Suchergebnisse

IN A CORPORATION WITH MANY SMALL OWNERS, IT MAY NOT PAY ANY ONE OF THEM TO MONITOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MANAGEMENT. WE EXPLORE A MODEL IN WHICH THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROVIDES A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THIS FREE-RIDER PROBLEM. THE MODEL SHEDS LIGHT ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL WE OBSERVE A TENDER OFFER AS OPPOSED TO A PROXY FIGHT OR AN INTERNAL MANAGEMENT SHAKE-UP? HOW STRONG ARE THE FORCES PUSHING TOWARD INCREASING CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP OF A DIFFUSELY HELD FIRM? WHY DO CORPORATE AND PERSONAL INVESTORS COMMONLY HOLD STOCK IN THE SAME FIRM, DESPITE THEIR DISPARATE TAX PREFERENCES?

THERE ARE TWO TENDENCIES IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY THAT MANY HAVE NOTICED AS ISOLATED PHENOMENA, BUT THAT FEW CONNECT WITH EACH OTHER. THE FIRST IS THE ENDURING DECLINE OF MOST U.S. WORKERS' REAL WAGES. THE SECOND IS THE TOP-HEAVY BLOATED SCALE OF U.S. CORPORATE BUREAUCRACIES, THESE TWO TENDENCIES ARE NEITHER ACCIDENTAL NOR COINCIDENTAL BUT STRUCTURALLY LINKED AND MUTUALLY INTERDEPENDENT. THE AUTHOR EXPLORES THE NATURE OF THIS CONNECTION.

THE AUTHORS ANALYZE THE FORCES AT WORK IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN CORPORATE SPACE AT BOTH THE NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL LEVELS. THEY COMBINE A COMPARATIVE WITH AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE AND ARGUE AGAINST ANALYSES THAT MINIMIZE THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND EXPLAIN THE CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN CAPITALISM SOLELY IN TERMS OF GLOBALIZATION-DRIVEN, NEOLIBERAL CONVERGENCE. AFTER DISCUSSING THE VARIETY OF EUROPE'S NATIONAL CAPITALISMS, THEY ARGUE THAT A NUMBER OF MECHANISMS ARE INDUCING CHANGE: COMPETITIVE PRESSURES ON PRODUCERS, THE LIBERALIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS, THE GROWING ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS, AND THE EQUALLY POTENT ROLE OF NON-ECONOMIC DOMESTIC ACTORS IN INTERNALIZING EXTERNAL PRESSURES. THEY ANALYZE THESE EFFECTS IN THREE CRITICAL AREAS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE, AND THE BALANCE BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOR IN NETWORKED SYSTEMS.

THIS PAPER OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE REPEATED OCCURRENCE OF MIDDLE EAST "ENERGY CONFLICT." THIS ANALYSIS CENTERS AROUND THE PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, EMPHASIZING THE QUEST TO EXCEED THE "NORMAL RATE OF RETURN" AND TO EXPAND ONE'S SHARE IN THE OVERALL FLOW OF PROFIT. WITH THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN CAPITALISM, THE DICTATES OF DIFFERENTIAL ACCUMULATION BECOME AN EVER STRONGER UNIFYING FORCE, DRAWING BOTH STATE MANAGERS AND CORPORATE EXECUTIVES INTO INCREASINGLY INEXTRICABLE POWER-DRIVEN ALLIANCES. OVER THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY, THE PROGRESSIVE POLITICIZATION OF THE OIL BUSINESS, TOGETHER WITH THE GROWING COMMERCIALIZATION OF ARMS TRANSFERS HELPED SHAPE AN UNEASY "WEAPONDOLLAR-PETRODOLLAR COALITION" BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND PETROLEUM COMPANIES. AS THEIR ENVIRONMENT BECAME INTERTWINED WITH THE BROADER POLITICAL REALIGNMENT OF OPEC AND THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, THE DIFFERENTIAL PROFITS OF THESE COMPANIES GREW EVERMORE DEPENDENT ON THE PRECARIOUS INTERACTION BETWEEN RISING OIL PRICES AND EXPANDING ARMS EXPORTS EMANATING FORM SUCCESSIVE MIDDLE EAST ENERGY CONFLICTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THESE COMPANIES WERE NOT PASSIVE BYSTANDERS. THIS IS SUGGESTED FIRSTLY BY THE VERY CLOSE CORRELATION EXISTING BETWEEN THEIR ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE REGION'S OIL REVENUES AND, SECONDLY, BY THE FACT THAT EVERY SINGLE "ENERGY CONFLICT" SINCE THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR COULD HAVE BEEN PREDICTED SOLELY BY ADVERSE SETBACKS TO THE DIFFEREPY: 1995

THESE AUTHORS PUT FORTH THE THESIS THAT MORE THAN A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF ALLEGEDLY NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS DO, IN FACT, OPERATE FOR PROFIT, CAUSING VARIOUS SORTS OF ABUSES TO OCCUR. ALTHOUGH THEY CANNOT ESTABLISH THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH THESE ABUSES OCCUR, THEY DO IDENTIFY THE MAJOR TYPES OF ABUSES WHICH OCCUR AND OUTLINE A NUMBER OF WAYS TO CURB THEM.