Suchergebnisse

The Governing Body of the International Labor Organization held its 112th session at Geneva from June 2 to 30, 1950. During consideration of an agenda of 22 items, the Governing Body completed the membership of the fact-finding and conciliation commission on freedom of association, decided to establish an ad hoc committee of five or six persons having experience in the field of occupational safetyand health to be appointed by the Director-General in consultation with officers of the Governing Body, and authorized the Director-General (Morse) to communicate the report of the Third International Pneumoconiosis Conference held at Sydney in February and March 1950 to the United Nations Secretary-General and the Director-General of the World Health Organization. The Governing Body also convened a meeting of experts to study the status and conditions of employment of domestic workers, authorized the Director-General to communicate to governments the reports, resolutions and memoranda adopted by the second session of the Chemical Industries Committee, accepted an invitation from the government of the United States of Indonesia to hold the first session of the Committee on Work in Plantations in Indonesia in December 1950, and appointed members of the Governing Body delegates to the third session of the Petroleum Committee to be held in Geneva in October and November. Other action taken by the Governing Body included acceptance of the invitation of the French government to hold the third session of the Textiles Committee in Lyons from November 28 to December 9, 1950, approved the general lines of a program of technical assistance ILO could undertake in the manpower field, noted that ILO had $2,500,000 at its disposal for its technical assistance activities, and accepted an offer by states members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation which were also members of ILO to make available to ILO $998,000 for establishment of a special fund to finance additional action in the field of migration.

The trend in transfers of major conventional arms, as measured by the SIPRI trend-indicator value, is apparently changing from a downward trend since 1997 to a more or less stable trend for 2000-2002 to a slightly upward trend in 2003-2004. Financial data from national export reports show a more or less similar change. However, it is too early to judge if this is really a trend or only a matter of annual fluctuations. Russia established itself as the main supplier of major conventional weapons for the five-year period 2000-2004, replacing the USA which was the main supplier for many years. However, even Russian officials expect a decline in Russian sales in the near future since Russian equipment is mainly based on old technology and Russian military research and development is lagging far behind. Together, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the USA made up 81% of all deliveries in 2000-2004. The combined deliveries of all 25 EU states to non-EU states made up some 19% of all deliveries in 2000-2004, making the EU the third largest exporter. China and India were the two main recipients of major conventional weapons in 2004. China is almost completely dependent on Russia for its arms imports, but its relationship is changing from a recipient of complete weapons to a recipient of components and technology to be used in Chinese weapon platforms. There are indications that China is anxious to gain access to other than Russian technology, partly because that technology is becoming outdated. India is also a major Russian client, but here Russia faces strong competition from France, the UK and other European suppliers, as well as from Israel and most recently from the USA. EU-US relations became strained in 2004 over the issue of technology transfers. The USA has been reluctant to share technology with close European allies even in joint ventures such as the F-35 JSF combat aircraft. The EU's plans to lift its arms embargo against China further strained relations. The non-binding and loosely drafted embargo was established in 1989 in reaction to Chinese human rights abuses. Today, many EU governments consider the embargo outdated and a barrier to improving Chinese-EU relations. The embargo has not stopped several European countries from supplying military technology to China, and most EU member states have argued that lifting the embargo would not mean increases in arms sales. Many EU governments feel that there should still be clear and strong limitations on the arms trade with China, either by keeping the embargo or by improving the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The USA strongly opposes lifting the embargo in order to prevent a Chinese military build-up and has threatened the EU with sanctions if the embargo is lifted. Public transparency in arms transfers increased again slightly, mainly in the EU where several countries improved their reporting and where 10 new EU members are now obliged to report under the EU Code of Conduct. At the international level, man-portable air defense systems and light artillery were added to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Adapted from the source document.

This book brings together a genealogy of thoughts on peace, war and ethics in Western political philosophy highlighting their legacies for contemporary theories on International Relations. Throughout this exciting history, the reader discovers important arguments against some of the mainstream narratives of International Relations, such as the contextualization of neo-realism in Hegelian philosophy rather than in an ostensibly realist tradition of international political thought. On an ontological and epistemological level, this book argues for a reinvention of universalistic notions in international and global politics to overcome the politics of 'national interest' and their perennial self-affirmations through violence, egocentrisms, and war.

Abstract
Walking is a nearly universal activity, even given the many contrivances invented to avoid it, yet it is widely absent from the sedentarist disciplines of politics and international relations. This absence is perhaps not surprising, given that so much political thought and practice are deeply tethered to the inventions of the boot and the chair that remove walking from our view, as Tim Ingold has observed. Yet, given the significance of events such as forced death marches as parts of war and genocide; formative collective walks such as Gandhi's march to the sea, the Long March in China, or the Selma to Montgomery marches; or the everyday politics of walking in global cities, such absence might be mistaken. This article suggests instead that walking be understood as integral to the operation of internationality. In particular, it argues that walking is part of a mobile field of power and agency that generates, stabilizes, and unsettles internationality in equal parts. The article diagrams some key conceptual nodes of walking and political power, and then traces their operation in the case of the Long Walk of the Navajo.