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In May 2023, Arab leaders who had called for ousting Syria's President Bashar al-Assad during the previous decade warmly welcomed him at the Arab League Summit and agreed to normalise diplomatic ties with Damascus. Syria's return to the League strengthened Assad's embattled rule while seriously weakening the opposition and those who still call for inclusive political reform.
The EU continues to impose sanctions on Syria and is adamant with its call for a political solution based on UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254. This said, there is an ongoing and robust debate regarding whether the EU should reconsider its policy. This reconsideration spans various aspects, including the efficacy of sanctions, the EU's role in reconstruction efforts, and the potential normalisation of relations.
Notably, news reports have emerged indicating that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) engaged in lobbying efforts in Brussels in June 2023. Their objective was to advocate for the lifting of sanctions specifically on key regime figures. This move is portrayed as a preliminary step toward facilitating the broader process of reconstructing Syria. The debates surrounding these developments underscore the complexity and multifaceted nature of the geopolitical landscape in the region.[1]
However, EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HRVP), Josep Borrell, has said that an EU change of tack on Syria is unlikely to materialise as member states disagree on the matter.[2] Still, there are voices among the member states calling for a pragmatic stance. What is then the potential path ahead for the EU vis-à-vis Syria?The EU Syria strategy: Sanctions and diplomatic isolation
EU sanctions against Syria encompass a broad spectrum, targeting not only the country's economy at large but also addressing high-ranking military, political and economic state officials. The EU's strategic approach to Syria, outlined in its 2017 Strategy, delineates several key policy objectives. Foremost among these objectives is the aspiration to bring an end to violence. Additionally, the EU aims to initiate an inclusive transition process, ensuring unhindered access to humanitarian aid for the civilian population, and pursuing accountability for war crimes committed during the course of the conflict.[3] In line with UNSC Resolution 2254 of 2015, EU policy continues to be centred around three no's: no normalisation, no reconstruction and no lifting of sanctions until the regime agrees to a political transition. Since there has not been any progress and – despite the current stalemate – the conflict is far from over (with risks of escalation especially in the area of Idlib), there does not seem to be much ground for the Union to change position.The earthquake strikes Syria
Before the February 2023 earthquake, according to the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), over three million people were internally displaced in Syria and 8.2 million needed life-saving aid in government-controlled areas. In opposition-controlled northwest Syria, 4.1 million people, including 2.7 million internally displaced, required urgent humanitarian assistance.[4] With 27.4 billion euros allocated to Syrians in Syria itself as well as in neighbouring countries, the EU is the largest international donor.[5]
Following the seizure of the northwest by opposition groups in Syria, the Syrian regime responded by imposing a blockade on all supplies to the region. The dynamics surrounding the provision of aid to this area are intricately tied to UNSC Resolution 2165, unanimously adopted in 2014. According to this resolution, all humanitarian aid destined for the northwest region was permitted to enter through Turkey via the main border crossing at Bab al Hawa, without requiring authorisation from the Syrian government. This cross-border aid mechanism was established to ensure the unimpeded flow of assistance to the affected population. However, the Assad regime asserts that all aid should be routed through Damascus, allowing it to exert control over who receives access to aid and who does not.[6]
Russia, a staunch ally of the Assad regime, has played a pivotal role in shaping the UN cross-border aid mechanism. Notably, Russia has advocated for the renewal of this mechanism every six months, deviating from the customary practice of annual extensions. The divergent perspectives on sovereignty and control over aid distribution continue to be key points of contention.
When the earthquake hit Syria, two more crossings were opened from Turkey at Bab el Ayni and el-Rai for aid delivery into the northwest Syria. However, it took a full week for Damascus to agree to open the crossings, delaying the delivery of aid at a time most needed. The Assad regime also tried to present itself as the only relevant body that can coordinate different agencies and manage the incoming aid and emergency funds by. The EU introduced a humanitarian exemption into the sanctions regime "to facilitate the speedy delivery of humanitarian assistance".[7]
What came as a shock in the UN was that in July 2023, when the six-month period was approaching expiration, Russia vetoed the extension of the cross-border aid delivery, leaving people living in northwest Syria on their own. This move aimed first to empower Damascus by forcing the international community to coordinate all aid effort with the Assad regime and, second, to weaken the opposition. A few days later, Syria announced it would let aid cross through Bab al-Hawa for the coming six months,[8] thus leading to further concerns that the regime would use the provision or withholding of aid to control the opposition areas. As this six-month period would end by the beginning of 2024, the issue continued to be debated in the following months.Normalisation with Arab countries
The consequences of the earthquake strengthened the prevalent view that Assad had essentially emerged victorious in the war and that engaging with him was crucial for the future stability and security of the area. Assad skilfully positioned his regime at the forefront of coordinating search and rescue operations in the earthquake-affected zones. He took control of the distribution of aid, utilising it as a tool to press the opposition, either by delaying or diverting assistance. Additionally, Syria was experiencing a relative stalemate in its civil conflict, with Assad solidifying his regime's control in Damascus.
In light of these circumstances, Arab states opted to readmit Syria into the Arab League. The rationale behind this decision was the expectation that such a move would expedite the safe return of Syrian refugees, address the issue of synthetic Captagon drug trafficking, and curtail the influence of Iranian-backed groups, particularly in southern regions of Syria.[9] However, progress on all these issues is very hard to achieve.
The likelihood of refugees voluntarily returning to Syria appears slim, primarily due to the extensive physical devastation in the absence of any visible reconstruction efforts. More significantly, the Syrian regime's dismal track record in handling returnees adds to the uncertainty.[10] Jordan cracked down on a Captagon network right after Syria's reintegration into the Arab League.[11] However, the notion the Assad regime might actively combat Captagon trafficking is questionable. The regime derives substantial profits from the drug trade. Most critically, the drug trafficking network has taken on a life of its own, making it highly doubtful whether the regime, even if willing, possesses the capability to dismantle it.[12]
As for Iran's influence in Syria, the Assad regime may leverage it but certainly not get rid of it.[13] In recent years, notable geopolitical shifts and reconciliations among former adversaries have been unfolding. The Abraham Accords initiated a fresh wave of normalisation between Israel and Arab states, which the ongoing conflict in Gaza has stalled but not undermined altogether. The Chinese-brokered Iranian-Saudi deal has diminished the relevance of regional sectarian dynamics, altering perceptions of Iran as the primary threat to Arab countries. Turkey's renewed engagements with former adversaries, including Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are significant signs of change. The reintegration of Syria into the Arab League should be regarded as a noteworthy component of this evolving transformation in which Iran is increasingly – if grudgingly – being accepted as a regional player also in the Levant.
In this context, the EU should find new instruments to engage with the crisis in Syria, through further cooperation with regional actors. New diplomatic platforms with more vigorous regional backing than the defunct Geneva process and the Astana framework (which is limited to Iran, Russia and Turkey) can be established.The EU can still play a political role in Syria
Time is not ripe for any dramatic change in EU policy unless coupled with political reform and a negotiated and inclusive peace based on accountability and justice. Normalisation, lifting of sanctions and reconstruction without political change cannot be considered as options and will only help further downgrade the EU's political role in Syria and its actorness in the region at large.
However, the EU has the potential to foster initiatives by offering political and financial incentives, reintroducing a politically negotiated solution for Syria into the regional agenda. Multilateral platforms supported by the EU, particularly in specific issue areas such as local development and water management, can have a meaningful impact. Despite Damascus' reluctance to heed calls for political change, there should be a concerted effort to advance mechanisms for more robust aid monitoring.
It is essential to clarify that the EU's pursuit of stronger aid monitoring does not equate to normalising relations with Damascus. On the contrary, while maintaining its stance against normalisation, the EU can utilise regional platforms to exert pressure on Assad. While the Arab countries showed minimal concern for human rights, accountability, justice, or transparency, they do appreciate economic and political stability, as well as addressing the impact of the refugee crisis. This provides avenues for cooperation with the EU. The Union should offer Arab countries financial assistance on the condition that political change in Syria remains in the regional conflict management agenda and that targeted solutions are adopted to help segments of Syria's population, spanning those living in opposition-held areas, internally displaced persons and refugees. This approach has the potential to bring about significant improvements in the lives of the people in Syria.Özlem Tür is Professor of International Relations at Middle East Technical University, Ankara.[1] "Saudis, UAE Lobby Europe to Restore Ties with Assad Regime", in The New Arab, 16 June 2023, https://www.newarab.com/node/2912773.[2] European External Action Service (EEAS), Syria: Opening Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the Ministerial Session of the VII. Brussels Conference on the Future of Syria and the Region, 15 June 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/430692_en.[3] Website of the Council of the European Union: Syria: EU Response to the Crisis, http://europa.eu/!jC96nD.[4] ECHO, Syria Factsheet (Last updated: 10/05/2022), https://reliefweb.int/node/3846134.[5] Council of the European Union, Earthquake in Türkiye and Syria: EU Amends Restrictive Measures in Place Regarding Syria to Facilitate the Speedy Delivery of Humanitarian Aid, 23 February 2023, https://europa.eu/!xVBn7H.[6] Margaret Basheer, "Syria Opens Aid Crossing for Six Months", in VOA News, 13 July 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/7180003.html.[7] Council of the European Union, Syria: EU Extends Humanitarian Exemption for Another Six Months, 14 July 2023, https://europa.eu/!bt8pmQ.[8] Raffi Berg, "Syria Seeks to Assert Control over UN Aid Deliveries", in BBC News, 14 July 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-66069530.[9] Marwan Muasher, "An Inauspicious Return", in Diwan, 16 May 2023, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/89762.[10] See for example, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Syria Situation of Returnees from Abroad. Country of Origin Information Report, June 2021, p. 20-29, https://doi.org/10.2847/980660.[11] "Jordan behind Attack that Killed Drug Trafficker in Syria: SOHR", in Al Jazeera, 8 May 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/8/sohr-attack-that-killed-drug-trafficker-in-syria-was-by-jordan.[12] Agnès Levallois et al., "Syria: A Multifaceted and Challenging Crisis for EU Foreign and Security Policy", in JOINT Research Papers, No. 17 (February 2023), p. 26-27, https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1540.[13] Steven Heydemann, "Syria's Normalization Signals a New Middle Eastern Order", in Brookings Commentaries, 10 May 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/syrias-normalisation-signals-a-new-middle-eastern-order.

1. General observations Africa south of the Sahara is probably the most vulnerable region when it comes to the impact and consequences of climate changes. Yet the African continent runs a serious risk of being marginalized in the global dialogue on climate issues. Africa contributes little to the global emissions of CO2, and other greenhouse gases. The major focus of the Framework Convention on Climate Change is on abatement and mitigation of emissions rather than adaptation to the consequences of climate change, and African states have therefore been slow to ratify the treaty and not as active in the international negotiation process as states from other parts of the world. Curbing emissions if justifiably not a central African concern. Yet Africa's potential vulnerability should demand attention from both African policy makers and other decision makers. Africa's natural resource base is seriously threatened. The two central guiding principles of African climate policy both on the part of governments and of international institutions should be reducing vulnerability on the one hand and increasing resilience on the other. Decision makers should not use the remaining scientific uncertainty and the acknowledged dearth of detailed information on African resource management as an excuse for inaction. Not taking climate change into account could be a serious source of mismanagement and fallacious planning. Both increase in temperature and increasing variability of climate are serious dangers in the future. Land degradation policies as well as future energy development should be central concerns. Any strategy for Africa should seek to minimize the potential conflicts among the concerns and priorities for development, adaptation and abatement. Africa's vulnerability to climatic changes relates to a number of factors, including 1) the dependency on bio-fuel, 2) the importance of agriculture, 3) immobility, 4) poor health services, 5) population growth, and 6) low material standards. In the case of Africa, it is difficult to make clear distinctions between abatement and adaptation measures. Social and economic development are necessary in order to prepare the continent for adaptation. 2. African obligations and opportunities under the Climate Convention Forty-nine African states have signed the Climate Convention, but only 33 have ratified so far (23.06.95). Ratification is important because- 1) it signifies the acceptance of the principles of the convention and 2) ratification will be required for financial support under the FCCC. The substantive obligation of all African Parties is a commitment to formulate a climate policy and how it could be implemented. Developing countries shall report on their inventories of GHG emissions, along with their plans and measures to meet the convention's objective within three years after the entry into force of the convention. Least-developed countries may report at their own discretion. Multilateral financing institutions should invest in data gathering on all levels to enhance awareness and improve the possibility for responsible governance in respect to natural resource management and environmental protection. Joint Implementation (JI) can allow for cost effective implementation of the Climate Convention, and provide funding for climate related projects for countries where financial resources are scarce or lacking. 3. Modeling of climate change in Africa There are still substantial limitations in the ability to provide accurate predictions of future climate in Africa. Confidence in regional model predictions is low and there are substantial differences between the models. One can distinguish between three regions when it comes to climatic changes in Africa: 1) Sahel region, 2) corresponding dry regions south of the Equator in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, etc., and 3) the tropical region centered around the Equator. Major findings from IPCC -90 and -92 of relevance for Africa Temperature. Expected increases in annual average surface temperature at the time of C02 doubling: Northern subtropical region (including Sahel): 2 degrees Celsisus (0.5-3.0 degrees Celsisus), Tropical region: 1.5 degrees Celsisus (0.5-2.5 degrees Celsisus), and Southern subtropical region: 2 degrees Celsisus (0.5-3.0 degrees Celsisus). Precipitation: Increase in surface temperature and increased radiative cooling of the atmosphere due to doubling of CO2, concentrations lead to increased evaporation at the surface and increased intensity of convective precipitation (e.g. thunderstorms from large cumulus towers). Sea level rise: Thermal expansion is regarded as the most important process. Predictions are a 20±10cm increase in sea level at the time of CO2, doubling. IPCC-90 estimates up to a 65cm increase in sea level in year 2100, but this number is likely to be decreased to 40~45cm in the new IPCC-95 report. Observed trends. Since 1895, annual average temperatures has increased by 0.53'C over continental Africa. The recent 25 year dry period in Sahel is the most substantial change in observed precipitation in the global record. Explanations have been sought in 1) land use changes, and 2) circulation changes caused by changing patterns of sea surface temperatures (SST). If the drought represents the first sign of a global warming remains however uncertain. Current anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGS) in Africa. 1) Carbon dioxide (CO2): The major source is land use change (~70); the rest originates mainly from industry and transportation. The African contribution of CO2, was in 1990 estimated to be about 7 0f the world's total. 2) Methane (CH4,): Emissions in Africa are about 7 0f the world's total, with livestock being the main source. Industrial sources are oil and gas production and coal mining. 3) Nitrous oxide (N2O) sources are mainly of natural origin. 3) Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC): Africa's share of global CFC emissions is estimated at 3. 4. Natural resource management The uncertainties in predicting climate change impacts in Africa must be underlined, and other human or natural influences may mitigate or exacerbate the effects. Natural variability in Africa is also substantial, and people are to a large extent adapted to changes. Still, predicted human-induced climatic changes are expected to occur very rapidly, and little is known about the capability of the ecosystems - which forms the basis for human existence - to adapt to such changes. It is also clear that impacts of climate change will be unevenly distributed: groups with the highest present vulnerability, such as poor people and people living in marginal areas, will most likely suffer most. Generally, changes in the frequency of extreme weather events would probably have greater impact than changes in average conditions. Agricultural Resources. The fertilizing effect of enhanced CO2 level on plant growth is well documented in laboratory studies, but disputed when it comes to complex "real-world" systems. Other factors concerning climate change impacts on agriculture include 1) Warmer climate and changes in rainfall may reduce the appropriability of present crops. Already being a major problem today, loss of crop and livestock genetic resources may threaten sustainable agricultural development and adaptations to future changes. 2) Increased intensity of rainfall may increase soil erosion, nutrient leaching and crop damage, 3) Changes in timing and length of growing seasons may lead to planning problems, 4) Loss of rainfall in marginal and vulnerable areas would exacerbate drought and desiccation problems, increase risks for bushfire and put forests at their dry margins at risk, and increase problems in animal husbandry, 5) Some models predict a noticeable loss of food production in Africa, but regional variations would probably be large, and local differences (such as in cropping systems) will to a large extent determine how significant the climate change impacts will be. 6) Sea level rise will put low lying agricultural areas at risk, and may render major rivers unsuitable for irrigation. Fish resources. Fish make up a significant part of the food supply in Africa, with a total harvest potential estimated at 10.5 million tons. It is expected that global warming will, varying with species, relocate fish populations. Freshwater populations in small rivers and lakes are vulnerable due to restricted ability to move in response to changes. In areas becoming drier, loss of habitat would also represent a threat. Fish populations are generally very sensitive to even small changes in frequency of extreme events. For the more mobile marine fish populations, relocation does not necessarily mean that production and potential yields are lowered, but subsistence and small scale-fishermen may suffer if institutional arrangements do not enable them to move within regions and across boundaries. Biodiversity. Impacts on biological diversity should be of particular concern, as the welfare of human beings strongly depends on the existence of biological systems and processes. Biological diversity provides a wide range of goods and services, including a genetic basis for agricultural development, and represents a heritage of unique species and ecosystems. Species will probably respond differentially to climatic changes, leading to new aggregations and ecosystems. In ecological terms, the predicted changes will occur over a short period of time. Migration is expected to be the main adaptation strategy, and adaptation success will be determined by the species' ability to respond quickly enough, as well as the suitability of the migration routes: Migration may be blocked by natural or human imposed barriers, or the natural environment (e.g. soils) may be inappropriate. A large part of the natural bio-diversity in Africa is confined to isolated reserves surrounded by agricultural land. Small populations are particularly vulnerable, and endemic species will be at risk of extinction. The changes would on the other hand favor species with high dispersal rates, ability to colonize a wide range of habitats and a high tolerance towards stress. Water resources. Past droughts have shown that for marginal and vulnerable areas, even a small reduction in water supply is critical. Water scarcity has substantial health and ecological consequences. Even today, there is growing scarcity of water in many African regions, and several countries rely on water originating outside their borders. Sea level rises can be expected to lead to increased saltwater intrusion in the groundwater. Desalinization is too costly for most countries. Hydro power generation is also vulnerable to temperature increases and rainfall changes. Social, political and economic impacts. Many authors mention the risk of getting more "eco-refugees". In addition to the social and health problems they may create, major migrations would also increase political tensions. Economic impacts include costs of climate-caused damages and costs of adapting to climate changes. In low-lying areas, sea level rise may cause substantial losses of land for human habitation, which in river deltas and urban centers will be aggravated by subsidence caused by extraction of water and hydrocarbons. 5. African priorities African policy statements emphasize that contributions to Climate Change mitigation efforts should not adversely affect their development targets. Few African countries have national policies explicitly aimed at combating climate change impacts, as they are not required to develop such plans until 1997. African policies are expected to concentrate on combating vulnerability. More specifically, this involves capacity building in a number of areas, including formulation of national and regional inventories and programs, development of effective negotiation skills, developing research capabilities, conducting cost-benefit analyses, and capacity building in the area of technology assessment and transfer. Improvement in planning capacity and governance would improve Africa's resilience to eventual climate changes. Future energy scenarios. African countries should get support in taking advantage of new technology for alternative energy resources, where no-regret options should be given priority. It should be underlined that effective mitigation measures against global warming must reinforce national economic policies and enhance the welfare of households. Three different energy scenarios for Africa are discussed: 1) Stagnation, 2) Growth based on fossil fuels, and 3) Sustainable growth. Scenario 1 is characterized by slow economic development and rapid population growth. Scenarios 2 and 3 involve high social and economic development and falling fertility rates. Scenario 2 is a fossilfuels based development, while scenario 3 provides large scale use of alternative energy sources and sustainable economic development. Economic development and improved living standards, especially among women, are necessary to reduce population growth. Abatement measures. Abatement measures may be carried out as part of a development strategy. Such no-regret options may however need additional funding to be carried out, since market failures and national constraints to the economy may make such options too costly for African governments. One should focus on measures with limited impacts on activities "outside" the market economy. The concern for climate change could make the support of new technology in Africa more attractive, but one should be aware that this may bias the countries' preferences for projects.

Il lavoro prende in considerazione i principali avvenimenti che hanno influenzato l'evoluzione economica finanziaria del nostro Paese nella crisi del cambio 1992,ho voluto concentrare l'attenzione sugli avvenimenti a partire dal 1979 e analizzando l'intervento delle autorità monetarie. Allora non esisteva l'Euro, esisteva il Sistema Monetario Europeo con una sorta di valuta di riferimento, l'ECU, a cui le varie valute nazionali aderenti al sistema dovevano stare agganciate, entro una percentuale di scostamento non superiore al 2,25% per alcune e al 6% per altre, fra cui la lira. La Germania vantava di un'economia più solida di altri, con un sistema produttivo di avanguardia e con una moneta forte che faceva da riferimento per tutte le economie. L'Italia aveva un' economia che si doveva adattare continuamente alle conseguenze di una gestione del paese sconsiderata, miope e orientata al breve termine, frutto di una incompetenza della classe politica. Nel marzo 1979, l'Italia aveva aderito al Sistema Monetario Europeo, una decisione orientata, insieme con la politica estera, al rafforzamento dei vincoli comunitari nell'intento di dar luogo alla creazione di un'Europa Unita; consapevoli che questa sarebbe stata una scelta più di carattere politico che economica. L'adesione allo Sme avvenne in un clima di divergenza, Paolo Baffi allora governatore della Banca d'Italia, faceva infatti presente che una valuta debole come la lira, avrebbe trovato difficoltà ad abbandonare il regime delle svalutazioni facile. diversi economisti, oltre a Baffi,al di là di dove sedessero, se in Parlamento come Luigi Spaventa o alla direzione della Banca d'Italia o ancora all'interno del governo come Rinaldo Ossola, sostenevano la loro contrarietà all'ingresso nel Sistema Monetario Europeo, esponendo motivazioni tra loro eterogenee. Tutti si attendevano che il vincolo esterno dei cambi stabili costringesse il paese a seguire una politica di rigorosa stabilità monetaria. L'Italia aveva ottenuto il privilegio di una banda di oscillazione del 6%, contro il 2,5% degli altri paesi, ma tutti intendevano che l'adesione all'accordo di cambio avrebbe imposto una politica di rientro all'inflazione. Contro le aspettative generali, l'inflazione proseguì invece più violenta di prima. Il tasso di cambio, assunse con l'avanzare del progetto unitario una significatività crescente, aggiungendo alla sua funzione di strumento di orientamento, quella di fattore di credibilità. Le autorità monetarie italiane non accettarono mai una svalutazione esterna della lira pari a quella interna. Fra il 1980 e il 1987, i riallineamenti di parità nell'ambito dello Sme si susseguirono numerosi e coinvolsero numerose valute. Ogni riallineamento segnò una svalutazione della lira rispetto al marco. Dopo il 1987, i riallineamenti vennero sospesi e il corso della lira subì un solo ritocco al ribasso, in occasione del rientro della banda stretta. La politica di fatto seguita fu dunque quella di una graduale rivalutazione della lira, in termini reali, rispetto al marco. All'inizio degli anni novanta venne firmato il trattato di Maastricht, il contenuto degli accordi si inseriva in un contesto politico- sociale interno altamente critico, nel quale le energie politiche a lungo represse dalla guerra fredda si erano liberate, grazie al crollo del Muro di Berlino, spingendo quindi gli equilibri del sistema politico e economico con una rottura che si verificò del tutto nel 1992. Se il processo d'integrazione europeo era stato spesso rappresentato dalla classe politica come una sorta di panacea alle tare italiane, a Maastricht, si celebrò l'innocenza dell'europeismo italiano che vide stravolgere e crollare la visione retorica con la quale aveva guardato alla costruzione europea a partire degli anni '70. Per la storia dell'integrazione europea, il trattato di Maastricht rappresenta una pietra miliare, anche se con l'entrata in vigore ha creato ancora più instabilità, in quanto caratterizzato da uno scarso realismo degli obiettivi di convergenza delle variabili macroeconomiche, da mancanza flessibilità e insieme da asimmetrie dei comportamenti possibili delle banche centrali. La scena economica internazionale era segnata da: tendenze divergenti dei tassi di interesse, al ribasso negli Stati Uniti per rilanciare l'economia, al rialzo in Germania per gli effetti dell'unificazione tedesca, con conseguenti indebolimenti del dollaro, rafforzamento del marco, tensione nello Sme; le incertezze circa il completamento della unificazione monetaria in Europa, quale è stata sancita nel trattato di Maastricht. Questi sviluppi esterni coglievano l'economia italiana in una fase di attività produttiva debole, inflazione in lenta discesa, squilibri irrisolti nella finanza pubblica. Tra gli accadimenti che sono susseguiti, sono da richiamare i seguenti: l'esito negativo del referendum danese sul trattato di Maastricht del 2 giugno, infatti il referendum di Copenaghen si conclude al fotofinish (50,7%) di no contro il (49,3%) di si; mancata riduzione dei tassi di interesse in Germania; voci di svalutazione della lira; rialzo dei tassi ufficiali in Germania. Nel corso dell'anno 1992 si assiste a una piena recessione, infatti con il debito pubblico al 105,5 del Pil, con un fabbisogno attorno al 10,4 del Pil, con il passivo della bilancia dei pagamenti di parte corrente in crescita, la crisi era alle porte. Il 6 giugno la Banca d'Italia aumenta il tasso sulle anticipazioni a scadenza fissa di mezzo punto percentuale, irrigidendo così la politica monetaria, Moody's mise sotto controllo l'Italia per la sua incapacità nella riduzione del debito pubblico. Il 29 giugno il cambio contro il marco arrivò a 756,54 a fronte di una sostanziale stabilità nei confronti della sterlina e della peseta, Amato per effettuare un risanamento economico annunciò il 5 luglio la manovra da 30000 miliardi di lire, e con quella successiva di 100000 miliardi dà inizio al risanamento finanziario del Paese. Le vicende relative alle turbolenze che hanno sconvolto le parità valutarie dei paesi aderenti allo Sme hanno avuto inizio con la svalutazione del 7% della lira, la quale appariva quasi un riallineamento da manuale. Il 21 settembre, la Banca d'Italia, annunciò che le autorità monetarie si sarebbero astenute all'effettuare la quotazione ufficiale della lira. Questo fu un colpo durissimo per l'Italia che fino a quella data, aveva fatto del cambio della lira l'architrave della sua politica economica e finanziaria, sostenendo pesanti oneri in termini di riserve valutarie, infatti tra il giugno e il settembre vennero impiegate 53000 miliardi di riserve; colpo durissimo anche per la Comunità, colpita al cuore proprio nello strumento fondamentale, lo SME, investito nel ruolo di preparare e garantire le condizioni di stabilità, generalizzata e consolidata, che avrebbero dovuto, poi consentire quel salto di qualità dell'Europa, con il decollo della Unione Economica e monetaria, la moneta unica e il sistema delle banche centrali europee. Successivamente le tensioni speculative investono la lira , la sterlina e la peseta: momento in cui Italia e Gran Bretagna annunciano di uscire dagli Accordi europei di cambio. Subito dopo la svalutazione del 1992, si aprì un periodo di svalutazione generale della lira rispetto alle altre monete, periodo che si protrasse all'incirca fino al marzo 1993. Tra il 1992 e 1993 vennero firmati due accordi triangolari il protocollo Amato 31 luglio 1992 che abolì il sistema di scala mobile, completato da Ciampi nel luglio 1993, con la quale si fissarono gli obiettivi comuni di politica di reddito. Dopo di allora la lira rimase agganciata al dollaro. Il legame fra lira e dollaro potrebbe essere frutto dell'agire spontaneo dei mercati, ma potrebbe anche essere scaturito dalla decisione delle autorità monetarie italiane di ritornare alla vecchia linea di cambio differenziato, già seguita negli anni prima del 1979, fino all'ingresso dello Sme. Il problema essenziale delle autorità di governo era quello di evitare che la svalutazione esterna della lira si traducesse in inflazione importata, l'aver agganciato la lira al dollaro può essere inteso come una misura ragionevolmente coerente con l'obiettivo della stabilità monetaria. Di certo che la svalutazione della lira non ha contribuito alla soluzione del problema economico italiano, ha rischiato di aggravarlo producendo perdita di credibilità per il Paese. La crisi del sistema monetario europeo ha favorito una ripresa dei dibattiti teorici sui modelli di crisi valutarie, che si distinguono tra prima e seconda generazione, quelli di prima collegano l'emergere della crisi all'incompatibilità tra politiche macroeconomiche e stabilità del cambio; quelli di seconda, il cui sviluppo è stato stimolato dagli stessi fatti del 1992, nella quale l'emergere di una crisi appare come una scelta endogena, effettuata dalle autorità in base alle proprie preferenze e all'interazione con gli agenti economici privati. Analizzando i modelli si può concludere che mentre la rappresentazione di un regime di cambio fisso per mezzo di un livello puntuale del cambio non rappresenta un limite interpretativo rilevante, le ipotesi relative al processo di espansione del credito e all'esistenza di un livello di soglia delle riserve, nei modelli di Krugman, non sembrano dar conto adeguatamente della realtà dei fenomeni economici. I modelli di prima generazione danno una spiegazione "fondamentalista" delle crisi nel senso che fanno risalire la crisi allo sfasamento dei fondamentali macroeconomici dell'economia, in particolare l'esistenza di politiche fiscali espansive e prolungati deficit di bilancio incompatibili con un impegno di cambio fisso. I modelli di seconda generazione sottolineano il comportamento ottimizzante del policy-maker che non subisce più la crisi, ma decide di avviarla perché tale scelta minimizza i costi, nel senso che i costi in termini di reputazione a cui il governo va incontro uscendo dall'impegno sono comunque minori dei costi di rimanere in termini di incremento dei tassi di interesse e riduzione delle riserve valutarie. I modelli di terza generazione pongono enfasi sulla presenza di squilibri di natura finanziaria con la conseguenza che delle crisi valutarie non sono più viste come fenomeni a sé stanti ma come parte di una crisi sistemica in cui le crisi valutarie e bancarie si autoalimentano. Le ipotesi di perfetta previsione, d'altra parte, implicano che la razionalità degli agenti sia tale da non permette il realizzarsi di peso problem, i quali invece vengono osservati nella realtà. (Riassunto tradotto in inglese) Labour takes into account the main events that influenced the financial economic development of our country in the 1992 exchange rate crisis, I wanted to focus on the events since 1979 and analysing the intervention of the monetary authorities. At that time there was no euro, there was the European Monetary System with a kind of reference currency, the ECU, to which the various national currencies participating in the system had to be hooked, within a variance rate of no more than 2.25% for some and 6% for others, including the lira. Germany boasted of an economy stronger than others, with a state-of-the-art production system and a strong currency that was the benchmark for all economies. Italy had an economy that had to adapt continuously to the consequences of a reckless, short-sighted and short-term management of the country, the result of an incompetence of the political class. In March 1979, Italy had joined the European Monetary System, a decision aimed, together with foreign policy, at strengthening EU ties in order to create a united Europe; aware that this would be a more political than an economic choice. The accession to the Sme took place in a climate of divergence, Paolo Baffi then governor of the Bank of Italy, in fact, pointed out that a weak currency such as the lira, would find it difficult to abandon the regime of devaluations easy. several economists, in addition to Baffi, beyond where they sat, whether in Parliament as Luigi Spaventa or at the management of the Bank of Italy or even within the government as Rinaldo Ossola, argued their opposition to entry into the European Monetary System, exposing heterogeneous motivations among themselves. Everyone expected that the external constraint of stable exchange rates would force the country to follow a policy of strict monetary stability. Italy had obtained the privilege of a 6% swing band, compared with 2.5% in the other countries, but all wanted that accession to the exchange agreement would impose a policy of returning to inflation. Against general expectations, however, inflation continued more violent than before. The exchange rate, as the unitary project progressed, became increasingly significant, adding to its role as a guideline, that of a credibility factor. The Italian monetary authorities never accepted an external devaluation of the lira equal to the internal one. Between 1980 and 1987, the realignments of parity within the Sme followed numerous and involved numerous currencies. Each realignment marked a devaluation of the lira against the mark. After 1987, the realignments were suspended and the course of the lira underwent only one downward adjustment, on the occasion of the return of the narrow band. The policy followed was therefore that of a gradual revaluation of the lira, in real terms, with respect to the mark. At the beginning of the 1990s the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the content of the agreements was part of a highly critical internal political-social context, in which political energies long repressed by the Cold War had been freed, thanks to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, thus pushing the balance of the political and economic system with a break that occurred entirely in 1992. If the process of European integration had often been portrayed by the political class as a kind of panacea to the Italian tare, in Maastricht, the innocence of Italian Europeanism was celebrated, which saw the rhetorical vision with which it had looked to the construction of Europe since the 1970s, overturned and collapsed. For the history of European integration, the Maastricht Treaty represents a milestone, although with the entry into force it has created even more instability, as it is characterized by a lack of realism in the convergence objectives of macroeconomic variables, lack of flexibility and at the same time as asymmetries of the possible behaviour of central banks. The international economic scene was marked by: divergent trends in interest rates, downwards in the United States to boost the economy, up in Germany due to the effects of unification Germany, resulting in a weakening of the dollar, a strengthening of the mark, tension in the SME; The uncertainty about the completion of monetary unification in Europe, as enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, is. These external developments caught the Italian economy in a period of weak production activity, slow-falling inflation, unresolved imbalances in public finances. Among the events that have followed, the following are to be recalled: the negative outcome of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty of 2 June, in fact the Copenhagen referendum ends at photofinish (50.7%) no versus (49.3%) yes; failure to reduce interest rates in Germany; rumours of the valuation of the lira; official interest rates in Germany. During the year 1992 there is a full recession, in fact with public debt at 105.5 of GDP, with a requirement around 10.4 of GDP, with the passive of the current account balance growing, the crisis was upon us. On 6 June, the Bank of Italy increased the rate on fixed-term advances by half a percentage point, thus tightening monetary policy, and Moody's brought Italy under control for its inability to reduce public debt. On 29 June, the exchange rate against the mark reached 756.54 in the face of substantial stability against the pound and the peseta, Amato to carry out an economic recovery announced on 5 July the maneuver of 30000 billion lre, and with the next one of 100000 billion begins the financial consolidation of the country. The events surrounding the turmoil that have disrupted the currency parities of the SME member countries began with the devaluation of 7% of the lira, which appeared to be almost a textbook realignment. On 21 September, the Bank of Italy announced that the monetary authorities would refrain from making the official listing of the lira. This was a very serious blow for Italy, which until that date had made the lira change the backbone of its economic and financial policy, bearing heavy burdens in terms of foreign exchange reserves, in fact between June and September 53 trillion reserves were used; It is also a very serious blow for the Community, which has been struck at the heart by the fundamental instrument, the EMS, which has been invested in the role of preparing and guaranteeing the conditions of stability, generalised and consolidated, which should have allowed Europe to jump in quality, with the take-off of the Economic and Monetary Union, the single currency and the system of European central banks. Subsequently, speculative tensions hit the lira, sterling and peseta, when Italy and Great Britain announced they were leaving the European Exchange Agreements. Immediately after the devaluation of 1992, a period of general devaluation of the lira against the other currencies opened up, which lasted approximately until March 1993. Between 1992 and 1993, two triangular agreements were signed, the Amato protocol on 31 July 1992, which abolished the escalator system, which was completed by Ciampi in July 1993, which set common income policy objectives. After that, the lira remained pegged to the dollar. The link between the lira and the dollar may be the result of the spontaneous action of the markets, but it could also have stemmed from the decision of the Italian monetary authorities to return to the old differentiated exchange line, which was already followed in the years before 1979, until the entry of the Sme. The main problem of the government authorities was to prevent the external devaluation of the lira from translating into imported inflation, the having pegged the lira to the dollar can be understood as a measure reasonably consistent with the objective of monetary stability. Certainly the devaluation of the lira did not contribute to the solution of the Italian economic problem, it risked aggravating it, producing a loss of credibility for the country. The crisis in the European monetary system has encouraged a resumption of theoretical debates on currency crisis patterns, which stand out between the first and second generations, those of first generation link the emergence of the crisis to the incompatibility between macroeconomic policies and exchange rate stability; Second, the development of which was stimulated by the same events of 1992, in which the emergence of a crisis appears to be a choice "It's not just a way of using private economic agents," he said. By analysing the models, it can be concluded that while the representation of a fixed exchange rate regime by means of a timely exchange rate does not represent a relevant interpretive limit, assumptions about the credit expansion process and the existence of a level of reserve threshold, in Krugman's models, do not seem to adequately account for the reality of economic phenomena. First-generation models give a "fundamentalist" explanation of crises in the sense that the crisis is traced back to the shift in macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy, in particular the existence of expansionary fiscal policies and prolonged budget deficits incompatible with a fixed exchange rate commitment. The second-generation models emphasize the optimising behaviour of the policy-maker who is no longer suffering from the crisis, but decides to start it because this choice minimizes costs, in the sense that the reputation costs that the government faces by exiting the commitment are still lower than the costs of staying in terms of raising interest rates and reducing currency reserves. Third-generation models place emphasis on financial imbalances, with the consequence that currency crises are no longer seen as stand-alone phenomena but as part of a systemic crisis in which currency and banking crises feed themselves. The hypotheses of perfect prediction, on the other hand, imply that the rationality of the agents is such that it does not allow the realization of weight problem, which instead are observed in reality.

The Ukrainian people are entering the third year of their fight for their existence as a state and people. Every day, soldiers and civilians—children, women, and the elderly—are killed, homes are destroyed, and jobs are lost. The uncertainty of wartime forces individuals, families, communities, and the authorities to shorten their planning horizons and be ready to adapt at a moment's notice. Under such circumstances, any effort to develop long-term strategies focused on postwar development immediately raises questions of feasibility. However, no society can live by only looking at the challenges of the moment. The future is also important for collective survival. Today's demographic crisis is a challenge that short- and long-term government strategy planning must account for.Since Ukraine gained its independence in the 1990s, its demographic situation has demanded the government's attention. Authorities worked to improve its policies and achieved some success between 2006 and 2015. Unfortunately, these positive outcomes were adversely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and demolished by Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. In recent months, the Ministry of Social Policy prepared a plan to respond to the demographic challenges brought on by the war. This document, the Demographic Development Strategy, underwent a series of public discussions and was developed in cooperation with government officials, Ukrainian scholars, and specialists from several international organizations. The strategy was finalized in January 2024 and now waits for governmental approval. About the Demographic Development Strategy The new strategy envisages two basic scenarios for Ukraine's development. The inertia scenario assumes that demographic processes will evolve naturally, without government intrusion. It predicts that the population of Ukraine within its 1991 borders may decrease to 28.9 million people by January 2041, and to 25.2 million by January 2051. The guided scenario assumes the implementation of the Demographic Development Strategy and predicts the achievement of decent living standards for Ukrainians returning from abroad. Under this scenario, the demographic decline would be mitigated, with estimates of a population of 33.9 million by January 1941, and 31.6 million by January 2051. The goal of the strategy is to ensure that the population maintains its long-term reproduction capacity despite all war-related conditions. It is intended to improve Ukraine's sociodemographic characteristics as defined in the policy's five strategic goals: Chart 1. Goals of the Demographic Development Strategy of Ukraine (2024–2040)Image CreditThe strategy proposes using tested—both in Ukraine and worldwide—policy instruments to avoid the inertia scenario. These include policies intended to improve the birth rate; reduce premature mortality and excessive migration; address population displacement; accommodate an aging population; and address other challenges confronting the nation. Increasing Ukraine's Birth Rate The primary issue that the strategy addresses is Ukraine's population size, an issue greatly exacerbated by Russia's aggression and occupation of Ukrainian territory. The war both sharply reduced Ukraine's already low birth rate, and sharply raised mortality across all age groups and occupations. Several million displaced Ukrainians moved toward the western part of Ukraine, and over six million others, mainly children and women, were forced to leave the country. In addition to the refugees, large-scale labor migration abroad between 2022 and 2023 threatens to turn into permanent emigration over time. The illegal annexation of Crimea and some southeastern Ukrainian regions between 2014 and 2022 has affected the demographic situation as well.[1] As a result, according to our calculations, Ukraine's population has radically decreased, moving from 48.5 million inhabitants in December 2001, to 42.0 million in January 2022, and then to 36.3 in August 2023 (of which, only around 31.5 million reside in the government-controlled territories).[2]Since Ukraine has not conducted a census since 2001, analysts must use both conventional and unconventional sources (as explained in the endnote 2). But making forecasts about the population size in the future is even more difficult. First, there is a lack of information on the population of the temporarily occupied territories and areas near the front. Second, military development scenarios vary greatly, which directly impact any demographic assessment. Third, the decisions that displaced and migrated Ukrainians make about whether and when to return are difficult to predict. Any demographic strategy must take all this into account in planning for the country's development. Even in peacetime, Ukraine's fertility rates have been below the level required for population replacement (2.2) since the mid-1960s. In 2021, the total fertility rate was 1.2. Put another way, the number of children born that year was half the number of people who reached the age of 60. After the start of Russian aggression in 2022, the fertility rate fell below 1.0.Even if the war were to end tomorrow, Ukraine would face an extreme challenge in improving its birth rate. There are five major reasons for such a low birth rate. First, there was a change in social values, towards self-realization and individualism. This translated into a shift from the number of children born to the quality of their care and upbringing, as well as a modification in the forms of marriage and the age at which people became parents.Second, economic factors played a negative role. According to 2021 statistical data, the poverty rate in Ukraine was 20.6 percent in the general population. For families with children, however, it was higher, measuring 22.4 percent for families with children; 27.6 percent for families with children under three years old; and 53.6 percent for large families. With the outbreak of the full-scale Russian invasion, these numbers became even worse. Third, there are structural obstacles to combining work with raising families for women in Ukraine. There is a significant difference in employment levels for women between 25 and 44 years old in 2021: the employment rate was 71.1 percent for women without children and only 51.5 percent for women with children between three and five years old. During the war, the shelling and large-scale destruction decreased the opportunities for children to attend school, which significantly worsened employment opportunities for women. Fourth, public health in Ukraine has deteriorated considerably in recent years, including declining trends in reproductive health. Additionally, Ukrainian women live under stress and depression caused by constant fear for their lives and the lives of their children and relatives. Finally, the fifth factor is the separation of families. Many men have been drafted into the armed forces, while many women have migrated abroad.Together, these factors have a synergistic effect, forcing most Ukrainian families to postpone childbearing in anticipation of a more favorable period. A significant number of these postponed births may never materialize. In the past, the Ukrainian government tried to increase the birth rate by increasing maternity benefits for women until their children reach the age of three. The government increased these benefits tenfold in 2005, and then threefold in 2008. These increases succeeded in increasing the birth rate: in 2005, there were 426,100 children born, compared to 512,500 newborns in 2009. However, the effect of financial incentives on the fertility rate was rather short-lived and mainly influenced families with low levels of education and income. A much more lasting positive result was achieved through the reduction of poverty for families with children, the creation of a legal and policy environment friendly to such families, and an increase in the economic self-sufficiency of families.Reducing Premature Mortality The second most important cause of the demographic crisis is high premature mortality for people under 65, an issue especially affecting men. Even before the major invasion and the COVID-19 pandemic, by 2020, the average life expectancy in Ukraine was 71.3 years, the lowest rate in Europe.The new strategy identifies the main factors contributing to the excessive mortality in Ukraine as a low level of hygiene culture, the prevalence of dangerous working conditions, unhealthy lifestyle, late response to health issues, widespread vaccination hesitancy, and faults in the public health care system. Lack of access to medical and recreational services are especially acute for residents in small towns and villages.The gender gap in mortality is typically high for all post-Soviet countries. According to 2020 official statistics, the gender gap in life expectancy was 9.8 years: 76.2 years for women and 66.4 years for men. Male mortality in Ukraine was higher than female mortality in all age groups, but especially—more than three times—in the 25–34 cohort. After retirement, this gap decreases. This difference stems from variations in lifestyle for women and men, and the exposure of men to more dangerous employment conditions. Russia's full-scale aggression has significantly increased mortality rates for Ukrainians. This is especially noticeable among soldiers who are risking death in battles and captivity. At the same time, the general population also risks death on a daily basis from rocket and drone attacks, limited access to medical care in the temporarily occupied territories,[3] and extreme stress that can lead to the emergence of new and exacerbation of old chronic diseases. Even though there are currently no reliable data on human losses among Ukrainian military personnel and civilians, the toll has tragically reduced the population. The cessation of hostilities in Ukraine is undoubtedly the first step to reducing mortality. However, the experience of other postwar countries shows that even the end of armed conflict does not immediately return mortality to prewar levels.Addressing Migration Out-migration of Ukraine's population has long exceeded in-migration since the dissolution of the USSR. For economic reasons, Ukrainians have been leaving for Russia, then for Poland. On the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of Ukrainian labor migrants abroad was estimated at between 2.5 and 3 million people. Over the last decade, Ukrainians consistently were among the top nationalities receiving first-time EU residence permits. For example, 873,700 Ukrainian citizens received EU residence permits in 2021, 30 percent of all those issued.Russia's military aggression has resulted in the largest outward flow of migration from Ukrainian territory since WWII. Millions of people moved away from frontline areas to either relatively safe regions of Ukraine or to other countries. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, by the end of 2023, over six million Ukrainians fled abroad. Of these, 1.2 million were either deported to or (less often) voluntarily left for the Russian Federation.[4] According to Eurostat, by the end of October 2023, 63.2 percent of the 4.3 million Ukrainians who were in the EU/European Free Trade Zone (excluding Hungary) were women, 33.2 percent were under the age of 18, and 6.1 percent were 60 or older.[5] Since one-third of forced migrants abroad are children and adolescents, their non-return may cause irreparable demographic loss for Ukraine. The situation is potentially made worse if some Ukrainian families decide to reunite outside Ukraine after the war ends. As a recent study demonstrates, many migrants may not return home.[6] Female migrants who have found good jobs and housing outside of their country may bring their husbands to join them once martial law and travel restrictions are lifted in Ukraine. Additionally, growing divorce rates between partners separated by war reduce the incentive of Ukrainian women to return home after the war.The same study shows that the reasons for Ukrainians' reluctance to return home include uncertainty about security in Ukraine (for 47 percent of those polled), lack of workplace or place to live (31 percent), insufficient access to basic services (22 percent), and lack of acceptable quality of education for children (15 percent). Abroad, Ukrainian migrants value stable employment (21 percent), school and preschool institutions (11 percent), and a sense of integration (11 percent).[7]The new strategy includes policies to attract Ukrainians living abroad so they return to their homeland. These policies would apply to migrants who left because of war and those who moved before the war. Should conditions require it, the strategy also includes migration policies to attract immigrants from other countries.(Re)distributing Postwar PopulationThe military conflict has greatly influenced population distribution in Ukraine's regions. The first cohort of internally displaced people (IDP) appeared in Ukraine in 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea and instigation of separatist conflicts in Donetsk and Luhansk. These attacks caused approximately 1.5 million Ukrainians to leave their homes for safer regions in the country. In December 2023, the number of IDPs reached 4.9 million. These numbers include about 739,000 families with children that were forced to leave their homes for regions of Ukraine away from the front lines. Despite efforts from the government and local communities, IDPs lack housing, acceptable work and income, and access to timely health and social assistance. The constant stress and uncertainty about their future cause larger declines in fertility and increases in mortality among IDPs compared to the general population.At the same time, the massive population movements within Ukraine can be a source of labor resources for the regions where IDPs settle in. The demographic strategy envisages the formation of a new resettlement system to influence and support the reconstruction of different regions of Ukraine. The most likely scenario for postwar development envisions the formation of five territorial clusters. The central cluster includes relatively safe regions of central Ukraine that already shelter the largest number of IDPs. This cluster is likely to become the country's new industrial center after the war. Due to its closeness to the EU, the western cluster will need a larger workforce. This region will develop quickly through economic ties with the European countries and will provide a strategic location for military industry. However, western Ukraine has long been underdeveloped relative to other major population centers. It will take time and investment for this region to accommodate a large population influx. The northeastern territories will remain the area of the most "insecure habitation" due to its proximity to Russia. Economic development in these regions will require special policies and interventions from both the central and local governments. The southern cluster's prospects are currently the least clear. This area will probably have to develop under conditions of both constant threat from Russian and the benefits from sea-born trade.Ukraine's large urban environments—like those in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, Lviv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia—will constitute a separate cluster. Big cities will likely provide the most accessible services and job opportunities to their residents. Rational population (re)settlement in postwar Ukraine must plan for housing (including temporary housing during reconstruction), infrastructure, reindustrialization, and job creation. These plans must also include social infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and other public buildings in each of the clusters.Adapting to an Aging SocietyUkraine has one of the 30 oldest populations in the world: almost 18 percent of its population is older than 65. Over the next several decades it will age even more. According to projections, the over-65 proportion will reach 21 percent by January 2041, and it will reach 23 percent of the general population by January 2051. This means that Ukraine must adapt and address issues related to the lives of older people.The demographic strategy plans to promote and accommodate the increased longevity of the Ukrainian population. The quality of life of older Ukrainians will depend on general factors like the social and economic outcomes of the war and specific factors like pensions; accessibility of social support and health services, especially in rural areas; and opportunities for employment and participation in society. Improving the quality of life of the elderly is an essential component for improving Ukraine's post-war prospects. Creating a Supportive Environment for Demographic ImprovementImproving a nation's demographic trends both requires and drives progress in other social sectors. For example, demography determines a nation's social and economic prospects, while governmental policies impact long-term demographic processes. The new Demographic Development Strategy, based on surveys and research, proposes to help develop an environment which supports population growth. Such an environment—in both war and postwar periods—has four major components: basic security, proper housing, a balanced labor market, and supportive living conditions.In the framework of this strategy, basic security for Ukraine's population means achieving physical security (advanced air defense system, accessible bomb shelters, and de-mining) and emotional security (social trust and trust in the authorities, supportive information flows, de-polarization). The solution to the housing problem means reconstruction and construction of a mix of private and public housing, using the best models from Ukraine and around the world. The labor market will require the elimination of imbalances that impede the ability of public and private enterprises to resume their operations and efficiently employ human resources. Finally, supportive living conditions mean the provision of basic services, including access to clean water, electricity, heat, communications systems, and public transportation.ConclusionSince the war continues with no end in sight, preventing the implementation of the Demographic Development Strategy, the authorities must use short-term approaches for wartime problems. However, these short-term solutions should take into consideration the goals and requirements of the demographic strategy, starting with building public understanding and support for its objectives. These strategic objectives will need to be regularly reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted, should the war bring new losses to the Ukrainian nation. That way, Ukraine will be ready to rebuild when the war ends.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.Endnotes[1] For more on this, see Ella Libanova, "Ukraine's Demography in the Second Year of the Full-Fledged War," Focus Ukraine, June 27, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-demography-second-year-full-fledged-war.[2] It is very difficult to determine a reliable count of the country's population, since there were no census conducted in the recent years. This document uses the estimate of the population during the war was made by researchers from the Ptukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. They used the following sources: the State Statistics Service (on population before the full-scale war); mobile operators (the number and location of their clients); the Ministry of Justice (registered deaths and births); the Ministry of Health (the number of newborns and children registered with the medical authorities); the Ministry of Social Policy (the number and location of IDPs); the International Organization for Migration (recent surveys); the UNHCR (the number, demographic characteristics, and regions of origin of Ukrainian forced external migrants abroad); the Pension Fund of Ukraine (the number and gender/age composition of retired people); and the Ministry of Education and Science (the number, location, and gender/age composition of students in educational institutions of different levels).[3] According to the Ministry of Public Health of Ukraine, during the battles, 189 medical facilities were destroyed and another 1,427 severely damaged in the temporarily occupied territory. [4] "UNHCR Warns Worsening Conditions and Challenges Facing Vulnerable Ukrainian Refugees in Europe," press release, UN Refugee Agency, November 15, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-warns-worsening-conditions-and-challenges-facing-vulnerable-ukrainian. [5] See Eurostat's constantly updated database at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/migration-asylum/asylum/database?node_code=migr_asytp. [6] According to the Center for Economic Strategy, in the spring of 2023, only 63 percent of respondents planned to return to Ukraine. About 14 percent of those migrated people did not plan to return, and 23 percent were undecided. It is safe to estimate that the number of Ukrainians who will remain abroad will range from 1.3 million to 3.3 million, depending on further developments in the situation. See Гліб Вишлінський, Дарія Михайлишина, Максим Самойлюк та Марія Томіліна, Біженці з України: хто вони, скільки їх та як їх повернути?, Центр економічної стратегії, ("Refugees from Ukraine: Who Are They, How Many Are There and How to Return Them?" March 21, 2023), https://ces.org.ua/who-are-ukrainian-refugee-research/. [7] For example, see «Передумови повернення в Україну для участі у відбудові українських жінок, які знайшли тимчасовий прихисток за кордоном» (Ukrainian Women's Congress, "Study 'Prerequisites for Returning to Ukraine to Participate in the Reconstruction of Ukrainian Women Who Found Temporary Shelter Abroad,'" December 3, 2023), https://womenua.today/news/doslidzhennya-peredumovy-povernennya-v-ukrai-nu-dlya-uchasti-i-vidbudovi-ukrai-nskyh-zhinok-yaki-znay-shly-tymchasovyy-pryhystok-za-kordonom-povnyj-zvit/.

The Ukrainian people are entering the third year of their fight for their existence as a state and people. Every day, soldiers and civilians—children, women, and the elderly—are killed, homes are destroyed, and jobs are lost. The uncertainty of wartime forces individuals, families, communities, and the authorities to shorten their planning horizons and be ready to adapt at a moment's notice. Under such circumstances, any effort to develop long-term strategies focused on postwar development immediately raises questions of feasibility. However, no society can live by only looking at the challenges of the moment. The future is also important for collective survival. Today's demographic crisis is a challenge that short- and long-term government strategy planning must account for.Since Ukraine gained its independence in the 1990s, its demographic situation has demanded the government's attention. Authorities worked to improve its policies and achieved some success between 2006 and 2015. Unfortunately, these positive outcomes were adversely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and demolished by Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. In recent months, the Ministry of Social Policy prepared a plan to respond to the demographic challenges brought on by the war. This document, the Demographic Development Strategy, underwent a series of public discussions and was developed in cooperation with government officials, Ukrainian scholars, and specialists from several international organizations. The strategy was finalized in January 2024 and now waits for governmental approval. About the Demographic Development Strategy The new strategy envisages two basic scenarios for Ukraine's development. The inertia scenario assumes that demographic processes will evolve naturally, without government intrusion. It predicts that the population of Ukraine within its 1991 borders may decrease to 28.9 million people by January 2041, and to 25.2 million by January 2051. The guided scenario assumes the implementation of the Demographic Development Strategy and predicts the achievement of decent living standards for Ukrainians returning from abroad. Under this scenario, the demographic decline would be mitigated, with estimates of a population of 33.9 million by January 1941, and 31.6 million by January 2051. The goal of the strategy is to ensure that the population maintains its long-term reproduction capacity despite all war-related conditions. It is intended to improve Ukraine's sociodemographic characteristics as defined in the policy's five strategic goals: Chart 1. Goals of the Demographic Development Strategy of Ukraine (2024–2040)Image CreditThe strategy proposes using tested—both in Ukraine and worldwide—policy instruments to avoid the inertia scenario. These include policies intended to improve the birth rate; reduce premature mortality and excessive migration; address population displacement; accommodate an aging population; and address other challenges confronting the nation. Increasing Ukraine's Birth Rate The primary issue that the strategy addresses is Ukraine's population size, an issue greatly exacerbated by Russia's aggression and occupation of Ukrainian territory. The war both sharply reduced Ukraine's already low birth rate, and sharply raised mortality across all age groups and occupations. Several million displaced Ukrainians moved toward the western part of Ukraine, and over six million others, mainly children and women, were forced to leave the country. In addition to the refugees, large-scale labor migration abroad between 2022 and 2023 threatens to turn into permanent emigration over time. The illegal annexation of Crimea and some southeastern Ukrainian regions between 2014 and 2022 has affected the demographic situation as well.[1] As a result, according to our calculations, Ukraine's population has radically decreased, moving from 48.5 million inhabitants in December 2001, to 42.0 million in January 2022, and then to 36.3 in August 2023 (of which, only around 31.5 million reside in the government-controlled territories).[2]Since Ukraine has not conducted a census since 2001, analysts must use both conventional and unconventional sources (as explained in the endnote 2). But making forecasts about the population size in the future is even more difficult. First, there is a lack of information on the population of the temporarily occupied territories and areas near the front. Second, military development scenarios vary greatly, which directly impact any demographic assessment. Third, the decisions that displaced and migrated Ukrainians make about whether and when to return are difficult to predict. Any demographic strategy must take all this into account in planning for the country's development. Even in peacetime, Ukraine's fertility rates have been below the level required for population replacement (2.2) since the mid-1960s. In 2021, the total fertility rate was 1.2. Put another way, the number of children born that year was half the number of people who reached the age of 60. After the start of Russian aggression in 2022, the fertility rate fell below 1.0.Even if the war were to end tomorrow, Ukraine would face an extreme challenge in improving its birth rate. There are five major reasons for such a low birth rate. First, there was a change in social values, towards self-realization and individualism. This translated into a shift from the number of children born to the quality of their care and upbringing, as well as a modification in the forms of marriage and the age at which people became parents.Second, economic factors played a negative role. According to 2021 statistical data, the poverty rate in Ukraine was 20.6 percent in the general population. For families with children, however, it was higher, measuring 22.4 percent for families with children; 27.6 percent for families with children under three years old; and 53.6 percent for large families. With the outbreak of the full-scale Russian invasion, these numbers became even worse. Third, there are structural obstacles to combining work with raising families for women in Ukraine. There is a significant difference in employment levels for women between 25 and 44 years old in 2021: the employment rate was 71.1 percent for women without children and only 51.5 percent for women with children between three and five years old. During the war, the shelling and large-scale destruction decreased the opportunities for children to attend school, which significantly worsened employment opportunities for women. Fourth, public health in Ukraine has deteriorated considerably in recent years, including declining trends in reproductive health. Additionally, Ukrainian women live under stress and depression caused by constant fear for their lives and the lives of their children and relatives. Finally, the fifth factor is the separation of families. Many men have been drafted into the armed forces, while many women have migrated abroad.Together, these factors have a synergistic effect, forcing most Ukrainian families to postpone childbearing in anticipation of a more favorable period. A significant number of these postponed births may never materialize. In the past, the Ukrainian government tried to increase the birth rate by increasing maternity benefits for women until their children reach the age of three. The government increased these benefits tenfold in 2005, and then threefold in 2008. These increases succeeded in increasing the birth rate: in 2005, there were 426,100 children born, compared to 512,500 newborns in 2009. However, the effect of financial incentives on the fertility rate was rather short-lived and mainly influenced families with low levels of education and income. A much more lasting positive result was achieved through the reduction of poverty for families with children, the creation of a legal and policy environment friendly to such families, and an increase in the economic self-sufficiency of families.Reducing Premature Mortality The second most important cause of the demographic crisis is high premature mortality for people under 65, an issue especially affecting men. Even before the major invasion and the COVID-19 pandemic, by 2020, the average life expectancy in Ukraine was 71.3 years, the lowest rate in Europe.The new strategy identifies the main factors contributing to the excessive mortality in Ukraine as a low level of hygiene culture, the prevalence of dangerous working conditions, unhealthy lifestyle, late response to health issues, widespread vaccination hesitancy, and faults in the public health care system. Lack of access to medical and recreational services are especially acute for residents in small towns and villages.The gender gap in mortality is typically high for all post-Soviet countries. According to 2020 official statistics, the gender gap in life expectancy was 9.8 years: 76.2 years for women and 66.4 years for men. Male mortality in Ukraine was higher than female mortality in all age groups, but especially—more than three times—in the 25–34 cohort. After retirement, this gap decreases. This difference stems from variations in lifestyle for women and men, and the exposure of men to more dangerous employment conditions. Russia's full-scale aggression has significantly increased mortality rates for Ukrainians. This is especially noticeable among soldiers who are risking death in battles and captivity. At the same time, the general population also risks death on a daily basis from rocket and drone attacks, limited access to medical care in the temporarily occupied territories,[3] and extreme stress that can lead to the emergence of new and exacerbation of old chronic diseases. Even though there are currently no reliable data on human losses among Ukrainian military personnel and civilians, the toll has tragically reduced the population. The cessation of hostilities in Ukraine is undoubtedly the first step to reducing mortality. However, the experience of other postwar countries shows that even the end of armed conflict does not immediately return mortality to prewar levels.Addressing Migration Out-migration of Ukraine's population has long exceeded in-migration since the dissolution of the USSR. For economic reasons, Ukrainians have been leaving for Russia, then for Poland. On the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of Ukrainian labor migrants abroad was estimated at between 2.5 and 3 million people. Over the last decade, Ukrainians consistently were among the top nationalities receiving first-time EU residence permits. For example, 873,700 Ukrainian citizens received EU residence permits in 2021, 30 percent of all those issued.Russia's military aggression has resulted in the largest outward flow of migration from Ukrainian territory since WWII. Millions of people moved away from frontline areas to either relatively safe regions of Ukraine or to other countries. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, by the end of 2023, over six million Ukrainians fled abroad. Of these, 1.2 million were either deported to or (less often) voluntarily left for the Russian Federation.[4] According to Eurostat, by the end of October 2023, 63.2 percent of the 4.3 million Ukrainians who were in the EU/European Free Trade Zone (excluding Hungary) were women, 33.2 percent were under the age of 18, and 6.1 percent were 60 or older.[5] Since one-third of forced migrants abroad are children and adolescents, their non-return may cause irreparable demographic loss for Ukraine. The situation is potentially made worse if some Ukrainian families decide to reunite outside Ukraine after the war ends. As a recent study demonstrates, many migrants may not return home.[6] Female migrants who have found good jobs and housing outside of their country may bring their husbands to join them once martial law and travel restrictions are lifted in Ukraine. Additionally, growing divorce rates between partners separated by war reduce the incentive of Ukrainian women to return home after the war.The same study shows that the reasons for Ukrainians' reluctance to return home include uncertainty about security in Ukraine (for 47 percent of those polled), lack of workplace or place to live (31 percent), insufficient access to basic services (22 percent), and lack of acceptable quality of education for children (15 percent). Abroad, Ukrainian migrants value stable employment (21 percent), school and preschool institutions (11 percent), and a sense of integration (11 percent).[7]The new strategy includes policies to attract Ukrainians living abroad so they return to their homeland. These policies would apply to migrants who left because of war and those who moved before the war. Should conditions require it, the strategy also includes migration policies to attract immigrants from other countries.(Re)distributing Postwar PopulationThe military conflict has greatly influenced population distribution in Ukraine's regions. The first cohort of internally displaced people (IDP) appeared in Ukraine in 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea and instigation of separatist conflicts in Donetsk and Luhansk. These attacks caused approximately 1.5 million Ukrainians to leave their homes for safer regions in the country. In December 2023, the number of IDPs reached 4.9 million. These numbers include about 739,000 families with children that were forced to leave their homes for regions of Ukraine away from the front lines. Despite efforts from the government and local communities, IDPs lack housing, acceptable work and income, and access to timely health and social assistance. The constant stress and uncertainty about their future cause larger declines in fertility and increases in mortality among IDPs compared to the general population.At the same time, the massive population movements within Ukraine can be a source of labor resources for the regions where IDPs settle in. The demographic strategy envisages the formation of a new resettlement system to influence and support the reconstruction of different regions of Ukraine. The most likely scenario for postwar development envisions the formation of five territorial clusters. The central cluster includes relatively safe regions of central Ukraine that already shelter the largest number of IDPs. This cluster is likely to become the country's new industrial center after the war. Due to its closeness to the EU, the western cluster will need a larger workforce. This region will develop quickly through economic ties with the European countries and will provide a strategic location for military industry. However, western Ukraine has long been underdeveloped relative to other major population centers. It will take time and investment for this region to accommodate a large population influx. The northeastern territories will remain the area of the most "insecure habitation" due to its proximity to Russia. Economic development in these regions will require special policies and interventions from both the central and local governments. The southern cluster's prospects are currently the least clear. This area will probably have to develop under conditions of both constant threat from Russian and the benefits from sea-born trade.Ukraine's large urban environments—like those in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, Lviv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia—will constitute a separate cluster. Big cities will likely provide the most accessible services and job opportunities to their residents. Rational population (re)settlement in postwar Ukraine must plan for housing (including temporary housing during reconstruction), infrastructure, reindustrialization, and job creation. These plans must also include social infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and other public buildings in each of the clusters.Adapting to an Aging SocietyUkraine has one of the 30 oldest populations in the world: almost 18 percent of its population is older than 65. Over the next several decades it will age even more. According to projections, the over-65 proportion will reach 21 percent by January 2041, and it will reach 23 percent of the general population by January 2051. This means that Ukraine must adapt and address issues related to the lives of older people.The demographic strategy plans to promote and accommodate the increased longevity of the Ukrainian population. The quality of life of older Ukrainians will depend on general factors like the social and economic outcomes of the war and specific factors like pensions; accessibility of social support and health services, especially in rural areas; and opportunities for employment and participation in society. Improving the quality of life of the elderly is an essential component for improving Ukraine's post-war prospects. Creating a Supportive Environment for Demographic ImprovementImproving a nation's demographic trends both requires and drives progress in other social sectors. For example, demography determines a nation's social and economic prospects, while governmental policies impact long-term demographic processes. The new Demographic Development Strategy, based on surveys and research, proposes to help develop an environment which supports population growth. Such an environment—in both war and postwar periods—has four major components: basic security, proper housing, a balanced labor market, and supportive living conditions.In the framework of this strategy, basic security for Ukraine's population means achieving physical security (advanced air defense system, accessible bomb shelters, and de-mining) and emotional security (social trust and trust in the authorities, supportive information flows, de-polarization). The solution to the housing problem means reconstruction and construction of a mix of private and public housing, using the best models from Ukraine and around the world. The labor market will require the elimination of imbalances that impede the ability of public and private enterprises to resume their operations and efficiently employ human resources. Finally, supportive living conditions mean the provision of basic services, including access to clean water, electricity, heat, communications systems, and public transportation.ConclusionSince the war continues with no end in sight, preventing the implementation of the Demographic Development Strategy, the authorities must use short-term approaches for wartime problems. However, these short-term solutions should take into consideration the goals and requirements of the demographic strategy, starting with building public understanding and support for its objectives. These strategic objectives will need to be regularly reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted, should the war bring new losses to the Ukrainian nation. That way, Ukraine will be ready to rebuild when the war ends.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.Endnotes[1] For more on this, see Ella Libanova, "Ukraine's Demography in the Second Year of the Full-Fledged War," Focus Ukraine, June 27, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-demography-second-year-full-fledged-war.[2] It is very difficult to determine a reliable count of the country's population, since there were no census conducted in the recent years. This document uses the estimate of the population during the war was made by researchers from the Ptukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. They used the following sources: the State Statistics Service (on population before the full-scale war); mobile operators (the number and location of their clients); the Ministry of Justice (registered deaths and births); the Ministry of Health (the number of newborns and children registered with the medical authorities); the Ministry of Social Policy (the number and location of IDPs); the International Organization for Migration (recent surveys); the UNHCR (the number, demographic characteristics, and regions of origin of Ukrainian forced external migrants abroad); the Pension Fund of Ukraine (the number and gender/age composition of retired people); and the Ministry of Education and Science (the number, location, and gender/age composition of students in educational institutions of different levels).[3] According to the Ministry of Public Health of Ukraine, during the battles, 189 medical facilities were destroyed and another 1,427 severely damaged in the temporarily occupied territory. [4] "UNHCR Warns Worsening Conditions and Challenges Facing Vulnerable Ukrainian Refugees in Europe," press release, UN Refugee Agency, November 15, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-warns-worsening-conditions-and-challenges-facing-vulnerable-ukrainian. [5] See Eurostat's constantly updated database at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/migration-asylum/asylum/database?node_code=migr_asytp. [6] According to the Center for Economic Strategy, in the spring of 2023, only 63 percent of respondents planned to return to Ukraine. About 14 percent of those migrated people did not plan to return, and 23 percent were undecided. It is safe to estimate that the number of Ukrainians who will remain abroad will range from 1.3 million to 3.3 million, depending on further developments in the situation. See Гліб Вишлінський, Дарія Михайлишина, Максим Самойлюк та Марія Томіліна, Біженці з України: хто вони, скільки їх та як їх повернути?, Центр економічної стратегії, ("Refugees from Ukraine: Who Are They, How Many Are There and How to Return Them?" March 21, 2023), https://ces.org.ua/who-are-ukrainian-refugee-research/. [7] For example, see «Передумови повернення в Україну для участі у відбудові українських жінок, які знайшли тимчасовий прихисток за кордоном» (Ukrainian Women's Congress, "Study 'Prerequisites for Returning to Ukraine to Participate in the Reconstruction of Ukrainian Women Who Found Temporary Shelter Abroad,'" December 3, 2023), https://womenua.today/news/doslidzhennya-peredumovy-povernennya-v-ukrai-nu-dlya-uchasti-i-vidbudovi-ukrai-nskyh-zhinok-yaki-znay-shly-tymchasovyy-pryhystok-za-kordonom-povnyj-zvit/.

Ali E. Abbas (" The Multiattribute Utility Tree ") received his M.S. in electrical engineering, M.S. in engineering economic systems and operations research, Ph.D. in management science and engineering, and Ph.D. (minor) in electrical engineering, all from Stanford University. He is an associate professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. His research interests include utility theory, decision making with incomplete information and preferences, dynamic programming, and information theory. He previously worked with Schlumberger Oilfield Services, where he held several international positions in wireline logging, operations management, and international training. He was also a lecturer in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford, and he was involved with several consulting projects for mergers and acquisitions in California. Dr. Abbas is a member of INFORMS, a senior member of the IEEE, and an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research. Address: Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 117 Transportation Building, MC-238, 104 South Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801; e-mail: aliabbas@uiuc.edu . James S. Dyer (" A Discrete Time Approach for Modeling Two-Factor Mean-Reverting Stochastic Processes ") occupies the Fondren Centennial Chair in Business in the Red McCombs School of Business Administration at the University of Texas at Austin. His research and teaching interests are focused on applications of decision analysis and real options to problems of risk management and capital budgeting, and he has published extensively on these subjects in various journals, including Management Science and Operations Research. He is the former Chair of the Decision Analysis Society of INFORMS, and the former area editor for decision analysis for Operations Research. He was awarded the Ramsey Medal by the Decision Analysis Society and the Edgeworth-Pareto Award by the International Society on Multiple Criteria Decision Making. Address: Information, Risk, and Operations Management Department, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712; e-mail: jim.dyer@mccombs.utexas.edu . Jeffery L. Guyse (" Consistency Among Elicitation Techniques for Intertemporal Choice: A Within-Subjects Investigation of the Anomalies ") is currently an associate professor in the Technology and Operations Management Department at the Cal Poly Pomona. He holds a Ph.D. from University of California, Irvine in management and an undergraduate degree in economics from California State University, San Marcos. His research interests are focused on the methodological issues involved with eliciting preferences for decisions that occur over time for both monetary and nonmonetary outcomes. Address: Technology and Operations Management Department, College of Business Administration, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, 3801 West Temple Avenue, Pomona, CA 91768; e-mail: jlguyse@csupomona.edu . Warren J. Hahn (" A Discrete Time Approach for Modeling Two-Factor Mean-Reverting Stochastic Processes ") is an assistant professor of decision sciences in the Graziadio School of Business and Management at Pepperdine University. He received his Ph.D. in management science from the University of Texas at Austin in 2005, and he also holds an M.B.A., an M.S. in civil engineering, and a B.S. in petroleum engineering, all from the University of Texas at Austin. His research interests include discrete-time modeling of stochastic processes and numerical techniques for solving decision analysis problems, with applications to commodity price modeling and valuation of real options. From 1991 through 2001, he held several engineering and financial management roles with firms in the energy industry, including ARCO, Vastar Resources, and BP. Address: Graziadio School of Business and Management, Pepperdine University, 24255 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, CA 90263; e-mail: joe.hahn@pepperdine.edu . Thomas W. Keelin (" Quantile-Parameterized Distributions ") is a cofounder and managing partner of Keelin Reeds Partners (KR), a management consulting firm that provides portfolio management, strategy, asset valuation, decision analysis, and business-development services. Over the last decade with KR, he has supervised such engagements for more than 80 venture-funded and emerging life sciences companies. Previously, Tom was the worldwide managing director of the Strategic Decisions Group (SDG), where he also served on the board of directors and executive committee. Over two decades at SDG, Tom founded the firm's electric utilities and life sciences practice areas and headed its strategy and strategy implementation consulting practices. He is a coauthor of the Harvard Business Review article "How SmithKline Beecham Makes Better Resource-Allocation Decisions" (March–April 1998), and he has testified before regulatory bodies in multiple U.S. states and internationally on issues of decision quality, investment risk analysis, and customer markets. He is also managing partner of Turning Point Asset Management, an investment management firm specializing in the acquisition and resolution of residential mortgages across the United States using an unusual combination of advance analytics and working with borrowers. Tom is a cofounder and is on the Board of Directors of the Decision Education Foundation, a not-for-profit organization that helps teens develop good decision making as a life skill. He holds three degrees from Stanford University: B.A. in economics and M.S. and Ph.D. in engineering-economic systems. Address: Keelin Reeds Partners, Menlo Park, CA 94025; e-mail: tomk@keelinreeds.com . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editor: Multiattribute and Intertemporal Preferences, Probability, and Stochastic Processes: Models and Assessment ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; e-mail: lrkeller@uci.edu . Francois Melese (" A Multiattribute Sealed-Bid Procurement Auction with Multiple Budgets for Government Vendor Selection ") is a professor of economics and the executive director of the Defense Resources Management Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School. He earned his B.A. in economics at the University of California, Berkeley; his M.A. at the University of British Columbia, Canada; and his Ph.D. at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. His research interests include public budgeting, public procurement, game theory, and defense economics. He is widely published in these areas and on other topics in economics and management. He has taught public executive management courses around the world, and he has been an advisor and consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD Director of Administration and Management), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Comptroller), NATO's Political and Economics Directorate, and the Defense Business Board (Advisors to the Secretary of Defense). A frequent participant at NATO meetings, Dr. Melese has represented the United States as a speaker and moderator in countries throughout Europe. Dr. Melese is a member of the American Economic Association, Southern Economic Association, and Western Economic Association, and he is an elected member of the Research Society of American Scientists—Sigma Xi. Address: Defense Resources Management Institute, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943; e-mail: fmelese@nps.edu . Bradford W. Powley (" Quantile-Parameterized Distributions ") is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University. Brad holds an M.S. degree in management science and engineering from Stanford and a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering and materials science from the University of California, Davis. Brad consults on various portfolio management, strategy, asset valuation, and decision analysis engagements within the life sciences industry, and he has held various positions in manufacturing, design, and systems engineering in HP's Imaging and Printing and Medical Products Groups. His research interests include probability encoding and the application of decision analysis to asset valuation. Address: Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; e-mail: bpowley@stanford.edu . Jay Simon (" A Multiattribute Sealed-Bid Procurement Auction with Multiple Budgets for Government Vendor Selection " and " Consistency Among Elicitation Techniques for Intertemporal Choice: A Within-Subjects Investigation of the Anomalies ") is an assistant professor at the Defense Resources Management Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he teaches a wide range of topics in quantitative analysis, decision-maker preferences, uncertainty, risk, logistics, and economics. He received his Ph.D. in operations and decision technologies from the University of California, Irvine. His main research focus is multiattribute preference modeling, particularly involving outcomes that occur over time, space, or groups of people. His current work is on the topics of reference-dependent utility, preferences over geographical data, altruistic utility, use of military reserves, and resource usage in military operations. He is a member of INFORMS and the Decision Analysis Society. Address: Defense Resources Management Institute, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943; e-mail: jrsimon@nps.edu .

Samuel D. Bond (" Improving the Generation of Decision Objectives ") is an assistant professor at the College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology. He received his Ph.D. from the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. Professor Bond's research focuses primarily on judgment and decision making in consumer settings. In prior work, he has examined confirmatory processing during the decision process and prescriptive methods for mitigating the effects of irrelevant context. More recently, he has been involved in various projects related to objectives-based decision making, focusing on impediments to the generation or elicitation of objectives. In other work, Professor Bond is exploring the interplay of intuitive and reason-based approaches to information processing and preference formation, and he is examining the ways in which descriptions of an experience can alter consumer forecasts, experience, and memory. Professor Bond teaches courses in marketing management and consumer behavior at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Address: College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, 800 West Peachtree Street NW, Atlanta, GA 30308-0520; sam.bond@mgt.gatech.edu . Kurt A. Carlson (" Improving the Generation of Decision Objectives ") was born in Kenosha, Wisconsin. He has a B.S. and M.S. in agricultural and applied economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. He has worked for the Wisconsin Center for Dairy Research and Wisconsin Milk Marketing Board, and most recently he was on the faculty at Duke University from 2001 to 2009. Dr. Carlson is an assistant professor at Georgetown University. Dr. Carlson's research focuses on the intersection of economics and psychology, with a specific emphasis on individual decision processes. Though much of his research explores consumer decision making, he also studies how voters, jurors, and managers make decisions. His research has been published in several top journals in marketing, psychology, and management. Dr. Carlson teaches courses on market intelligence, consumer behavior, and marketing management. Address: McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, 578 Hariri Building, Washington, DC 20057; kc377@georgetown.edu . Michel Denuit (" Bivariate Stochastic Dominance and Substitute Risk-(In)dependent Utilities ") is a professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), Institut de Statistique, Biostatistique et Sciences Actuarielles. He has done extensive research in the area of actuarial risk theory, especially in stochastic inequalities and dominance relations. Address: Institut de Statistique, Biostatistique et Sciences Actuarielles (ISBA), Université Catholique de Louvain, 20 Voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; michel.denuit@uclouvain.be . Louis Eeckhoudt (" Bivariate Stochastic Dominance and Substitute Risk-(In)dependent Utilities ") received a Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University in 1970. Since then and until his retirement in 2004 he taught economics at the Catholic Faculties of Mons, Belgium. He now holds a research position at IÉSEG School of Management (Lille, France) and is also a research associate with CORE (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium). His work deals mostly with the economics of risk and the analysis of risk attitudes. Address: IÉSEG, 3 Rue de la Digue, F-59000 Lille, France; louis.eeckhoudt@fucam.ac.be . Charles M. Harvey (" Cardinal Scales for Health Evaluation ") is a retired professor from the Department of Decision and Information Sciences at the University of Houston. He received his Ph.D. in pure mathematics at Stanford University. Soon afterward, he changed his research interests to applied mathematics, and a decade later— after writing the textbook Operations Research, published by North-Holland in 1979—he focused on decision analysis. His research has been primarily in the development of prescriptive models in which preferences are shown to satisfy certain conditions if and only if they are represented by functions having a certain structure. Sections 4–7 of the present paper present models of this type. He is a proponent of new theory that is applicable. He has taught at six universities and has held nonteaching positions at the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis. Address: 5902 NW Pinewood Place, Corvallis, OR 97330; cmharvey1@earthlink.net . Ralph L. Keeney (" Improving the Generation of Decision Objectives ") is a research professor at Duke University, Fuqua School of Business, Durham, North Carolina. Professor Keeney's areas of expertise are decision analysis, risk analysis, and management decision-making. He is an authority on decision making with multiple objectives. His experience includes corporate management problems, risk analyses, public policy, large-scale siting studies (e.g., airports, power plants), and environmental studies. Dr. Keeney has been a consultant for several organizations including Fair Isaac, Seagate Technology, American Express, British Columbia Hydro, Pacific Gas and Electric, Kaiser Permanente, GTE, Hunton & Williams, the Electric Power Research Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Energy. Address: Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, P.O. Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120; keeney@duke.edu . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editor… ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from UCLA. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) and is now on the Scientific Advisory Committee for the USC Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorist Events. Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; lrkeller@uci.edu . Alen Nosić (" How Riskily Do I Invest? The Role of Risk Attitudes, Risk Perceptions, and Overconfidence ") recently completed his Ph.D. at the University of Mannheim in the area of behavioral finance. In his current research he focuses on determinants of risk-taking behavior in investment decisions and on the question of which factors drive changes in risk-taking behavior over time. Address: Chair of Business Administration, University of Mannheim, L 5, 2, 68131 Mannheim, Germany; alennosic@yahoo.de . Lars Peter Østerdal (" Cardinal Scales for Health Evaluation ") is a professor in the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Copenhagen in 2004. His research interests include health economics, welfare economics, and game theory. His current research focuses on rationing methods and cost-sharing methods, pricing in networks, quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) models, stochastic dominance theory, and studies of childhood poverty in Mozambique and Vietnam. He teaches courses in health economics, game theory, and general microeconomics. Address: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark; lars.p.osterdal@econ.ku.dk . Bjørn Sandvik (" Sensitivity Analysis of Risk Tolerance ") is an associate professor of economics at the University of Bergen and holds a Ph.D. from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. He teaches finance and does research in finance and public economics. Address: Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Fosswinckelsgate 14, N-5007 Bergen, Norway; bjorn.sandvik@econ.uib.no . Lars Thorlund-Petersen (" Sensitivity Analysis of Risk Tolerance ") is the Sparebanken Nord-Norge Professor of Financial Economics at the Bodø Graduate School of Business, Norway. He teaches courses in decision analysis and game theory. His research interests include game theory and strategic behavior of agents in the presence of incentive systems determined, for example, by specific cost-sharing or rationing rules. He investigates decisions under uncertainty, with emphasis on risk preferences, utility functions, and stochastic dominance. He received his Ph.D. in mathematical economics from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Address: Bodø Graduate School of Business, Mørkvedtraakket, N-8049 Bodø, Norway; lars.thorlund-petersen@hibo.no . Martin Weber (" How Riskily Do I Invest? The Role of Risk Attitudes, Risk Perceptions, and Overconfidence ") holds a chair for Banking and Finance at the University of Mannheim. Born in 1952, he studied mathematics and business administration and received his Ph.D. as well as his Habilitation for Business Administration from the University of Aachen. He spent about three years as a visiting scholar at UCLA, the Wharton School, Stanford University, and the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. His main interests lie in the area of banking, behavioral finance, and its psychological foundations. He is the author of numerous publications in these areas and coauthor of textbooks on decision analysis and banking. He served as director (1997–2002) and deputy director (2003–2008) for the Sonderforschungsbereich 504 of the German National Science Foundation (rationality, decision making, and economic modelling), and he serves on the editorial board of various national and international journals. Dr. Weber was dean of the Faculty for Business Administration, University of Mannheim from April 2004 to March 2006, is a member of the German Academy of Natural Scientists Leopoldina, and is a member of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. He was awarded an honorary doctoral degree by the University of Münster in June 2007. Address: Chair of Business Administration, University of Mannheim, L 5, 2, 68131 Mannheim, Germany; weber@bank.bwl.uni-mannheim.de .

This paper covers selective aspects of Spain's experience in evaluating government performance and public policies. Rather than a cohesive evaluation system, there is instead a constellation of organizations, with evaluation mandates and/or practices, which are not interrelated. These organizations and their respective practices have been evolving without coordination over the past three decades. An evaluation culture is slowly emerging, amid different conceptual approaches used by different organizations that are managing and/or conducting evaluations. Evaluation activity has been taking place in Spain for years, with a marked acceleration and qualitative shift since 2005. Despite Spain's standing as an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country as well as a European Union (EU) country, it still has not developed a consolidated evaluation system. This fact points out how long-term and complex is the task of institutionalizing an evaluation system. Finally, this paper contains several website addresses where readers can obtain additional information on aspects of the paper that most interest them and to follow the Spanish experience as it unfolds.

Today, I'll add an entry to my occasional reviews of interesting academic papers. The paper: "Price Level and Inflation Dynamics in Heterogeneous Agent Economies," by Greg Kaplan, Georgios Nikolakoudis and Gianluca Violante. One of the many reasons I am excited about this paper is that it unites fiscal theory of the price level with heterogeneous agent economics. And it shows how heterogeneity matters. There has been a lot of work on "heterogeneous agent new-Keynesian" models (HANK). This paper inaugurates heterogeneous agent fiscal theory models. Let's call them HAFT. The paper has a beautifully stripped down model. Prices are flexible, and the price level is set by fiscal theory. People face uninsurable income shocks, however, and a borrowing limit. So they save an extra amount in order to self-insure against bad times. Government bonds are the only asset in the model, so this extra saving pushes down the interest rate, discount rate, and government service debt cost. The model has a time-zero shock and then no aggregate uncertainty. This is exactly the right place to start. In the end, of course, we want fiscal theory, heterogeneous agents, and sticky prices to add inflation dynamics. And on top of that, whatever DSGE smorgasbord is important to the issues at hand; production side, international trade, multiple real assets, financial fractions, and more. But the genius of a great paper is to start with the minimal model. Part II effects of fiscal shocks. I am most excited by part II, the effects of fiscal shocks. This goes straight to important policy questions. Note: This figure plots impulse responses to a targeted and untargeted helicopter drop, aggregated at the quarterly frequency. The helicopter drop is a one-time issuance of 16% of total government nominal debt outstanding at t = 0. Only households in the bottom 60% of the wealth distribution receive the issuance in the targeted experiment (dashed red line). The orange line plots dynamics in the representative agent (RA) model. The dashed black line plots the initial steady state. Source: Kaplan et al. Figure 7At time 0, the government drops $5 trillion of extra debt on people, with no plans to pay it back. The interest rate does not change. What happens? In the representative agent economy, the price level jumps,  just enough to inflate away outstanding debt by $5 trillion. (In this simulation, inflation subsequent to the price level jump is just set by the central bank, via an interest rate target. So the rising price level line of the representative agent (orange) benchmark is not that interesting. It's not a conventional impulse response showing the change after the shock; it's the actual path after the shock. The difference between colored heterogeneous agent lines and the orange representative agent line is the important part.) Punchline: In the heterogeneous agent economies, the price level jumps a good deal more. And if transfers are targeted to the bottom of the wealth distribution, the price level jumps more still. It matters who gets the money. This is the first step on an important policy question. Why was the 2020-2021 stimulus so much more inflationary than, say 2008? I have a lot of stories ("fiscal histories," FTPL), one of which is a vague sense that printing money and sending people checks has more effect than borrowing in treasury markets and spending the results. This graph makes that sense precise. Sending people checks, especially people who are on the edge, does generate more inflation. In the end, whether government debt is inflationary or not comes down to whether people treat the asset as a good savings vehicle, and hang on to it, or try to spend it, thereby driving up prices. Sending checks to people likely to spend it gives more inflation. As you can see, the model also introduces some dynamics, where in this simple setup (flexible prices) the RA model just gives a price level jump. To understand those dynamics, and more intuition of the model, look at the response of real debt and the real interest rate The greater inflation means that the same increase in nominal debt is a lesser increase in real debt. Now, the crucial feature of the model steps in: due to self-insurance, there is essentially a liquidity value of debt. If you have less debt, the marginal value of higher; people bid down the real interest rate in an attempt to get more debt. But the higher real rate means the real value of debt rises, and as the debt rises, the real interest rate falls. To understand why this is the equilibrium, it's worth looking at the debt accumulation equation, \[ \frac{db}{dt} = r_t (b_t; g_t) b_t - s_t. \]\(b_t\) is the real value of nominal debt, \(r_t=i_t-\pi_t\) is the real interest rate, and \(s_t\) is the real primary surplus. Higher real rates (debt service costs) raise debt. Higher primary surpluses pay down debt. Crucially -- the whole point of the paper -- the interest rate depends on how much debt is outstanding and on the distribution of wealth \(g_t\). (\(g_t\) is a whole distribution.)  More debt means a higher interest rate. More debt does a better job of satisfying self-insurance motives. Then the marginal value of debt is lower, so people don't try to save as much, and the interest rate rises. It works a lot like money demand,Now, if the transfer were proportional to current wealth, nothing would change, the price level would jump just like the RA (orange) line.  But it isn't; in both cases more-constrained people get more money. The liquidity constraints are less binding, they're willing to save more. For given aggregate debt the real interest rate will rise. So the orange line with no change in real debt is no longer a steady state. We must have, initially \(db/dt>0.\) Once debt rises and the distribution of wealth mixes, we go back to the old steady state, so real debt rises less initially, so it can continue to rise. And to do that, we need a larger price level jump. Whew. (I hope I got that right. Intuition is hard!)  In a previous post on heterogeneous agent models, I asked whether HA matters for aggregates, or whether it is just about distributional consequences of unchanged aggregate dynamics. Here is a great example in which HA matters for aggregates, both for the size and for the dynamics of the effects. Here's a second cool simulation. What if, rather than a lump-sum helicopter drop with no change in surpluses, the government just starts running permanent primary deficits? 
Note: Impulse response to a permanent expansion in primary deficits. The dotted orange line shows the effects of a reduction in surplus in the Representative Agent model. The blue line labelled "Lump Sum" illustrates the dynamics following an expansion of lump sum transfers. The dashed red line labelled "Tax Rate" plots dynamics following a tax cut. The orange line plots dynamics in the representative agent (RA) model. The dashed black line plots the initial steady state. Source: Kaplan et. al. Figure 8.

In the RA model, a decline in surpluses is exactly the same thing as a rise in debt. You get the initial price jump, and then the same inflation following the interest rate target. Not so the HA models! Perpetual deficits are different from a jump in debt with no change in deficit. 
Again, real debt and the real rate help to understand the intuition. The real amount of debt is permanently lower. That means people are more starved for buffer stock assets, and bid down the real interest rate. The nominal rate is fixed, by assumption in this simulation, so a lower real rate means more inflation. For policy, this is an important result. With flexible prices, RA fiscal theory only gives a one-time price level jump in response  to unexpected fiscal shocks. It does not give steady inflation in response to steady deficits. Here we do have steady inflation in response to steady deficits! It also shows an instance of the general "discount rates matter" theorem. Granted, here, the central bank could lower inflation by just lowering the nominal rate target but we know that's not so easy when we add realisms to the model. 
To see just why this is the equilibrium, and why surpluses are different than debt, again go back to the debt accumulation equation, \[ \frac{db}{dt} = r_t (b_t, g_t) b_t - s_t. \] In the RA model, the price level jumps so that \(b_t\) jumps down, and then with smaller \(s_t\), \(r b_t - s_t\) is unchanged with a constant \(r\). But in the HA model, the lower value of \(b\) means less liquidity value of debt, and people try to save, bidding down the interest rate. We need to work down the debt demand curve, driving down the real interest costs \(r\) until they partially pay for some of the deficits. There is a sense in which "financial repression" (artificially low interest rates) via perpetual inflation help to pay for perpetual deficits. Wow!
Part I r<gThe first theory part of the paper is also interesting. (Though these are really two papers stapled together, since as I see it the theory in the first part is not at all necessary for the simulations.) Here, Kaplan, Nikolakoudis and Violante take on the r<g question clearly. No, r<g does not doom fiscal theory! I was so enthused by this that I wrote up a little note "fiscal theory with negative interest rates" here. Detailed algebra of my points below are in that note,  (An essay r<g and also a r<g chapter in FTPL explains the related issue, why it's a mistake to use averages from our real economy to calibrate perfect foresight models. Yes, we can observe \(E(r)<E(g)\) yet present values converge.) I'll give the basic idea here. To keep it simple, think about the question what happens with a negative real interest rate \(r<0\), a constant surplus \(s\) in an economy with no growth, and perfect foresight. You might think we're in trouble: \[b_t = \frac{B_t}{P_t} = \int e^{-r\tau} s d\tau = \frac{s}{r}.\]A negative interest rate makes present values blow up, no? Well, what about a permanently negative surplus \(s<0\) financed by a permanently negative interest cost \(r<0\)? That sounds fine in flow terms, but it's really weird as a present value, no? Yes, it is weird. Debt accumulates at \[\frac{db_t}{dt} = r_t b_t - s_t.\] If \(r>0\), \(s>0\), then the real value of debt is generically explosive for any initial debt but \(b_0=s/r\). Because of the transversality condition ruling out real explosions, the initial price level jumps so \(b_0=B_0/P_0=s/r\). But if \(r<0\), \(s<0\), then debt is stable. For any \(b_0\), debt converges, the transversality condition is satisfied. We lose fiscal price level determination. No, you can't take a present value of a negative cashflow stream with a negative discount rate and get a sensible present value. But \(r\) is not constant. The more debt, the higher the interest rate. So  \[\frac{db_t}{dt} = r(b_t) b_t - s_t.\] Linearizing around the steady state \(b=s/r\), \[\frac{db_t}{dt} = \left[r_t  + \frac{dr(b_t)}{db}\right]b_t - s.\] So even if \(r<0\), if more debt raises the interest rate enough, if \(dr(b)/db\) is large enough, dynamics are locally and it turns out globally unstable even with \(r<0\). Fiscal theory still works! You can work out an easy example with bonds in utility, \(\int e^{-\rho t}[u(c_t) + \theta v(b_t)]dt\), and simplifying further log utility \(u(c) + \theta \log(b)\). In this case \(r = \rho - \theta v'(b) = \rho - \theta/b\) (see the note for derivation), so debt evolves as \[\frac{db}{dt} = \left[\rho  - \frac{\theta}{b_t}\right]b_t - s = \rho b_t - \theta - s.\]Now the \(r<0\) part still gives stable dynamics and multiple equilibria. But if \(\theta>-s\), then dynamics are again explosive for all but \(b=s/r\) and fiscal theory works anyway. This is a powerful result. We usually think that in perfect foresight models, \(r>g\), \(r>0\) here, and consequently positive vs negative primary surpluses \(s>0\) vs. \(s<0\) is an important dividing line. I don't know how many fiscal theory critiques I have heard that say a) it doesn't work because r<g so present values explode b) it doesn't work because primary surpluses are always slightly negative. This is all wrong. The analysis, as in this example, shows is that fiscal theory can work fine, and doesn't even notice, a transition from \(r>0\) to \(r<0\), from \(s>0\) to \(s<0\). Financing a steady small negative primary surplus with a steady small negative interest rate, or \(r<g\) is seamless. The crucial question in this example is \(s<-\theta\). At this boundary, there is no equilibrium any more. You can finance only so much primary deficit by financial repression, i.e. squeezing down the amount of debt so its liquidity value is high, pushing down the interest costs of debt. The paper staples these two exercises together, and calibrates the above simulations to \(s<0\) and \(r<g\). But I bet they would look almost exactly the same with \(s>0\) and \(r>g\). \(r<g\) is not essential to the fiscal simulations.* The paper analyzes self-insurance against idiosyncratic shocks as the cause of a liquidity value of debt. That's interesting, and allows the authors to calibrate the liquidity value against microeconomic observations on just how much people suffer such shocks and want to insure against them. The Part I simulations are just that, heterogeneous agents in action. But this theoretical point is much broader, and applies to any economic force that pushes up the real interest rate as the volume of debt rises. Bonds in utility, here and in the paper's appendix, work. They are a common stand in for the usefulness of government bonds in financial transactions. And in that case, it's easier to extend the analysis to a capital stock, real estate, foreign borrowing and lending, gold bars, crypto, and other means of self-insuring against shocks. Standard ``crowding out'' stories by which higher debt raises interest rates work. (Blachard's r<g work has a lot of such stories.) The ``segmented markets'' stories underlying faith in QE give a rising b(r). So the general principle is robust to many different kinds of models. My note explores one issue the paper does not, and it's an important one in asset pricing. OK, I see how dynamics are locally unstable, but how do you take a present value when r<0? If we write the steady state \[b_t = \int_{\tau=0}^\infty e^{-r \tau}s d\tau = \int_{\tau=0}^T e^{-r \tau}s d\tau + e^{-rT}b_{t+T}= (1-e^{-rT})\frac{s}{r} + e^{-rT}b,\]and with \(r<0\) and \(s<0\), the integral and final term of the present value formula each explode to infinity. It seems you really can't discount with a negative rate. The answer is: don't integrate forward \[\frac{db_t}{dt}=r b_t - s \]to the nonsense \[ b_t = \int e^{-r \tau} s d\tau.\]Instead, integrate forward \[\frac{db_t}{dt} = \rho b_t - \theta - s\]to \[b_t = \int e^{-\rho \tau} (s + \theta)dt =  \int e^{-\rho \tau} \frac{u'(c_t+\tau)}{u'(c_t)}(s + \theta)dt.\]In the last equation I put consumption (\(c_t=1\) in the model) for clarity. Discount the flow value of liquidity benefits at the consumer's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. Do not use liquidity to produce an altered discount rate.  This is another deep, and frequently violated point. Our discount factor tricks do not work in infinite-horizon models. \(1=E(R_{t+1}^{-1}R_{t+1})\) works just as well as \(1 = E\left[\beta u'(c_{t+1})/u'(c_t)\right] r_{t+1}\) in a finite horizon model, but you can't always use \(m_{t+1}=R_{t+1}^{-1}\) in infinite period models. The integrals blow up, as in the example. This is a good thesis topic for a theoretically minded researcher. It's something about Hilbert spaces. Though I wrote the discount factor book, I don't know how to extend discount factor tricks to infinite periods. As far as I can tell, nobody else does either. It's not in Duffie's book. In the meantime, if you use discount factor tricks like affine models -- anything but the proper SDF -- to discount an infinite cashflow, and you find "puzzles," and "bubbles," you're on thin ice. There are lots of papers making this mistake. A minor criticism: The paper doesn't show nuts and bolts of how to calculate a HAFT model, even in the simplest example. Note by contrast how trivial it is to calculate a bonds in utility model that gets most of the same results. Give us a recipe book for calculating textbook examples, please!Obviously this is a first step. As FTPL quickly adds sticky prices to get reasonable inflation dynamics, so should HAFT. For FTPL (or FTMP, fiscal theory of monetary policy; i.e. adding interest rate targets), adding sticky prices made the story much more realistic: We get a year or two of steady inflation eating away at bond values, rather than a price level jump. I can't wait to see HAFT with sticky prices. For all the other requests for generalization: you just found your thesis topic. Send typos, especially in equations. Updates*Greg wrote, and pointed out this isn't exactly right. "In the standard r>g, s>0 case, an increase desire to hold real assets (such as more income risk) leads to a lower real rate and higher real debt - the standard "secular stagnation" story. With r<g, s<0, an increased desire to hold real assets leads to higher real rates and higher debt." To understand this comment, you have to look at the supply and demand graph in the paper, or in my note. The "supply" of debt in the steady state \(b = s/r/), plotted with \(r\) as a function of \(b\) flips sign from a declining curve to a rising curve when \(s\) and \(r\) change sign. The "demand" \( r(b)) is upward sloping. So when demand shifts out, \(b\) rises, but \(r\) falls when \(r>0\) and rises when \(r<0\). With positive interest rates, you produce a greater amount of real debt, for the same surplus, with a lower real interest rate. With negative interest rates and a negative surplus, you produce more debt with a less negative real rate. Hmm. The \(r<g\) region is still a little weird. There is also the possibility of multiple equilibria, like the New-Keynesian zero bound equilibria; see the paper and note.  Erzo Luttmer has a related HAFT paper, "Permanent Primary Deficits, Idiosyncratic Long-Run Risk, and Growth." It's calibrated in much more detail, and also more detailed on the r<g and long run deficit questions. It includes fiscal theory (p. 14) but does not seem centrally focused on inflation. I haven't read it yet, but it's important if you're getting in to these issues. I still regard r<g as a technical nuisance. In most of the cases here, it does not relieve the government of the need to repay debts, it does not lead to a Magic Money Tree, and it does not undermine fiscal price level determination. I am still not a fan of OLG models, which delicately need the economy truly to go on for infinite growth. I'm not totally persuaded HA is first-order important for getting aggregate inflation dynamics right. The Phillips curve still seems like the biggest rotten timber in the ship to me. But these issues are technical and complex, and I could be wrong. Attention is limited, so you have to place your bets in this business; but fortunately you can still read after other people work it out!  Noah Kwicklis at UCLA has a very interesting related paper "Transfer Payments, Sacrifice Ratios, and Inflation in a Fiscal Theory HANK"I numerically solve a calibrated Heterogeneous Agent New-Keynesian (HANK) model that features nominal rigidities, incomplete markets, hand-to-mouth households, nominal long-term government debt, and active fiscal policy with a passive monetary policy rule to analyze the implications of the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) in a setting with wealth and income inequality. In model simulations, the total cumulative inflation generated by a fiscal helicopter drop is largely determined by the size of the initial stimulus and is relatively insensitive to the initial distribution of the payments. In contrast, the total real GDP and employment response depends much more strongly on the balance sheets of the transfer recipients, such that payments to and from households with few assets and high marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) move aggregate output much more strongly than payments to or from households with low MPCs.... 

When I was asked to write the foreword for this important journal I was honored. Honored and troubled. What could a conservation ecologist say about development that was particularly relevant at such a critical time in Madagascar's history? During such a distinct period of uncertainty and change, what reflection might I offer that would be helpful, hopeful, and reasonable? Over the weeks, I have witnessed the turmoil of a country searching for inner peace while dedicated individuals continue to work towards improving lives and safeguarding the future of this wonderfully unique island. And in struggling with what to say in the face of inevitable change, three concepts keep coming to mind. The first two concepts come from my ecology training; the last emerges from my experiences as a development professional. These concepts are neither new nor ground-breaking. They certainly won't solve all the challenges of Madagascar conservation and development today. Yet together, these three concepts may offer some orientation for continued integrated conservation and development work in a changing Madagascar. The first concept is connectedness. Connections are the key to ecology. Species and ecological processes linked in one complex system. Natural elements connected to people and culture through a complex web of relationships, desires and values. At this critical juncture in Madagascar's history, it seems imperative to both understand and exploit these connections. Healthy people cannot exist in an unhealthy environment. Political decisions are intimately connected to the well-being of people and the survival of their natural resource base. As choices are made, it is imperative that decisions not be taken in short-term haste to meet the pressing needs of today at the expense of the longer term needs of both today and tomorrow.A thoughtful process that embraces the connectedness of all Malagasy people to each other and their natural world is a difficult one. But by keeping these connections intact, by ensuring that each part of the system is understood and valued, a more rewarding, equitable and sustainable future can be secured. The second concept is resiliency. Resiliency relates to the ability to withstand and recover from shocks and perturbances while maintaining functionality and equilibrium. It is clear that Madagascar is experiencing shocks. More frequent and intense cyclones, changing climatic patterns, severe periods of drought and unprecedented pressure for natural resources tax the recovery abilities of humans and the natural world alike. Recent socio-political changes are undoubtedly testing the resiliency of Malagasy society. New pathways for development in Madagascar must offer resilient options for the Malagasy people.The sharing of development dividends amongst a larger number of citizens across Malagasy society will enhance the resiliency of Madagascar as a whole. Safeguarding natural assets, including soil, water, forests, fisheries and biological diversity, creates a social safety net that will allow Madagascar to cope in the short-term, and thrive in the long-term. The last concept is reconciliation. Of all the concepts, this is probably the most difficult one. In the financial world, we reconcile our accounts. Inputs and outputs, income and expenses are scrutinized to ensure that the ledger adds up at the end of the day. But such reconciliation demands an honest and clear accounting system where incomes are transparent and real costs are understood. In Madagascar, this means making development decisions that incorporate the real costs of leaving marginalized and vulnerable members of society behind, real costs of irrevocable and detrimental changes to the functioning of natural systems, real costs of losing species, and the real cost of not being able to adapt and cope with climatic changes. It means internalizing and making rationale decisions about these costs now, so that Malagasy children will be able to ensure that the ledger adds up at the end of the century. But there is another definition of reconciliation, the coming together of opposing parties to r esolve conflict and find peace. Undoubtedly, this is the hardest part. It involves open and participatory dialogue that teases out seemingly intractable issues to find balanced solutions that everyone can live with. Reconciliation cannot be forced – people must want to engage, must be willing to expose truths and be open to exploring other perspectives. With a commitment to compromise and dignity, reconciliation brings healing and harmony. It is incumbent upon us, the conservation and development community, to support the Malagasy people in efforts to come together and embrace the linkages between people and their natural world through a process of reconciliation and thoughtful weighing of trade-offs to ensure a resilient Madagascar. The lessons and articles we share through this journal offer important insights and lessons to move us in that direction.Réflexions sur Madagascar, pays en évolution Je me suis sentie en même temps honorée et troublée quand ce grand journal m'a fait honneur en m'invitant à écrire une préface. Quel sujet pertinent sur le développement pourrait donc écrire une éco-conservationniste à un moment si critique de l'histoire de Madagascar ? Que pourrais-je proposer comme réflexion qui soit à la fois utile, empreinte d'espoir et raisonnable pendant cette période marquée par l'incertitude et le changement ? Pendant des semaines, j'ai été le témoin de l'agitation d'un pays à la recherche de paix intérieure pendant que des gens dévoués poursuivaient leurs efforts afin d'améliorer les conditions de vie et préserver le futur de ce pays merveilleux et unique. Alors que ces pensées me taraudaient face à un changement inévitable, trois concepts me sont venus à l'esprit. Les deux premiers me viennent directement de ma formation en écologie alors que le dernier a été façonné par mon expérience professionnelle acquise dans le développement. Ces concepts ne sont ni nouveaux ni révolutionnaires et ils ne vont vraisemblablement pas constituer la solution à tous les problèmes du développement et de la conservation de Madagascar actuels. Cependant, ils pourront conjointement tracer une voie dans la poursuite des travaux de conservation et de développement intégré pour ce pays en pleine évolution qu'est Madagascar. Le premier concept porte sur la connexité. Les connexions sont les clefs de l'écologie avec les espèces et les processus écologiques qui sont liés dans un système complexe. Nous avons ici des éléments naturels reliés à des gens, à leur culture au sein d'un réseau complexe de rapports, de désirs et de valeurs. À ce moment délicat de l'histoire de Madagascar, ces connexions doivent être à la fois comprises et exploitées. Des gens sains ne peuvent vivre dans un environnement malsain. Les décisions politiques sont intimement liées au bien-être des gens et à la survie de leurs ressources naturelles de base. Lorsque des choix sont faits, il est impératif que les décisions ne soient pas prises dans la hâte du cours terme pour satisfaire des besoins immédiats au détriment des besoins à plus long terme actuels et futurs. Un processus réfléchi qui englobe l'ensemble des rapports connexes régissant tous les habitants de Madagascar entre eux mais aussi avec leur patrimoine naturel n'est pas aisé. Cependant c'est en maintenant ces liens, en assurant que chaque élément du système est compris et mis en valeur, qu'un avenir plus prometteur, plus équitable et plus durable peut être assuré. Le deuxième concept porte sur la résilience. La résilience se réfère à la capacité de résister et de se ressaisir des chocs et perturbations tout en maintenant fonctionnalité et équilibre. Il est clair que Madagascar est en train de subir des chocs. Des cyclones plus fréquents et plus intenses, des changements climatiques, de graves épisodes de sécheresse et une pression sans précédent sur les ressources naturelles mettent en péril les capacités de se recomposer, qu'il s'agisse des gens ou de la nature. Les changements socio-politiques récents mettent assurément à l'épreuve la résilience de la société malgache. Les nouvelles voies pour le développement de Madagascar doivent fournir des options résilientes pour les gens de Madagascar. Le partage des acquis du développement entre un plus grand nombre de citoyens de la société malgache améliorera la résilience de Madagascar dans l'ensemble. Sauvegarder le patrimoine naturel, y compris la terre, l'eau, les forêts, la pêche et la diversité biologique crée un filet de sécurité social qui permettra à Madagascar de composer à court terme et de prospérer à long terme. Le dernier concept, qui est sans doute le plus ardu des trois, est le rapprochement. Dans le monde financier, nous procédons à des états de rapprochement de nos comptes. Des entrées et des sorties, des revenus et des dépenses qui sont contrôlés pour s'assurer que les soldes dans les livres s'équilibrent en fin de journée. Mais un tel rapprochement requiert un livre comptable honnête et clair dans lequel les revenus sont transparents et les charges réelles sont comprises. À Madagascar, cela signifie de prendre des décisions en matière de développement en incorporant les coûts réels liés au fait que certaines personnes marginalisées ou vulnérables de la société soient écartées du processus, les coûts réels des changements irrévocables et préjudiciables apportés au fonctionnement des systèmes naturels, les coûts réels de la perte d'espèces naturelles et les coûts réels liés au fait de ne pas être capable de s'adapter et de faire face aux changements climatiques. Il s'agit d'absorber ces coûts et de prendre dès à présent des décisions raisonnables à leur propos de sorte que les enfants de Madagascar seront capables d'assurer que les soldes dans les livres s'équilibrent à la fin du siècle. Il existe aussi une autre définition du rapprochement, celle de la rencontre de parties en opposition pour résoudre un conflit et trouver la paix. Il s'agit sans nul doute de l'acte le plus difficile à jouer car il repose sur un dialogue ouvert et participatif jusqu'à la limite des situations inextricables afin d'aboutir à des consensus équilibrés où chacun peut se retrouver. Le rapprochement ne peut être forcé – les gens doivent vouloir s'engager, doivent être disposés à exposer des vérités et s'ouvrir pour rechercher des alternatives. Avec la dignité et la volonté réelle de dialoguer, le rapprochement peut panser les plaies et apporter l'harmonie. Il nous incombe, à nous membres de la communauté de la conservation et du développement, de soutenir les Malgaches dans leurs efforts pour se rassembler et renforcer les liens entre les gens et la nature dans un processus de rapprochement avec des compromis soigneusement réfléchis pour assurer la résilience de Madagascar. Les leçons et les articles que nous partageons dans ce journal constituent ainsi des aperçus importants pour nous mener sur cette voie.

"The EU ahead of a new political cycle and a new geopolitical era" was the subject of the 22nd edition of the "War and Peace in the 21st Century" conference, held in Barcelona on March 16th, 2024. Organised by CIDOB in collaboration with EsadeGeo - Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, and supported by "La Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona City Council and the rest of the CIDOB board, the conference provided expert insights on the internal and external challenges facing the EU in view of the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024, the wars raging in the EU's neighbourhood, and the potential outcomes of the US elections in November 2024.







The European Union (EU) is facing a new political cycle marked by the European Parliament elections to be held in June 2024 and a shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by the war in Ukraine and in Gaza. Issues such as enlargement, institutional reform, the green transition, technological transformations, migration and asylum policy and European defence are taking centre stage on the European agenda. CIDOB's Annual Conference aimed to identify the challenges that lie ahead, both internally and in terms of external action, and discuss opportunities for a more inclusive and cohesive EU. In his opening address, Antoni Segura (Chairman of CIDOB) noted the importance of analysing the EU's internal dynamics, considering the negative consequences of the rise of the extreme right ahead of the European Parliament elections. Segura reflected on the contributions of CIDOB's Annual Conference to the study of global politics from Barcelona since its first edition, held in 2002. Speaking on behalf of the Mayor of Barcelona, Pau Solanilla (Commissioner for International Relations and City Promotion of Barcelona City Council) welcomed all the participants and highlighted the importance of reflecting on the global agenda from Barcelona, a global city and a non-state capital that benefits from the work of CIDOB, founded 50 years ago by civil society representatives. Cities can bring a human dimension and help build bridges for peace through city diplomacy, responding to today's global calls for a new way of conceiving international relations, he said. Reminding us to "never cut ties between humans in conflicts", Barcelona should once again provide a platform for dialogue for peace in Europe and the Mediterranean. Javier Solana (President of EsadeGeo and Honorary Chairman of CIDOB) began by underlining that "the project of Europe is a project of peace", requiring it to go beyond mere geopolitics. Regarding relations with the United States, he said the upcoming US elections in November made it imperative for the EU to foster its own technological sector and to construct its defence in a way which is not like America's. He addressed the EU's own upcoming elections and the need to take decisive steps to prevent populism from gaining control of European institutions. Finally, Solana underlined the geopolitical importance of China for the EU. Reforming and enlarging the European Union for a new era The first panel, moderated by Cristina Gallach (Member of Global Women Leaders' Voices), followed CIDOB's report "The World in 2024: ten issues that will shape the international agenda", which defines the geopolitical situation in two words: ballots and bullets. Ms. Gallach proposed instead to discuss ballots and policies and underlined that, with expectations of a shift from the centre to the right in the upcoming elections, the EU has never faced a set of ballots which will have such a direct influence on its green, digital, reform and enlargement policies. This set the stage for an exchange of ideas on how democratic processes intersect with policy debates. Daniela Schwarzer (Member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Executive Board) highlighted that in the present geopolitical context, enlargement policy could be a tool to bring regional stability and security, as it was in the past, but a larger union of 35 member states, and voting based on unanimity, also carries the risk of weakening the EU's decision-making capacity. The EU will only emerge stronger from enlargement if it is paired with internal reforms addressing the question of qualified majority voting and the responsibilities of the European Commission. At the same time, differentiated integration and specific policies with rule of law conditionality – as was the case with the successful Next Generation EU funds – could provide ways to protect the fundamental principles of the EU. However, if it is to be credible in expecting candidate countries to fight corruption, the EU also needs to address its own internal challenges. Loukas Tsoukalis (President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP) remarked that while enlargement may be called "the most successful foreign policy of the EU" because it helps new members to become more stable and prosperous (as it did in the case of Spain and Greece), it is not a panacea that cures all ills (referring to the problems with the rule of law in countries such as Hungary and Poland). He noted that enlargement comes at a cost: more members in a system that works through consensus and unanimity risks becoming a model for dysfunctionality. Tsoukalis said that the current challenge for the EU is reform on two levels, namely institutional reform and funding, without which it will be impossible to address any enlargement successfully. How could the EU consider exporting pax europea when neither it itself is ready to introduce the required internal reforms and budget increases, nor are the proposed countries for enlargement ready to fulfil the criteria? Brigid Laffan (President of the European Policy Centre) highlighted how the EU has moved from a technocratic to an increasingly politicised union. She reflected on how the EU has matured as a political system through crises, especially since 2009, becoming more resilient, adaptable and flexible. Laffan also pointed to four challenges for the EU if it is to be ready for the next stage. First, she focused on heterogeneity among European countries in terms of democratic capacities, with Hungary constantly blackmailing the EU and threatening unity over EU support for Ukraine. Second, she outlined the risks related to the geopolitics of war, with the resurgence of conflict in the continent and in Gaza, making relations with the US and China more problematic. Third, the EU's enlargement towards weak, aid-dependent, democratically challenged states risks undermining EU policy-making capacity. Fourth, ahead of the next European elections Laffan observed the centre-right's fatal tendency to move further right. She concluded that it remains to be seen whether the EU has the capacity to rise to these challenges and noted that a more fitting motto for the EU today is not "unity in diversity" but Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" to continue to be a zone of peace and prosperity. The contributions from the three panellists were followed by a round of debate centring on the contradictions and challenges for the European integration and enlargement project, the need for a more consolidated budget, and the question of immigration. On the subject of European integration, some participants suggested the creation of subgroups within the EU where honest discussion among geopolitically aligned countries could take place, in addition to acknowledging the need for coalitions "of willing and able" within the EU, and the need for the EU to invest in relationships between member states and those with waiting-room status to smooth the candidates' transition processes. As far as funding was concerned, the need for greater financial resources was noted, and it was argued that the EU should avoid relying solely on national contributions (and therefore taxation) and instead explore alternative methods of funding (i.e. carbon taxes). Lastly, the issue of immigration triggered a huge discussion as a divisive topic within the European community that goes to the heart of European identity. There was a consensus that Europe will need migration and that more attention and resources should be allocated to integration. The issue of controlling immigration and borders was also raised during the discussion, as well as the conflation of immigration and diversity, pointing to the ethnic and religious diversity within European societies and warnings about political exploitation of migration by far-right parties. The EU in a new geopolitical context The second panel was moderated by Xavier Mas de Xaxàs (Diplomatic Correspondent of La Vanguardia). It aimed to elaborate on the needs and efficiency of EU external action when it comes to tackling the challenges of an increasingly complex geopolitical reality, with open conflicts in European territory and its neighbourhood, including in Ukraine and Gaza; competition between the US and China; rivalry with Russia; and necessary engagement with the so-called Global South. Jean-Marie Guéhenno (Director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution, Columbia University) warned of the consequences of the return of war in Europe. He reflected on how double standards in the EU's responses to the war in Ukraine and Gaza have undermined its soft power and global respect for the universality of European values. He emphasised the importance of legitimacy for the future of European integration, hence the need to preserve the identity and core values of the EU such as the rule of law, human dignity and solidarity. In his concluding remarks, he highlighted the urgency of reinforcing the EU's industrial capacity in defence and artificial intelligence to address the existing security challenges in Europe. Drawing on some of the points raised during the first panel, he also stressed the need for multi-speed integration, especially in security and defence, and increasing financial resources for AI, research and development and technology. Natalie Nougayrède (Member of the Council, European Council on Foreign Relations) focused her contribution on the importance of putting people at the centre of geopolitics, and the objective of democratisation for a peaceful Europe. Through the examples of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Maidan revolution, and the ongoing popular resistance to Russia's invasion, she reflected on how Ukrainians have shaped geopolitics, arguing that geopolitics can also be made by people. Similarly, Nougayrède saw the empowerment of Russia's civil society and the reinforcement of democratic institutions in Russia as a necessary step towards the end of the Ukraine war. The latter, she argued, is indeed a direct result of the autocratic power system that Putin has built in Russia, for which the EU needs to think of a different Russia if peace is to be restored in the continent. Wang Huiyao (Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, CCG), began by saying that it is vital for the EU (and the rest of the world) to play a bigger role to prevent the scenario of "lose-lose" geopolitics. In the face of the uncertainty that comes with the prospect of a victory for Trump, he emphasised the importance of more strategic autonomy, noting that, as one of the world's great powers, China can act as a stabilising force in peace-making, global governance and the economy. He called for a trust-building process between major powers in global politics and a real and efficient multilateral system that reflects the current multipolar world. Given we all live on the same planet and face common threats, and therefore cannot afford to be rivals, Huiyao proposed working together on projects like climate change, the economy, green development, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway to tackle huge infrastructure deficits, while noting the need to rebuild Ukraine and Gaza. He also said that as China can mediate between Ukraine and Russia, the EU can do the same in US-China relations, making the EU, the United States and China work well as a trilateral relationship and making the world more stable. Maha Yahya (Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center) referred to the Gaza war as a game changer with direct implications for Europe. For too long, the conflict has been swept under the carpet, with an idea of peace and security in the region based on a process of normalisation. The blame game over who was responsible for the failure of the Oslo peace process and the negotiations for a ceasefire made the debate on a two-state solution unviable, while new settlements continued to be established. She also underlined the absence of leadership, not just in Israel (with its most far-right government for a long time) and the region as a whole, but also in the US and the EU, where leaderships are fragmented. While the European Commission takes a pragmatic approach, there is a lack of brainpower and political solutions in the European debate, noting that Borrell's appeals for peace will go unheeded for as long as the EU fails to send a clear, united message. Given the horrific humanitarian situation, Yahya criticised the EU's double standards in response to Ukraine and Gaza. She said that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is one leverage that European countries should use, either collectively or individually. Lastly, she noted that the perception in the region and the Global South is that the Gaza war is an incomplete decolonisation process. During the discussion with the audience, the following issues were raised: the possibility of a change of government in Israel; the necessity of reform for EU enlargement; Europe's dark colonial past and how it could engage differently with the Global South; whether it is in the interest of Europe to open negotiations with Russia; and how the green transition is impacted by war. In response, Jean-Marie Guéhenno stressed that, for a better relationship with the Global South, Europe will need a stronger stance on the Middle East, including recognising the Palestinian state. Wang Huiyao reaffirmed the importance of ending both wars, calling for a high-level peace summit. He then noted that although China was pushed towards Russia by the US, Henry Kissinger brokered US-China relations in the 1970s. Unfortunately, he added, there is "no Kissinger of the EU" now. Finally, Maha Yahya mentioned that there is no hope of an Israeli leadership change, therefore there is no significant window for peace talks. She mentioned some urgent necessities for the short term: a ceasefire, a firmer position from the EU; averting an invasion of Lebanon owing to the high risk of regional escalation; and the need to link the reconstruction of Gaza to a political track of the conflict. In his concluding remarks, Pol Morillas (Director of CIDOB) summarised the conference themes by highlighting the intersection between politics and geopolitics in both panel discussions. He concluded by stating that, while the EU has matured enough to hold discussions on critical issues such as migration, the far right or the environment, it is still in the process of defining how the challenge of enlargement and reform will be addressed to strengthen the EU in the future. By asking whether the EU is ready to do "whatever it takes" on issues like security and defence and the green and the technological transitions, he argued that the main challenge for the EU will be approaching these issues through political discussions rather than policies alone. Reflecting on the second panel, Morillas referred to the idea of geopolitics defining our identity, and the impact of people and private actors on the shaping of geopolitics, too. He noted the imperative to rebuild trust among citizens and within the global community and argued that "at a moment when politics is most needed for the challenges we are facing, geopolitics is preventing global politics from solving our shared global problems".

"The EU ahead of a new political cycle and a new geopolitical era" was the subject of the 22nd edition of the "War and Peace in the 21st Century" conference, held in Barcelona on March 16th, 2024. Organised by CIDOB in collaboration with EsadeGeo - Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, and supported by "La Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona City Council and the rest of the CIDOB board, the conference provided expert insights on the internal and external challenges facing the EU in view of the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024, the wars raging in the EU's neighbourhood, and the potential outcomes of the US elections in November 2024.







The European Union (EU) is facing a new political cycle marked by the European Parliament elections to be held in June 2024 and a shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by the war in Ukraine and in Gaza. Issues such as enlargement, institutional reform, the green transition, technological transformations, migration and asylum policy and European defence are taking centre stage on the European agenda. CIDOB's Annual Conference aimed to identify the challenges that lie ahead, both internally and in terms of external action, and discuss opportunities for a more inclusive and cohesive EU. In his opening address, Antoni Segura (Chairman of CIDOB) noted the importance of analysing the EU's internal dynamics, considering the negative consequences of the rise of the extreme right ahead of the European Parliament elections. Segura reflected on the contributions of CIDOB's Annual Conference to the study of global politics from Barcelona since its first edition, held in 2002. Speaking on behalf of the Mayor of Barcelona, Pau Solanilla (Commissioner for International Relations and City Promotion of Barcelona City Council) welcomed all the participants and highlighted the importance of reflecting on the global agenda from Barcelona, a global city and a non-state capital that benefits from the work of CIDOB, founded 50 years ago by civil society representatives. Cities can bring a human dimension and help build bridges for peace through city diplomacy, responding to today's global calls for a new way of conceiving international relations, he said. Reminding us to "never cut ties between humans in conflicts", Barcelona should once again provide a platform for dialogue for peace in Europe and the Mediterranean. Javier Solana (President of EsadeGeo and Honorary Chairman of CIDOB) began by underlining that "the project of Europe is a project of peace", requiring it to go beyond mere geopolitics. Regarding relations with the United States, he said the upcoming US elections in November made it imperative for the EU to foster its own technological sector and to construct its defence in a way which is not like America's. He addressed the EU's own upcoming elections and the need to take decisive steps to prevent populism from gaining control of European institutions. Finally, Solana underlined the geopolitical importance of China for the EU. Reforming and enlarging the European Union for a new era The first panel, moderated by Cristina Gallach (Member of Global Women Leaders' Voices), followed CIDOB's report "The World in 2024: ten issues that will shape the international agenda", which defines the geopolitical situation in two words: ballots and bullets. Ms. Gallach proposed instead to discuss ballots and policies and underlined that, with expectations of a shift from the centre to the right in the upcoming elections, the EU has never faced a set of ballots which will have such a direct influence on its green, digital, reform and enlargement policies. This set the stage for an exchange of ideas on how democratic processes intersect with policy debates. Daniela Schwarzer (Member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Executive Board) highlighted that in the present geopolitical context, enlargement policy could be a tool to bring regional stability and security, as it was in the past, but a larger union of 35 member states, and voting based on unanimity, also carries the risk of weakening the EU's decision-making capacity. The EU will only emerge stronger from enlargement if it is paired with internal reforms addressing the question of qualified majority voting and the responsibilities of the European Commission. At the same time, differentiated integration and specific policies with rule of law conditionality – as was the case with the successful Next Generation EU funds – could provide ways to protect the fundamental principles of the EU. However, if it is to be credible in expecting candidate countries to fight corruption, the EU also needs to address its own internal challenges. Loukas Tsoukalis (President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP) remarked that while enlargement may be called "the most successful foreign policy of the EU" because it helps new members to become more stable and prosperous (as it did in the case of Spain and Greece), it is not a panacea that cures all ills (referring to the problems with the rule of law in countries such as Hungary and Poland). He noted that enlargement comes at a cost: more members in a system that works through consensus and unanimity risks becoming a model for dysfunctionality. Tsoukalis said that the current challenge for the EU is reform on two levels, namely institutional reform and funding, without which it will be impossible to address any enlargement successfully. How could the EU consider exporting pax europea when neither it itself is ready to introduce the required internal reforms and budget increases, nor are the proposed countries for enlargement ready to fulfil the criteria? Brigid Laffan (President of the European Policy Centre) highlighted how the EU has moved from a technocratic to an increasingly politicised union. She reflected on how the EU has matured as a political system through crises, especially since 2009, becoming more resilient, adaptable and flexible. Laffan also pointed to four challenges for the EU if it is to be ready for the next stage. First, she focused on heterogeneity among European countries in terms of democratic capacities, with Hungary constantly blackmailing the EU and threatening unity over EU support for Ukraine. Second, she outlined the risks related to the geopolitics of war, with the resurgence of conflict in the continent and in Gaza, making relations with the US and China more problematic. Third, the EU's enlargement towards weak, aid-dependent, democratically challenged states risks undermining EU policy-making capacity. Fourth, ahead of the next European elections Laffan observed the centre-right's fatal tendency to move further right. She concluded that it remains to be seen whether the EU has the capacity to rise to these challenges and noted that a more fitting motto for the EU today is not "unity in diversity" but Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" to continue to be a zone of peace and prosperity. The contributions from the three panellists were followed by a round of debate centring on the contradictions and challenges for the European integration and enlargement project, the need for a more consolidated budget, and the question of immigration. On the subject of European integration, some participants suggested the creation of subgroups within the EU where honest discussion among geopolitically aligned countries could take place, in addition to acknowledging the need for coalitions "of willing and able" within the EU, and the need for the EU to invest in relationships between member states and those with waiting-room status to smooth the candidates' transition processes. As far as funding was concerned, the need for greater financial resources was noted, and it was argued that the EU should avoid relying solely on national contributions (and therefore taxation) and instead explore alternative methods of funding (i.e. carbon taxes). Lastly, the issue of immigration triggered a huge discussion as a divisive topic within the European community that goes to the heart of European identity. There was a consensus that Europe will need migration and that more attention and resources should be allocated to integration. The issue of controlling immigration and borders was also raised during the discussion, as well as the conflation of immigration and diversity, pointing to the ethnic and religious diversity within European societies and warnings about political exploitation of migration by far-right parties. The EU in a new geopolitical context The second panel was moderated by Xavier Mas de Xaxàs (Diplomatic Correspondent of La Vanguardia). It aimed to elaborate on the needs and efficiency of EU external action when it comes to tackling the challenges of an increasingly complex geopolitical reality, with open conflicts in European territory and its neighbourhood, including in Ukraine and Gaza; competition between the US and China; rivalry with Russia; and necessary engagement with the so-called Global South. Jean-Marie Guéhenno (Director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution, Columbia University) warned of the consequences of the return of war in Europe. He reflected on how double standards in the EU's responses to the war in Ukraine and Gaza have undermined its soft power and global respect for the universality of European values. He emphasised the importance of legitimacy for the future of European integration, hence the need to preserve the identity and core values of the EU such as the rule of law, human dignity and solidarity. In his concluding remarks, he highlighted the urgency of reinforcing the EU's industrial capacity in defence and artificial intelligence to address the existing security challenges in Europe. Drawing on some of the points raised during the first panel, he also stressed the need for multi-speed integration, especially in security and defence, and increasing financial resources for AI, research and development and technology. Natalie Nougayrède (Member of the Council, European Council on Foreign Relations) focused her contribution on the importance of putting people at the centre of geopolitics, and the objective of democratisation for a peaceful Europe. Through the examples of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Maidan revolution, and the ongoing popular resistance to Russia's invasion, she reflected on how Ukrainians have shaped geopolitics, arguing that geopolitics can also be made by people. Similarly, Nougayrède saw the empowerment of Russia's civil society and the reinforcement of democratic institutions in Russia as a necessary step towards the end of the Ukraine war. The latter, she argued, is indeed a direct result of the autocratic power system that Putin has built in Russia, for which the EU needs to think of a different Russia if peace is to be restored in the continent. Wang Huiyao (Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, CCG), began by saying that it is vital for the EU (and the rest of the world) to play a bigger role to prevent the scenario of "lose-lose" geopolitics. In the face of the uncertainty that comes with the prospect of a victory for Trump, he emphasised the importance of more strategic autonomy, noting that, as one of the world's great powers, China can act as a stabilising force in peace-making, global governance and the economy. He called for a trust-building process between major powers in global politics and a real and efficient multilateral system that reflects the current multipolar world. Given we all live on the same planet and face common threats, and therefore cannot afford to be rivals, Huiyao proposed working together on projects like climate change, the economy, green development, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway to tackle huge infrastructure deficits, while noting the need to rebuild Ukraine and Gaza. He also said that as China can mediate between Ukraine and Russia, the EU can do the same in US-China relations, making the EU, the United States and China work well as a trilateral relationship and making the world more stable. Maha Yahya (Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center) referred to the Gaza war as a game changer with direct implications for Europe. For too long, the conflict has been swept under the carpet, with an idea of peace and security in the region based on a process of normalisation. The blame game over who was responsible for the failure of the Oslo peace process and the negotiations for a ceasefire made the debate on a two-state solution unviable, while new settlements continued to be established. She also underlined the absence of leadership, not just in Israel (with its most far-right government for a long time) and the region as a whole, but also in the US and the EU, where leaderships are fragmented. While the European Commission takes a pragmatic approach, there is a lack of brainpower and political solutions in the European debate, noting that Borrell's appeals for peace will go unheeded for as long as the EU fails to send a clear, united message. Given the horrific humanitarian situation, Yahya criticised the EU's double standards in response to Ukraine and Gaza. She said that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is one leverage that European countries should use, either collectively or individually. Lastly, she noted that the perception in the region and the Global South is that the Gaza war is an incomplete decolonisation process. During the discussion with the audience, the following issues were raised: the possibility of a change of government in Israel; the necessity of reform for EU enlargement; Europe's dark colonial past and how it could engage differently with the Global South; whether it is in the interest of Europe to open negotiations with Russia; and how the green transition is impacted by war. In response, Jean-Marie Guéhenno stressed that, for a better relationship with the Global South, Europe will need a stronger stance on the Middle East, including recognising the Palestinian state. Wang Huiyao reaffirmed the importance of ending both wars, calling for a high-level peace summit. He then noted that although China was pushed towards Russia by the US, Henry Kissinger brokered US-China relations in the 1970s. Unfortunately, he added, there is "no Kissinger of the EU" now. Finally, Maha Yahya mentioned that there is no hope of an Israeli leadership change, therefore there is no significant window for peace talks. She mentioned some urgent necessities for the short term: a ceasefire, a firmer position from the EU; averting an invasion of Lebanon owing to the high risk of regional escalation; and the need to link the reconstruction of Gaza to a political track of the conflict. In his concluding remarks, Pol Morillas (Director of CIDOB) summarised the conference themes by highlighting the intersection between politics and geopolitics in both panel discussions. He concluded by stating that, while the EU has matured enough to hold discussions on critical issues such as migration, the far right or the environment, it is still in the process of defining how the challenge of enlargement and reform will be addressed to strengthen the EU in the future. By asking whether the EU is ready to do "whatever it takes" on issues like security and defence and the green and the technological transitions, he argued that the main challenge for the EU will be approaching these issues through political discussions rather than policies alone. Reflecting on the second panel, Morillas referred to the idea of geopolitics defining our identity, and the impact of people and private actors on the shaping of geopolitics, too. He noted the imperative to rebuild trust among citizens and within the global community and argued that "at a moment when politics is most needed for the challenges we are facing, geopolitics is preventing global politics from solving our shared global problems".

"The EU ahead of a new political cycle and a new geopolitical era" was the subject of the 22nd edition of the "War and Peace in the 21st Century" conference, held in Barcelona on March 16th, 2024. Organised by CIDOB in collaboration with EsadeGeo - Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, and supported by "La Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona City Council and the rest of the CIDOB board, the conference provided expert insights on the internal and external challenges facing the EU in view of the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024, the wars raging in the EU's neighbourhood, and the potential outcomes of the US elections in November 2024. The European Union (EU) is facing a new political cycle marked by the European Parliament elections to be held in June 2024 and a shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by the war in Ukraine and in Gaza. Issues such as enlargement, institutional reform, the green transition, technological transformations, migration and asylum policy and European defence are taking centre stage on the European agenda. CIDOB's Annual Conference aimed to identify the challenges that lie ahead, both internally and in terms of external action, and discuss opportunities for a more inclusive and cohesive EU. In his opening address, Antoni Segura (Chairman of CIDOB) noted the importance of analysing the EU's internal dynamics, considering the negative consequences of the rise of the extreme right ahead of the European Parliament elections. Segura reflected on the contributions of CIDOB's Annual Conference to the study of global politics from Barcelona since its first edition, held in 2002. Speaking on behalf of the Mayor of Barcelona, Pau Solanilla (Commissioner for International Relations and City Promotion of Barcelona City Council) welcomed all the participants and highlighted the importance of reflecting on the global agenda from Barcelona, a global city and a non-state capital that benefits from the work of CIDOB, founded 50 years ago by civil society representatives. Cities can bring a human dimension and help build bridges for peace through city diplomacy, responding to today's global calls for a new way of conceiving international relations, he said. Reminding us to "never cut ties between humans in conflicts", Barcelona should once again provide a platform for dialogue for peace in Europe and the Mediterranean. Javier Solana (President of EsadeGeo and Honorary Chairman of CIDOB) began by underlining that "the project of Europe is a project of peace", requiring it to go beyond mere geopolitics. Regarding relations with the United States, he said the upcoming US elections in November made it imperative for the EU to foster its own technological sector and to construct its defence in a way which is not like America's. He addressed the EU's own upcoming elections and the need to take decisive steps to prevent populism from gaining control of European institutions. Finally, Solana underlined the geopolitical importance of China for the EU. Reforming and enlarging the European Union for a new era The first panel, moderated by Cristina Gallach (Member of Global Women Leaders' Voices), followed CIDOB's report "The World in 2024: ten issues that will shape the international agenda", which defines the geopolitical situation in two words: ballots and bullets. Ms. Gallach proposed instead to discuss ballots and policies and underlined that, with expectations of a shift from the centre to the right in the upcoming elections, the EU has never faced a set of ballots which will have such a direct influence on its green, digital, reform and enlargement policies. This set the stage for an exchange of ideas on how democratic processes intersect with policy debates. Daniela Schwarzer (Member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Executive Board) highlighted that in the present geopolitical context, enlargement policy could be a tool to bring regional stability and security, as it was in the past, but a larger union of 35 member states, and voting based on unanimity, also carries the risk of weakening the EU's decision-making capacity. The EU will only emerge stronger from enlargement if it is paired with internal reforms addressing the question of qualified majority voting and the responsibilities of the European Commission. At the same time, differentiated integration and specific policies with rule of law conditionality – as was the case with the successful Next Generation EU funds – could provide ways to protect the fundamental principles of the EU. However, if it is to be credible in expecting candidate countries to fight corruption, the EU also needs to address its own internal challenges. Loukas Tsoukalis (President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP) remarked that while enlargement may be called "the most successful foreign policy of the EU" because it helps new members to become more stable and prosperous (as it did in the case of Spain and Greece), it is not a panacea that cures all ills (referring to the problems with the rule of law in countries such as Hungary and Poland). He noted that enlargement comes at a cost: more members in a system that works through consensus and unanimity risks becoming a model for dysfunctionality. Tsoukalis said that the current challenge for the EU is reform on two levels, namely institutional reform and funding, without which it will be impossible to address any enlargement successfully. How could the EU consider exporting pax europea when neither it itself is ready to introduce the required internal reforms and budget increases, nor are the proposed countries for enlargement ready to fulfil the criteria? Brigid Laffan (President of the European Policy Centre) highlighted how the EU has moved from a technocratic to an increasingly politicised union. She reflected on how the EU has matured as a political system through crises, especially since 2009, becoming more resilient, adaptable and flexible. Laffan also pointed to four challenges for the EU if it is to be ready for the next stage. First, she focused on heterogeneity among European countries in terms of democratic capacities, with Hungary constantly blackmailing the EU and threatening unity over EU support for Ukraine. Second, she outlined the risks related to the geopolitics of war, with the resurgence of conflict in the continent and in Gaza, making relations with the US and China more problematic. Third, the EU's enlargement towards weak, aid-dependent, democratically challenged states risks undermining EU policy-making capacity. Fourth, ahead of the next European elections Laffan observed the centre-right's fatal tendency to move further right. She concluded that it remains to be seen whether the EU has the capacity to rise to these challenges and noted that a more fitting motto for the EU today is not "unity in diversity" but Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" to continue to be a zone of peace and prosperity. The contributions from the three panellists were followed by a round of debate centring on the contradictions and challenges for the European integration and enlargement project, the need for a more consolidated budget, and the question of immigration. On the subject of European integration, some participants suggested the creation of subgroups within the EU where honest discussion among geopolitically aligned countries could take place, in addition to acknowledging the need for coalitions "of willing and able" within the EU, and the need for the EU to invest in relationships between member states and those with waiting-room status to smooth the candidates' transition processes. As far as funding was concerned, the need for greater financial resources was noted, and it was argued that the EU should avoid relying solely on national contributions (and therefore taxation) and instead explore alternative methods of funding (i.e. carbon taxes). Lastly, the issue of immigration triggered a huge discussion as a divisive topic within the European community that goes to the heart of European identity. There was a consensus that Europe will need migration and that more attention and resources should be allocated to integration. The issue of controlling immigration and borders was also raised during the discussion, as well as the conflation of immigration and diversity, pointing to the ethnic and religious diversity within European societies and warnings about political exploitation of migration by far-right parties. The EU in a new geopolitical context The second panel was moderated by Xavier Mas de Xaxàs (Diplomatic Correspondent of La Vanguardia). It aimed to elaborate on the needs and efficiency of EU external action when it comes to tackling the challenges of an increasingly complex geopolitical reality, with open conflicts in European territory and its neighbourhood, including in Ukraine and Gaza; competition between the US and China; rivalry with Russia; and necessary engagement with the so-called Global South. Jean-Marie Guéhenno (Director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution, Columbia University) warned of the consequences of the return of war in Europe. He reflected on how double standards in the EU's responses to the war in Ukraine and Gaza have undermined its soft power and global respect for the universality of European values. He emphasised the importance of legitimacy for the future of European integration, hence the need to preserve the identity and core values of the EU such as the rule of law, human dignity and solidarity. In his concluding remarks, he highlighted the urgency of reinforcing the EU's industrial capacity in defence and artificial intelligence to address the existing security challenges in Europe. Drawing on some of the points raised during the first panel, he also stressed the need for multi-speed integration, especially in security and defence, and increasing financial resources for AI, research and development and technology. Natalie Nougayrède (Member of the Council, European Council on Foreign Relations) focused her contribution on the importance of putting people at the centre of geopolitics, and the objective of democratisation for a peaceful Europe. Through the examples of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Maidan revolution, and the ongoing popular resistance to Russia's invasion, she reflected on how Ukrainians have shaped geopolitics, arguing that geopolitics can also be made by people. Similarly, Nougayrède saw the empowerment of Russia's civil society and the reinforcement of democratic institutions in Russia as a necessary step towards the end of the Ukraine war. The latter, she argued, is indeed a direct result of the autocratic power system that Putin has built in Russia, for which the EU needs to think of a different Russia if peace is to be restored in the continent. Wang Huiyao (Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, CCG), began by saying that it is vital for the EU (and the rest of the world) to play a bigger role to prevent the scenario of "lose-lose" geopolitics. In the face of the uncertainty that comes with the prospect of a victory for Trump, he emphasised the importance of more strategic autonomy, noting that, as one of the world's great powers, China can act as a stabilising force in peace-making, global governance and the economy. He called for a trust-building process between major powers in global politics and a real and efficient multilateral system that reflects the current multipolar world. Given we all live on the same planet and face common threats, and therefore cannot afford to be rivals, Huiyao proposed working together on projects like climate change, the economy, green development, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway to tackle huge infrastructure deficits, while noting the need to rebuild Ukraine and Gaza. He also said that as China can mediate between Ukraine and Russia, the EU can do the same in US-China relations, making the EU, the United States and China work well as a trilateral relationship and making the world more stable. Maha Yahya (Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center) referred to the Gaza war as a game changer with direct implications for Europe. For too long, the conflict has been swept under the carpet, with an idea of peace and security in the region based on a process of normalisation. The blame game over who was responsible for the failure of the Oslo peace process and the negotiations for a ceasefire made the debate on a two-state solution unviable, while new settlements continued to be established. She also underlined the absence of leadership, not just in Israel (with its most far-right government for a long time) and the region as a whole, but also in the US and the EU, where leaderships are fragmented. While the European Commission takes a pragmatic approach, there is a lack of brainpower and political solutions in the European debate, noting that Borrell's appeals for peace will go unheeded for as long as the EU fails to send a clear, united message. Given the horrific humanitarian situation, Yahya criticised the EU's double standards in response to Ukraine and Gaza. She said that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is one leverage that European countries should use, either collectively or individually. Lastly, she noted that the perception in the region and the Global South is that the Gaza war is an incomplete decolonisation process. During the discussion with the audience, the following issues were raised: the possibility of a change of government in Israel; the necessity of reform for EU enlargement; Europe's dark colonial past and how it could engage differently with the Global South; whether it is in the interest of Europe to open negotiations with Russia; and how the green transition is impacted by war. In response, Jean-Marie Guéhenno stressed that, for a better relationship with the Global South, Europe will need a stronger stance on the Middle East, including recognising the Palestinian state. Wang Huiyao reaffirmed the importance of ending both wars, calling for a high-level peace summit. He then noted that although China was pushed towards Russia by the US, Henry Kissinger brokered US-China relations in the 1970s. Unfortunately, he added, there is "no Kissinger of the EU" now. Finally, Maha Yahya mentioned that there is no hope of an Israeli leadership change, therefore there is no significant window for peace talks. She mentioned some urgent necessities for the short term: a ceasefire, a firmer position from the EU; averting an invasion of Lebanon owing to the high risk of regional escalation; and the need to link the reconstruction of Gaza to a political track of the conflict. In his concluding remarks, Pol Morillas (Director of CIDOB) summarised the conference themes by highlighting the intersection between politics and geopolitics in both panel discussions. He concluded by stating that, while the EU has matured enough to hold discussions on critical issues such as migration, the far right or the environment, it is still in the process of defining how the challenge of enlargement and reform will be addressed to strengthen the EU in the future. By asking whether the EU is ready to do "whatever it takes" on issues like security and defence and the green and the technological transitions, he argued that the main challenge for the EU will be approaching these issues through political discussions rather than policies alone. Reflecting on the second panel, Morillas referred to the idea of geopolitics defining our identity, and the impact of people and private actors on the shaping of geopolitics, too. He noted the imperative to rebuild trust among citizens and within the global community and argued that "at a moment when politics is most needed for the challenges we are facing, geopolitics is preventing global politics from solving our shared global problems".

Publisher's version (útgefin grein) ; Background Achieving universal health coverage (UHC) involves all people receiving the health services they need, of high quality, without experiencing financial hardship. Making progress towards UHC is a policy priority for both countries and global institutions, as highlighted by the agenda of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and WHO's Thirteenth General Programme of Work (GPW13). Measuring effective coverage at the health-system level is important for understanding whether health services are aligned with countries' health profiles and are of sufficient quality to produce health gains for populations of all ages. Methods Based on the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2019, we assessed UHC effective coverage for 204 countries and territories from 1990 to 2019. Drawing from a measurement framework developed through WHO's GPW13 consultation, we mapped 23 effective coverage indicators to a matrix representing health service types (eg, promotion, prevention, and treatment) and five population-age groups spanning from reproductive and newborn to older adults (>= 65 years). Effective coverage indicators were based on intervention coverage or outcome-based measures such as mortality-to-incidence ratios to approximate access to quality care; outcome-based measures were transformed to values on a scale of 0-100 based on the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of location-year values. We constructed the UHC effective coverage index by weighting each effective coverage indicator relative to its associated potential health gains, as measured by disability-adjusted life-years for each location-year and population-age group. For three tests of validity (content, known-groups, and convergent), UHC effective coverage index performance was generally better than that of other UHC service coverage indices from WHO (ie, the current metric for SDG indicator 3.8.1 on UHC service coverage), the World Bank, and GBD 2017. We quantified frontiers of UHC effective coverage performance on the basis of pooled health spending per capita, representing UHC effective coverage index levels achieved in 2019 relative to country-level government health spending, prepaid private expenditures, and development assistance for health. To assess current trajectories towards the GPW13 UHC billion target-1 billion more people benefiting from UHC by 2023-we estimated additional population equivalents with UHC effective coverage from 2018 to 2023. Findings Globally, performance on the UHC effective coverage index improved from 45.8 (95% uncertainty interval 44.2-47.5) in 1990 to 60.3 (58.7-61.9) in 2019, yet country-level UHC effective coverage in 2019 still spanned from 95 or higher in Japan and Iceland to lower than 25 in Somalia and the Central African Republic. Since 2010, sub-Saharan Africa showed accelerated gains on the UHC effective coverage index (at an average increase of 2.6% [1.9-3.3] per year up to 2019); by contrast, most other GBD super-regions had slowed rates of progress in 2010-2019 relative to 1990-2010. Many countries showed lagging performance on effective coverage indicators for non-communicable diseases relative to those for communicable diseases and maternal and child health, despite non-communicable diseases accounting for a greater proportion of potential health gains in 2019, suggesting that many health systems are not keeping pace with the rising non-communicable disease burden and associated population health needs. In 2019, the UHC effective coverage index was associated with pooled health spending per capita (r=0.79), although countries across the development spectrum had much lower UHC effective coverage than is potentially achievable relative to their health spending. Under maximum efficiency of translating health spending into UHC effective coverage performance, countries would need to reach $1398 pooled health spending per capita (US$ adjusted for purchasing power parity) in order to achieve 80 on the UHC effective coverage index. From 2018 to 2023, an estimated 388.9 million (358.6-421.3) more population equivalents would have UHC effective coverage, falling well short of the GPW13 target of 1 billion more people benefiting from UHC during this time. Current projections point to an estimated 3.1 billion (3.0-3.2) population equivalents still lacking UHC effective coverage in 2023, with nearly a third (968.1 million [903.5-1040.3]) residing in south Asia. Interpretation The present study demonstrates the utility of measuring effective coverage and its role in supporting improved health outcomes for all people-the ultimate goal of UHC and its achievement. Global ambitions to accelerate progress on UHC service coverage are increasingly unlikely unless concerted action on non-communicable diseases occurs and countries can better translate health spending into improved performance. Focusing on effective coverage and accounting for the world's evolving health needs lays the groundwork for better understanding how close-or how far-all populations are in benefiting from UHC. ; Lucas Guimaraes Abreu acknowledges support from Coordenacao de Aperfeicoamento de Pessoal de Nivel Superior -Brasil (Capes) -Finance Code 001, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico (CNPq) and Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais (FAPEMIG). Olatunji O Adetokunboh acknowledges South African Department of Science & Innovation, and National Research Foundation. Anurag Agrawal acknowledges support from the Wellcome Trust DBT India Alliance Senior Fellowship IA/CPHS/14/1/501489. Rufus Olusola Akinyemi acknowledges Grant U01HG010273 from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as part of the H3Africa Consortium. Rufus Olusola Akinyemi is further supported by the FLAIR fellowship funded by the UK Royal Society and the African Academy of Sciences. Syed Mohamed Aljunid acknowledges the Department of Health Policy and Management, Faculty of Public Health, Kuwait University and International Centre for Casemix and Clinical Coding, Faculty of Medicine, National University of Malaysia for the approval and support to participate in this research project. Marcel Ausloos, Claudiu Herteliu, and Adrian Pana acknowledge partial support by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNDSUEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P4-ID-PCCF-2016-0084. Till Winfried Barnighausen acknowledges support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation through the Alexander von Humboldt Professor award, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Juan J Carrero was supported by the Swedish Research Council (2019-01059). Felix Carvalho acknowledges UID/MULTI/04378/2019 and UID/QUI/50006/2019 support with funding from FCT/MCTES through national funds. Vera Marisa Costa acknowledges support from grant (SFRH/BHD/110001/2015), received by Portuguese national funds through Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia (FCT), IP, under the Norma TransitA3ria DL57/2016/CP1334/CT0006. Jan-Walter De Neve acknowledges support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Kebede Deribe acknowledges support by Wellcome Trust grant number 201900/Z/16/Z as part of his International Intermediate Fellowship. Claudiu Herteliu acknowledges partial support by a grant co-funded by European Fund for Regional Development through Operational Program for Competitiveness, Project ID P_40_382. Praveen Hoogar acknowledges the Centre for Bio Cultural Studies (CBiCS), Manipal Academy of Higher Education(MAHE), Manipal and Centre for Holistic Development and Research (CHDR), Kalghatgi. Bing-Fang Hwang acknowledges support from China Medical University (CMU108-MF-95), Taichung, Taiwan. Mihajlo Jakovljevic acknowledges the Serbian part of this GBD contribution was co-funded through the Grant OI175014 of the Ministry of Education Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. Aruna M Kamath acknowledges funding from the National Institutes of Health T32 grant (T32GM086270). Srinivasa Vittal Katikireddi acknowledges funding from the Medical Research Council (MC_UU_12017/13 & MC_UU_12017/15), Scottish Government Chief Scientist Office (SPHSU13 & SPHSU15) and an NRS Senior Clinical Fellowship (SCAF/15/02). Yun Jin Kim acknowledges support from the Research Management Centre, Xiamen University Malaysia (XMUMRF/2018-C2/ITCM/0001). Kewal Krishan acknowledges support from the DST PURSE grant and UGC Center of Advanced Study (CAS II) awarded to the Department of Anthropology, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India. Manasi Kumar acknowledges support from K43 TW010716 Fogarty International Center/NIMH. Ben Lacey acknowledges support from the NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre and the BHF Centre of Research Excellence, Oxford. Ivan Landires is a member of the Sistema Nacional de InvestigaciA3n (SNI), which is supported by the Secretaria Nacional de Ciencia Tecnologia e Innovacion (SENACYT), Panama. Jeffrey V Lazarus acknowledges support by a Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities Miguel Servet grant (Instituto de Salud Carlos III/ESF, European Union [CP18/00074]). Peter T N Memiah acknowledges CODESRIA; HISTP. Subas Neupane acknowledges partial support from the Competitive State Research Financing of the Expert Responsibility area of Tampere University Hospital. Shuhei Nomura acknowledges support from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology of Japan (18K10082). Alberto Ortiz acknowledges support by ISCIII PI19/00815, DTS18/00032, ISCIII-RETIC REDinREN RD016/0009 Fondos FEDER, FRIAT, Comunidad de Madrid B2017/BMD-3686 CIFRA2-CM. These funding sources had no role in the writing of the manuscript or the decision to submit it for publication. George C Patton acknowledges support from a National Health & Medical Research Council Fellowship. Marina Pinheiro acknowledges support from FCT for funding through program DL 57/2016 -Norma transitA3ria. Alberto Raggi, David Sattin, and Silvia Schiavolin acknowledge support by a grant from the Italian Ministry of Health (Ricerca Corrente, Fondazione Istituto Neurologico C Besta, Linea 4 -Outcome Research: dagli Indicatori alle Raccomandazioni Cliniche). Daniel Cury Ribeiro acknowledges support from the Sir Charles Hercus Health Research Fellowship -Health Research Council of New Zealand (18/111). Perminder S Sachdev acknowledges funding from the NHMRC Australia. Abdallah M Samy acknowledges support from a fellowship from the Egyptian Fulbright Mission Program. Milena M Santric-Milicevic acknowledges support from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia (Contract No. 175087). Rodrigo Sarmiento-Suarez acknowledges institutional support from University of Applied and Environmental Sciences in Bogota, Colombia, and Carlos III Institute of Health in Madrid, Spain. Maria Ines Schmidt acknowledges grants from the Foundation for the Support of Research of the State of Rio Grande do Sul (IATS and PrInt) and the Brazilian Ministry of Health. Sheikh Mohammed Shariful Islam acknowledges a fellowship from the National Heart Foundation of Australia and Deakin University. Aziz Sheikh acknowledges support from Health Data Research UK. Kenji Shibuya acknowledges Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Joan B Soriano acknowledges support by Centro de Investigacion en Red de Enfermedades Respiratorias (CIBERES), Instituto de Salud Carlos III (ISCIII), Madrid, Spain. Rafael Tabares-Seisdedos acknowledges partial support from grant PI17/00719 from ISCIII-FEDER. Santosh Kumar Tadakamadla acknowledges support from the National Health and Medical Research Council Early Career Fellowship, Australia. Marcello Tonelli acknowledges the David Freeze Chair in Health Services Research at the University of Calgary, AB, Canada. ; "Peer Reviewed"

The political situation witnessed in Madagascar since the beginning of this year has resulted in major changes in the daily lives of the Malagasy. Besides instability and increased uncertainty, the population is facing more imminent challenges: increasing unemployment, exploding staple food prices, a shortage in basic food supplies, and a closure of schools, universities and financial institutions. How will Madagascar be affected in the near and long term? This remains unknown, however, it is highly probable that the current situation will negatively affect all levels of Malagasy society. These impacts are likely to be longer lasting and more far - reaching than currently anticipated. In this issue, Doreen Robinson from USAID is presenting three ecological concepts in her foreword "A changing Madagascar": connectedness, resiliency and reconciliation. These are consistent with Buzz Holling's theory of adaptive cycling. Imagine Madagascar is traveling on a trajectory in the form of a figure of eight laid on its side attached to this text, or an infinity symbol in 3 - D. On the front loop (the right side in the figure) there is the 'K'-phase where a system, such as a forest or society, is becoming increasingly established and conservative and reaches a point of 'over'-stability, which risks becoming too rigid. With low resilience, it becomes increasingly prone to external forces. If such forces succeed to cause the system to collapse and chaos prevails in the 'Ω'-phase, the result is the release of the old system and its energy. This release, however, can trigger a new beginning. In the 'α'- phase of reorganization and renewal, a new system emerges. In the 'r'-phase swift exploitation and growth are occurring and the more time passes, the more the processes slow and the conservative 'K'-phase approaches. During this growth period, several processes are simultaneously at work. The potential for novelty, innovation and wealth increases, as does the connectedness and reconciliation of the system components. Meanwhile, the overall resiliency of the system decreases, that is, the system becomes rigid once more. There are rumors that the current political turmoil has been curbed by a 'land deal' with a South Korean company. In a country like Madagascar, where traditional land - use and strong beliefs in ancestry are prevalent, such news might have caused a cultural shock and a resultant backlash. However, as discussed in an essay by Geoffrey York from the International Food Policy and Research Institute in March 2009, claims to land in developing countries by developed countries might become more common in the near future as they face ever - dwindling land area coupled with increased demands for resources. For governments of developing countries, with an abundance of cheap land, they might find quick 'land-deals' simply too tempting. The same can be said for resources below ground. Natural resources are shifting ever more to the center of attention, and as Johny Rabenantoandro from QMM/RioTinto aptly emphasises in the other foreword of this issue, we need to start appreciating the richness of biodiversity and safeguarding it for the future in order for our children to enjoy it. Pertinent questions arise in this context: how will we deal with social, environmental and economic changes; how can changes in resource availability, or in demand for such resources, be absorbed by our existing ecological and societal systems without precipitating collapse? Our questioning of the fate of Madagascar's future does not end here. Fortunately, we are presented with the opportunity in this issue to make contributions that can explore these very questions. In the newly introduced journal section SPOTLIGHTS, Jeffrey Sayer (IUCN) argues for the landscape mosaic as the solution to reconcile conservation and development. In another contribution, William McConnell from Michigan State University reviews modeling human agency. Modeling is an emergent topic in Madagascar as it is elsewhere, and it can be a helpful tool to gain a greater understanding of land - use patterns, which is pertinent to the study of livelihoods and other socially-based research. Another contribution draws on interview-based research to understand the livelihood needs of fishermen and rice cultivators of the Alaotra marshes. How can the conservation of biodiversity and livelihood needs be balanced? How can rare and endangered species and their ecosystems be protected without compromising people's basic needs to survive? To answer such pressing questions, we need to substantially expand our knowledge base by gaining more insight into the ecological systems within which conservation and development exist. The authors of two other contributions on lemurs and birds help to expand such a knowledge base. In summary, although these times of change and upheaval are overturning seemingly stable systems, there is also hope that the release of energy we are currently experiencing in Madagascar will develop into a 'Holling's loop' where new opportunities can be formed. We should take this momentum to free even more energy and funnel it into research, so we can enlarge our knowledge base, increase our understanding of the interconnected systems and enforce our resilience in order better to adapt our readiness to future changes. For the only certainty we have for Madagascar's future is change.Seule certitude à Madagascar : le changement Depuis le début de l'année, nous sommes témoins d'une crise politique à Madagascar qui a profondément changé le quotidien de bon nombre de gens. En plus de l'insécurité et de l'instabilité, la population se retrouve à faire face à de nouvelles situations avec une augmentation du chômage, l'explosion des prix des produits de première nécessité, des pénuries dans les approvisionnements, la fermeture d'écoles, d'universités ou d'institutions financières. Pour l'avenir, on peut se demander dans quelle mesure Madagascar resterait affectée par ces événements mais sans rentrer dans une polémique ni nous lancer dans des pronostiques, il semble vraisemblable que l'ensemble de la société malgache sera touchée et dans des proportions plus graves que ce qu'on pourrait imaginer. Dans ce numéro, Doreen Robinson de l'USAID présente trois concepts écologiques dans sa préface « Réflexions sur Madagascar, pays en évolution » qui sont la connexité (ou connectance), la résilience et le rapprochement. Ces termes sont empruntés au cycle adaptatif de Buzz Holling. Imaginez Madagascar se déplaçant sur une trajectoire en forme de huit couché ou représenté par le symbole de l'infini dans l'espace. Sur la boucle du premier plan (à droite sur le dessin) nous avons une phase K au cours de laquelle un système, qui peut être une forêt ou une société, se stabilise, s'établit et en devient conservateur jusqu'à atteindre un point où il est tellement stable qu'il en devient rigide. Avec une faible résilience, un tel système devient vulnérable face à des perturbations extérieures et si de telles perturbations devaient s'appliquer et entraîner l'effondrement du système, on rentrerait dans une phase 'Ω' avec une libération de l'ancien système et de son énergie. Cette libération peut cependant déclencher un renouvellement, dans la phase 'α ' de réorganisation et de renouveau, un nouveau système émerge. On assiste dans la phase 'r' à une croissance et une exploitation rapides et plus le temps passe et plus le système ralentit pour se rapprocher de la phase 'K'. Au cours de cette période de croissance, on assiste à plusieurs processus qui ont cours en même temps avec un accroissement des changements, des innovations et de la prospérité en même temps que les composantes du système gagnent en connexité et en rapprochement. Simultanément, la résilience globale du système baisse de sorte que le système devient rigide, une fois de plus. Certains disent que le contrat de cession de terres à une compagnie sud - coréenne aurait déclenché la crise politique de 2009. Dans un pays tel que Madagascar où l'utilisation traditionnelle des terres et l'attachement aux ancêtres est de règle, de telles annonces pourraient déclencher un choc culturel et un retour de manivelle. Cependant, comme le disait Geoffrey York de l'International Food Policy and Research Institute dans un essai publié en mars 2009, les revendications de terres dans les pays en voie de développement par les pays développés pourraient devenir monnaie courante dans un proche avenir car les terres disponibles sont à la baisse en même temps que la demande pour les ressources augmentent. Et quand on sait que le Sud disposent d'une abondance de terres que le Nord pourrait considérer comme étant à bon marché, les pays en voie de développement pourraient facilement se laisser tenter par des cessions rapides de terres et il en va également ainsi des ressources souterraines. Les ressources naturelles sont de plus en plus souvent au centre des intérêts et comme le souligne à propos Johny Rabenantoandro de QMM/RioTinto dans l'autre préface de ce numéro, il nous faut commencer par apprécier la richesse de la biodiversité et la sauvegarder pour l'avenir de nos enfants. D ès lors, on peut se poser des questions pertinentes sur la façon d'appréhender les changements sociaux, environnementaux et économiques, ou encore sur les moyens qu'ont les systèmes écologiques et sociaux d'encaisser les variations en matière de disponibilité et de demande de ressources sans qu'ils ne s'effondrent. Nos questions sur l'avenir de Madagascar ne trouveront pas un terme ici, car nous avons la chance de vous présenter dans ce numéro des contributions qui abordent justement ces thèmes. Dans la nouvelle rubrique SPOTLIGHTS, Jeffrey Sayer (IUCN) nous éclaire sur des concepts qu'il connaît bien et défend les mosaïques de paysages pour réconcilier la protection de la nature et le développement. Dans une autre contribution, William McConnell de la Michigan State University nous propose une revue de la modélisation de l'influence humaine. La modélisation est un sujet émergeant à Madagascar comme ailleurs et peut s'avérer être un outil utile pour mieux comprendre certains schémas d'occupation des terres comme dans les études portant sur les moyens de subsistance ou d'autres recherches sur des questions sociales. Une autre contribution est basée sur des enquêtes menées auprès des pêcheurs et riziculteurs des marais de l'Alaotra afin d'appréhender leurs conditions de vie et leurs besoins. Et nous nous posons tous les mêmes questions : comment concilier protection de la biodiversité et conditions de vie de l'humanité ? Comment protéger les espèces rares ou menacées et leurs écosystèmes sans compromettre les besoins vitaux des gens ? Pour répondre à ce genre de questions, il nous faut absolument étendre nos connaissances de base pour mieux comprendre les systèmes écologiques au sein desquels on retrouve la protection de la nature et le développement. Les auteurs de deux autres contributions portant sur les lémuriens et sur les oiseaux apportent leur pierre à cet édifice de connaissances. En résumé, bien que ces périodes de changement et de bouleversement retournent des systèmes apparemment stables, il existe également l'espoir que la libération de l'énergie à laquelle nous assistons actuellement à Madagascar se soldera par une « boucle de Holling » avec de nouvelles occasions à saisir. Nous devrions profiter de cet élan pour libérer encore plus d'énergie et la concentrer dans la recherche pour que nous puissions étendre nos connaissances de base, mieux comprendre les connexions des systèmes et renforcer notre résilience pour nous adapter plus rapidement aux futurs changements. Car la seule certitude que nous ayons pour le futur de Madagascar est le changement.