics 40 (2):229–31; Wauthy 1996, "Quality Choice in Models of Vertical Differentiation." The Journal of Industrial Economics 44 (3):345–53) remains valid when an entrant purchases an essential input from an incumbent at a regulated price. We find that the higher quality firm always chooses the best available quality, whereas the lower quality firm chooses an intermediate quality, which increases with the input price. If the higher quality firm is the incumbent, a cost-oriented input price maximizes welfare, but comes at the cost of a lower average quality, a higher degree of product differentiation, and therefore stronger downstream market power.
In: Moscow University Economics Bulletin, Band 2019, Heft 1, S. 50-70
In this paper we present the results of the analysis of firm behavior in two-sided market with product differentiation. Based on the developed model, we study the conditions when it is profitably for a firm to launch two versions of a product: full and test platform models. In our analysis we draw on the methods of microeconomics, industrial economics, game theory and contract theory. The main conclusions confirm the benefit from versioning strategy in a firm in case of strong indirect network effects in the market between the two groups of agents. Product versioning allows the firm to separate agents more effectively: the first group with high product and connection value and the second group that generates high network effects. We noted that product differentiation is preferable for agents from the second group.
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 105-122
ISSN: 1935-1704
Abstract
We consider final goods producers' preference for horizontal product differentiation in the presence of strategic input price determination. Final goods producers may not prefer maximal differentiation but may prefer moderate differentiation under both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the final goods market if product differentiation does not increase the market size significantly and there is either free entry in the input market or the input supplier has increasing returns to scale technology. Thus, we provide a new rationale for moderate product differentiation. Our reasons are different from the existing reasons of mixed pricing strategy, endogenous leadership, no-buy option for the consumers and the relative performance incentive schemes.
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 523-545
ISSN: 1540-5982
Abstract. This is a successive oligopoly model with two varieties of a final product. Downstream firms choose one variety to sell on a final market. Upstream firms specialize in the production of one input specifically designed for one variety, but they also produce the input for the other variety at an extra cost. We show that as more downstream firms choose one particular variety, more upstream firms specialize in the input specific to that variety, and vice‐versa. Multiple equilibria may result, and the softening effect of product differentiation on competition might not be strong enough to induce maximal differentiation. JEL Classification: L11, L13, L23
We study subgame-perfect equilibria of the classical quality-price, multistage game of vertical product differentiation. Each firm can choose the levels of an arbitrary number of qualities. Consumers' valuations are drawn from independent and general distributions. The unit cost of production is increasing and convex in qualities. We characterize equilibrium prices, and the equilibrium effects of qualities on the rival's price in the general model. We present necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium differentiation in any of the qualities.
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There are few industries in modern market economies that do not manufacture differentiated products. This book provides a systematic explanation and analysis of the widespread prevalence of this important category of products. The authors concentrate on models in which product selection is endogenous. In the first four chapters they consider models that try to predict the level of product differentiation that would emerge in situations of market equilibrium. These market equilibria with differentiated products are characterised and then compared with social welfare optima. Particular attention is paid to the distinction between horizontal and vertical differentiation as well as to the related issues of product quality and durability. This book brings together the most important theoretical contributions to these topics in a succinct and coherent manner. One of its major strengths is the way in which it carefully sets out the basic intuition behind the formal results. It will be useful to advanced undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in industrial economics and microeconomic theory
In: Economics Letters, Band 174
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This paper analyses price competition between two firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated goods. These are assumed to be credence goods, as consumers can hardly ascertain the quality of the commodities. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique price equilibrium and we characterize it. To illustrate the model, we adapt it to represent a newspapers' industry with two outlets, when the population of readers have preferences both on the political stance of the newspapers and on the accuracy of news they dispatch.
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