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The use of instrumental variables regression in political science has evolved from an obscure technique to a staple of the political science tool kit. Yet the surge of interest in the instrumental variables method has led to implementation of uneven quality. After providing a brief overview of the method and the assumptions on which it rests, we chart the ways in which these assumptions are invoked in practice in political science. We review more than 100 articles published in the American Journal of Political Science, the American Political Science Review, and World Politics over a 24-year span. We discuss in detail two noteworthy applications of instrumental variables regression, calling attention to the statistical assumptions that each invokes. The concluding section proposes reporting standards and provides a checklist for readers to consider as they evaluate applications of this method. Adapted from the source document.

This article uses Q-methodology, a factor analytic approach, to distinguish among different types of European attachments in Scotland and Wales. This method allows us to divide the types of European attachment into two groups: Euroskeptics, who oppose nearly every aspect of Europe, the EU and European integration; and those with more positively inclined European attachments. While positive European types share enough to be considered a meaningful group, they can also be divided between Europhiles and instrumental supporters of Europe. The result is deeper understanding of the dynamics of political attitudes of citizens from one of the more Euroskeptical members of the EU, but also reconsideration of Britain as more than simply an awkward partner in the European Union.

In this contribution we demonstrate that European citizens distinguish between political and instrumental Euro-scepticism and indicate the extent to which these Euro-sceptic positions are endorsed. Data from 143,367 European citizens in 15 countries and 182 regions show that political Euroscepticism constitutes a cumulative evaluation in each European country. European citizens who are Euro-sceptic on international policies are also Euro-sceptic on joint decisions on immigration policies and sociocultural policies. Moreover, we notice that political Euro-scepticism is modestly correlated with instrumental Euro-scepticism. We explore the extent to which both forms of Euro-scepticism vary between countries and regions and to what extent the percentages of missing values on these measurements affect the degree of Euro-scepticism at the national and regional level. This contribution shows that research on Euro-scepticism to date is skewed by a focus on instrumental Euro-scepticism.

In this contribution we demonstrate that European citizens distinguish between political and instrumental Euro-scepticism and indicate the extent to which these Euro-sceptic positions are endorsed. Data from 143,367 European citizens in 15 countries and 182 regions show that political Euroscepticism constitutes a cumulative evaluation in each European country. European citizens who are Euro-sceptic on international policies are also Euro-sceptic on joint decisions on immigration policies and sociocultural policies. Moreover, we notice that political Euro-scepticism is modestly correlated with instrumental Euro-scepticism. We explore the extent to which both forms of Euro-scepticism vary between countries and regions and to what extent the percentages of missing values on these measurements affect the degree of Euro-scepticism at the national and regional level. This contribution shows that research on Euro-scepticism to date is skewed by a focus on instrumental Euro-scepticism.

This article examines how Indonesian civil society organisations (CSOs) working for women's empowerment and gender equality have worked together with members of parliament (MPs) to support processes of developmental change. Examples are taken from initiatives supported by MAMPU, an Australian government funded project that promotes gender equality and women's empowerment in Indonesia, describing ways in which gender-focused organisations have engaged with, and had an impact upon, the actions of political leaders in parliament. The article focuses on interaction between institutions and the agency exercised by individuals within institutions. MPs act within a structure of institutional and political incentives, but they also have the power to make choices about how they respond to incentives. Moreover, the leaders of outside actors such as CSOs can modify the structure of incentives by both applying pressure on MPs and providing opportunities for legislators to make different choices. One of MAMPU's tools for targeting MPs has been political economy analysis. Having correctly understood the pressures and incentives facing MPs, CSOs can target their actions to bring about outcomes favourable to both sides in what the article calls 'alliances of instrumental advantage.' Organisations supported by MAMPU achieved success where relationships were forged between the organisations and politicians based on the identification of mutual advantage.

This article explores the distinction between an instrumentalist nationalism employed as a resource to combat relative deprivation and an ideological nationalism that resolves the anomic impact of social disruption by constructing politics as a simplistic moral confrontation between the virtuous "Us" and the demonized "Other." This distinction is related to the examination of how radicalized ethnic majority nationalisms and radicalized ethnic minority nationalisms might be buffered by civic nationalisms, or by the resilience of patrimonial networks. These conceptualizations of nationalism illuminate, and are at the same time illuminated by, one contemporary dispute, that of Achenese secessionism in Indonesia.

This article is part of the special cluster titled Political Parties and Direct Democracy in Eastern Europe, guest-edited by Sergiu Gherghina. The relationship between political parties and referendums has been receiving increased attention in the literature. While most research has focused on the challenges faced by political parties, little attention is dedicated to the ways in which they can use referendums to serve their purposes. This article analyzes the seven national-level referendums organized in post-communist Romania between 1991 and 2012 and shows how referendums were not used primarily as a means to reflect citizens' opinions on policy issues. Instead, they were primarily used as electoral strategies for legitimacy purposes or to augment the popularity of the initiators or main supporters. In isolated instances, they were oriented against other competitors.

In this contribution we demonstrate that European citizens distinguish between political and instrumental Euro-scepticism and indicate the extent to which these Euro-sceptic positions are endorsed. Data from 143,367 European citizens in 15 countries and 182 regions show that political Euroscepticism constitutes a cumulative evaluation in each European country. European citizens who are Euro-sceptic on international policies are also Euro-sceptic on joint decisions on immigration policies and sociocultural policies. Moreover, we notice that political Euro-scepticism is modestly correlated with instrumental Euro-scepticism. We explore the extent to which both forms of Euro-scepticism vary between countries and regions and to what extent the percentages of missing values on these measurements affect the degree of Euro-scepticism at the national and regional level. This contribution shows that research on Euro-scepticism to date is skewed by a focus on instrumental Euro-scepticism.