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Working paper
Political Reform and Trade Policy
In: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy; The Tricontinental Series on Global Economic Issues, S. 201-224
Understanding the Welfare Implications of Preferential Trade Agreements
In: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy; The Tricontinental Series on Global Economic Issues, S. 85-99
Seniority in Legislature
In: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy; The Tricontinental Series on Global Economic Issues, S. 185-199
Trade shocks and macroeconomic fluctuations in Africa
In: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy; The Tricontinental Series on Global Economic Issues, S. 369-394
Market Entry Costs, Underemployment and International Trade
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3263
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Preference Bias and Outsourcing to Market: A Steady-State Analysis
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2222
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Fixed Transport Costs and International Trade
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1764
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Trade and the distribution of human capital
We develop a two-country, two-sector model of trade where the only difference between the two countries is their distribution of human capital endowments. We show that even if the two countries have identical aggregate human capital endowments the pattern of trade depends on the properties of the two human capital distributions. We also show that the two distributions of endowments also completely determine the effects of trade on income inequality. Then, we prove that there are long-term gains from trade if the marginal utility of income is constant or as long as losers from trade are compensated by winners. Finally, we look at a simple majority voting model. It turns out depending on the distribution of human capital, autarky and free trade with and without compensation may be the outcome of majority voting.
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Small Countries and Preferential Trade Agreements: How Severe is the Innocent Bystander Problem?
In: Pacific economic review, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 279-304
ISSN: 1468-0106
In this paper the welfare implications of preferential trade agreements (PTA) are examined from the perspective of small countries in the context of a multi‐country general equilibrium model. We calibrate our model to represent one relatively small country and two symmetric big countries. We consider two cases. In one case, the small country is an 'innocent bystander', that is, it is left out of a PTA between the two large countries. In the second case, the small country signs a PTA with one of the large countries. We simulate the model and calculate consumption allocations, prices, trade volume, and tariffs in these two cases considering three different equilibria: free trade (FT), free trade association (FTA) and customs union (CU). We find that free trade is the best outcome for the small country. If the large country PTA takes the form of a CU then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is very large. If it is an FTA then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is relatively modest. In fact, the small country prefers to be an 'innocent bystander' to being a member of an FTA with one of the large countries.
Political reform and trade policy
In: Journal of international economics, Band 42, Heft 1-2, S. 67-90
ISSN: 0022-1996
Seniority in Legislatures
In: American political science review, Band 86, Heft 4, S. 951-965
ISSN: 1537-5943
We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.
Seniority in Legislatures
In: American political science review, Band 86, Heft 4, S. 951
ISSN: 0003-0554