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How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a "best loser" or "zombie" provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

Recent elections in Japan have been dramatic, and the 2021 general election was no exception. Worldwide turmoil caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, as well as domestic uncertainty following the resignation of long-serving Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, left many voters and political observers wondering whether his successors were up to the task of leading the country through the crisis. In the end, the LDP and coalition partner Komeito eked out an electoral victorybut one that masks important changes in the party system and nuanced changes in voter behavior and preferences. This fourth volume in the Japan Decides series features a comprehensive collection of analyses from leading experts, covering the legacy of Abes tenure in office, the state of the LDP and other parties, the impact of COVID-19 and the postponed 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympics, and many other important topics in contemporary party politics and domestic and foreign policy. Robert J. Pekkanen is Professor in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, and Adjunct Professor of Sociology at the University of Washington, USA. Steven R. Reed is Professor Emeritus, retired from Chuo University, Japan. Daniel M. Smith is the Gerald L. Curtis Visiting Associate Professor of Modern Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, USA.

1: Osborne, Stephen P.: The voluntary and non-profit sector in contemporary Japan. Emerging roles and organizational challenges in a changing society. 2: Bestor, Victoria Lyon ; Maekawa, Reiko: The philanthropic roots of the voluntary and non-profit sector in Japan. The Rockefeller legacy. 3: Imada, Makoto: The voluntary response to the Hanshin Awaji earthquake. A trigger for the development of the voluntary and non-profit sector in Japan. 4: Pekkanen, Robert: The politics of regulating the non-profit sector. 5: Pekkanen, Robert ; Simon, Karla: The legal framework for voluntary and non-profit activity. 6: Kawashima, Nobuko: Business and the NPO sector in Japan. Development and prospects. 7: Bothwell, Robert O.: The challenges of growing the NPO and voluntary sector in Japan. 8: Nishizutsumi, Yoji ; Rillington, Kira ; Handy, Femida: Strategic management and Japanese non-profits. Can it work? 9: Auger, Deborah A.: The government - non-profit relationship in contemporary Japan. An emerging local government-non-profit partnership in Miyagi. 10: Imada, Makoto:The philanthropic tradition and fund raising for the voluntary and non-profit sector in Japan. 11: Ohwa, Mie: The voluntary and non-profit-sector and the community in Japan. Making links and responding to needs. 12: Ueto, Takato: Supporting local groups in responding to social needs. A case study of the Kobe Community Support Project. 13: Osborne, Stephen P. ; McLaughlin, Kate ; Miyamoto, Taro: Managing the Japanese voluntary and non-profit sector. An agenda for the future

AbstractWhat determines whether interest groups choose to contact politicians or bureaucrats? Despite the importance of this question for policymaking, democracy, and some prominent principal-agent understandings of politics, it is relatively unexplored in the literature. We argue that government stability plays a major part in interest groups' decisions. That is, central to interest groups' decisions is their assessment of the likelihood that politicians currently in power will continue to be in the future. We deduce logical, but totally contrasting hypotheses, about how interest groups lobby under such conditions of uncertainty and then test these using a heteroskedastic probit model that we apply to a unique longitudinal survey of interest groups in Japan. We find that when it is unclear if the party controlling the government will maintain power in the future, interest groups are more likely to contact the bureaucracy. When it is believed that the party in power will retain control for a considerable period, interest groups are more inclined to contact politicians. In addition, during times of government uncertainty, interest groups that are supportive of the governing party (or parties) are more likely to contact politicians and those that are less supportive will be more likely to contact bureaucrats.

1. Introduction -- 2. Japanese Politics 2017 to 2021 -- 3. The 2021 Election Results: Continuity and Change -- 4. How the Liberal Democratic Party Avoided a Loss in 2021 -- 5. The Opposition in 2021: A Second Party and a Third Force -- 6. Kōmeitō in 2021: Strategizing between the LDP and Sōka Gakkai -- 7. Abe's legacy -- 8. Candidate Selection for the 2021 General Election -- 9. Generational Change or Continuity in Japan's Leadership? -- 10. Should I Stay or Should I Go? Party Switching in Japan -- 11. Ministerial Selection under Abe, Suga, and Kishida -- 12. Public opinion and COVID-19 -- 13. Social media in the 2021 Election Campaign -- 14. Are the Kids Alright? Young People and Turnout in Japan -- 15. Did COVID-19 Impact Japan's 2021 General Election? -- 16. Japan's Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic -- 17. Economic Policy Trilemma: Macroeconomic Politics in the 2021 Election -- 18. Does Income Inequality Matter in Japan? -- 19. Women's representation and the gendered impact of COVID-19 in Japan -- 20. Black Lives Matter in Japan: The Specter of Race and Racism Haunting Japan -- 21. Constitutional Revision in the 2021 Election -- 22. Covid-19: The International Dimension -- 23. Foreign Policy and Defense Issues in Japan's 2021 Election -- 24. China in Japan's 2021 Elections -- 25. The Olympics in the 2021 Election -- 26. Conclusion: The 2021 Japanese Election in the Shadow of the Coronavirus Pandemic.

Studies of venue shopping have typically analyzed the case of an individual advocacy group or issue campaign rather than comparing venue strategies across multiple groups. Moreover, this literature focuses on interest groups and advocacy coalitions whose principal mandate is to influence public policy. Using original data, we test theories of venue selection among nonprofit organizations that report engaging in policy processes but the majority of which do not self‐identify as an advocacy group. Our analyses explore the "where" of nonprofit advocacy across three different venue types: branch (executive, legislative), domain (bureaucracy, elected officials), and level of government (local, state, federal). Like interest groups, we find that nonprofits shop among both executive and legislative branches and among elected and bureaucratic domains; however, they tend to specialize in one level of government. Geographic scope and revenue source predicted venue targeting, but most other organizational characteristics including age, capacity, and structure did not.

This third volume in the Japan Decides series remains the premier venue for scholarly research on Japanese elections. Putting a spotlight on the 2017 general election, the contributors discuss the election results, party politics, coalition politics with Komeito, the cabinet, constitutional revision, new opposition parties, and Abenomics. Additionally, the volume looks at campaigning, public opinion, media, gender issues and representation, North Korea and security issues, inequality, immigration and cabinet scandals. With a topical focus and timely coverage of the latest dramatic changes in Japanese politics, the volume will appeal to researchers and policy experts alike, and will also make a welcome addition to courses on Japanese politics, comparative politics and electoral politics.

How do electoral systems affect legislative organization? The change in electoral systems from Single Member District plurality (SMD) to Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) in New Zealand can illuminate how electoral incentives affect the distribution of cabinet positions. Because in SMD the outcome of individual local districts determines the number of seats a party wins collectively, New Zealand parties deploy cabinet posts in order to shore up the electoral fortunes of individual members. In MMP, the total number of seats a party receives is determined by the votes in the proportional representation (PR) portion for the party, which eliminates the incentives to reward electorally unsafe members with cabinet positions. We show that strong cabinet members, measured through experience as prior terms in the cabinet position, are still likely to be retained. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

How do electoral systems affect legislative organization? The change in electoral systems from Single Member District plurality (SMD) to Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) in New Zealand can illuminate how electoral incentives affect the distribution of cabinet positions. Because in SMD the outcome of individual local districts determines the number of seats a party wins collectively, New Zealand parties deploy cabinet posts in order to shore up the electoral fortunes of individual members. In MMP, the total number of seats a party receives is determined by the votes in the proportional representation (PR) portion for the party, which eliminates the incentives to reward electorally unsafe members with cabinet positions. We show that strong cabinet members, measured through experience as prior terms in the cabinet position, are still likely to be retained.

This paper introduces eight country‐level datasets with >50,000 observations that can be used to analyze novel comparative questions concerning party personnel strategies—how parties recruit candidates and allocate members across party, legislative, and cabinet positions. We make these datasets public to inspire comparative research, especially from an electoral systems perspective; electoral systems shape constituency representation and influence how parties recruit candidates and organize members in legislative and government bodies. In this paper, we first briefly review the relevant literature on electoral nomination and post‐election appointment and then describe our motivations for constructing multi‐country datasets that can be used to further comparative research. To illustrate the possibilities in these new datasets, we show how recruitment and placement of parliamentarians with particular personal characteristics correlates with their placement onto specific committees and cabinet posts. A conclusion identifies other areas of research that might benefit from using the party personnel datasets.