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Centralisation of political decision making often fails to produce the desired results. For instance, it is frequently argued that decision making within the European Union results in overspending and overregulation in some policy areas, while too low spending and too little regulation prevails in other policy areas. In this paper, we study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over the amounts of public goods provided by jurisdictions. Following Besley and Coate (2000) we show that local policy makers have an incentive to delegate bargaining to 'public good lovers' if all the cost of public goods are shared through a common budget. Consequently, overprovision of public goods results. If a sufficiently large part of the cost of public goods can not be shared among regions, underprovision of public goods persists under centralised decision making because local policy makers delegate bargaining to 'conservatives'. Underprovision is strongest when spillover effects are moderate: both in the absence of spillover effects and in the case of global public goods, centralised decision making produces the social optimum. Finally, we study financing rules that may help to avoid strategic delegation by local policy makers.

We provide an explanation for why centralisation of political decision making results in overspending in some policy domains, whereas toolow spending persists in others. We study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over local public goods provision. If all of thecosts of public goods are shared through a common budget, policymakers delegate bargaining to `public good lovers', resulting inoverprovision of public goods. If a sufficiently large part of the costs can no be shared, underprovision persists because policy makers delegate bargaining to `conservatives'. We derive financing rules that eliminate the incentives for strategic delegation.Keywords: Centralised decision making, strategic delegation, financing rules.

This paper identifies factors to be looked at when considering the extent to which decisions within government should be centralised or decentralised. In practice, the solution is almost always likely to involve a balance between centralised and decentralised decision-making. Nevertheless there are a number of common factors that are generally applicable to questions of centralisation and decentralisation. This paper identifies those factors in order to provide some guidance for decisions regarding the location of decision rights. Rather than being prescriptive, the paper simply presents the relevant issues for consideration. Centralisation (or decentralisation) is a complex and multi-dimensional issue. It is partly for this reason that the paper does not suggest any specific solutions. The solution in any particular case will involve tradeoffs between the factors identified in the paper as well as value judgements regarding the ranking of the various factors. In determining the appropriate balance between centralised and decentralised decisions, various factors are in tension. Centralisation can help ensure uniform and consistent standards, minimise inequalities, avoid the duplication of services, allow for the achievement of economies of scale, and increase coherence and coordination. Decentralisation, on the other hand, can help enhance local autonomy and empowerment, encourage customisation and innovation, and increase participation. Economic, social, managerial and constitutional perspectives offer a number of theoretical frameworks that are useful in considering issues of centralisation/ decentralisation. This paper draws together ideas from across these perspectives. It concludes that the solution is likely to be characterised by a "tight/loose" pattern whereby there is "tight" or centralised control over the major objectives that is then joined by "loose" or decentralised discretion over the ways in which those objectives are achieved to varying degrees.

Purpose
Decision-making structures are commonly associated with the logistics challenges experienced during disaster operations. However, the alignment between the operational level and the decision-making structure is commonly overlooked. The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the fit of both levels and its impact on performance.


Design/methodology/approach
The research is developed around a case study in Mexico. Through a review of the disaster management policy in the country, interviews and secondary data, the paper provides an analysis of the current decision-making structure, the logistics activities undertaken by authorities and the impact of the alignment between both components on logistics performance.


Findings
The analysis suggests that several of the challenges commonly associated with centralisation are actually rooted on its alignment with the operational level. The logistics performance is negatively affected by faulty assumptions, poorly planned procedures, inconsistent decision-making and poorly designed structures. The case showed the need to align the operational level with a centralised perspective to increase responsiveness, flexibility and the interaction between different organisations.


Originality/value
This paper identifies the impact of the misalignment between the decision-making structure and the operational level on logistics performance, an area currently understudied. It moves from the current argument about the appropriate decision-making structure for disaster management to the identification of components to implement an efficient and effective disaster management system. Additionally, this paper provides recommendations for best practices in humanitarian logistics, which are applicable to Mexico and other countries using a centralised decision-making approach.

This article examines the organisational models of decision-making regarding care placements in child welfare. Many countries currently report reorganising and economising their services and greater use of independent and voluntary agencies, all of which will have a direct and indirect influence on placement decisions about children in care. Very little is known about how public authorities make these decisions, what processes achieve the best option for a child and how different organisational models interact with front-line decision-making. The article is based on a study of placement decisions in Finland. The data comprise 49 phone interviews and five focus group interviews with social workers and their managers in charge of substitute care in different municipalities. The analysis presents three decision-making models: the holistic model, the shared expertise model and the centralised model. Each of these rests on different understandings of knowledge, expertise and client participation. The study predicts that the centralised model is likely to become more common due to the reorganisation of social services. While this may strengthen the managerial process and enhance the quality of decision-making, it is likely to diminish the relationship-based casework that is typical for the holistic model.

This paper discusses two contemporary trends in local decision-making. Firstly, there seems to be more centralised decision-making today than before in important policy fields such as welfare policy. Secondly, informal governance processes outside formal government structures open up for a substantial influence from non-elected political actors. The paper asserts that there is a connection between the trends, and argues that the centralisation tendencies in welfare issues might affect and encourage governance processes in other local policy arenas. These policy fields are mainly within the so-called 'developmental policies' that often facilitate more networking and partnership activities in 'grey areas' between the public, private and civil sectors in collective problem solving. Accordingly, more attention should be given to policy fields where governance networks operate, and the implications for revitalising democratic political participation should be studied. The paper concludes that the well-established rationales for local self-government and local democracy need to be reconsidered by taking into account these new decision-making structures.