Suchergebnisse

Während der Neorealismus die Struktur eines sozialen Systems auf die Summe seiner Handelnden reduziert, reduziert die "world-system theory" die Handelnden zu Ergebnissen der Struktur. Beide Theorien sind nicht in der Lage, staatliches Handeln im internationalen System adäquat zu beschreiben. Lediglich die 'strukturelle Theorie' (structuration theory), die sich aus dem 'wissenschaftlichen Realismus' (scientific realism) ableitet, leistet dies, da sie sowohl die Struktur als auch die politisch Handelnden als bestimmende Faktoren in ihre Betrachtung einbezieht. (SWP-Mee)

While neorealism and world-system theory both claim to be "structural" theories of international relations, they embody very different understandings of system structure and structural explanation. Neorealists conceptualize system structures in individualist terms as constraining the choices of preexisting state agents, whereas world-system theorists conceptualize system structures in structuralist terms as generating state agents themselves. These differences stem from what are, in some respects, fundamentally opposed solutions to the "agent-structure" or "micromacro" problem. This opposition, however, itself reflects a deeper failure of each theory to recognize the mutually constitutive nature of human agents and system structures—a failure which leads to deep-seated inadequacies in their respective explanations of state action. An alternative solution to the agent-structure problem, adapted from "structuration theory" in sociology, can overcome these inadequacies by avoiding both the reduction of system structures to state actors in neorealism and their reification in world-system theory. Structuration theory requires a philosophical basis in scientific realism, arguably the "new orthodoxy" in the philosophy of natural science, but as yet largely unrecognized by political scientists. The scientific realist/structuration approach generates an agenda for "structural-historical" research into the properties and dispositions of both state actors and the system structures in which they are embedded.

Modern sovereignty is anthropocentric, constituted and organized by reference to human beings alone. Although a metaphysical assumption, anthropocentrism is of immense practical import, enabling modern states to command loyalty and resources from their subjects in pursuit of political projects. It has limits, however, which are brought clearly into view by the authoritative taboo on taking UFOs seriously. UFOs have never been systematically investigated by science or the state, because it is assumed to be known that none are extraterrestrial. Yet in fact this is not known, which makes the UFO taboo puzzling given the ET possibility. Drawing on the work of Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, the puzzle is explained by the functional imperatives of anthropocentric sovereignty, which cannot decide a UFO exception to anthropocentrism while preserving the ability to make such a decision. The UFO can be "known" only by not asking what it is.

Contemporary international politics embody a tension between formal equality and de facto inequality. States recognize each other as sovereign equals, yet the strong still push around the weak. Among the structures that reflect this tension are informal empires. The dominant assumptions in mainstream international relations theory, materialism and rationalism, privilege the formal equality of states in informal empires a priori: materialism by assuming that authority relations cannot exist between sovereign states; rationalism by assuming that states are sovereign over their own interests. A constructivist approach allows one to explore the hypothesis that transnational authority structures construct state identities and interests. An empirical analysis of the Soviet-East German relationship supports this hypothesis, which raises questions about the emerging study of international governance.

The relationship between militarization and state formation in the West has been the subject of considerable scholarship,1 and there is thus some temptation to simply transfer concepts and arguments from that domain to the study of Third World militarization. Yet state formation dynamics in the two contexts were and are quite different, with important implications for the nature of national security threats. In the West threats tended to be external, rooted in anarchical competition between relatively equal states possessing domestic legitimacy, which meant that militarization could be understood primarily in terms of the political realist focus on security dilemmas and action-reaction dynamics. In contrast, Third World state formation has occurred in a largely dependent context in which relative external security contrasts with domestic insecurity.2 In this case the external environment, rather than being a source of threat, becomes a source of opportunities for elites lacking domestic legitimacy to gain support against internal security threats. In short, national security problems look very different in the First and Third Worlds because of different trajectories and contexts of state formation. Very different mechanisms may therefore account for militarization, suggesting the need for concepts and theories different than those that dominate security studies in the West.

An examination of the relations between epistemological commitments & the conduct of social science, hypothesizing that a commitment to philosophical realism offers decisive advantages over several influential varieties of empiricism & interpretivism. Social scientists guided by realist presuppositions are shown to be open to a comparatively wide range of hypotheses for explaining human action, & their substantive analyses are relatively uncontaminated by their epistemological commitments. This claim is illustrated & defended by reference to the political science literature on power & consent by Robert Dahl, Steven Lukes, John Gaventa, Quentin Skinner, Antonio Gramsci, James Scott, & others. It is also argued, in opposition to much of the literature on scientific realism, that although realists are open to considering the sorts of claims that Marxists & critical theorists want to advance, by itself, scientific realism gives us no reason to think that these claims are true. Whether or not a particular theory of power or consent is true is a subject for scientific study, nor armchair reflection. AA

The contributors to this volume are motivated by a common apprehension and a common hope. The apprehension was first voiced by Einstein, who lamented the inability of humanity, at the individual and social level, to keep up with the increased speed of technological change brought about by the quantum revolution. As quantum science and technology fast forward into the 21st century, the social sciences remain stuck in classical, 19th century ways of thinking. Can such a mechanistic model of the mind and society possibly help us manage the fully realized technological potential of the quantum? That's where the hope appears: that perhaps quantum is not just a physical science, but a human science too. In Quantum International Relations, James Der Derian and Alexander Wendt gather rising scholars and leading experts to make the case for quantum approaches to world politics. As a fundamental theory of reality and enabler of new technologies, quantum now touches everything, with the potential to revolutionize how we conduct diplomacy, wage war, and make wealth. Contributors present the core principles of quantum mechanics—entanglement, uncertainty, superposition, and the wave function—as significant catalysts and superior heuristics for an accelerating quantum future. Facing a reality which no longer corresponds to an outdated Newtonian worldview of states as billiard balls, individuals as rational actors or power as objective interest, Der Derian and Wendt issue an urgent call for a new human science of quantum International Relations. At the centenary of the first quantum thought experiment in the 1920s, this book offers a diversity of explorations, speculations and approaches for understanding geopolitics in the 21st century.