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Cover -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Review Of Existing Datasets -- III. Methodological Considerations -- IV. Overview of the Global Debt Database -- V. Global Debt Trends -- VI. Conclusion And Way Forward -- BOXES -- 1. A Multidimensional Approach to Debt Statistics: The Example of Mexico -- A.1.1. Compilation of the Global Debt Database -- FIGURES -- 1. Private Debt Coverage in Approach 2 vs. IIP Approach -- 2. Country Coverage in the Global Debt Database -- 3. Country Coverage in the Global Debt Database -- 4. Private Debt: Country Coverage in Global Debt Database vs. Existing Datasets -- 5. Public Debt: Country Coverage in the Global Debt Database vs. Existing Datasets -- 6. Largest Debtors by Income Group, 2016 -- 7. Total Debt -- 8. Change in Public and Private Debt -- 9. Total Debt: World and G20 -- 10. Contribution to Total Debt by Income Group -- 11. Private Debt by Income Group -- 12. Public Debt by Income Group -- 13. Total Debt by Region -- 14. Private Debt by Region -- 15. Public Debt by Region -- A.1.1. Global Debt Database: Country Coverage -- TABLES -- 1. Comparison of Existing Debt Datasets -- 2. Selected Countries and Income Group: Total Debt -- A.1.1. Global Debt Database: Characteristics of Private Debt Data -- A.2.1. Classification by Income Group -- A.2.2. Classification by Region -- ANNEXES -- I. The Global Debt Database: Definitions, Methodology and Sources -- II. Country Classification

Chile is nowadays considered to have the most successful programme of debt conversion among debtor countries. However, the Chilean debt conversion programme presents some shortcomings. In fact, as this study shows, the conversion scheme may have negative effects regarding direct foreign investment and the balance of payments

Front Cover -- Table of Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Part I Overview -- Overview -- Key Messages of the 2020 Data Are as Follows -- Aggregate Financial Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries -- External Debt Stocks in 2020 -- External Debt Flows in 2020 -- IDA Borrowers Eligible for the DSSI -External Debt Stocks and Flows -- Debt Indicators 2011-2020 -- Equity Flows in 2020 -- Supporting Debt Transparency -- Part II Aggregate and Country Tables -- All Low- and Middle-Income Countries -- East Asia and Pacific -- Europe and Central Asia -- Latin America and the Caribbean -- South Asia -- Sub-Saharan Africa -- Afghanistan -- Albania -- Algeria -- Angola -- Argentina -- Armenia -- Azernaijan -- Bangladesh -- Belarus -- Belize -- Benin -- Bhutan -- Bolivia, Plurinational State of -- Bosnia and Herzegovina -- Botswana -- Brazil -- Bulgaria -- Burkina Faso -- Burundi -- Cabo Verde -- Cambodia -- Cameroon -- Central African Republic -- Chad -- China -- Colombia -- Comoros -- Congo, Democratic Republic of -- Congo, Republic of -- Costa Rica -- Côte d'Ivoire -- Djibouti -- Dominica -- Dominican Republic -- Ecuador -- Egypt, Arab Republic of -- El Salvador -- Eritrea -- Eswatini -- Ethiopia -- Fiji -- Gabon -- Gambia, the -- Georgia -- Ghana -- Grenada -- Guatemala -- Guinea -- Guinea-Bissau -- Guyana -- Haiti -- Honduras -- India -- Indonesia -- Iran, Islamic Republic of -- Jamaica -- Jordan -- Kazakhstan -- Kenya -- Kosovo -- Kyrgyz Republic -- Lao People's Democratic Republic -- Lebanon -- Lesotho -- Liberia -- Madagascar -- Malawi -- Maldives -- Mali -- Mauritania -- Mauritius -- Mexico -- Moldova -- Mongolia -- Montenegro -- Morocco -- Mozambique -- Myanmar -- Nepal -- Nicaragua -- Niger -- Nigeria -- North Macedonia -- Pakistan -- Panama -- Papua New Guinea -- Paraguay -- Peru -- Philippines -- Romania -- Russian Federation -- Rwanda.

Front Cover -- Table of Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Part I Overview -- Executive Summary -- Aggregate Financial Flows to Low-and Middle-Income Countries -- External Debt Stocks in 2019 -- External Debt Flows in 2019 -- Supporting Debt Data Transparency -- IDA Borrowers Eligible for the DSSI: External Debt Stocks and Flows -- Debt Indicators, 2010-2019 -- Equity Flows in 2019 -- Part II Aggregate and Country Tables -- All Low- and Middle-Income Countries -- East Asia and Pacific -- Europe and Central Asia -- Latin America and the Caribbean -- Middle East and North Africa -- South Asia -- Sub-Saharan Africa -- Afghanistan -- Albania -- Algeria -- Angola -- Argentina -- Armenia -- Azerbaijan -- Bangladesh -- Belarus -- Belize -- Benin -- Bhutan -- Bolivia, Plurinational State of -- Bosnia and Herzegovina -- Botswana -- Brazil -- Bulgaria -- Burkina Faso -- Burundi -- Cabo Verde -- Cambodia -- Cameroon -- Central African Republic -- Chad -- China -- Colombia -- Comoros -- Congo, Democratic Republic of -- Congo, Republic of -- Costa Rica -- Côte d'Ivoire -- Djibouti -- Dominica -- Dominican Republic -- Ecuador -- Egypt, Arab Republic of -- El Salvador -- Eritrea -- Eswatini -- Ethiopia -- Fiji -- Gabon -- Gambia, The -- Georgia -- Ghana -- Grenada -- Guatemala -- Guinea -- Guinea-Bissau -- Guyana -- Haiti -- Honduras -- India -- Indonesia -- Iran, Islamic Republic of -- Jamaica -- Jordan -- Kazakhstan -- Kenya -- Kosovo -- Kyrgyz Republic -- Lao People's Democratic Republic -- Lebanon -- Lesotho -- Liberia -- Madagascar -- Malawi -- Maldives -- Mali -- Mauritania -- Mexico -- Moldova -- Mogolia -- Montenegro -- Morocco -- Mozambique -- Myanmar -- Nepal -- Nicaragua -- Niger -- Nigeria -- North Macedonia -- Pakistan -- Papua New Guinea -- Paraguay -- Peru -- Philippines -- Russian Federation -- Rwanda -- Samoa -- São Tomé and Príncipe.

Since the 1950s, the need to raise the debt ceiling, the statutory limit to the borrowing authority of the federal government, has created highly contentious votes in Congress. In some cases, full blown debt ceiling crisis has resulted, in which default appeared a distinct possibility. This paper attempts to explain why periodic debt ceiling crises take place. It concludes that debt ceiling crises are the product of increased national debt and more frequent instances of divided government, coupled with heightened levels of partisanship and party polarization in the post-1950 period. These conclusions are supplemented by case studies of three debt ceiling crises: 1985, 1995-1996, and the summer of 2011.

The United States' borrowing poses a potential threat to its long-term external power. This is not because the United States' fiscal debt is large in relative terms, or because rising debt necessarily threatens a state's power, but because the United States has now indebted itself to China, and this financial relationship fundamentally changes the political terms on which the United States has borrowed since the 1960s. The consequences of that change may force American presidents to consider questions about the domestic viability of their foreign policy in a way that has not been necessary since the beginnings of the Cold War. Neither liberals nor realists are equipped to understand the significance of this change, because of the way in which they conceive power in relation to the interaction between domestic and international politics.

At the height of the Washington feeding frenzy about the fiscal cliff, the debt ceiling, and sequestration, austerity hawks coined a new label to denigrate lawmakers who were opposed to cutbacks brought on by the cynical manipulation of national debt: "debt deniers." It was a savvy way of turning the tables on those who had gotten traction out of depicting the GOP as hopelessly afflicted by "climate denial." This past year finally saw the climate change threat acknowledged by the worlds leading international finance institutions. Both the IMF and the World Bank have acknowledged that the brunt of the impact will be borne by some of the poorest populations in the world, further jeopardizing their prospects for sustainable development. But neither institution has encouraged, let alone pressed, rich nations to pay climate debts to developing countries that have already felt the effects of climate change. Adapted from the source document.

The paper generally describes the segment of public debt management or especially the structure of public debt. It focuses on different kinds of risks which present potential danger for the public debt explosion. It intends to explain the government goal for borrowing money at lowest rate and sustain the fiscal stability. Also, it explains some practical issues regarding this topic for Republic of Macedonia for the period from 2009-2011. In the process of research were implemented several qualitative methods.