Suchergebnisse

In spite of extent of economy development in one country, every corporation faces up with same problems connected with corporate governance. Problems are ownership, shareholders rights and control. The way to acquire ownership is by buying shares of company. Ownership is connected with making essential decisions in corporation like changing statute of firm, allowing new stock market flotation, etc. There are two types of ownership: widespread or dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership. Dispersed ownership is characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries (United Kingdom and United States) where one-tier system is representative model of corporate governance. Dispersed ownership means that every single packet of shares is smaller than 20% of total shares in corporation. On the other hand concentrated ownership characterizes presence of ultimate owner(s) in company. Ultimate owner is person who holds more than 20% of shares in firm. If shareholder holds more than 50% of shares he is major shareholder what means that he has control over company. Concentrated ownership is characteristic of continental Europe and Japan where is presented two-tier model of corporate governance. Law and other institutional rules, like rules for listed companies of stock market, must guarantee the shareholder rights. Today, every country accepts Principles of Corporate Governance published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Further more, the transitional countries, as Russia, must pass and respect laws, which protect shareholders rights. Control of management is one of the ways to protect shareholder rights. Control could be internal and external. Audit or Supervisory board is main part of internal control. Independent external auditor who is in relation with company does external control by contract of giving services. It is important that all auditors (internal of external) be independent of management of corporations. In this paper, we try to adduce main problems of modern corporate governance as ownership control and shareholders rights.

AbstractWe examine the relation between risk and ownership structure among depository institutions. The empirical results provide evidence that the relation between managerial ownership and depository institution risk is negative and significant, suggesting that as managerial ownership increases the level of risk‐taking decreases. This finding, which supports a risk aversion hypothesis, is consistent across several market‐based risk measures. Furthermore, we document greater risk and greater risk aversion for savings institutions relative to commercial banks.

The purpose of this article is to provide further evidence on the functional form of relationship between management ownership and earnings management in the Japanese context. Applying regression model with third-order polynomial like Teshima and Shuto (2008) , this study finds evidence of non-monotonic (cubic) relationship between management ownership and earnings management which supports alignment–entrenchment–alignment hypothesis. However, this study attempts to confirm the robustness of such findings with two additional approaches, namely piecewise linear regression and third-order polynomial regression with mean-centring adjustment. Unlike initial results, further evidence indicates that though the relationship between management ownership and earnings management is non-linear but the nature is quadratic ('U'-shaped) which supports alignment–entrenchment hypothesis. Such conflicting findings will surely assist the future researchers to be cautious in designing non-linear models while investigating the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management.

The Government has regulated CSR activities through Law No. 40 Year 2007 regarding Limited Liability Company. Mentioned that the company must perform and disclose CSR activities, especially companies that related to natural resources such as mining companies. The objective is to know the effect of company size, profitability, leverage, and management ownership on the level of CSR disclosure of mining companies listed on BEI during the period of 2014-2017. Using secondary data from annual report and financial report. The samples sum up to a total of ten companies with a four-year observation period, resulting in a total of 40 observational data. The method used in this research is multiple linear regression using SPSS 22.0 program. The result of the research shows that (1) firm size has positive effect on CSR disclosure level, (2) profitability and leverage has no effect on CSR disclosure level; (3) management ownership negatively affect CSR disclosure level. This finding contributes to the future research, companies, creditors, investors, and government.

In this study, we examine the impact of ownership structure on the receivables management of Indian corporate firms. We argue that owners' incentives to monitor manager's actions increase with the increase in their stake holding. Therefore, firms with concentrated promoter and institutional ownership should have lower receivables in terms of its sales. Our results obtained using a panel of 1,164 firms show a negative relationship between the percentage of promoter holding and the receivables ratio. Further, for growing firms, both promoter and institutional shareholdings have a negative impact. However, the firm size effect did not show any impact on the relationship between ownership concentration and receivables ratio.