Suchergebnisse

We study the work hours of Australian couples, using a neoclassical labour-supply model in which couples choose from a small, realistic set of possible wife-husband working hour combinations. We introduce three improvements to this standard model. First, we allow partners' preferences about non-market time to be correlated. We also correct the estimates to accunt for the fact that we estimate the non-observable wage rates of individuals who do not work. Lastly, we allow each individual's preferences for nonmarket time to be correlated with her or his wage rate. These changes, which substantially enhance the realism of the standard, discretized labour-supply model, also have an important impact on the results. We estimate the model using HILDA data and find wage elasticities of labour supply - 0.26 for men and 0.50 for women - that are twice as large as those found without these three innovations. Using simulation methods, we then analyze the expected impact of the 2005/06 Australian tax reform. As a result of the tax cuts, we expect working hours to increase by 1.7 per cent for both men and women and household after-tax incomes to increase by approximately $60 per week on average. For families with two wage earners, each earning between $25,000 and $55,000 per year, our model predicts an after-tax increase in income of $38 after accounting for these labour supply effects - much larger than the Australian Government's own prediction of $12, which does not allow for labour supply effects.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Boxes -- List of Diagrams -- List of Abbreviations -- Preface, Preliminaries and Acknowledgements -- 1 Macroeconomy versus Macroeconomics? -- 1.1 Overview -- 1.2 The Short-Run and Long-Run Syndrome and Beyond -- 1.3 From What to How -- 1.4 Further Thoughts and Readings -- 2 Accelerator-Multiplier: Stabbing the Knife-Edge in the Back? -- 2.1 Overview -- 2.2 The Model -- 2.3 The Greater Realism of Eliminating Instability? -- 2.4 Further Thoughts and Readings -- 3 Classical Dichotomies -- 3.1 Overview -- 3.2 Dissecting the Classical Dichotomy -- 3.3 The Short- and Long-Run and Micro and Macro Dichotomies -- 3.4 Further Thoughts and Readings -- 4 Growth Theories: Old, New or More of the Same? -- 4.1 Overview -- 4.2 Old Growth Theory -- 4.3 New Growth Theory for Old? -- 4.4 Growth Econometrics -- 4.5 Further Thoughts and Readings -- 5 The Keynesian Revolutions -- 5.1 Overview -- 5.2 IS/LM as Neoclassical Synthesis -- 5.3 Reappraising or Reducing Keynes? -- 5.4 Further Thoughts and Readings -- 6 Post-Keynesian Dilemmas -- 6.1 Overview -- 6.2 Post-Keynesianisms? -- 6.3 Kaldor-Pasinetti Savings -- 6.4 Post-Keynesianism as Mainstream? -- 6.5 Further Thoughts and Readings -- 7 Keynesian Revolution: What Keynes, What Revolution? -- 7.1 Overview -- 7.2 The Revolution Portrayed or Betrayed? -- 7.3 Further Thoughts and Readings -- 8 From Monetarist Counter-Revolution to Fundamentalism -- 8.1 Overview -- 8.2 From Vertical Phillips Curve ... -- 8.3 ... to New Classical Economics -- 8.4 From the Not so Sublime to the Even More Ridiculous -- 8.5 Further Thoughts and Readings -- 9 Forging the Consensus: Monetary Policy and Real Business Cycle Theory -- 9.1 Overview -- 9.2 Monetary Policy under the NCE -- 9.3 Real Business Cycle Theory -- 9.4 Further Thoughts and Readings

BRICS içerisinde yer alan (Brezilya, Rusya, Hindistan, Çin ve Güney Afrika) yükselen güçlerinin 21. Yüzyıldan itibaren uluslararası siyasette öne çıkışı kalkınma için işbirliğinin teşvik edilmesi fikrine yeni bir ivme kazandırmıştır. Bu süreçte BRICS'in yapmış olduğu dış yardımlar artırmış ve özellikle Güney ülkeleriyle Güney-Güney işbirliği yoluyla farklı ekonomik işbirliği yolları ve alanları ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu tez, genel olarak bu beş ülke ve özel olarak Çin tarafından Sahra Altı Afrika'da yürütülen ikili dış yardım faaliyetlerine ilişkin hali hazırda var olan ama oldukça kısıtlı olan mevcut literatüre katkı sağlamayı hedeflemektedir. Yükselen donörler olarak nitelendirilen bu devletler, son yıllarda uluslararası kalkınmada istikrarlı bir şekilde öne çıkarken esasen 1950'li yıllara kadar uzanan dış yardım programları ile kesinlikle bu alanda yeni değiller. Böyle olmakla birlikte söz konusu devletlerin dünyanın dört bir yanındaki yardım faaliyetleri kimi zaman Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Batı Avrupa ve Japonya'nın hakim olduğu uluslararası yardım mimarisine bir tehdit olarak algılanmaktadır. Kalkınma yardımının Güney-Güney işbirliği çerçevesinde önemli bir dış politika aracı olduğu varsayımından yola çıkarak, bu tez söz konusu yükselen güçleri bu alanda harekete geçiren motivasyonların neler olduğunu sorgulamaktadır. Dış yardımın araçsallaştırılmasının arkasındaki temel motivasyonlar nelerdir? Yükselen donörler uluslararası kalkınmada geleneksel bağışçılardan farklı mı? Sahra altı Afrika'nın dış yardımın ana alıcısı olduğu ve doğal kaynaklar açısından zengin olduğu düşünüldüğünde, Çin dış politika araçlarını Sahra altı Afrika ile olan işbirliğinde nasıl ve ne amaçla kullanıyor? Son olarak, uluslararası politikada kalkınma yardımı farklı bağışçılar arasında bir rekabet unsuru olmakla birlikte, aynı zamanda farklı yönelim, teknik ve politik özelliklerine sahip olan bağışçıların her birinin kendi aralarında işi paylaştıkları ileri sürülebilir. Bütün bunlar bize kalkınma yardımı ortamının büyük oranda değiştiğini göstermektedir.İÇİNDEKİLER . . . benTEŞEKKÜRLER . . . ivÖZ . . . vÖZET . . . viKISALTMALAR, KISALTMALAR VE KISALTMALAR LİSTESİ . viiBÖLÜM 1GENEL TANITIM1.1 Sorunun bağlamı veya ifadesi . . 11.2 Araştırma hedefleri ve soruları. . . 71.3 Çalışmanın önemi. . . 81.4 Konunun kapsamı, sınırlaması ve metodolojisi. . . 91.5 Tezin yapısı. . . 10BÖLÜM 2KALKINMA YARDIMI: KAVRAMSAL VE TEORİK ÇERÇEVE2.1 KAVRAMSAL ÇERÇEVE . . 112.1.1 Dış yardım . . . 112.1.1.1 Tanım . . 112.1.2 Yabancı yardım türleri . . 162.1.2.1 Resmi kalkınma yardımı . . 172.1.2.2 Diğer hükümetler arası yardım . . 182.1.2.3 Hükümet dışı yardım . . 192.1.3 Dış yardım için farklı motivasyonlar . . 202.1.3.1 Siyasi-diplomatik . . 21ii2.1.3.2 Askeri güvenlik . . 222.1.3.3 İnsani Yardım . . 232.1.3.4 Özgecil veya gelişimsel . . 232.1.3.5 Ticari . . 242.1.3.6 Prestij . . . 252.1.4 Dış yardım kanalları . . 262.2 KURAMSAL ÇERÇEVE . . 302.2.1 Gerçekçi teoriler . . 322.2.1.1 Klasik gerçekçilik . . 332.2.1.2 Neo-gerçekçilik . . 342.2.1.3 Neoklasik gerçekçilik . . 362.2.2 Liberal teoriler . . 382.2.3 Yapılandırmacı teoriler . . 412.2.4 Global Sistem Teorisi (TSM) . . 43BÖLÜM 3KALKINMA YARDIM MİMARİSİ: KALKINMA YARDIMI BAĞIŞÇILARI OLARAK GELİŞMEKTE OLAN GÜÇLERİN BİR PROFİLİ3.1 Geleneksel yardımdan Güney-Güney işbirliğine: literatürün gözden geçirilmesi . 453.2 Yükselen güçlerin Güney-Güney işbirliğine katkısı . 533.3 Kalkınma yardımında ortaklar olarak yükselen güçler . 563.4 BRICS geliştirme yardımının farkı nedir? . 624. BÖLÜMULUSLARARASI KALKINMADA GELİŞMEKTE OLAN GÜÇLERİN KONUMU: SAHARAN ALTINDA AFRİKA'DA ÇİN ÖRNEĞİ4.1 Afrika'ya Çin yardımına tarihsel bir bakış . . 67iii4.2 Yükselen bir donör olarak Çin . . 714.3 Çin'in dış yardımına yönelik motivasyonlar . . 754.3.1 Siyasi nedenler . . 754.3.1.1 Tek Çin politikası: uluslararası tanınma arayışı . . . 764.3.1.2 Uluslararası kuruluşlarda destek alma . 784.3.1.3 İyi bir uluslararası imaj yansıtma . . 794.3.2 Ticari çıkarlar . . 804.3.2.1 Çin şirketlerine uluslararası pazarların açılması . 814.3.2.2 Doğal kaynaklara güvenli erişim . . 824.3.3 Gelişimsel ve insani endişeler . 844.4 Güney-Güney işbirliği örneği olarak Çin-Afrika ilişkileri . 854.5 Afrika'da Çin yardımı . . 884.5.1 Rol ve etki . . . 884.5.2 Zorluklar ve değişen eğilimler . . 90SONUÇ . . . 95KAYNAKÇA . . . 98EKLER . . . 122 --- Since the beginning of the 21st century, the rise of the emerging powers of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has given new impetus to the promotion of development cooperation. the BRICS have increased their foreign assistance and established distinct avenues and means of economic cooperation, in particular through South-South cooperation with countries of the South. This dissertation provides an overview of the small but growing literature on bilateral foreign aid activities carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa by these five countries in general and China in particular. While these so-called emerging donors are steadily growing in importance in international development, they are certainly not new to the field, with foreign aid programs dating back to the 1950s. The recent increase in the size and scope of their aid activities around the world is seen by some as a threat to the international aid architecture dominated by the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. Starting from the assumption that development aid represents an instrument of foreign policy within the framework of South-South cooperation, our objective is to ask ourselves what are the motivations that drive these emerging countries? What are the main motivations behind the instrumentalization of foreign aid? Are they different from traditional donors in providing aid? Given that sub-Saharan Africa is the main recipient of foreign aid and rich in natural resources, how and for what purposes is China using its foreign policy tools in its collaboration with the latter? On the international scene, development aid can indeed be an element of competition between different donors; on the other hand, we sometimes have the impression that the donors share the work, each with its own tropisms and technical and political characteristics. However, it is clear that the development aid landscape is changing dramatically.TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . iTHANKS . . . ivABSTRACT . . . vÖZET . . . viLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS . viiCHAPTER 1GENERAL INTRODUCTION1.1 Context or statement of the problem . . 11.2 Research objectives and questions. . . 71.3 Importance of the study. . . 81.4 Scope, limitation and methodology of the subject. . . 91.5 Structure of the dissertation. . . 10CHAPTER 2DEVELOPMENT AID: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK . . 112.1.1 Foreign aid . . . 112.1.1.1 Definition . . . 112.1.2 Types of foreign aid . . 162.1.2.1 Official development assistance . . 172.1.2.2 Other intergovernmental assistance . . 182.1.2.3 Non-government assistance . . 192.1.3 The different motivations for foreign aid . . 202.1.3.1 Political-diplomatic . . 21ii2.1.3.2 Military-security . . 222.1.3.3 Humanitarian . . . 232.1.3.4 Altruistic or developmental . . 232.1.3.5 Commercial . . . 242.1.3.6 Prestige . . . 252.1.4 Channels of foreign aid . . 262.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK . . 302.2.1 Realistic theories . . 322.2.1.1 Classical realism . . 332.2.1.2 Neo-realism . . . 342.2.1.3 Neoclassical realism . . 362.2.2 Liberal theories . . 382.2.3 Constructivist theories . . 412.2.4 Global Systems Theory (TSM) . . 43CHAPTER 3DEVELOPMENT AID ARCHITECTURE: A PROFILE OF EMERGING POWERS AS DEVELOPMENT AID DONORS3.1 From traditional aid to South-South cooperation: a review of the literature . 453.2 Contribution of emerging powers to South-South cooperation . 533.3 Emerging powers as partners in development aid . 563.4 How is BRICS development assistance different? . 62CHAPTER 4POSITION OF EMERGING POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF CHINA IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA4.1 A historical perspective of Chinese aid to Africa . . 67iii4.2 China as an emerging donor . . 714.3 Motivations for China's foreign aid . . 754.3.1 Political reasons . . 754.3.1.1 One-China policy: the search for international recognition . . . 764.3.1.2 Obtaining support in international organizations . 784.3.1.3 Projecting a good international image . . 794.3.2 Commercial interests . . 804.3.2.1 Opening international markets to Chinese companies . 814.3.2.2 Secure access to natural resources . . 824.3.3 Developmental and humanitarian concerns . 844.4 Sino-African relations as a case of South-South cooperation . 854.5 Chinese aid in Africa . . 884.5.1 Role and impact . . . 884.5.2 Challenges and changing trends . . 90CONCLUSION . . . 95BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . 98APPENDICES . . . 122

Capitalism is often held to be the best of all possible worlds, or even the only possible world, in which the market is underpinned by the highest principles of rationality, efficiency, and compatibility with democracy. These truths are backed up by economists, a group who present themselves as impartial experts capable of operating independently of ideology or political intrusion. This book questions these "scientific truths". It discusses the ideological foundations of neoliberalism and the value judgements, often kept implicit, in economic theory. It analyses the claims of the key pillars of neoliberal economics - the neoclassical and Austrian schools of economic thought - and the myths which they propagate about markets. It is shown that there is a deep division between the theoretical market - the fair market, the free market, the market of equal opportunities, the market as producer of wealth, the market as aforum for discovering and sharing information - and the reality. This is not a simple problem of realism. The problem also concerns the perfect market idealized by these theories, which is subjected to criticism through a process of demystification that reveals the true ideological content hidden behind the market myths. There have been various attempts by heterodox schools of economics to move beyond this flawed view of the market. However, these have struggled to gain mainstream attention because of the cultural and political dominance of the neoliberal mindset which is claimed to be objective and neutral. Ultimately, the book argues that neoliberalism needs to be countered with an alternative based on a progressive decommodification of social relations to reduce the real and imagined significance of the market. This book is essential reading for those interested in Marxist political economy, heterodox economics, and critiques of neoliberalism, capitalism and markets.

This doctoral dissertation offers a rational explanation of cooperation flaws in regional security mechanisms in the Global South. My main argument is that, when it comes to regional cooperation for security, Global South regions may be susceptible to tensions between the search for regional autonomy and that of national autonomy. The result of these tensions is low multilateral cooperation. This outcome could be mitigated through the manipulation of institutional design, although the operability of these regional security mechanisms can be permanently affected. I call this effect the "paradox of autonomy", and its most conspicuous case is the South American one. The chosen case was the Defence Council of the Union of South American Nations (CDS for its acronym in Spanish and Portuguese). This study covers the almost decade of the existence of the CDS, considering structural aspects of the international system, as well as regional geopolitical factors, and domestic political dynamics. The research revealed an incongruence that accompanied the CDS from its beginning: the structural conditions, as well as the regional and national dynamics that favoured an unprecedented exercise of South American regional autonomy, also opened opportunities for the search for greater margins of freedom of action in the international political arena. This incongruence between regional autonomy and national autonomy became a tension is explained by the paradox of autonomy, an analytical model developed for this work. The project went through three distinct phases reflected in three manuscripts that make up the central chapters of the dissertation. The first one is entitled "Missing Geopolitical Links in Explaining the South American Defence Council." In this Chapter Two, I start with a structural explanation of the origins and subsequent deficiencies that the CDS has presented in terms of multilateral cooperation. Based on a quantitative analysis of the concentration of capabilities in the international system, as well as a geopolitical analysis, the chapter explains how the incentives for the creation of the Council also serve as inducements for a low multilateral regional security commitment. The second manuscript corresponds to Chapter Three, entitled "The South American Defence Council Performance under Autonomy Pressures". It explores the shortcomings of the performance of the CDS with greater emphasis on the regional and national levels of analysis. The chapter presents a purely qualitative methodology based on the method of descriptive inference, a subsidiary of process tracing. Use of historical analysis, and interviews with elites and experts, supported the method and neoclassical realism works as the referential theoretical framework. The results of this phase confirmed those of Chapter Two, but also provided empirical elements that allowed me to infer the regional (collective) / national (individual) tensions derived from a generalized quest for autonomy in South America. Finally, Chapter Four, entitled "Explaining Flaws of Security Regionalism in the Global South: Lessons from the South American Paradox of Autonomy," corresponds to a theoretical formulation based on the results of the previous two chapters. In it, I address the major contribution of the dissertation: the analytical framework of the paradox of autonomy in security regionalism, offering clues to its application for the rest of the Global South. ; Diese Doktorarbeit bietet eine Erklärung für Schwachstellen in der Kooperation in regionalen Sicherheitsmechanismen des Globalen Südens. Mein zentrales Argument ist, dass Regionen des Globalen Südens im Bereich der regionalen Sicherheitskooperation anfällig für Spannungen sein können, die sich aus dem Streben nach regionaler Autonomie auf der einen und nationaler Autonomie auf der anderen Seite ergeben. Die Folge dieser Spannungen ist ein niedriges Niveau multilateraler Kooperation. Dieses Resultat könnte durch die Veränderung des institutionellen Designs entschärft werden, obwohl dadurch die Funktionsfähigkeit der regionalen Sicherheitsmechanismen dauerhaft beeinträchtigt werden kann. Südamerika ist die Region, in der dieser Effekt, den ich als das "Paradox der Autonomie" bezeichne, am augenscheinlichsten zu beobachten ist. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht als Fallstudie den Verteidigungsrat der Union Südamerikanischer Nationen (CDS nach seiner spanischen und portugiesischen Abkürzung) und behandelt den gesamten Zeitraum – mittlerweile fast ein ganzes Jahrzehnt – des Bestehens dieser Institution. Dabei werden strukturelle Aspekte des internationalen Systems, regionale geopolitische Faktoren und innenpolitische Dynamiken berücksichtigt. Die Untersuchung offenbart einen Zielkonflikt, der den CDS von seiner Gründung an begleitet: die strukturellen Bedingungen des internationalen Systems sowie die regionalen und nationalen Dynamiken, die eine beispiellose Stärkung der regionalen Autonomie in Südamerika begünstigten, eröffneten zugleich Möglichkeiten für ein Streben nach größerer Handlungsfreiheit der einzelnen Staaten in der internationalen politischen Arena. Die Arbeit erklärt diesen Zielkonflikt zwischen regionaler und nationaler Autonomie mit dem oben erwähnten analytischen Modell des Paradoxes der Autonomie, das für diese Arbeit entwickelt wurde. Das Forschungsprojekt durchlief drei unterschiedliche Phasen, deren Ergebnisse in den drei zentralen Kapiteln (Kapitel zwei, drei und vier) der Dissertation dargestellt sind. Das erste davon, Kapitel zwei der Arbeit, trägt den Titel "Missing Geopolitical Links in Explaining the South American Defence Council". Es beginnt mit einer strukturellen Erklärung der Ursprünge der multilateralen Kooperation im Rahmen des CDS und der daraus folgenden Unzulänglichkeiten. Aufbauend auf einer quantitativen Analyse der Konzentration von Ressourcen im internationalen System sowie einer geopolitischen Untersuchung erklärt das Kapitel, wie die Motivation für die Einrichtung des Rates zugleich einen Anreiz für ein niedriges Bekenntnis zu multilateraler regionaler Sicherheit darstellt. Kapitel drei, "The South American Defence Council Performance under Autonomy Pressures", untersucht die mangelnde Leistungsfähigkeit des CDS mit Schwerpunkt auf der regionalen sowie der nationalen Ebene der Analyse. Diese rein qualitative Studie basiert auf deskriptiver Inferenz, einer speziellen Methode des Process Tracing. Diese Methode wird unterstützt durch historische Analyse sowie Interviews mit Vertretern der Elite und Experten. Neoklassischer Realismus bildet den referentiellen theoretischen Bezugsrahmen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie bestätigen die Resultate des vorangegangenen Kapitels und bringen gleichzeitig neue empirische Erkenntnisse zu den Spannungen zwischen der regionalen (kollektiven) und nationalen (individuellen) Ebene, die sich aus dem allgemeinen Streben nach Autonomie in Südamerika ergeben. Aufbauend auf den empirischen Ergebnissen der zwei vorherigen Kapitel entwickelt Kapitel vier mit dem Titel "Explaining Flaws of Security Regionalism in the Global South: Lessons from the South American Paradox of Autonomy" ein theoretisches Erklärungsmodell. Hier befasse ich mich mit dem zentralen Beitrag der Dissertation: dem analytischen Rahmen für das Paradox der Autonomie im Regionalismus der Sicherheitskooperation und Möglichkeiten für dessen Anwendung für den Rest des Globalen Südens.

İktisadın temel sorunu olan karar verme sürecinin açıklanması için çeşitli teoriler geliştirilir. Teorilere konu olan rasyonel insanın davranışlarının katı varsayımlarla sınırlanması temel sorun olan karar verme sürecinin gerçekçi olarak ortaya konulamaması anlamına gelmektedir. Neoklasik iktisadın varsayımlarının insani yapının bilişsel ve algısal bileşenleri dikkate alınarak rahatlatılması bu sürecin gerçekçiliğini artırarak açıklama gücünü yükseltecektir. Enerji ve çevre açısından asimetrik bilgi ve çevresel problemler standart iktisadi analizde piyasa başarısızlığı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Ancak bu analizlerde çözüme yönelik önerilen parasal faktörler yanında insani davranışlara yön veren, parasal olmayan faktörlerin de dikkate alınması enerji tasarrufu ve enerji verimliliği sağlanması ve politik çıkarımların etkin ve etkili olması açısından önemlidir. Enerji ve çevre sorunları konusunda etkin ve etkili politika önerilerinde bulunulması hanehalklarının bilişsel eğilimleri ve algılarının dikkate alınması ile mümkündür. Bu çalışmada enerji ve çevre sorunları ortaya konulup yenilenebilir enerjiye geçişin önemi vurgulanarak bu sorunların çözümü için davranışsal iktisat literatüründe yer alan politik çıkarımlar araştırılacaktır. ; Various theories are developed to explain the decision-making process which is the main problem of economics. Limiting the behaviours of rational man subject to theories, with strict assumptions means that the decision-making process which is the main problem could not be presented realistically. Relieving of the assumptions in Neoclassical economics through considering the cognitive and perceptive components of the human psych, will increase the explanatory power of this process, by enhancing its realism. Assymetrical information in the sense of energy and environment, and environmental problems are dealt as market failure in the standart economical analysis. However, in these analyses, beside the suggested monetary factors which are solution-oriented, also considering the non-monetary factors directing the human behaviours are vital in terms of energy conservation and energy efficiency, and efficiency and effectiveness of policy outcomes. Advising efficient and effective policy implications on energy and environmental problems it is possible by considering the cognitive bias and perceptions. In this study, while emphasizing the importance of transition to renewable energy, energy and environmental problems will be presented and the policy implications in the behavioural economics' literature will be explored to find solutions for these problems.

1-. International relations (IR) theory has suffered a restructuring among several lines over the past two decades. The gradual but uninterrupted decline of systemic theories - primus inter pares in the discipline since the 1970s- is one of those. (1) This decline was accompanied by a rise of those approaches that privilege domestic politics as the place to look for answers. For reasons I will develop below, such an intellectual step was logical, expected, and partially appropriate. (2) While the current state of affairs should not be seen as immutable and a systemic comeback is plausible, the truth is that domestic politics, and non-systemic approaches in general, are well entrenched in a semi-hegemonic position. In this essay I will explain the reasons behind the aforementioned shift, assess its consequences, and advance some hypotheses on the future of systemic theories of IR.2-. Born between the interwar period and the dawn the Cold War world, IR was created with the explicit objective of explaining the causes of war –particularly great wars, understood under the lenses of the two devastating conflicts of the first half of the 20th century. Since then, IR scholars have struggled to respond to the main challenges –or what they perceive as the main challenges- in world politics. (3) This "duty" to explain the world drives theory to follow the patterns of change in international politics, which, as they develop, suggest new problématiques and novel ways to approach them. In important ways then –although, as discussed later, this is not the whole picture- (4) a sociology of inquiry is needed to better understand some of the key transformations in IR theory -e.g. the shift from systemic to domestic theories. Systemic approaches (5) made their meteoric rise under the shelter of K. Waltz's Neorealism. (6) They were created as a tool for a particular time with particular problems. (7) This was a world in which the primary preoccupation was how to manage the bilateral relationship between the United States and the USSR so that it would not en up in World War III. There were certainly other interests in the discipline, but this one outweighed all the rest. A Cold War context made systemic theories very appropriate. Needless to say, the bipolar conflict had been in place a long time before Waltz's path-breaking Theory of International Politics. (8) The essential point is, however, that Neorealism proved to be very successful in explaining the basic patterns of interest in this particular period of the history of IR –i.e. dynamics of polarity, relevance of nuclear weapons, consequences of anarchy and its relationship with war and cooperation, inter alia- in a more parsimonious and convincing way than the discipline had ever been able to do.The IR community recognized this "Copernican turn", as Waltz defined it, as progress and systemic approaches were established as mainstream, maybe even as "normal science." Anyone trying to explain something in international politics had to reckon with the system. This was true for realists (see the work of Gilpin, Walt, and Grieco) but also for scholars with a line of inquiry that differed substantially from Waltz's (see Keohane's Cooperation after Hegemony for a good example). 3-. A dramatic event that shakes the bases of an academic discipline is sometimes needed to motivate scholars to devise new lines of inquiry and surpass research programs that appear to be losing heuristic power. This is what the fall of the Soviet Union did with Neorealism, and systemic approaches in general. (9) Structural realism was in many ways, and problematically so, a theory for the Cold War. Its discussion on nuclear weapons, bipolarity, uncertainty, and superpower dynamics seemed to be too tied to a specific historical context. (10) The inability of neorealism, or any other systemic theory for that matter, to foresee –or even explain- the disappearance of the bipolar world –a systemic change par excellence-supposed a hard blow to its appeal. (11) Both the fall of the USSR and the subsequent appearance (or uncovering, once the Cold War veil was lifted) of new "themes" in international politics -IPE, civil wars, the role of leaders, the democratic peace, inter alia- opened a fertile camp over which to argue for the need to "go beyond systemic theory." (12) I argued supra that this was an appropriate move (or partially appropriate). But the reasons implicitly inferred up to know -failure in predicting events and a crisis in the IR community (in a Kuhnian sense)- cannot support this claim. The other face of the coin is that the thorough self-examination of the 1990s also responded to internal problems of systemic theories as research programs. For example, in the 1980s the discipline was stuck in the mud of absolute vs. relative gains debate, a degenerative discussion from a Lakatosian perspective. (13) Visible problems of heuristic power were calling for a partial move beyond the system. This was the real cause for the shift, and the best argument to characterize it as "appropriate". The exogenous shock (fall of the USSR) had the role, not at all minor, of opening a window of opportunity for dissenting scholars. Helen Milner was one of the most eloquent advocates for this turn. Her argument, in short, was that "systemic theory simply cannot take us far enough" (Milner, 1992). The assumption that anarchy was the principal variable defining states preferences and the primacy of a straight causal line from the system to the state and then to policy-making was excessively simplistic, Milner argued. How could the discipline solve this quagmire? By studying domestic politics to understand states' preferences and, consequently, the differing patterns of conflict and cooperation in international politics. (14) As Milner contended: "…cooperation may be unattainable because of domestic intransigence, and not because of the international system." (15) A reaction against systemic theories was not exclusive to the liberal trenches. Following this turn toward domestic politics, some realist scholars directed their efforts at the incorporation of domestic variables as a way to add complexity to systemic models that they saw as too crude. In his From Wealth to Power, F. Zakaria argued that anarchy and the distribution of power were not enough to explain the behavior of rising powers. After observing that at the end of the 19th century the US was not as assertive as a structural approach would have predicted, he hypothesized that this was because it did not have the governmental capacity to do so. To solve this puzzle he argued for the incorporation of models of resource extraction and governmental capability to try to get through the Neorealist corset. This was an important intra-realist challenge to a somewhat ossified systemic realism. (16)The rise of domestic approaches represented a generalized discontentment with the excessive importance given to parsimony and the inflexibility that came with it. Parsimony, which should be no more than a tool in theory building, was placed as a goal in itself, restricting research in a way that went against the discipline's own progress. Those boundaries had to be overcome if we wanted to say something about some of the important issues left unstudied by a focus on the system. Once again, the Cold War world with its apparently clear strategic problems may have seemed more propitious to a highly parsimonious approach to theory building. In a post Cold War world, the costs of parsimony were too heavy. Domestic theories certainly lost in parsimony, but they gained in a more real approach to IR problématiques. This was the primary rationale behind the turn here discussed, and in this limited sense, the shift was appropriate. (17)4-. It would be nice to unambiguously assert that the fall of systemic theories made IR a coherent and progressive discipline. This, unfortunately, is not the case. The past two decades have seen the formation of a different ethos of theory building and discipline development that may end up doing more harm than good to our broader understanding of international politics. Something not mentioned up to now is the ascent of quantitative and strategic-choice approaches in the discipline. Quantitative approaches gained prominence by the same time that, and related to, domestic theories were supplanting systemic theories. (18) Strategic choice and game theory, following developments in other academic areas -especially economics-, also gained importance in the 1990s under the idea of formalizing theories and going beyond the "isms." There is nothing wrong with these approaches per se. Quantitative work has been very important in the empirical development of IR -maybe too neglected in the past. Formal theory, on the other hand, is a powerful and clear tool to build and evaluate theories while avoiding problems of underspecification all too common in the discipline –though, this is only true if one can get through its assumptions. (19)The problems of this new "methodological bets" are to be found in the costs for the general development of the discipline. The most pressing are the ones related to the idea that theory construction should be a bottom to top affair, and the implicit notion that by building the parts individually we will eventually end up in a progressive accumulation of theoretical knowledge. However, this epistemological decision may well result in the proliferation of particularistic theories of problems ever more sophisticatedly studied, increasingly particular and micro, and in crescendo uninteresting. (20) By depending on a kind of magical automatic accumulation of theoretical knowledge we are risking to end up with an even more chaotic and incoherent discipline (more on this in the conclusion). 5-. As said in the introduction, the fall of grace of systemic theories cannot be taken as an irreversible given; it is possible to devise some scenarios in which systemic approaches could make a comeback.The first one is linked to the relationship between theory and History discussed earlier. The post Cold War world, particularly the 1990s, was a strange period for the discipline. The study of IR has historically dealt with great power politics as its core. The "curious" 1990s came with a certain absence of great power politics, especially due to the overwhelming power position of the US. This goes a long way in explaining the growing emphasis on domestic politics, civil wars, international organizations, inter alia, during those years. A partial return of classical great power politics (or the perception of it) -for example under the banner of the rise of China and some other middle powers- might motivate a recasting of systemic theories -particularly for those wanting to study polarity (a passé topic in the unipolar 1990s), (21) systemic change and its consequences, etc. (22)Another plausible scenario would be the success of some of the ongoing projects to make systemic theories more sophisticated and comprehensive by, for example, incorporating domestic variables. A good example is "Neo-classical Realism" (see fn. 16). This research project proceeds from a systemic assumption of the influences of the system (that is, a neorealist basis) but incorporates domestic politics as an intervening variable between systemic pressures and decision-making. Though a rather interesting proto-school, Neoclassical Realism is still in its infant stages and has yet to produce work of remarkable characteristics. Lastly, domestic politics, as should have been expected, were not the panacea for the development of IR theory. There might well be a social exhaustion with the results of domestic and micro-theory –a Kuhnian crisis analogous to the one that discredited systemic theories. This may eventually take IR on unexpected paths. Nevertheless, if measured by academic output and Geist, predicting a comeback of systemic approaches seems a risky bet. The discipline appears to be quite comfortable with increasing its empirical production, formalizing theories towards an Icarian "scientism", and avoiding, at its own peril, a "wholist" view of international politics. 6-. Going beyond systemic theories –not in the sense of vanishing them, but of relaxing some of their strictures, increasing their sophistication, and trying new approaches- was the necessary thing to do for a methodology that was unable to cope with many of the relevant problems in IR. The turn to domestic and particularistic perspectives brought much needed renovation, indeed. However, the excesses incurred by systemic theorists as a result of an obsession with parsimony and structural effects may now seem analogous (although for the opposite reasons) to a fixation with the particular and micro-level studies in contemporary IR theory. A blind push to obtain ever more data of increasingly micro phenomena puts at risk what we can say about international relations in general. We may, for example, be more much prepared to sophisticatedly answer why a specific insurgent group responded in a specific way to the level of aggression of a specific state, (23) but we may also be losing our interest and capacity to think about the nature of conflict in its most elemental condition. The stakes are too high for the IR community to avoid an honest discussion on how far we are willing to continue on this path. (1) This essay works with the assumption of a relative decline of systemic apporaches. To argue that they have vanished would be utterly incorrect. For a convincing argument on the inevitability of structural constraints see Jervis'sSystem Effects.(2) Although a change may be welcomed, the results are not always as encouraging as expected (more on this qualification of "appropriate" later).(3) This does not mean, of course, that there is an exclusive focus on policy or immediacy, It means that in its most basic essence, the idea of the discipline is to be able to provide some answers to the pressing problems in the international system. To give an example, few people would be interested in studying the prospects of war between France and Germany in the 21st century per se –though it surely is studied as a historical case that can shed light on other issues-, while this was one of the main topics in the nascent IR discipline.(4) Social science does not progress only by exogenous shocks, but also for endogenous reasons that cannot be explained by what happens outside theoretical disscusions.(5) Understood simply as those that privilege the influence of the structure over the behavior of the units.(6) This type of theories certainly were not born with Waltz; systemic is a much broader category than Neorealism. The important point is that Waltz devised the more convincing type of systemic theory. For simplicity, Waltz' Neorelism will be used here as the epitome and a kind of proxy for systemic theory. (7) It must be said that the rise of systemic theories also responded to changes in the social sciences in general; for example, the influence of structuralist anthorpoligist Levi-Strauss' work, which Waltz knew well.(8) Theories of IR before Waltz hosted a diverse group of analysts: Classical realism from the hand of a Hans Morgenthau, Geroge Kennan and Raymond Aron; liberal approaches from a Stanley Hoffman, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye; Bureacratic Organization and foreign policy from a Graham Allison; and a long et cetera.(9) See R. N. Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War and the Failure of Realism."(10) See I. Oren's Our Enemies and US: America´s Rivalries and the Making of Political Science.(11) As with its rise the decline of systemic theories was also linked to broader transformations in the world of ideas, to which IR seems to always be a latecomer. From a broad perspective, this phenomenon had started in the 1960s with the work of Foucault, Derrida, Geertz and others.(12) The end of the immediate preoccupation with bipolarity also gave the opportunity to rethink some long-term historical problems of Neorealism (see Schroeder 1994).(13) Some of the scholars engaged in this deabate were: Keohane, Grieco, Axelrod, and Mastanduno; cf. Milner (1992).(14) In another article in International Organization (1987) she argues that to understand the way in which states make decisions in the international economy it is not enough to look at anarchy. Her model studies the type of economic links between countries (high or low interdependence) and the influence of interests groups that may pressure the state to make particular decisions; these policy outcomes would have been incomprehensible from a systemic/anarchic stance. According to Milner, there is an important dynamic of preference construction and strategies adopted that are to be found in domestic politics.(15) See also Putnam (1988) for an interesting effort to move beyond lists of domestic factors and towards a coherent two level theory.(16) This line of research has been given the title of Neoclassical Realism (see G. Rose 1998). See the work of R. Schweller, J. Taliaferro, A. Friedberg, and T. Christensen.(17) Systemic theories were also attached to what has been discussed as the "paradigm wars" between realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc. The turn away from them can also be given credit for helping to discredit this unproductive way of theorizing.(18) This trend was tied to the notoriety of the "democratic peace" project that was, and still is, an empirical enterprise at its core. See Russett and Oneal (1999); cf. Gartzke (2007).(19) See Wagner, War and the State, and Lake and Powell Strategic Choice and International Relations.(20) This is not the nature of all the work in this approach, of course, but just a possible trend of the school as a whole. See Walt's "Rigor or Rigor Mortis" for a sharp, but not always convincing, critique.(21) For an exception see the work by N. Monteiro on unipolarity. This does not mean that polarity disappeared from the IR map, but it was certainly shrinked as a research question.(22) Some young scholars on this line of research are: P. MacDonald, J. Parent, D. Kliman and M. Beckley.(23) See Jason Lyall's "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya" To be fair, Lyall's work attempts to generalize from this specific case –how convincing he is not very clear, however. *Ph.D. StudentDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Pennsylvania.E-mail: gcastro@sas.upenn.edu

"Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation"Alexander Hamilton "The whole point of the doomsday machineis lost if you keep it a secret!!"Dr. Strangelove VII) Críticas Una de las principales críticas realizadas al realismo es su imposibilidad de explicar el cambio y, en particular, aportar inteligibilidad al mundo de la posguerra fría. Los cambios provocados por la globalización a partir de la década del 90 han, para muchos autores, resquebrajado profundamente los fundamentos axiomáticos del realismo. Badie (2001: 255-256) identifica tres aspectos fundamentales de este cambio de paradigma: A) Acercamiento: el nuevo orden mundial no es más territorial, sino que se basa en lo transnacional y en la interconexión entre individuos y flujos que no son controlados por el estado, provocando la eclosión de nuevas identidades y lealtades. B) Emergencia de bienes públicos globales. En un mundo globalizado, los bienes públicos dejan de ser puramente soberanos (nacionales). La búsqueda del bien social necesita de la mediación, movilización y cooperación internacionales que sobrepasan el control del estado (ej: medio ambiente, DD.HH, bienes socio-económicos, etc.). C) nacimiento de nuevos actores que reconfiguran la relación tradicional entre el ciudadano y el estado y, en cierta medida, atacan la legitimidad del contrato social y ponen en riesgo a la comunidad política en su conjunto. Esta nueva realidad debilitaría la soberanía y la territorialidad tradicionalmente asociadas al Estado-Nación. La nueva concepción de la soberanía lidia con el mercado transnacional y los nuevos compromisos y lealtades generados por la etno-política. En un mundo globalizado, el poder ya no residiría exclusivamente en la soberanía de un estado unitario, sino que éstos se ven de manera creciente obligados a conciliar o negociar sus estrategias con una multiplicidad de nuevos actores no estatales en una escena internacional pública que ya no puede ser monopolizada por el Estado-Nación. Según Badie, (2001: 258) este proceso sería similar al de la emergencia de la burguesía que demandaba participación política al interior de los Estados-Nación en los siglos XVIII y XIX, llevando al colapso de los regímenes absolutistas. Estos nuevos actores internacionales desafían el rol monopólico y absolutista del Estado-Nación y demandan derechos de participación y definición en la agenda internacional. Para esto, los realistas, clásicos y otros, tienen pocas respuestas. Esta crítica hace eco de lo que los adversarios del realismo han sostenido por décadas, a saber que la suposición (dogmática) realista del estado como actor unitario y racional ha desviado la atención del estudio, necesario, de las complejidades de la estructura del estado, del proceso de formación de preferencias así como de la acción de los actores no estatales (Williams, 2004: 636). Otra crítica importante que han enfrentado todas las escuelas realistas es que a pesar de su resistencia como programa de investigación, en particular en la academia estadounidense, el realismo político ha sido históricamente poco propenso a la verificación científica. Vasquez demuestra que las hipótesis realistas han constantemente fallado la corroboración empírica, mientras que las hipótesis no-realistas, liberales u otras, han demostrado ser estadísticamente significativas (Vasquez, 1983: 202), lo que ha llevado al autor a proponer el abandono del paradigma realista como guía teórica y práctica. La obsesión de la academia estadounidense con el enfoque realista ha sido bien documentada. Ya planteaba Kuhn (1970: 24) los problemas del "fanatismo científico" al advertir que cuando un paradigma se torna dominante, la academia se vuelve intolerante hacia las teorías alternativas y decide trabajar exclusivamente dentro del marco teórico dominante. El problema de esto, como bien marca Karl Popper, es que ese acto tiende a empobrecer a la academia y debilitar el pensamiento original e innovador (Walker y Morton, 2005: 342). ¿Cómo explicar entonces que a pesar de sus falencias el realismo político haya sido el paradigma dominante en el mundo académico y político? La respuesta realista es la siguiente: ningún paradigma rival ha logrado presentar, de manera integral, una visión alternativa, descriptiva y normativa de la acción de los estados y del funcionamiento de las RR.II. Una segunda respuesta es que el realismo, desde el inicio de la Guerra Fría, ha aportado un paradigma legitimador a la política exterior estadounidense. Al centrar el realismo el interés nacional en términos de seguridad y promover el gasto militar, alabar la Realpolitik y minimizar el componente legal o moral de las RR.II, ha encontrado en los decisores de política exterior (así como en el complejo industrial-militar) fervientes defensores de sus principios. No es de extrañar que los principales policy-makers de la Guerra Fría, como H. Kissinger o G. Kennan, hayan sido realistas convencidos (Wittner, 1985: 285). Finalmente, el cambio en el paradigma dominante parece haber seguido, si bien de manera relativamente lenta, los cambios estructurales en el mundo en los últimos 40 años. Walker y Morton (2005: 352) analizaron la producción de artículos académicos entre 1970 y 2000 en los Estados Unidos, agrupando principalmente los estudios en tres grandes escuelas: realismo, liberalismo y otros. Entre 1970-74, los artículos realistas y relacionados al realismo representaban el 73% del universo estudiado (37 artículos) y los artículos sobre liberalismo y otros tan sólo el 28%. En 1989, 61% de los artículos aún estaban bajo el paradigma realista. En el año 2000, tan sólo el 34% de los artículos analizados (515 artículos) versaban sobre el realismo político, contra 65% para artículos liberales y otros (de los cuales 40% eran sólo sobre el liberalismo). Esto demostraría que, por lo menos a nivel de la academia estadounidense, el realismo ha dejado de ser la teoría dominante. A nivel de los decisores de política exterior, el realismo sigue relevante, en particular a partir del 11 de setiembre de 2001. A todas estas críticas los realistas responderán invariablemente: los supuestos que han hecho del realismo político una filosofía política relevante, y dominante, desde hace más de dos mil años, permanecen incambiados hasta el día de hoy. El mundo sigue siendo un lugar anárquico, inseguro e imprevisible. Las guerras modernas entre pequeños estados o entre estados rebeldes y la superpotencia dominante no hacen más que confirmar la hipótesis neorrealista de que la disuasión atómica ha cambiado para siempre la guerra dentro del S.I. Las N.U no tienen más poder hoy en día del que tenían hace 50 años y es difícil imaginar un escenario futuro donde la Organización cumpla un rol eficaz como garante de la seguridad internacional, inclusive, o justamente a pesar de la reforma del Consejo de Seguridad. A pesar de la emergencia de nuevos actores, flujos transnacionales y problemas transfronterizos que demandan una respuesta concertada, los estados siguen siendo los actores principales de las RR.II. Los realistas no niegan la importancia de los nuevos temas de la agenda transnacional pero, argumentan ellos, ninguno de estos asuntos ha cambiado drásticamente la razón de ser de los estados ni alterado su principal obligación: salvaguardar su seguridad. Ni siquiera el terrorismo en su versión más extrema representa una amenaza seria a la integridad de los estados, por más que así haya sido instrumentalizado por los decisores de política exterior, apelando o inspirándose erróneamente en una lectura realista para lidiar con este problema. "The war on Terror" no es, desde una perspectiva realista, una guerra: no es más que una respuesta desproporcionada de un estado poco racional que combate un enemigo no tradicional en términos realistas. La "seguridad nacional" es sin dudas la expresión más utilizada en la arena política estadounidense desde el 11 de setiembre, pero lo que los decisores de política exterior estadounidenses parecen no entender, es que si bien los Estados Unidos no pueden perder esa guerra, tampoco pueden ganarla. Ya lo decía Morgenthau cuando criticaba el involucramiento de EEUU en la guerra de Vietnam: "Our very presence in Vietnam is in a sense dictated by considerations of public relations; we are afraid lest our prestige would suffer were we to retreat from an untenable position. One may ask whether we have gained prestige by being involved in a civil war on the mainland of Asia and by being unable to win it. Would we gain more by being unable to extricate ourselves from it, and by expanding it unilaterally into an international war? …Does not a great power gain prestige by mustering the wisdom and courage necessary to liquidate a losing Enterprise? In other words, is it not the mark of greatness, in circumstances such as these, to be able to afford to be indifferent to one´s prestige?". Si Morgenthau no consideraba la Guerra de Vietnam digna del interés nacional, ¿cómo puede serlo en el siglo XXI la guerra contra Al-Qaeda?. VIII) Consideraciones finales En conclusión, me gustaría refutar en parte el argumento comúnmente utilizado para avanzar la muerte del realismo como doctrina relevante a la hora de explicar el accionar de los grandes estados en el concierto internacional, a saber: el fin del estado nación y la consolidación del supranacionalismo, el ejemplo más estridente siendo la construcción europea. Pero para entender claramente a qué me refiero, conviene recordar brevemente qué es un Estado. Según la definición clásica comúnmente aceptada, un Estado, para existir, debe tener por los menos 4 características incompresibles. El Estado es entonces: a) una población, b) dentro de un territorio, c) con alguna forma de gobierno centralizado y d) que ejerce el monopolio legítimo de la fuerza (o de la coerción) para asegurar, entre otras cosas, la seguridad interna y externa. Ahora bien, si reflexionamos en términos de la Unión Europea y hasta donde ha avanzado la construcción de un Estado Europeo, constatamos que es bien cierto que la UE cuenta con tres de las cuatro características normalmente atribuidas al Estado. La Unión Europea posee una población claramente identificable, los ciudadanos miembros de los estados que la conforman, con derechos y obligaciones propias que no poseen los ciudadanos no europeos. La UE cuenta igualmente con unas fronteras delimitadas y protegidas que separan a este "Estado Europeo" de las naciones no europeas. La UE tiene además su propio gobierno (supranacional), el Parlamento, el Consejo y la Comisión, que poseen importantes potestades legislativas y ejecutivas capaces de imponerse a las legislaciones nacionales. Por lo tanto, la Unión Europea estaría en camino a convertirse en un estado hecho y derecho. Hélas para los defensores de dicha tesis, la cuarta característica, el monopolio de la fuerza, está claramente ausente de las discusiones reales de la construcción europea y ello, por un buen tiempo a venir. Recordemos que para los realistas, clásicos y demás, este cuarto componente, a saber el monopolio de la fuerza, destinado a garantizar la supervivencia del Estado, debe ser casi exclusivamente la única preocupación de los Estadistas y por lo tanto, sin ella, no podemos hablar propiamente de Estado. En consecuencia, mientras que los franceses, los alemanes o los ingleses no hagan un paso en dirección hacia una verdadera política de defensa supranacional (y no internacional o concertada), es decir, hasta el día en que los gobiernos nacionales no cedan la potestad sobre su bien más preciado (según los realistas) a un órgano supranacional sobre el cual ejerzan poco o nulo control, entonces el axioma realista que los grandes estados siguen pensando y actuando antes que nada en términos de seguridad y de poder, seguirá siendo relevante para el estudio de las RR.II. Aquellos que desconocen la penetración del realismo y de la realpolitik y desu fuerza ordenadora como principio de acción de los estados, ciegamente niegan que los estados, en materia de seguridad, continúan avalando, en el siglo XXI, una visión Hobbesiana del S.I. Afirmo plenamente en este epílogo que el realismo sigue siendo una doctrina relevante para explicar, si bien no todos, por los menos varios aspectos cruciales de las RR.II. Me arriesgaría a afirmar igualmente que el realismo progresivamente retomará un lugar de privilegio entre las teorías dominantes. El S.I internacional se encuentra actualmente en un período de transición entro lo que fue el fin de la Guerra Fría, el interludio del dominio unilateral estadounidense y la emergencia progresiva de China como principal potencia antagonista. La historia ha tenido múltiples escenarios de dominio unipolar o hegemónico, desde los siglos que duró el Imperio Romano, los años de la Francia Napoleónica, los meses de la Alemania Nazi hasta los 20 años del nuevo orden mundial capitalista y liberal. Pero, si hay algo que el realismo enseña y predice con infalibilidad matemática, es que el poder en el sistema internacional tiende siempre al equilibrio. Es altamente improbable que la potencia China no expanda su área de influencia hasta chocar irremediablemente con los intereses estadounidenses. En la aceptación mutua de la paridad de fuerzas y en el miedo recíproco entre ambas potencias, encontraremos seguramente las garantías de la seguridad colectiva, tal como predice el realismo, y no así otras teorías. El pensamiento realista ha sido injustamente simplificado y encasillado en lo que parece ser una colección de máximas de galletas de la fortuna: de Clausewitz a Maquiavelo, pasando por Tucídides, Hobbes y Morgenthau, el realismo ha producido enunciados categóricos que parecen despojar al mundo de todo matiz. Si bien es cierto que esas afirmaciones banalizan una de las escuelas teóricas más fecundas, no es menos cierto que la incertidumbre del sistema internacional ha llevado a los teóricos realistas a considerar que la supervivencia del Estado es algo demasiado importante para dejarlo en manos de los buenos sentimientos. 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Germán Clulow es Licenciado en Estudios Internacionales por la Universidad ORT –Uruguay, Master en Ciencia Política por la Université de Genève – Suiza, y Master en Estudios de Desarrollo por el Instituto de Altos Estudios Internacionales y de Desarrollo (IHEID-The Graduate Institute) Ginebra, Suiza.

The article examines the phenomenon of the «silent poetry» and analyzes its ideological structures which were targeted at addressing the traditional and demonstrational silence, posited as internal opposition to the political usurpation of the art space in the second half of the 20th century. After all, the cultural era of 1960s–1980s was characterized as a loud artistic heyday, lyrical experimentation, and as a silence, latter being the form of a protest against the ideological system. It should be noted, if the principal position «to remain silent» wasnot considered very popular in the literary circles of the 1960s, in the 1970s and 1980s its importance increased signifi cantly. «Silent poetry» is an unprecedented phenomenon in literature during 1960s–80s. Its philosophical and aesthetic system focused not only on natural and philosophical tendencies, but also, in our opinion, heavily relied on cordocentrism, hesychasm, liberalism, stoic and anthropological vision of existence. Poets concentrated primarily on the moral principles which shaped a stable social and political position of the author. The main feature of «silent poetry» worldview was an appeal to nature (human civilization womb) and, in particular, to natural philosophy. Poetry followed cordocentrism, the essence of which was only in condemning the bodily. The preference was given to deep spiritual self-refl ection, a true feeling of the environment and homeland. Creative art and imagery of «silent poetry» has such aesthetic criteria as the criticism of the program of socialist realism, and delineation of the ideological position of the artist in the form of internal isolation. The poets aptly showed the creative independence from political standardization, unity of tradition and innovation (appeal to the neoclassical heritage), the idea of complementarity between the internal and external perfection (Kalos kagathos), individualization, which stressed the elitism of their creative method. A special attention was attributed to the increased pain due to loneliness. The inner awareness of belonging to life in the loneliness acquired herein polysemantic signifi cance. Deliberate asceticism in the world of the individual indicates his spiritual growth and helps to understand the essence of the purpose of life. This situation is a consequence of the withdrawal right beyond the ordinary into an independent inner world of the individual. The represented art and imagery dominants of this literary and aesthetic phenomenon appealed to the ontological categories of truth of human existence, direct connection with human and natural universe, as well as appealed to the inner world of the lyrical hero. Keywords: «silent poetry», silence-homo silentio, natural philosophy, cordocentrism, aestheticism, еxistentialism. ; Розглянуто поетичний феномен «тихої лірики». Проаналізовано його ідеологіч- ну складову, яка полягала у зверненні до традиційності та демонстрації мовчання як внутрішньої непогодженості із політичною узурпацією мистецького простору другої половини ХХ століття. Репрезентовано художньо-образні домінанти вказаного лі- тературно-естетичного явища, які апелювали до онтологічних категорій істинності людського існування, безпосереднього зв'язку людини із природним універсумом та зверненні до внутрішнього світу ліричного героя. Ключові слова: «тиха лірика», мовчання-homo silentio, натурфілософія, кордо- центризм, естетизм, екзистенціалізм

1. Agency / Edward J. McKenna and Diane C. Zannoni -- 2. Australia / J.E. King -- 3. Austrian school of economics / Stephen D. Parsons -- 4. Babylonian mode of thought / Sheila C. Dow -- 5. Balance-of-payments-constrained economic growth / John S.L. McCombie -- 6. Banking / Gillian Hewitson -- 7. Bastard Keynesianism / John Lodewijks -- 8. Behavioural economics / Therese Jefferson and J.E. King -- 9. Brazil / Luiz Fernando de Paula and Fernando Ferrari-Filho -- 10. Bretton Woods / Matías Vernengo -- 11. Budget deficits / Joëlle Leclaire -- 12. Business cycles / Peter Skott -- 13. Cambridge economic tradition / G.C. Harcourt -- 14. Capital theory / Ben Fine -- 15. Central banks / Fernando J. Cardim de Carvalho -- 16. Chartalism / Sergio Rossi -- 17. Choice under uncertainty / Victoria Chick and Sheila C. Dow -- 18. Circuit theory / Riccardo Realfonzo -- 19. Competition / Nina Shapiro -- 20. Consumer debt / Robert H. Scott, III -- 21. Consumer theory / Marc Lavoie -- 22. Consumption / David Bunting -- 23. Conventions / David Dequech -- 24. Credit rationing / Martin H. Wolfson -- 25. Critical realism / Andrew Brown -- 26. Development finance / Rogério Studart -- 27. Econometrics / Paul Downward -- 28. Economic development / Stephanie Blankenburg and Gabriel Palma -- 29. Economic policy / Malcolm Sawyer -- 30. Effective demand / Mark Setterfield -- 31. Efficient markets hypothesis / Mark Hayes -- 32. Employer of last resort / Pavlina R. Tcherneva -- 33. Employment / Engelbert Stockhammer -- 34. Environmental economics / Adrian Winnett -- 35. Environmental policy / Neil Perry -- 36. Equilibrium and non-equilibrium / Donald W. Katzner -- 37. Exchange rates / John T. Harvey -- 38. Expectations / Éric Tymoigne -- 39. Export-led growth / Arslan Razmi -- 40. Financial instability hypothesis / Louis-Philippe Rochon -- 41. Financial markets / Jörg Bibow -- 42. Financial reform / Aldo Barba -- 43. Financialization / Till Van Treeck -- 44. Fiscal policy / J.W. Nevile -- 45. Full employment / William Mitchell and Martin Watts -- 46. Fundamentalist Keynesians / Bill Gerrard -- 47. Galbraith's economics / Stephen P. Dunn -- 48. Gender / Colin Danby -- 49. Germany and Austria / Torsten Niechoj -- 50. Global financial crisis / Stephanie Blankenburg -- 51. Growth and income distribution / Carlo Panico -- 52. Growth theory / Steve Keen -- 53. Households / Zdravka Todorova -- 54. Income distribution / Thomas I. Palley -- 55. Inflation / John Smithin -- 56. Innovation / Jerry Courvisanos -- 57. Institutionalism / Steven Pressman -- 58. International economics / Robert A. Blecker -- 59. International financial reform / Leanne Ussher -- 60. Investment / Tracy Mott -- 61. Italy / Andrea Pacella and Guido Tortorella Esposito -- 62. Japan / Toichiro Asada -- 63. Joan Robinson's economics / Maria Cristina Marcuzzo -- 64. Journal of post Keynesian economics / Phillip Anthony O'Hara -- 65. Kaldorian economics / A.P. Thirlwall -- 66. Kaleckian economics / Jan Toporowski -- 67. Keynes's general theory / Paul Davidson -- 68. Keynes's treatise on money / Giuseppe Fontana -- 69. Keynes's treatise on probability / Rod O'Donnell -- 70. Latin American structuralism / Gerardo Fujii -- 71. Liquidity preference / Stephanie Kelton (née Bell) -- 72. Macroeconomic methodology / Jesper Jespersen -- 73. Marginalism / Harry Bloch -- 74. Market governance / Tuna Baskoy -- 75. Microfoundations / Steven Fazzari -- 76. Monetary policy / Peter Howells -- 77. Money / L. Randall Wray -- 78. Money manager capitalism / Yeva Nersisyan -- 79. Multiplier / Andrew B. Trigg -- 80. New classical economics / Alessandro Vercelli -- 81. New Keynesian economics / Wendy Cornwall -- 82. New neoclassical synthesis / Sebastian Dullien -- 83. Non-ergodicity / Stephen P. Dunn -- 84. Open systems / Andrew Mearman -- 85. Pluralism in economics / Rob Garnett -- 86. Price rigidity / Jordan Melmiès -- 87. Prices and pricing / Gyun Cheol Gu and Frederic S. Lee -- 88. Production / Amitava Krishna Dutt -- 89. Profits / Elizabeth Webster -- 90. Rate of interest / Massimo Pivetti -- 91. Regional monetary policy / Carlos J. Rodríguez-Fuentes -- 92. Saving / Robert Pollin -- 93. Say's law / Claudio Sardoni -- 94. Socialism / Howard J. Sherman -- 95. Sraffian economics / Gary Mongiovi -- 96. Stagflation / Mark Setterfield and John Cornwall -- 97. Stock-flow consistent modelling / Tarik Mouakil -- 98. Sustainable development / Jerry Courvisanos -- 99. Technology and innovation / Amaia Altuzarra -- 100. Time in economic theory / John F. Henry -- 101. Time-series econometrics / Flavia Dantas -- 102. Tobin tax / Philip Arestis -- 103. Transition economies / Christine Rider -- 104. Traverse / Peter Kriesler -- 105. Uncertainty / Murray Glickman -- 106. Underconsumption / J.E. King -- 107. Unemployment / Mathew Forstater -- 108. University of Missouri--Kansas City / Frederic S. Lee -- 109. Wage deflation / Jan Priewe -- 110. Wage- and profit-led regimes / Eckhard Hein -- 111. Walrasian economics / M.C. Howard -- 112. Welfare economics / Tae-Hee Jo.

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ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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"Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.). Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/docCIDOB.2024.15/enE-ISSN: 2339-9570

Documents CIDOB: 15Winner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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Reuters (8 August 2021), (on-line) [Date accessed 16.05.2023]: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexico-host-negotiations-between-venezuelan-government-opposition-2021-08-05/ Riste, Olav. Norway's Foreign Relations - A History. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001. Rodríguez, Jorge & Blyde, Gerardo. "Memorando de entendimiento". (13 August 2021), (on-line) [Date accessed 20.06.2023]: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/d62443bc624041238af2902d356f949c/memorando-de-entendimiento.pdf Santander, Diego. "Nueva ronda de negociación entre Maduro y la oposición finaliza sin acuerdos". El Mundo, (28 September 2021), (on-line) [Date accessed 16.05.2023]: https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2021/09/27/61520d3d21efa0703d8b461c.html Skånland, Øystein Haga. "'Norway is a peace nation': A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement". Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 45, no. 1, (April 2010), p. 34–54, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836709347212 Sørbø, Gunnar M. 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Voz de América, (30 May 2019), (on-line), [Date accessed 12.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/venezuela-noruega-negociaciones-para-poner-fin-a-la-crisis-/4936901.html Voz de América. "Tras fracaso en Barbados, Venezuela sigue esperando una solución". Voz de América, (11 August 2019), (on-line) [Date accessed 14.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/tras-fracaso-en-barbados-venezuela-sigue-esperando-una-solucion/5037644.html Voz de América. "Funcionarios de EE.UU. viajan a Venezuela y se reúnen con oficiales del gobierno: según medios". Voz de América, (6 March 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/funcionarios-eeuu-viajaran-venezeula-reunen-oficiales-gobierno-/6472694.html Voz de América. "Gobierno y oposición de Venezuela coinciden en Noruega". Voz de América, (20 June 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/delegaciones-maduro-dialogo-noruega-/6625220.html Wilson, Peter. "Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.).Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolution

Volume I -- 1 Cambridge, That Was: The Crucible of Heterodox Economics -- 1.1 The Narrative -- 1.2 Evolutions and Revolutions -- 1.2.1 The Great Banyan of Heterodox Traditions -- 1.2.2 Cohorts -- 1.2.3 The Cambridge Habitat -- 1.2.4 Which Cambridge? -- 1.3 Regime Change -- 1.3.1 The World of Cambridge: Stories Within -- 1.3.2 Worlds Beyond Cambridge: Neoliberalism at the Gates -- 1.4 The Dialectic of Competing Paradigms -- 1.4.1 Laissez-Faire: "Receding at last into the distance" -- 1.4.2 The Force of Ideas -- 1.4.3 Opposition Brewing -- 1.4.4 Evolutions and Hegemonic Incorporation -- 1.4.5 Ideological: Not the Techniques but the Purposes of Economics -- 1.4.6 Sociological: Mathematical Whiz-Kids and Ageing Dinosaurs -- 1.4.7 Beyond Kuhnian Reductionism -- 1.4.8 Mankiw's Pendulum -- 1.4.9 Solow's À La Carte Approach -- 1.4.10 Silos and Trenches -- 1.4.11 Joan Versus Hahn—History Versus Equilibrium -- 1.5 Semantics and Pedantics -- References -- 2 The Warring Tribes -- 2.1 A Sanctuary of Sages -- 2.1.1 Class to Community: The Cement of War -- 2.1.2 Community to Conflict: Cement to Sand -- 2.1.3 A Pride of Savage Prima Donnas -- 2.2 Faculty Wars -- 2.2.1 Paradise Lost -- 2.2.2 Fault Lines Within -- Wynne Godley: No Legacy No Synthesis, No Textbooks—The Samuelson Factor -- Shifting Student Preferences? -- "Irrelevance" and Irreverence: Joan and K-Theory -- Inbred Insularity, Complacency -- Simultaneities in the Demographic Lifecycle -- Lack of Internal Group Coherence -- The Heterodox Camp: No Chairs—Sorry, Standing Room Only -- A Break in Intergenerational Transmission, in the Reproduction of Traditions -- 2.3 Godfathers, Uncles and Nephews: The Gathering Foe -- 2.3.1 The Trojan Horse: By the Pricking of My Thumbs -- 2.3.2 Forming the Academy -- Meanwhile, at the Orthodox Party—A Merry Game of Musical Chairs -- 2.3.3 The Chess Master -- 2.4 The Campaign: How the War Was Lost and Won -- 2.4.1 The Orthodox Gambit: Capture the External Commanding Heights -- 2.4.2 Carrots and Commanders -- 2.4.3 Modus Operandi: Masters, Mandarins and Interlocking Committees -- References -- 3 Worlds Beyond Cambridge: The Global Web of the 'Neoliberal Thought Collective' -- 3.1 Conjunctures -- 3.1.1 1930s, The Prelude -- LSE Versus Cambridge -- Émigré Economists: The Benefactions of Lenin and Hitler -- 3.1.2 1940s, The Cascade -- 3.1.3 Keynesianism: Divergent Receptions -- Post-war Affinity in the UK -- Post-New Deal Hostility in the USA -- 3.2 Spreading the Word: Messiahs, Messages, Methods -- 3.2.1 Ideas and Ideologies: Manufacturers and Retailers -- 3.2.2 USA: Early Ideological Entrepreneurs of Libertarianism -- Harold Luhnow: The Volker Fund and its Dollars -- Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) and its Facilitators -- 3.2.3 Europe: Friedrich Hayek and the Mont Pelerin Society -- Antecedents -- Pilgrims Atop a Mountain, Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, April 1947 -- Financial Sponsors -- The First Meeting of Minds -- Sarcastic Schumpeter, Sceptical Solow, Scathing Samuelson -- 3.2.4 UK: Antony Fisher, Global Venture Capitalist of Think Tanks -- 3.3 Branding the Message: The 'Nobel' Prize -- 3.3.1 The Stockholm Connection: Ideological Entrepreneurs -- 3.3.2 Some Early Awards: Setting the Direction -- Jan Tinbergen—Ragnar Frisch 1969 -- Samuelson 1970 -- Gunnar Myrdal—Friedrich von Hayek 1974 -- Milton Friedman 1976 -- 3.3.3 Mont Pelerin Society and the 'Nobel'—A Golden Embrace -- 3.3.4 Cambridge Heterodoxy? -- 3.3.5 'An Ideological Coup' -- 3.4 Reaching Politics: Weaponising the Message -- 3.4.1 Santiago de Chile: Pinochet the Pioneer -- Chicago and its Cowboys -- Thatcher: Romancing Pinochet's Chile -- 3.4.2 The White House: Reagan, a Disciple -- 3.4.3 10 Downing Street: Thatcher, a Devotee -- More than its Weight in Gold—The Market Price of Symbolic Capital -- 3.4.4 Pulling Together -- 3.5 Besieging Cambridge: The Chicago–MIT–LSE Trinity -- 3.5.1 A Cross-Atlantic Triangle -- 3.5.2 Diversity of Practice -- 3.5.3 Unity of Purpose -- References -- 4 Camp Skirmishes Over Interstitial Spaces: Journals, Seminars, Textbooks -- 4.1 The Battle of Teruel—The Day before -- 4.2 Journals -- 4.2.1 EJ Leaves 'Home'—The Loss of a Flagship -- 4.2.2 CJE Arrives—A Forum of One's Own -- 4.2.3 Cambridge Economic Policy Review: One Crowded Hour of Glorious Life -- 4.3 Seminars -- 4.3.1 Cambridge Economic Club—A Marshallian Precursor: 1884–1890, 1896–? -- 4.3.2 Political Economy Club: From Keynes to Robertson to Kahn—Dazzling to Dour -- 4.3.3 The Marshall Society: A Socialisation into Economics and Its Purposes -- 4.3.4 Piero Sraffa's Research Students Seminar: A Precocious Nursery -- 4.3.5 In Retrospect, Austin Robinson on the Cambridge Circus: The Engine Room of The General Theory -- 4.3.6 Cambridge–LSE Joint Seminar: Jousting Juniors -- 4.3.7 Kahn's 'Secret' Seminar at King's: Fires in the Kitchen -- 4.3.8 The Richard Stone Common Room: Typhoo and Typhoons -- 4.3.9 Ajit Singh's Political Economy Seminar at Queens': Young Turks -- 4.3.10 Arestis and Kitson Political Economy Seminar at St. Catherine's College -- 4.3.11 Hahn's Churchill Seminar: Only Maths and Neoclassicals, Others Beware -- 4.3.12 Cambridge Growth Project Seminar at DAE -- 4.3.13 Hahn's 'Quaker' Risk Seminar: The Rising Tide -- 4.3.14 Matthews's CLARE Group: The Master's Lodge of Moderate Practitioners -- 4.3.15 Lawson—Realism and Social Ontology: Ways of Seeing and Framing -- 4.4 Textbooks -- 4.4.1 Distant Thunder: Keynes and McCarthy, Tarshis and Samuelson -- 4.4.2 Lawrence Klein and the Paradox of The Keynesian Revolution -- Puzzle -- Ph.D.—At Samuelson's Feet -- Cowles Commission—The New Dealers -- The Keynesian Revolution: The Extra Chapter— Klein, Then a Closet Marxist? -- Beyond Keynes -- UMich and McCarthyism -- Policy to Forecasting -- Resolution -- 4.4.3 'Death of a Revolutionary Textbook': Robinson and Eatwell -- 4.4.4 An 'Applied Economics' Textbook That Wasn't: Joan and Young Friends -- 4.5 The Battle of Teruel—The Day After -- Appendix 4.1: First off the Blocks: Mabel Timlin's Keynesian Economics, 1942 -- References -- 5 The DAE Trilogy -- 5.1 Origins and Evolution -- 5.1.1 Origins -- 5.1.2 Evolution: Substance and Styles -- 5.1.3 Foundations of Stone -- 5.1.4 Reddaway's Method: Eclectic Development -- 5.1.5 Godley: Turbulent Times -- 5.2 End of the Golden Age: The Decade of Discontent -- 5.3 The Trilogy: Discrete Episodes or a Serial Campaign? -- Appendix 5.1: DAE—Finding a Good Home -- References -- 6 Cambridge Economic Policy Group: Beheading a Turbulent Priest -- 6.1 Charged Conjuncture -- 6.1.1 Imbroglios of 1974: Old Versus New Cambridge Versus the Establishment -- 6.1.2 The Enigma of Kahn -- 6.1.3 Kaldor: On Radical Policy Implications of New Cambridge, 1976 -- 6.1.4 Cambridge Squabbles: Spillover into Whitehall? -- 6.1.5 Triggering Crisis: The Pivot of the OPEC Price Hikes -- 6.1.6 1979: Enter Margaret Thatcher, Right-Wing, Upfront -- 6.1.7 The Case of the Odd Consensus: The Letter by 364 Economists, 1981 -- 6.1.8 Thatcher in the Garage of the Federal Reserve -- 6.1.9 1981: Brixton Riots, Toxteth Fires: "A Concentration of Hopelessness" -- 6.1.10 The CEPG: A Thorn in the Thatcher Hide -- 6.1.11 The Bogey of Import Controls and the Spectre of Bennism -- 6.2 SSRC and CEPG: Dispensing Instant Injustice -- 6.2.1 Posner's Parlour -- 6.2.2 Posner's Process -- 6.3 Epilogue -- 6.3.1 Vengeance -- 6.3.2 The Team Scattered -- 6.3.3 The Model Reincarnated -- 6.3.4 The Rehabilitation of Wynne -- 6.3.5 Wynne Godley: 'My Credo' … -- 6.3.6 The Pacification of the CEPG -- Appendix 6.1: Old Cambridge, New Cambridge, 1974: and All the King's Men -- 1. Letter WG to RFK 23 May 1974. JVR/ vii/228/3/3 -- 2. Letter NK to RFK 20 May 1974. JVR/ vii/228/3/14-16 -- 3. Letter from RFK and MP to NK 24 May 1974. JVR/vii/228/3/17-20 -- 4. Letter from RFK and MP to NK 28 May 1974. JVR/vii/228/3/24 -- 5. Letter from FC to RFK 29 May 1974. JVR/7/228/3/25 -- 6. Reply from RFK to FC 6 June 1974. JVR/7/228/3/24 -- 7. In the interim, NK replied to RFK and MP. JVR/7/228/3/26 -- 8. Letter from NK to RFK. RFK/12/2/132/3 -- References -- 7 'Unintended' Collateral Damage? The Cambridge Economic Policy Group and the Joseph-Rothschild-Posner SSRC Enquiry, 1982 -- 7.1 Joseph—Rothschild—Posner—Godley -- 7.2 The Posner-the-Saviour Narrative -- 7.3 Setting Up the Enquiry -- 7.4 Who Proposed Rothschild? -- 7.5 Rothschild Report Writing Process -- 7.6 The Judgement of Rothschild -- 7.7 Between Draft and Release and Response: Handshakes and Cigars -- 7.8 Did Posner Get Away with Just a Change of Name? -- 7.9 CEPG—Collateral Damage? Or, Traded Down the River? -- 7.10 The Rothschild Report: Gleanings on Macroeconomic Modelling -- 7.11 Lord Kaldor—Off the Record, Off the Cuff, Off the Mark? -- 7.12 Lord Harris' Vitriol -- 7.13 Catholicity and Independence -- 7.14 Rothschild's Last Word -- 7.15 Joseph's Last Laugh -- References -- 8 Cambridge Growth Project: Running the Gauntlet -- 8.1 Background and Conjuncture -- 8.1.1 The Decision -- 8.2 Substantive Issues -- 8.2.1 No Innovation? -- 8.2.2 Catholicity, Turnover and the Value of Disaggregation -- 8.2.3 Use of Input-Output Tables -- 8.2.4 CGP Presence in Policy Debates -- 8.2.5 Insularity -- 8.2.6 On Exploiting the Cheap Labour of Graduate Students -- 8.3 Issues of Procedural Probity -- 8.3.1 Shifting Goalposts Across Evaluations -- 8.3.2 Unequal Application of Criterion of Commercial Funding -- 8.3.3 Public Good or Private Resource? -- 8.3.4 ESRC Ignored CGP Model Performance: Why? -- 8.3.5 Compromised 'Independent' Evidence -- 8.4 Other Concerns -- 8.4.1 'Reds'? -- 8.4.2 Crowding Out Competitors? -- 8.4.3 Deadweight Loss of Built-up Intellectual Capital -- 8.4.4 Gratuitously Offensive: Up Close and Out of Order -- 8.4.5 The Consortium: 'Revived Talk of Conspiracy Theory' -- 8.4.6 I.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic securityAgainst this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic securityThe new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union?In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead.ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic securityAgainst this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic securityThe new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union?In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead.ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.