Can Social Spending Cushion the Inequality Effect of Globalization?
In: Economics & Politics, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 104-142
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In: Economics & Politics, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 104-142
SSRN
In: Economics & politics, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 104-142
ISSN: 1468-0343
AbstractThis paper examines whether social spending cushions the effect of globalization on within‐country inequality. Using information on disposable and market income inequality and data on overall social spending, and health and education spending from the ILO and the World Bank/WHO, we analyze whether social spending moderates the association between economic globalization and inequality. The results confirm that economic globalization—especially economic flows—associates with higher income inequality, an effect driven by non‐OECD countries. Health spending is strongly associated with lower inequality, but we find no robust evidence that any kind of social spending negatively moderates the association between economic globalization and inequality.
This article focuses on a new form of governing that targets a selected group of teachers. Specifically, it analyses how the Swedish so-called advanced teacher reform is enacted at the local level and discusses its implications for teachers' professionalism. The methodological approach enables a local analysis in a broader international policy context. Using characteristic elements from curriculum theory to analyse the relationship between different levels and elaborating on the linguistic turn of curriculum theory, three concepts are central in the analysis: enactment, linguistic criteria and professionalism. Empirically, the study draws on material from a two-year application process in a medium-sized municipality. The result demonstrates that the local enactment process is clearly influenced by transnational policy trends and that less allowance is made for teachers' own experience-based knowledge in the second studied year. The linguistic analysis shows how the applicants using the 'right concepts' were selected to become 'advanced teachers'. As complex and qualitative aspects disappeared from the agenda, this type of governing, with its standardized use of language, may reduce schools' educational potential. Changes like this raise new questions about how schools can maintain and develop democratic and professional values whilst being exposed to new policy trends.
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This article focuses on a new form of governing that targets a selected group of teachers. Specifically, it analyses how the Swedish so-called advanced teacher reform is enacted at the local level and discusses its implications for teachers' professionalism. The methodological approach enables a local analysis in a broader international policy context. Using characteristic elements from curriculum theory to analyse the relationship between different levels and elaborating on the linguistic turn of curriculum theory, three concepts are central in the analysis: enactment, linguistic criteria and professionalism. Empirically, the study draws on material from a two-year application process in a medium-sized municipality. The result demonstrates that the local enactment process is clearly influenced by transnational policy trends and that less allowance is made for teachers' own experience-based knowledge in the second studied year. The linguistic analysis shows how the applicants using the 'right concepts' were selected to become 'advanced teachers'. As complex and qualitative aspects disappeared from the agenda, this type of governing, with its standardized use of language, may reduce schools' educational potential. Changes like this raise new questions about how schools can maintain and develop democratic and professional values whilst being exposed to new policy trends.
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 48, S. 3-15
In: Public choice, Band 172, Heft 3-4, S. 483-500
ISSN: 1573-7101
SSRN
Working paper
In the literature on political economy and public choice, it is typically assumed that government size correlates positively with public corruption. The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive, owing to both measurement problems and endogeneity. This paper creates a corruption index based on original data from a survey covering top politicians and civil servants in all Swedish municipalities. The effect of more politicians on corruption problems is analyzed using discontinuities in the required minimum size of local councils. Despite the fact that Sweden consistently has been ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world, the survey suggest that non-trivial corruption problems are present in Sweden. Municipalities with more local council seats have more reported corruption problems, and the regression discontinuity design suggests that the effect is causal. ; Funding agencies: Swedish Research Council; Torsten Soderbergs Foundation
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In: Applied Economics Letters, Band 23, Heft 10
SSRN
In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 69-88
ISSN: 1748-7889
In: IFN Working Paper No. 1077
SSRN
In: Oxford development studies, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 365-394
ISSN: 1469-9966
In: Oxford Development Studies, Band 42, Heft 3
SSRN
In this paper, we use data from a corruption survey conducted among top politicians and high level civil servants in 290 Swedish municipalities in 2007 to investigate the effects of government size on corruption. We construct several measures of corruption based on the survey, and combine these corruption measures with detailed administrative municipality level data to estimate the effect of local government resources on corruption. In cross-sectional analysis, we find a robust and negative association between total public expenditure and corruption. When we use lagged population growth rates and age structure as instruments for expenditure in 2-stage-least-squares regressions, the point estimates remain negative, but are no longer significant. In contrast with standard political economy models, where a bigger public sector is typically assumed to cause problems with corruption and public office abuse, our results suggest that corruption pressures may be particularly high when government resources are limited.
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In: IFN Working Paper No. 938
SSRN
Working paper