Suchergebnisse

In contrast to arguments that the rule of law is breaking down under globalization, it is argued here that laws & structures associated with economic globalization constitute a rule of law regime in insulating certain key aspects of economic life from political pressure. Principal legal rules for the protection of foreign investment that is intended to freeze out politics are discussed. As an alternative to the neoliberal formulation of property rights & the rule of law, the positions of Weimar legal theorists on the rule of law, the generality requirement, & property rights are discussed. The current rule of law project in the investment regime would serve similar functions to the rule of law in the Weimar Republic. However, attempts to have the rule of law act as a resource of social movements, contesting the influence of dominant capitalists, may fail, as it did in the Weimar constitution. Thus, democratic forms are cautioned against embracing the rule of law at this time. M. Pflum

This Article focuses on the tension between the late-nineteenth century "Dillon's Rule" limiting city powers, and the "home rule" approach that gained traction in the early and mid-twentieth century. Washington's constitution allows cities to exercise all the police powers possessed by the state government, so long as local regulations do not conflict with general laws. The constitution also vests charter cities with control over their form of government. But all city powers are subject to "general laws" adopted by the legislature. Further, judicial rulings on city powers to provide public services have fluctuated, ranging from decisions citing the "Dillon's Rule" doctrine that local governments have only those powers clearly granted to them by the legislature, to the "home rule" view that charter and optional code cities have broad unspecified powers. Despite actions by lawmakers to expand city home rule powers, recent court decisions have puzzled practitioners by alternately voicing these two approaches in a seemingly random fashion. This Article describes the origin of Dillon's Rule, places it in a national context, and explains its longevity in Washington despite the legislature's clear intent to eliminate the rule's application to most cities. The Article suggests that the zombie-like reappearance of Dillon's Rule is explained by (1) the vitality of the rule as a doctrine applicable to special purpose districts; (2) appellate judges' insistence on picking and choosing from doctrines (including ostensibly dead doctrines) to support a case's outcome; and (3) a combination of doctrinal forgetfulness and carelessness. The Article repeats a recommendation made five decades ago by former University of Washington law professor Philip Trautman that the Supreme Court of Washington should adopt a more consistent approach, one that follows the legislature's clear intent to make Dillon's Rule inapplicable to most cities.

The provisions of the new RF Foreign Policy Concept are compared both with the previous versions of this document (adopted in 2013 and 2016) and with the effective National Security Strategy. Structural, normative, and strategic novelties are discussed. They determine not only Russia's foreign policy priorities in the changing world order but also substantiate, ideologically and geopolitically, its commitment to these priorities. A clear statement of national interests, and foreign policy goals and objectives provide a clearer and more logical framework for Russia's further actions in the international arena.

Frontmatter -- Introduction: Gherardo Colombo's Concern for the Democratic State under the Rule of Law: A Work in Progress / Foqué, René -- 1. An Imaginary Country -- Contents -- Part I. The Ambiguities of Justice -- 2. Law and Justice -- 3. Laws Differing in Time and Space -- 4. 'Justice' is an Ambiguous Word -- 5. Law Comes From God -- 6. Law is Just If It is 'Natural' -- 7. Law is Just When It Exists -- 8. From Subject to Citizen -- Part II. Horizontal Society and Vertical Society -- 9. The Vertical Society -- 10. The Horizontal Society -- 11. Structure of the Two Models -- 12. Consequences of the Vertical Society -- 13. Consequences of the Horizontal Society -- 14. Fundamental Rights According to the Two Models -- 15. Sanctions According to the Vertical Model -- 16. The Consequences to Offences in the Horizontal Society -- 17. Victim and Offender -- 18. Limits to Personal Liberty -- 19. Vertical Society, Horizontal Society, Ideology and Religion -- Part III. Towards a Horizontal Society -- 20. An Attempt to Justify Law at the End of the Second Millennium -- 21. The Limits of International Rules -- 22. An Attempt at Creating a Horizontal Society: the Italian Constitution -- 23. The Person Comes First -- 24. What is Missing? -- 25. Uncertainties in the Constitutional Process -- 26. Culture -- 27. The Interests of Those Who Oppose the Horizontal Society -- 28. Security -- 29. Escaping Responsibility -- Part IV. How Do We Get There? -- 30. The Time Dynamic -- 31. Self-Awareness -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments

Those of us who work on the Indian princely states sometimes seem to share a certain marginalization, a certain distance from the debates shaping the writing of South Asian history today. We also share, more positively, views of that history that do not focus on British colonial rule and are not based on colonial sources, views that arguably offer more continuity with pre-British history and alternative visions of the South Asian past, present, and future.

AbstractIn everyday discourse, and also in the academic literature, the expressions "regulatory interventions" (i.e. interventions intended to regulate behaviours) and "normative interventions" (i.e. interventions which set norms/rules) are usually assumed to be synonymous. From this perspective, any regulatory intervention is also normative, and vice versa. This article investigates the relationship between regulation and rules/norms in order to verify whether the "regulatory" and the "normative" aspects are intrinsically and essentially connected, as is usually thought (on the assumption that there is no regulation without rules and no rules without regulation).

This book focuses on the problems of rules, rule-following and normativity as discussed within the areas of analytic philosophy, linguistics, logic and legal theory. Divided into four parts, the volume covers topics in general analytic philosophy, analytic legal theory, legal interpretation and argumentation, logic as well as AI&Law area of research. It discusses, inter alia, "Kripkenstein's" sceptical argument against rule-following and normativity of meaning, the role of neuroscience in explaining the phenomenon of normativity, conventionalism in philosophy of law, normativity of rules of interpretation, some formal approaches towards rules and normativity as well as the problem of defeasibility of rules. The aim of the book is to provide an interdisciplinary approach to an inquiry into the questions concerning rules, rule-following and normativity