Suchergebnisse

In this paper, we argue that the incentive structures of the games nations play in international environmental negotiations depend on the choice of environmental policy instruments. Bargaining on the use of some instrument (eg, an effluent charge) may put the players into a dilemma game (like Chicken). Negotiations to apply a different instrument (say, an emission reduction quota) may lead to a cooperation game (like Stag Hunt). The higher the incentive to cooperate in the type of game built up by a specific instrument, the higher is this instrument's "cooperative push." Of course, comparing two instruments, the one with the higher cooperative push might well be the less efficient one. In this paper, we analyze a situation where the higher cooperative push of an instrument overcompensates this instrument's lower efficiency: Aggregate welfare with bilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of Stag Hunt) is higher than with unilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of the Chicken game). The question remains whether sovereign countries decide to play Stag Hunt, ending up in the welfare superior equilibrium. It is shown below that they do not in an uncoordinated optimizing setting. However, we develop a particular frame where the proposed solution meets the criteria of individual rationality, stability, & fairness. It thereby establishes the politically most desired result -- international cooperation. 4 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

This intermediate-level undergraduate textbook in environmental economics builds on the microeconomics courses students take in their first year. It intentionally does not survey the whole field or present every possible topic. Instead, there is a clear focus on the theory of environmental policy and its practical applications. Most of the applied parts of the book deal with the economics of environmental policy in the European Union and in the United States. The book combines basic environmental economic analysis, such as the internalization of externalities, with recent developments in this field, including induced technical change and coalition theory. Moreover, topics from daily policy debates such as global warming are put into economic perspective. This is done in an intelligible form for advanced undergraduate students of economics, business administration and related fields. Each part of the book contains a set of exercises and suggested solutions

Das k}rzlich verabschiedete Umwelthaftungsgesetz wirft eine Vielzahl von umweltrechtlichen und umwelt|konomischen Fragen auf, z.B. bez}glich der - rechts- und umweltpolitischen Zielsetzung des Umwelthaftungsgesetzes, - der Wirksamkeit des Umwelthaftungsgesetzesals Anreiz zur Schadensverh}tung, - der Anreizkompatibilit{t der obligatorischen Umwelthaftpflicht-Versicherung, - der Grenzen der Versicherbarkeit von Umweltrisiken, - der Besonderheiten im Falle des Mitverschuldens des Gesch{digten und bei Summations- und Distanzsch{den, - der M|glichkeiten von Fondsl|sungen, Umweltgenossenschaften oder anderen kollektiven Schadenstragungssystemen und - der Rolle des Haftungsrechts im Kanon umweltpolitischer Instrumente. Das vorliegende Buch beleuchtet diese Fragen in einem interdisziplin{ren Dialog von Juristen und \konomen, der im Rahmen des Kollegs "Umweltstaat" der Gottlieb Daimler- und Carl Benz-Stiftung in den Jahren 1989 bis 1991 stattgefunden hat. Es bietet einenumfassenden ]berblick }ber die Probleme und Perspektiven des Haftungsrechts als Instrument des "Umweltstaats