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The article studies whether financial sector (in)stability had an effect on reforms in the financial sector in a large cross-country panel from 1990 to 2005. We forward the theory that countries are more likely to liberalize their financial sectors in times of financial stability. We argue that politicians are less likely to undertake financial reforms if they face a strong lobby in the financial sector which is able to block reforms that are not in its interest. Our empirical results suggest that financial instability leads to regulations, while financial stability is found to induce liberalizations. We also find that weaker financial lobbies are unable to block financial reforms while strong lobbies can effectively stop reforms.

The article studies whether financial sector (in)stability had an effect on reforms in the financial sector in a large cross-country panel from 1990 to 2005. We forward the theory that countries are more likely to liberalize their financial sectors in times of financial stability. We argue that politicians are less likely to undertake financial reforms if they face a strong lobby in the financial sector which is able to block reforms that are not in its interest. Our empirical results suggest that financial instability leads to regulations, while financial stability is found to induce liberalizations. We also find that weaker financial lobbies are unable to block financial reforms while strong lobbies can effectively stop reforms.

International audience ; The financial crisis has revealed the dysfunction of all banking and financial regulatory mechanisms. Prudential regulation failed to prevent the meltdown. Market discipline neglected to send any warning signals. Internal control was seriously undermined by doubtful dealings, in France as elsewhere. Does the crisis call the big three into question? No regulation mechanism is omniscient, whether it be state, market or self-regulation. As such, none of three can operate without the other two, with the corollary that they can only function together. It means that splitting up the big three can therefore not be the answer to the crisis. By contrast, since each one of them has shown its weaknesses, the only solution is to work on reinforcing each one. Unfortunately there is no guarantee that the reforms go far enough.

International audience ; The financial crisis has revealed the dysfunction of all banking and financial regulatory mechanisms. Prudential regulation failed to prevent the meltdown. Market discipline neglected to send any warning signals. Internal control was seriously undermined by doubtful dealings, in France as elsewhere. Does the crisis call the big three into question? No regulation mechanism is omniscient, whether it be state, market or self-regulation. As such, none of three can operate without the other two, with the corollary that they can only function together. It means that splitting up the big three can therefore not be the answer to the crisis. By contrast, since each one of them has shown its weaknesses, the only solution is to work on reinforcing each one. Unfortunately there is no guarantee that the reforms go far enough.

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries

The Great Recession of 2007-2009 piqued the interest of policymakers worldwide, prompting various initiatives to stabilize the financial system and advance financial inclusion. However, few studies have considered their interconnectedness or whether any synergies or trade-offs exist between them. This paper investigates how financial inclusion affects the stability of the European banking system. The findings indicate that advancements in financial inclusion through more account ownership and digital payments have a stabilizing effect on the banking industry. A deeper investigation shows that such a stabilizing impact is mainly driven by the targeting of disadvantaged adults who are young, undereducated, unemployed, and who live in rural areas. Hence, along with its known benefits to society as a whole, financial inclusion has the additional benefit of improving the stability of the financial system. Such findings call for policy configurations that are specifically designed to achieve financial inclusion for disadvantaged individuals.

The Great Recession of 2007-2009 piqued the interest of policymakers worldwide, prompting various initiatives to stabilize the financial system and advance financial inclusion. However, few studies have considered their interconnectedness or whether any synergies or trade-offs exist between them. This paper investigates how financial inclusion affects the stability of the European banking system. The findings indicate that advancements in financial inclusion through more account ownership and digital payments have a stabilizing effect on the banking industry. A deeper investigation shows that such a stabilizing impact is mainly driven by the targeting of disadvantaged adults who are young, undereducated, unemployed, and who live in rural areas. Hence, along with its known benefits to society as a whole, financial inclusion has the additional benefit of improving the stability of the financial system. Such findings call for policy configurations that are specifically designed to achieve financial inclusion for disadvantaged individuals.

This paper explores the financial stability implications of mark-to market accounting, in particular its tendency to amplify financial cycles and the "reach for yield". Market prices play a dual role. Not only do they serve as a signal of the underlying fundamentals and the actions taken by market participants, they also serve a certification role and thereby influence these actions. When actions affect prices, and prices affect actions, the loop thus created can generate amplified responses - both in creating bubble-like booms in asset prices, and also in magnifying distress episodes in downturns.

This paper explores the financial stability implications of mark-to market accounting, in particular its tendency to amplify financial cycles and the "reach for yield". Market prices play a dual role. Not only do they serve as a signal of the underlying fundamentals and the actions taken by market participants, they also serve a certification role and thereby influence these actions. When actions affect prices, and prices affect actions, the loop thus created can generate amplified responses - both in creating bubble-like booms in asset prices, and also in magnifying distress episodes in downturns.

The transparency of credit institutions is currently an issue of crucial importance not only with regard to the adaptation of regulatory tools (Basle II, IAS-IFRS international norms etc.)but also to the banking, financial and economic consequences. The current crisis places the importance of information about all banking activities centre stage in any debate. At a time when banks are controlled more than ever before, it is surprising to see them being swamped with criticism about their opaqueness and their reluctance to communicate, especially about the risks they are taking. This paper therefore, presents state of the art works on disclosure and bank transparency.It deals with questioning whether it is beneficial or not to increase disclosure levels in order to improve the discipline that the regulators and the markets exert on the banks.