Suchergebnisse

What is required to create and sustain a political order is debated as intensively today as it has ever been. Constitutions are being written and rewritten in many parts of the world, a great many possibilities are being explored, and much that matters deeply to millions of people hangs on the results. In the eighteen chapters, all previously unpublished, that make up the present volume, major scholars address some of the most pressing questions about political order. Under what conditions do we get political order rather than political chaos? How is political order sustained once it has been created? Do constitutions and electoral systems matter, and if so how much? Is there one best type of political order, or, if not, what is the range of viable possibilities and how should they be evaluated?

AbstractThis article addresses Andrew Rehfeld's attempt to ensure a place for
political theory within political science, which he does partly by
showing how political theory fits into a defensible definition of
political science and partly by excluding much political theory from
the discipline in order to safeguard the rest. His account of what
the discipline should comprehend is overly narrow, however, and does
not serve the interests of the sorts of political theory he strongly
believes are worth doing. I argue instead that political science
must be defined by its subject matter alone, and that political
theory's contribution to this subject matter must be defended.

By presenting alternative conceptions of how to link political theory to practice and education, this volume inaugurates a discussion hitherto not often attempted by modern political philosophers. Originally published in 1980. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vas

We provide a justification for political liberalism's Reciprocity Principle, which states that political decisions must be justified exclusively on the basis of considerations that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. The standard argument for the Reciprocity Principle grounds it in a requirement of respect for persons. We argue for a different, but compatible, justification: the Reciprocity Principle is justified because it makes possible a desirable kind of political community. The general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle, we will argue, helps realize joint political rule and relationships of civic friendship. The main obstacle to the realization of these values is the presence of reasonable disagreement about religious, moral, and philosophical issues characteristic of liberal societies. We show the Reciprocity Principle helps to overcome this obstacle.

It is a question, said David Hume, "whether there be any essential difference between one form of government and another and, whether every form . . . may not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill administered," administered well by men of virtue -- that is, people of good character, wisdom, and high principle -- or administered badly by fools and knaves who know or care nothing for justice and the common good. Were it once admitted, Hume continued, "that all governments are alike, and that the only difference consists in the character and conduct of the governors, most political disputes would be at an end, and all zeal for one constitution above another, must be esteemed mere bigotry and folly." Hume imagines people who take that view adopting the maxim of Alexander Pope in the Essay on Man: "For forms of government let fools contest/Whateer is best administerd is best.". Adapted from the source document.

The most incisive twentieth century students of language converge from different premises on the conclusion that language is the key creator of the social worlds people experience, and they agree as well that language cannot usefully be understood as a tool for describing an objective reality. For the later Wittgenstein there are no essences, only language games. Chomsky analyzes the sense in which grammar is generative. For Derrida all language is performative, a form of action that undermines its own presuppositions. Foucault sees language as antedating and constructing subjectivity. The "linguistic turn" in twentieth century philosophy, social psychology, and literary theory entails an intellectual ferment that raises fundamental questions about a great deal of mainstream political science, and especially about its logical positivist premises.While the writers just mentioned analyze various senses in which language use is an aspect of creativity, those who focus upon specifically political language are chiefly concerned with its capacity to reflect ideology, mystify, and distort. The more perspicacious of them deny that an undistorting language is possible in a social world marked by inequalities in resources and status, though the notion of an undistorted language can be useful as an evocation of an ideal benchmark. The emphasis upon political language as distorting or mystifying is a key theme in Lasswell and Orwell, as it is in Habermas, Osgood, Ellul, Vygotsky, Enzensberger, Bennett, and Shapiro.

A review article of David Butler's THE STUDY OF POLITI- CAL BEHAVIOUR, with special emphasis on the fact that it is an appraisal by an American of a book by a British pol'al sci'st. There is first a short summary of the 5 'approaches' which characterize the current study of pol'al behavior.. And the bulk of the article is devoted to an analysis of why the behavioral approaches are so popular among Americans, whereas they are so conspicuously avoided by the British. 7 reasons, themselves based on an informal 'behavioral' analysis of the pol'al sci professions in the respective countries, are advanced for this diff in orientation. AA-IPSA.