Suchergebnisse

Issue 4.2 of the Review for Religious, 1945. ; ,~Befora wrlt[~9 to ~s~° pl:~'se'co~sult noilce ~a Inside. back ~ove,. VOLUME IV / MARCH"i'5. 1945 ¯ ,, + " " l~ItJMbl~l~,2 , CONTENTS, +, ., , SECOND YEAR OF NOVI:FIA'~E" Adam~C: Ellis, +g.J -. .-. 73,, BOiDKLETS . ? . ° . . .,\. HOLY COMMUNIO~ AND SPIRITUAL .~ROGRES~-- " ~- , Clarence McAuliffe; S.2 . ~. . . .- ,-'OUR CO~qT~IBUTORS + ' ' ' " ILL-HEALTH AND THE APOSTOLIC VOCATION~A Missionary" ~THREE PREVENTI'#ES OF, "EXHAUSTION"~ ' ' BOO~S,~i~CEIVED . . ~. ,, .' ' " ' ' . . ,10, THE FAST BEFORE COMMUNION--Gerald Kelly,~ S.J. .~. . .j :l o# L~+'DECISIONS OF ,THE HOLY SEE o. . 122 BOOKREVIEWS (Edited by Clement DeMnth, S.J.)-- '-+- TJ~e Man NeareSt to ChriSt: ~A Herolne~of the Mission Field:,~niroductio . : ~ in Codicerfi: A Prefad'e to Ne,wman's Theology; War'is My Parish; Secrets , . ' ." 124~"~ of ghe Saints: Our Lad, y of Fauma '. , ,.~,, . COMMUNICATIONS ;' . . ' ; . -+. ; . .'+I~0 QUESTIONS AND' ANSWERS-- " '" Absences froXm the Novitiate: ,General+Pei'missions to Spend Small Sfims:' . +Soliciting Votes at General Chapter: Meaning 6f the Perio,dic "General r +Abso ut on":~ Use'+of Old Albs ahd ~eligious Habits: Plenary 'Indu"lge~ce . ~n articulo morris and thd_He~oic Acf; Plenary Indulgence~for.~Communion of Reparation: Nbvitia~e.+at Ordinary House and NoviCes at Community Recreation: Power to Ex't~ndoTime °of Novitiate;'Per'mission for Reli-gious to Donate Blood: Renewal,of Altar Breads: Banner b~fore Blessed, ~5" S,acrament, during Office: Oinission of Sign 'of Cross during the PassiOn; Right"to Admit Can, didate.s . " . ¯ " . ' " " i~ . ~ 136 SUMMER S~HOOL 'DIRECTORY O" --" " " " ~,~'-- ' '~; " " "" EX'PLANA:FI.ON OF THE MASS . " 14'4 ~'MARYKNOLL MISSION LETTERS . ' .- A 144 REVIEW FOR°REI~IGIOUS, Mar~h. 1945". Vol.°IV, No. 2. Publis~'ed +.+~n°ntb] y ; .~January'o March,. , May, July,. Sel~tember;and November, at"~he College.,,, +press,, '606 H;~rnson Street, T, opeka, Kansas,. by St. Mary s College, St. Marys, Kansas; with ecclesmsttcal, approba~t ¯i o- n , E n t ,e- r e d a s s e c o n d c ,lass matter ,January 15 1942o+ at thePost Of~ce~ Topeka,~Kansasi under'the act of March 3, 1879. ¯ '- ~ 'Editofialfl3oard: Adam C. Ellis, S~. G. Augustine Ellard. S.3. Gel:~ld¢K~ll~,, S.3. Editorial Secretary: Alfred F. SchnetderJ S.J. . C6pyright. 1'945. by Adam C. ,Elli,s. Permission' is hereby granted fo~ quotati~nS '~of reasonable~ length, provided due~ credit be giyen this rewew and .tile ,au'thdr. Subscriptioii pric~: 2 dollars a year. ,~, ' Prifited in'U.- Second- Year of Novi :iat:e Adam C. Ellis, S.J: ,7T H| "EE mFRpEirNe,C aHnd R oet~hoelru p'toil0inti,c 3aol sthepehoir~iems iinni mthiec Aalu tsot rtihaen Church had all but ~estroyed the .religious life in: ~ Europe by the end of the eightdenth century. V.ery many,, monasteries and convents had either been Suppresse'd or were, f6rbidd~n to take novices. As a restilt ¯many" b~n~fi~ent labors~of the religious, in behalf Of the social needs 6f the:J "Church ~ere brought to a standstill. BU~ it was imperative that these spiritual and corporal.~works of mercy should hot'be abandoned altogether. Divine Providence inspired dd~'oted laymen and women to step into the-breach~ ~ to.take.up the task of teaching Christia_n Do~.r.rine ~to chil- ~dren, and of caril~g for the sick, .th~ aged, and the orphans. - Eventual.ly th~se zealousla~borers ,bhnded tbgether into .~,~smallgrout~s in order to work together more efficiently.; then-they began to live toge'ther in community,'and with ¯ the-permission of their local Ordinary they took simple, private vows and wore a common garb. Recognized offi-cially neither by Church nor State, the.y carried on their work valiantly. Eventually the Church rewarded thei~o °o zealous efforts. At first approval was given only 'to" their "constitutionsi but, especially during the second half~ of the nir;eteenth century,,, the Holy See .appro.ved the institutes .themselves as congregations with simple vows. Many of the founders of these modern congregations o realize'd that men.~and women whose vocation it was to-strive for perfection, in the active life needed a longer period " of' ptobation than the single year of novitiate commgnly ~-,,prescribed for cloistered religious. Hence these founders.~ ordained that all c.andidates undergo a second year of novi-. , 73~ ADAM C. ELLIS -.tiate~before the "firs~ Reoieto for R~ligiou.s profession+ of vows.° Furthermore, - some provided in their constitutions that the noviCesshould b~ employed in the external works of the congregatiffn during their second year. "This was done to determine whether they were fitted for this kind of work, and to give them opportunity to adjust their spiritua! life to the dis-tractions and trials+of the actiye apostolate. The Sacred Congregation of Religious consistently-refused to permit novices to be so employed during,the first year of nov.itiate.~ This practice of the S. Congregatt0n passed into the legislation of the NOrrnae of /901. 'After . stating in Art. 73 tfiat novices were n~t to be engaged in the ¯ study of the arts and sciences nor in theeexternal work of the institute, Art. 7"4 continued as follows: "Where there are tyro years of novitiate,the first is to follow all the i~r~- scriptio, ns laid down above for the one (canonical) year. During the second year, howe('er, the novices may engage moderately in studies or in other works of the institute ¯ always under the direction and vigilance of the master; this is to be done in the novitiate house itself, but" not outside of it, unless-grave, reasons advi~e otherwise." - The Code of-Canon Law was promulgated on.Pente-- cost.Sunday, May 27, 1917,, and.began t6 bind on Pen-tecost Sunday,. May 19, 1918. ~ Since the l~gi_slation of the Code sut~'erseded .the old Noi'rnae, upon which most of the cons~titutions of modern congregations were based, it became necessary for all religious institutes ~o revise their constitutions .in order (o bring ~hem into con-" ?;forniity with the Code. Superiors, therefore, were inter-i~ sti~d to find out what theCode had to say in regard t6 the second year of novitiate. They fo'ufid very little. 'Canon 5.55,"§ 2 allo~ed a second year df nowt~ate tf the+constitu-tions prescribed it,- but stated that this second year was not required for the validity of the subseqUent profi~ssi6n of 74 - w.hich were eventually-.sent tothe :Congregation of Reli-,. giou~ fora solution.Since canon 565, § 3-forbade n6vices _to engage in studies or in the. external' Works'of the institut~ "::during the year of novitia'te," did the s~im~ prohibition apply also'to the second year? Again, some congregatidns that employed, novices in external work, as was permitted' .![ b}'~ their, constitutions, preferre,d t6 do this during "the firs.t "~°~' year (as a means-dr trying out th,e:no~rices), and then~ to- ~ devote the Second ~ear exclusively to their spiritual f0rma/ ~ ., tion. Was this permitted under the new Cod~? -Such ";questi0ns,land others similar to-them, ~ind the fact that ~, various .provisions .concerning this rhatter.were found in many constitutions which had been revised according to the Code and submifted to the Itoly See for approval ~ill induced }he Congregation of Rdigious to make a careful 0 study of the subjgct. This study resulted in the "Instruc- [ion on the Second Year of Novitiate'" in .which all~ such 0_. questio~s~ gre. ~nswered and the fundamental :prinCiples-- which governed the pr.acticeof the Church during the.past ninety years are brought to the attention of all superiors of ~instit'utes having, two years of novitiate, . " There are fdur cardinfil points.in the instruction,~ ¯ Let us~consider each one in turn, I,. SpiritaalTormation of the Nboice is thO Principal ~ Purpose of the Second" Year. " -, "It is qui'te right that a i~ovitiate of more than one yearo~ be prescribed in. some institutes, especiz[lly, among those. '~Whose members ~are emp~loyed in external works, since they, distracted by various cares and more exposed ~o the dangers ~For thcr. tegt of "this Instruction see pp. 122-1.23 of this- issue. ~ Mar~b, 1945 " SECOND YEXR OF NOQI'rlAT[~ - ~ 'thereby serve You-in serving them for the mission. I was "~ " d~sconsolate at the thought that I'had"lost my work in the. mission and~had been given none in the province: ai~d al~l, the~while Your loving mercy was gig, ing me a-~hr~e~f01~t work, TO. YOU, IN MY FELLOW RELIGIOUS,. FOR° .~ December 1,Sth. It ~toesn't matter what I do if-I~-do .~ ~. God's will, if I: obey,-if [ love. God w~nts not my:~vork, ~ but. my love. ~o - . December 20.th. There is NO VACATION for ~a.'., " religic~us. Is no work ass{gned'or°allowed? Then must ,~' ¯ ~l.eisure be used to work the ~arder at becoming a saint, oat ~ ~. .- loving God more, at intercedifig and atoning more for souls~ ~ December 29th. -A ciborium full of hosts was conse- -, ~ated at Mass and then ,pushed ,back to the co~ner 6f the :~. /. corporal so 'that.it would not interfere with the l~Ias~s beingsaid. I waiat to be like that ciborium. Even though ; :'~ I am not a~llowed to return to the mission or am not givdn- " " ~" "~ ' work elsewhere, I wa~t to~do God's holy .will quietly and. entirely a'nd unostentatiously like that.citmfium-~-not hin~- derin~g .the great work of lorethat others'are carrying.on, ~- - and yet keeping Jesus all the while in my heait, read,r to ~.7" impart Him~without losing Him~to the souls, whoeve~ and wherever they be,to which "the servants of our Lord, .my'superi°rs, may. take me. . . \ Three Preventives" "' ot: "l xhausfioh" -. G. Augustine Ellard, S:J. ~, ~ ECENTLY it was announced that l~sychiat/isti i~n th~ United. States-ArmY have discovered threeLfactors, which tend to prevent "exhaustion" or "combat: :fatigue,".,that is,~a~bndition of certain soldiers who with~" Out being wounde~lbr, diseased.bave become more: or lels, iinfit to continue fi~hting, They may have fought long and ourageously: :but now, though apparently physicall_y well, they feel incapable of doing more; they are "exhaustedT'. too grdatly_ fat.igued to go on. The three preventives are: ~-edprit de corps, gooffleadership, and~reasons for fighting2 ,, ~Ivappears not unlikely that among- religious there may sometimes be an amilogous condition of "exhaustion," "and that it may be avoided by. the same three means. The first pre~;entive is esprit de corp.s. Amon~ Ameri-can~ service units its character and efficacy, are best illustrated _~.perhaps by the Marines. A Marine ~is taught f~om the beginning to feel that he is in thd greatest fighting group in all the world. ~Hence the~re is every reason why he should have the ti'tmost confidence in all his t~eilow Marines,' and why. he in turn must measure up to their exp,ectations. The ~Mdrines' records ar~ most glorious:, they must not be allowed to be'stained with ~nything that would dim their ~ luster.0 Everybody, atleast everybody in the American ~world, expectsofily what is most excellent~and heroic"from the Marines: he mu~f not disappoint.them. The'importance ~ of esprit.de co.rps is recognized by the Aimy and Nawy to be _so gregt that they are careful to f~reserve the distinctive "ide~nti~y and"historical ;ontinuit.y, with all their ~raditions ~> " - '- G,~ "AuG~-STINE EELAR~ ~ ¯ ; " Reoied) fo~ Relioious," aitd glories, of each s~parat'e u.n.i~ or division.--.The "~ight- -ingoSixty-hinth'' would be another ~xample of a. gtou_p in the American/~rmy that is.noted for its esprit de dorps. - ,.Religious orders and cbngregations also have their own esprif db corps., ' Sometimes it leads 'them intb faults,, for example, corporate pride or envy. But that is n6reason why it should not be cultivated f0r the good th~it is in it." A teligious:naturally and rightly tikes a cett~iin pride "in belonging to his 6rder-=-otherwise why did he-join it?-- an-d if h~ shoul~l 'feel~ deeply' and tritimatelywith regard to it: What is. meant by .noblesse oblige; that ~sense could be powerful aidto, livin_g up.t.o tile ideals andtoattaining t,ile ::purpose~ of the o~der'. 'The.laistok~r.'andtraditions of the institiate can be'a perennial f6untainhead of .inspiration arid courage: Its professed aims are a standing.challenge a~nd stirhulation to renewed or greater,.exertion. The examples of the founder arid of distinguished member~ are a~ constant _ invit~tioh to.emulate them, and'a clear prbof of what mem-bers o{ the organization, can achieve-.:' One feels that it" Would be a sil~me not to give a good account oYoneself in Suchcompany or t9 disappoint their hopes. The laurels

The relevance of the study has two sides — individual and general. In its essential aspect, it is the development of achievements of predecessors by consistently taking into account the latest data on trends and changes in the interconnected spheres of education, economics and culture. In the individual aspect, it is about improving the professional means of improving the efficiency of teaching foreign languages in order to form students with a high level of linguistic-professional competence. Public relevance is the goal of educating young people in a new patriotic direction, because today, due to various global influences, the classical principles of life in the agrarian system (in which Ukrainians have a good national heritage), created in recent centuries, or in the industrial society, are devalued due to various global influences.The purpose of the study in a broad sense was to highlight the causes and consequences of the European religious Reformation as the main factor in accelerating the movement of the whole of Western Europe to the position of the world leader that previously belonged to China. We see precise tasks in the integrated analysis on the basis of the latest discoveries of many humanities and exact sciences in the educational, economic and cultural systems of Germany and other successful European states. On this basis, we hope to fulfill the public task which is to make significant proposals in the plans and practice of higher education reform in Ukraine. The methodology of the study relies on the best classical means, on the principle of historicism and the continuity of the connection between the material and the ideal, a modern multidisciplinary approach. For the highest effectiveness of the research, we will use the latest scientific data and recommendations of the innovators who collect and use these data. The results of the study mostly follow from the mentioned new discoveries. They testify that in ancientt history, in the role of locomotives of civilizational progress in the western part of Eurasia, direct descendants of the inventors of agriculture acted, among which the especially great contribution (domestication of the horse, the invention of the wheel and the efficient metallurgy of copper) belongs to the ancestors of Ukrainians from the territories of Trypillya and the Great Trypillya. It is indicated that during the existence of the Great Trypillya, future German farmers acquainted themselves with the technologies of the Great Trypillya, so the German language, through borrowed words, became part of the Indo-European family. It is noted that after the collapse of the Great Trypillya, the Germans and Slavs became neighbors along the meridian Elbe. In the age of steppe invasions, future Ukrainians and Germanic tribes did not get in contact, and the influence of the Roman Empire was mostly experienced by western lands. Emphasis was placed on the evolution of ideological, religious and other paradigms in the territory of Germany after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, which determined the development of the nation for the next hundreds of years. The religious and philosophical paradigmatic origins of those unique features of culture and education that during the nineteenth century were emphasized. brought Germany to the position of the scientific and technological leader of the world. The high role of German neo-humanism and the Berlin Research University were noted. In the final section, special attention is paid to religious issues and to the destructive impact on social and other processes in the German immigration flows of Islamists. The conclusions focus on the competition of several important paradigms in the education of modern Germany and the proposals made to incorporate German experience in legislation and the use of the Bologna process. An important caution is made regarding the choice of Germany's strategy for the development of the scientific and educational complex 'within the framework of the Lisbon project (2000). This country has become a world leader not only in alternative energy, but also in the implementation of the fourth industrial revolution. We consider an example of this leadership like the regular world conferences in Davos, which involve the majority of influential politicians and economists (in particular, from Ukraine) ; Актуальность нашего исследования имеет две стороны - индивидуальную и общественную. В сущностном аспекте она заключается в развитии достижений ученых-предшественников через последовательный учет новейших данных о трендах и изменениях взаимосвязанных сфер образования, экономики и культуры. В индивидуальном аспекте речь идет о совершенствовании профессиональных средств повышения эффективности преподавания иностранных языков для формирования у студентов высокой культурно-профессиональной компетентности. Общественную актуальность составляет воспитание молодежи в новом патриотическом направлении, ведь настоящее через различные глобальные влияния обесценивает созданные в последние века классические основы жизнедеятельности в аграрном (здесь украинцы имеют хороший национальный наследству) или индустриальном обществе. Целью исследования в широком аспекте мы выбрали изучение причин и последствий европейской религиозной Реформации как главного фактора ускорения движения всей Западной Европы в положение мирового лидера, ранее принадлежавшее Китаю. Конкретные задачи мы видим в интегральном анализе на основе новейших открытий многих гуманитарных и точных наук событий в образовательных, экономических и культурных системах Германии и других успешных европейских государств. На этой основе мы надеемся выполнить общегражданскую задачу - внести весомые предложения в планы и практику реформ высшего образования Украины. Методология исследования опирается на лучшие классические средства, на принцип историзма и неразрывность связи материального и идеального, современный мультидисциплинарний подход. Для высшей результативности исследования воспользуемся новейшими научными данными и рекомендациями ученых-инноваторов, которые и накапливают эти данные и используют их. Результаты исследования, большей частью вытекают из указанных новейших открытий. Они свидетельствуют, что в долетописные времена в роли локомотивов цивилизационного прогресса в западной части Евразии выступали прямые потомки изобретателей земледелия, среди которых особенно большой вклад (одомашнивание лошади, изобретение колеса и эффективной металлургии меди) принадлежит предкам украинцев с территории Триполья и Большого Триполья. Указано, что уже во время существования Большого Триполья будущие немцы-земледельцы знакомились с технологиями Большого Триполья, поэтому немецкий язык через заимствованные слова вошел в состав индоевропейской семьи. Отмечено, что после распада Большого Триполья немцы и славяне стали соседями по меридиану Эльбы. В век степных нашествий будущие украинцы и германские племена контактировали мало, а влияние Римской империи испытали преимущественно западные земли. Сделан упор на эволюции мировоззренческих, религиозных и других парадигм на территории Германии после распада Священной Римской империи, которые определили развитие нации на следующие сотни лет. Подчеркнуто религиозные и философские парадигмальные истоки тех уникальных черт культуры и образования, которые в течение XIX в. вывели Германию на позицию научного и технологического лидера мира. Отмечена высокая роль немецкого неогуманизма и Берлинского исследовательского университета. В заключительной части особое внимание обращено на религиозные вопросы и на деструктивное влияние на социальные и другие процессы в Германии иммиграционных потоков исламистов. В выводах акцентировано внимание на конкуренцию нескольких важных парадигм в образовании современной Германии и сделаны предложения учета в Украине немецкого опыта в законодательстве и в использовании Болонского процесса. Сделано важное предостережение по выбору Германией стратегии развития научно-образовательного комплекса в рамках Лиссабонского проекта (2000 г.). Эта страна стала мировым лидером не только в альтернативной энергетике, но и в воплощении в жизнь четвертой промышленной революции. Примером этого лидерства мы считаем регулярные мировые конференции в Давосе, в которых принимают участие большинство влиятельных политиков и экономистов (в частности, и из Украины) ; Актуальність нашого дослідження має дві сторони – індивідуальну і загальносуспільну. В сутнісному аспекті воно полягає в розвитку досягнень науковців-попередників через послідовне врахування найновіших даних про тренди і зміни взаємопоєднаних сфер освіти, економіки та культури. В індивідуальному аспекті йдеться про вдосконалення фахових засобів підвищення ефективності викладання іноземних мов задля формування у студентів високої мовно-фахової компетентності. Загальносуспільну актуальність складає мета виховання молоді у новому патріотичному скеруванні, адже сьогодення через різноманітні глобальні впливи знецінює створені в останні століття класичні засади життєдіяльності в аграрному (тут українці мають хороший національний спадок) чи індустріальному суспільстві. Метою дослідження в широкому аспекті ми обрали вивчення причин і наслідків європейської релігійної Реформації як головного чинника прискорення руху всієї Західної Європи до становища світового лідера, що раніше належало Китаю. Конкретні завдання ми вбачаємо в інтегральному аналізі на основі найновіших відкриттів багатьох гуманітарних і точних наук подій в освітніх, економічних і культурних системах Німеччини та інших успішних європейських держав. На цій основі ми сподіваємося виконати загальносуспільне завдання – внести вагомі пропозиції в плани і практику реформ вищої освіти України. Методологія дослідження спирається на кращі класичні засоби, на принцип історизму і нерозривність зв'язку матеріального та ідеального, сучасний мультидисциплінарний підхід. Для вищої результативності дослідження скористаємося найновішими науковими даними і рекомендаціями науковців-інноваторів, які і накопичують ці дані, і використовують їх. Результати дослідження, більшою частиною випливають з вказаних новітніх відкриттів. Вони свідчать, що в долітописні часи у ролі локомотивів цивілізаційного прогресу у західній частині Євразії виступали прямі нащадки винахідників землеробства, серед яких особливо великий внесок (одомашнення коня, винахід колеса та ефективної металургії міді) належить пращурам українців з теренів Трипілля і Великого Трипілля. Вказано, що вже під час існування Великого Трипілля майбутні німці-землероби знайомилися з технологіями Великого Трипілля, тому німецька мова через запозичені слова увійшла у склад індоєвропейської сім'ї. Відзначено, що після розпаду Великого Трипілля німці і слов'яни стали сусідами по меридіану Ельби. У століття степових навал майбутні українці і німецькі племена контактували мало, а впливу Римської імперії зазнали переважно західні землі. Зроблено наголос на еволюції світоглядних, релігійних та інших парадигм на теренах Німеччини після розпаду Священної Римської імперії, які визначили розвиток нації на наступні сотні років. Підкреслено релігійні та філософські парадигмальні витоки тих унікальних рис культури та освіти, які впродовж ХІХ ст. вивели Німеччину на позицію наукового й технологічного лідера світу. Відзначена висока роль німецького неогуманізму і Берлінського дослідницького університету. У заключній частині особлива увага звернута на релігійні питання і на деструктивний вплив на соціальні та інші процеси в Німеччині імміграційних потоків ісламістів. У висновках акцентовано конкуренцію кількох важливих парадигм в освіті сучасної Німеччини і зроблені пропозиції врахування в Україні німецького досвіду у законодавстві та у використанні Болонського процесу. Зроблено важливе застереження щодо вибору Німеччиною стратегії розвитку науково-освітнього комплексу в рамках Лісабонського проекту (2000 р.). Ця країна стала світовим лідером не тільки в альтернативній енергетиці, а й у втіленні у життя четвертої промислової революції. Прикладом цього лідерства ми вважаємо регулярні світові конференції у Давосі, в яких беруть участь більшість впливових політиків та економістів (зокрема, і з України)

I. Objetivos 1) Analizar el cambio del papel social que ha sufrido el periodismo en las últimas décadas. 2) Describir la crisis del sector en sus principales dimensiones (de rentabilidad de las empresas periodísticas, de pérdida de audiencias, de reducción del volumen publicitario y su efectividad, de calidad de la información y de prestigio social) y comprobar su relación con el cambio del papel social del periodismo, para verificar que la crisis del periodismo actual y del negocio de la comunicación tiene su origen en las prácticas empresariales poco éticas, en la visión del periodismo como un negocio, en lugar de un servicio público. 3) Evaluar el papel que han desempeñado las nuevas tecnologías en esta crisis. 4) Prever las tendencias de la nueva realidad comunicativa. 5) Determinar el rol y responsabilidad de los periodistas en el proceso de cambio del periodismo, su pérdida de autonomía y de influencia en las informaciones publicadas. 6) Evaluar la alienación informativa de la audiencia, así como su capacidad de autodeterminación frente a los mensajes informativos y el protagonismo que la reacción de las audiencias (su fraccionamiento o el periodismo 3.0) puede haber tenido en la crisis estructural del negocio informativo. 7) Investigar qué nuevos problemas éticos ha generado el proceso de transformación del periodismo y la crisis informativa. 8) Establecer qué propuestas en el campo de la ética pueden permitir una recuperación de la dimensión político-social de la información para contribuir a la democracia en la nueva realidad comunicativa. II. Metodología Partiendo del estudio de una amplia selección publicaciones, se han incorporado análisis de comunicólogos, testimonios profesionales, estudios de normas jurídicas, referencias históricas sobre periodismo, entrevistas, análisis de datos, reflexiones de periodistas veteranos y empresarios de la comunicación, referencias económicas del sector y propuestas desde numerosos ámbitos. III. Conclusiones 1. La gestión empresarial del periodismo como un gran negocio ha conllevado un cambio sustancial en el papel social que los ciudadanos, los sistemas políticos democráticos y sus leyes fundamentales le asignaron, empequeñeciendo su labor social y agigantando el beneficio privado. 2. La explotación comercial de los medios de comunicación, productos y tecnología de la comunicación de masas generó, a partir de los años ochenta del siglo pasado, una expansión económica en este sector empresarial impulsada por el éxito comercial en la televisión. 3. El productivismo y la rentabilidad económica guían hoy la gestión de los medios de comunicación, dirigiendo la inversión empresarial a las aplicaciones tecnológicas en detrimento de la calidad de los contenidos y de la estabilidad de las plantillas periodísticas, todo ello supeditado ahora a la agenda informativa y a los intereses de las fuentes estables. 4. La salida a la crisis del periodismo supondrá una importante transformación de las formas de explotación, emisión y consumo. El futuro estará más marcado por la tecnología, una rentabilidad más compleja y un comportamiento de las audiencias más activo y menos masivo: separación del producto respecto del soporte; la prensa escrita ahondará en su crisis pero no desaparecerá; puede haber fórmulas de convergencia digital, como la hubo audiovisual; el periodismo social o 3.0 seguirá adelante, aunque no está clara su relación con las formas actuales de periodismo comercial ni con las futuras; surgirán nuevos modelos de negocio que hoy no se vislumbran; habrá buen periodismo, pero posiblemente no estará en los medios y productos actuales; el futuro del periodismo lo decidirá la rentabilidad, aunque al margen o paralelamente pueden tener un gran éxito formas no rentables de periodismo, aunque no sea de grandes audiencias. 5. Los periodistas han perdido en las redacciones gran parte de su autonomía profesional y de su capacidad de influencia en la elaboración y presentación final de las informaciones. Los profesionales se enfrentan a las presiones internas de sus jefes para no dañar los intereses económicos aliados con la empresa informativa, y a las limitaciones que impone el productivismo, la autocensura y unas condiciones laborales pésimas. 6. La audiencia en conjunto sufre un proceso de alienación informativa que contrasta con el aumento de la autodeterminación de los individuos, que se expresa en reacciones como el periodismo 3.0 o periodismo ciudadano. 7. El cambio del papel social del periodismo, el hiperdesarrollo comunicativo, la concepción de la información como negocio, la crisis del sector y las nuevas tecnologías han agravado los problemas éticos clásicos y han surgido otros problemas éticos de segunda generación. 8. La ética periodística y la calidad de los contenidos constituyen dos aspectos esenciales para la construcción de un nuevo sistema informativo que recupere el equilibrio entre la función social y el beneficio empresarial. Palabras clave Ética / periodismo / ética periodística / periodistas / contrapoder / periodismo 3.0 / autorregulación / deontología / cuarto poder / objetividad I. Objectives 1) To analyse the change that journalism has undergone over recent decades in terms of its social role. 2) To describe the main aspects of the crisis suffered by the sector (the profitability of newspaper corporations, the loss of audience, the reduction in the volume of advertising and its effectiveness, the quality of information and social prestige) and to examine its relation with the change in the social role played by journalism in order to demonstrate that the current crisis in journalism and the communication business is a result of business practices which are unethical and a perspective that sees journalism as a business instead of a public service. 3) To evaluate the role played by new technologies in this crisis. 4) To anticipate the future trends of the new reality of communications. 5) To determine the role and responsibility of journalists in the process of change being experienced by journalism and their loss of autonomy and influence in terms of the information published. 6) To evaluate the informational alienation experienced by the audience, as well as their capacity for forming their own views on the information received, and the key role that audience responses (audience attrition or journalism 3.0) may have played in the structural crisis of the information sector. 7) To investigate the new ethical problems that have emerged from the transformation of journalism and the media crisis. 8) To establish which proposals in the field of ethics may enable a recovery of the politico-social dimension of information, thus contributing towards democracy in the new reality of communications. II. Methodology Drawing on a wide selection of publications, this study incorporates analyses carried out by communication theorists, testimonials from professionals, studies of legal standards, historical references to journalism, interviews, data analysis, reflections provided by veteran journalists and communication enterprises, economic references from the sector and proposals from numerous fields. III Conclusions 1. The fact that journalism has been managed in the same way as a large-scale business has resulted in a significant change in the social role assigned to it by citizens, democratic political systems and their fundamental laws, with its social function being played down while the private gain derived from it is increased. 2. From the 1980s onwards, the commercial exploitation of the media, as well as mass media products and technologies, has led to the economic expansion of this business sector driven by the commercial success of television. 3. Today, the media is managed in a way that is driven by productivity and economic profitability, directing business investment into technological applications to the detriment of the quality of contents and the stability of the journalism industry workforce, which are now subordinated to the news agenda and the vested interests of the stable sources. 4. In order to overcome this crisis, journalism will need to undergo a significant transformation in terms of its exploitation, broadcasting/publication and consumption. The future will be increasingly marked by technology, more complex profitability, and with audience behaviour which is less massive and more active. Other factors will include the following: the separation of the product from its support; the written press will fall into a deeper crisis but will not disappear entirely; possible new formulas for digital convergence as there were with audiovisual forms; social journalism or journalism 3.0 will continue to move forward, although its relation with current and future forms of commercial journalism is unclear; new business models will emerge which have not been contemplated up to now; good journalism will be available, but it is possible that this may not take the same form as the means and products currently available; the future of journalism will be decided by profitability, although non-profit-making forms of journalism may be successful in parallel with or on the fringes of traditional forms, even if these new forms do not attract large audiences. 5. Journalists have lost a significant amount of professional autonomy when writing up their reports, as well as their capacity to influence the end result and the presentation of their work. Professionals are faced with the internal pressures applied by their bosses so as not to damage the economic interests allied to the news corporation, and with the limitations imposed by the emphasis on productivity, self-censorship and poor working conditions. 6. The entire audience suffers from informational alienation that contrasts with the increase in the self-determination of individuals which is expressed in responses such as journalism 3.0 or citizen journalism. 7. The changing social role of journalism, the hyper-development of communications, the conception of information as business, the crisis in the sector, as well as new technologies, have aggravated traditional ethical problems and other second-generation ethical problems have emerged. 8. Journalism ethics and the quality of contents constitute two crucial elements in the construction of a different kind of information system capable of restoring the balance between its social function and business profit. Key words Ethics / journalism / journalism ethics / journalists / countervailing / journalism 3.0 / self-regulation / deontology / fourth estate / objectivity

Evalueringen af transportprojekter har traditionelt været baseret på overvejelser af kvantitative beskrivelser af udvalgte effekter ved hælp af cost-benefit analyse (CBA). Miljøpåvirkninger er nu også medtaget i betragtningerne, når beslutninger om gennemførelsen af større transportprojekter skal tages. Denne del bliver varetaget af vurdering af virkninger på miljøet (VVM). Ved beslutninger om transportprojekter er der ofte adskillige alternativer, mange usikkerheder, mange interessenter og mange konsekvenser af interesse. På trods af dette har de offentlige beslutningstagere et ansvar for at udvikle og gennemføre en politik, der har den bedste chance for at bidrage til den økonomiske udvikling, sundhed, sikkerhed og trivsel for samfundet. De er konfronteret med den vanskelige opgave at vurdere mulige resultater og vælge mellem alternativer for at opnå de ønskede resultater i tilstedeværelse af stigende kompleksitet. Optimering er blevet erstattet med satisficering, som er defineret ved at finde en acceptabel eller tilfredsstillende løsning på et problem i stedet for en socio-økonomisk optimal løsning. Dette kræver nye tilgange til vurdering af transportprojekter, som går ud over, hvad den klassiske CBA synes egnet til. Som følge af ovennævnte problemstillinger med transportvurdering er yderligere metoder til vurdering blevet foreslået for at kunne håndtere f.eks interessekonflikter, flere effekter, inddragelse af interessenter og bæredygtighed. Multi-kriterie beslutningsanalyse (MCDA) er blevet indført i transportplanlægningssystemet, hvor evalueringsmetode er en MCDA model med en CBA indlejret. Men det kræver at visse problemstillinger behandles; i CBA bestemmes de vægte (den monetære værdiansættelse) på grundlag af den bedst tilgængelige viden. I MCDA derimod kan vægte afspejle viden, ekspert bedømmelser eller forskellige præferencer. Men at definere vægte på grundlag af præferencer introducerer subjektivitet i analysen og i det ekstreme kan det trodse analysens formål. Det er vigtigt, at være i stand til at håndtere denne subjektivitet for at give et forsvarligt beslutningsgrundlag. Dette kan behandles ved brug af følsomhedsanalyse og robusthedsmål. Yderlige kræver en sådan tilgang også en vurdering metode, der er gennemsigtig og i stand til også at omfatte de forskellige præferencer der findes blandt eksperter, offentligheden og interessenter. Denne ph.d.-afhandling har tre primære fokus områder omhandlende vurdering af transportprojekter: • Hvordan kan man opnå transportpolitiske beslutninger, der forener samfundsøkonomisk forsvarlighed og offentlig accept? • Hvordan kan interessenter involveres i en vurderingsproces af transportprojekter? • Hvordan kan et mål for robusthed forbedre vurderingsprocessen? Undersøgelsen af disse primære fokus har været tve-delt: For hvert spørgsmål er først dets relevans fremført, og bagefter behandlet mere specifikt med hensyn til metode og forslag. Det primære fokus i ph.d.-studiet har været anvendelsen af robusthed som et middel til at forbedre vurderingen af transportprojekter. For at opnå dette, er der udarbejdet metoder til følsomhedsanalyse og robusthedsmål, der undersøger den subjektive del af MCDA (i form af kriterie vægte) og dennes rolle i beslutningsprocessen. Til dette formål er både deterministiske og stokastiske følsomhedsanalyser blevet udviklet. Fokus har desuden været på at formulere en struktur, der giver en gennemsigtig analyse, der er kommunikerbar. Strukturen indeholder: cost-benefit analyse til at vurdere den socio-økonomiske del af beslutningsproblemet; VVM til at vurdere miljøspørgsmål; MCDA til at behandle forskellige og ofte modstridende kriterier, og følsomhedsanalyse for at tage hensyn til interesserenter og deres præferencer. Disse forskellige præferencer er blevet afdækket ved anvendelse af beslutningskonferencer (DC), som engagerede interessenterne og skabte fælles platform for forståelse af beslutningsproblemet. Afhandlingen har ligeledes belyst spørgsmålet om hvorvidt man kan yde beslutningsstøtte der både kan understøtte beslutninger, der er rationelle i et socio-økonomisk perspektiv og som samtidig er i stand til at legitimatise beslutninger for offentligheden. Anvendelsen af de udviklede metoder er præsenteret i tre casestudier, der er beskrevet i fire artikler skrevet i forbindelse med ph.d.-studiet. Potentialet for transportvurdering demonstreret i dette ph.d.-studie kan opgøres i de følgende resultater. • For at opnå både god overordnet samfundsøkonomi og offentlig accept kan det anbefales at udvide vurderingsmetoden til også at omfatte miljømæssige og strategiske hensyn. • Ved en sådan udvidelse er det vigtigt, at der lægges stor vægt på formidlingen af resultaterne herfra, og at metoden ikke bliver for kompleks. Dette skal sikre at metoden er transparent og at metodens anbefalinger kan accepteres. • Ved anvendelse af beslutningskonferencer med deltagelse af forskellige interessenter er det muligt at kombinere tekniske, analytiske løsninger med en social interaktion, der sigter mod at engagere interessenterne. • De udviklede mål for følsomhedsanalyse og robusthedsanalyse anses for at være relevante i at understøtte processen i beslutningskonferencer, idet robustheden af en anbefalet løsning er et vigtigt anliggende. Som nævnt, er vurdering af transportprojekter et komplekst spørgsmål, der vedrører adskillige interesser, hvilket kræver nye tilgange til at praktisere projektvurdering. Den fremlagte vurderingsstruktur er et værktøj til at analysere modstridende præferencer. En effektiv udnyttelse af tilgængelige oplysninger fra CBA og VVM, kombineret med et MCDA perspektiv og robusthedsforanstaltninger vil etablere et stærkt beslutnings-støtteværktøj for den praktiske evaluering af større transportprojekter. ; The evaluation of transport projects has traditionally been based on quantitative descriptions of selected impacts by the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). However, environmental impacts are now taking into consideration when decisions have to be made, regarding which large transport projects to implement. This is handled by using environmental impact assessment (EIA). In most real-world policy situations there are many possible alternatives, many uncertainties, many stakeholders, and many consequences of interest. In spite of this, public decision-makers (DMs) have a responsibility to develop and implement policies that have the best chances of contributing to economic development, health, safety, and well-being of their constituencies. DMs are confronted with the difficult task of evaluating potential outcome and choosing policies to achieve the desired outcome in the presence of increasing complexity. Optimisation has been replaced with satisficing, where satisficing is defined as finding an acceptable or satisfactory solution to a problem instead of a socio-economical optimal solution. This calls for new approaches of appraising transport projects that goes beyond what the classical CBA, seems suitable for. As a result of the above mentioned issues regarding conflict of interests, multiple impacts, participation of stakeholders, and sustainability, additional approaches for appraisal have been suggested. Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) has been introduced in the transport planning system, where the appraisal method is an MCDA priority model, with a CBA nested within. However, some concern needs to be addressed; In CBA, the weights (that is, the monetary valuation) are determined on the basis of the best available evidence. In MCDA, weights can reflect evidence, expert opinion, or various preferences. However, defining weights on the basis of preferences introduces subjectivity in the analysis and in the extreme defies its purpose. Therefore it is essential to be able to cope with this introduced subjectivity in order to provide justifiable decision support. This can be dealt with by the use of sensitivity analysis and robustness measures. This also calls for an appraisal methodology which is transparent and able to include the different preferences among experts, the public, and stakeholders. This PhD thesis has three main focuses concerning appraisal of transport projects: • How to reconcile socio-economic and public acceptance to obtain decisions that are both rational and legitimate • How to involve stakeholders in the appraisal • How to apply robustness as mean to improve the appraisal The examination of these main focuses has been two-folded: For each question first its relevance has been argued and afterwards been treated more specifically in regards to methodology and suggestions. The main concern in the PhD study has been to apply robustness as a mean to improve the appraisal of transport projects. In order to accomplish this, sensitivity analysis methods and robustness measures have been elaborated, which examine the subjective part of the MCDA (in form of criteria weights) and its role in decision support making. For this purpose both deterministic and stochastic sensitivity analyses have been developed. In addition, the focus has been formulating a framework which provides a transparent analysis that can be communicated to the DMs. The framework involves CBA for assessing the socio-economic part of the decision problem, EIA to include environmental issues, MCDA to embrace various and often conflicting criteria, and sensitivity analysis for taking into account the interests and preferences of different stakeholders. These various interests and preferences have been revealed by the use of decision conferencing, which engage the stakeholders and provide a common platform for understanding the decision problem. Leading up to this framework, this thesis has also examined the issues of how to provide decision support which both support decisions that are rational in a socio-economic manner as well as being able to legitimatise decisions for the public. Applications of the developed methods are demonstrated by three case studies which are described in four papers written during the PhD study. The potential for transport appraisal demonstrated in this PhD study can be listed in the following main findings. • To reconcile socio-economic analysis and public acceptance it can be recommended to widen the appraisal methodology. • When widening the appraisal methodology, e.g. replacing CBA with EIA+CBA+MCDA+DC, there is a need to balance between the use of sophisticated modelling and emphasising transparency for all. • The conduct of a DC with the participants representing different stakeholders is seen as a way of combining technical, analytical solutions with social group processes aiming for engaging the different stakeholders with consideration of their variability of their preferences. • The different sensitivity analysis and robustness measures developed in the technical part of this PhD study are found to be relevant in supporting the DC group process, as robustness of a recommended solution is major concern in the final steps of decision making. As mentioned, the appraisal of transport projects is a complex issues involving conflict of various interests and this calls for new approaches to the practice of appraisal. The presented appraisal framework is a tool for analysing conflicting preferences, and it is believed that the efficient use of available information from CBA and EIA, combined with the MCDA approach and the robustness measures, establishes a strong decision aid tool for the practical evaluation of larger transport projects.

Dottorato di ricerca in Economia e territorio ; In agricoltura l'acqua è spesso un fattore produttivo limitante e soggetto a frequenti ed importanti periodi di scarsità, che incentiva una forte competizione per il suo impiego anche tra diversi settori, sia industriali che urbani. Avvalendosi del principio che l'uso familiare dell'acqua debba prevalere su quello produttivo, le Pubbliche Amministrazioni tendono a razionalizzarne l'utilizzo agricolo, attraverso consorzi per la gestione delle fonti d'acqua. Tuttavia, esiste ancora una forte necessità di calibrare la gestione delle risorse idriche a scopo irriguo, per perseguire obiettivi di natura economica e politica che riguardano la riduzione degli sprechi e l'allocazione efficiente. Il problema della gestione della risorsa idrica è reso ancora più rilevante e attuale dalle recenti osservazioni e teorie sul cambio climatico globale, che prospettano scenari futuri con una scarsità dell'acqua in aumento, accompagnata da modificazioni della variabilità degli eventi atmosferici che sono alla base della sua disponibilità. Una prima e importante difficoltà nasce dall'uso normativo del concetto di efficienza, in un'ottica di recupero dei costi. E' quindi d'interesse lo studio dei costi legati all'uso della risorsa idrica in agricoltura, per comprendere meglio in che direzione sarebbe opportuno spingere le politiche di gestione dell'acqua per il raggiungimento degli obiettivi comunitari e, più in generale, di traguardi di efficienza economica più sostenibili. Per una corretta e consapevole gestione delle risorse idriche, è necessaria un'analisi degli aspetti economici legati alla fornitura del servizio irriguo, per comprendere gli effetti che determinati interventi avranno sui benefici associati a tale servizio. E' sulla comprensione di questi aspetti della distribuzione dell'acqua a scopo irriguo che si incentra il lavoro di tesi. Per realizzare questo studio, è stata presa in esame l'area servita da un consorzio di bonifica e irrigazione in Sardegna. Tale scelta è da ritenersi interessante, giacché i sistemi di distribuzione dell'acqua irrigua e i metodi di tariffazione adottati da questo consorzio sono tra i più praticati in Italia e nell'area del Mediterraneo. Pertanto, le caratteristiche di questa area permettono di estendere le conclusioni del lavoro per considerazioni più generali. Attraverso un'approfondita ricostruzione delle tecnologie distributive e dei dati economici e tecnici, sono stati prodotti i dati per poter costruire un modello dei costi operativi della distribuzione irrigua. Il lavoro di raccolta dati ha permesso di comprendere come la realtà dei consorzi irrigui sia molto variegata e diversificata. A tal proposito, infatti, non va trascurato che nel corso degli anni le strutture consortili hanno operato delle ristrutturazioni, sia dal punto di vista organizzativo che tecnico. E' quindi auspicabile comprendere come queste ristrutturazioni hanno modificato le economie e le efficienze dei consorzi irrigui e quanto spazio può ancora sussistere per un ulteriore miglioramento di queste condizioni. All'interno dello stesso comprensorio, difatti, coesistono strutture molto diverse per la distribuzione dell'acqua irrigua che sono il risultato del processo di ammodernamento differenziato e disomogeneo dei vari distretti irrigui. L'approccio metodologico utilizzato è quello basato sulla funzione di costo logaritmica trascendente (translog), già ampiamente utilizzato in altre aree di studio dell'economia applicata, soprattutto nell'analisi dell'efficienza e nella valutazione del progresso tecnologico. In questo lavoro sono stati sviluppati 7 modelli econometrici con 3 diversi gradi di dettaglio nella specificazione della tecnologia. Questa differenzazione è stata utile per comprendere come alcuni aspetti peculiari dei diversi sistemi di distribuzione dell'acqua possano essere presi in considerazione nelle politiche di tariffazione dell'acqua irrigua. Esiste ancora una forte necessità di calibrare la gestione delle risorse idriche a scopo irriguo, per perseguire obiettivi di natura economica e politica che riguardano la riduzione degli sprechi e l'allocazione efficiente. Si è visto come il volume d'acqua fornito sia di fatto un elemento insufficiente per descrivere i costi operativi: la distribuzione dei volumi d'acqua su superfici più o meno estese ha impatti spesso più importanti dei volumi d'acqua in sé. Ciò è facilmente comprensibile, perché le strutture utilizzate nella distribuzione hanno dei costi anche di 'attivazione' e di mantenimento in funzione che sono più legati alla loro dimensione piuttosto che a loro livello operativo. Quando l'acqua viene distribuita per gravità si generano delle perdite di rete dovute a necessità tecnologiche e organizzative, che raggiungono anche il 30% dell'acqua immessa nei canali. Queste perdite non assumono alcun valore economico, tranne forse quando l'acqua deve essere pompata per brevi tratti collinari. Ciò è rilevante per la gestione del servizio irriguo, nel momento in cui si vuole regolare l'esternalità dello spreco di acqua generata dal consorzio attraverso la tariffazione. Dai risultati, emerge anche un sostanziale sotto utilizzo delle strutture che generano i costi fissi di fornitura: è importante specificare che l'implementazione del recupero costo pieno, richiesto dalla attuale normativa, non determini che in varie circostanze, gli agricoltori si trovino a pagare le inefficienze dei sistemi che gestiscono i servizi idrici. Certamente, la sola conoscenza dei costi di fornitura è incompleta per adottare un adeguato sistema di tariffazione. Lo studio dei costi operativi ha comunque dato un apporto significativo alla conoscenza sul funzionamento dei consorzi di bonifica e irrigazione ed i risultati ottenuti permettono di fare delle considerazioni sulle indicazioni di tariffazione introdotti dalla WFD. ; In agriculture the water is often a limiting factor and subject to frequent and important periods of scarcity, which encourages strong competition for its use even among different sectors, both industrial and urban areas. Using the principle that the family use of water should take precedence over the production, Public Administrations tend to rationalize the agricultural use, through consortia for the management of water sources. However, there is still a strong need to adjust the management of water resources for irrigation purposes, in pursuit of economic objectives and policy dealing with waste minimization and allocation efficiency. The management of water resources is made even more relevant and topical by recent observations and theories on global climate change, which envisage future scenarios with an increasing scarcity of water, accompanied by changes in the variability of atmospheric events that underlie the availability. A first and important difficulty arises from the use of the concept of regulatory efficiency, considering cost recovery. The study of the costs associated with the use of water resources in agriculture is therefore interesting to better understand in what direction we should push the water management policy for the achievement of EU objectives and, more generally, the goals of sustainable economic efficiency. For a correct and conscious management of water resources is necessary to analyze the economic aspects related to irrigation service supply, in order to understand the effects that certain actions will have on the benefits associated with such service. The thesis focuses on understanding of these aspects of water supply for irrigation purposes. In order to carry this study on, the area served by a consortium of drainage and irrigation in Sardinia has been examined. This choice can be considered interesting, since the irrigation water distribution systems and pricing methods adopted by this consortium are among the most practiced in Italy and the Mediterranean. Therefore, the characteristics of this area allow us to extend the conclusions of the work for more general interpretations. Through a detailed reconstruction of the distribution technologies and the economic and technical aspects, the data for constructing a model of the operational costs of the irrigation distribution have been produced. The work of data collection has made it clear that the reality of the consortium irrigation is very varied and diverse. In this regard, it should not be overlooked that over the years the facilities have operated consortium of restructuring, both organizationally and technically. It is therefore desirable to understand how these renovations have changed the economies and efficiencies of irrigation consortia and how much space can still exist for further improvement of these conditions. Within the same area, in fact, very different structures for irrigation water distribution coexist, and are the result of the variable and heterogeneous modernization process throughout the various irrigation districts. The methodological approach used is based on the transcendental logarithmic (Translog) cost function, already widely used in other areas of applied economics, particularly when analyzing and evaluating the efficiency of technological progress. In this work 7 econometric models were developed, with 3 different degrees of detail in the specification of the technology . This differentiation is helpful in understanding how certain distinctive features of different water distribution systems can be taken into account in the irrigation water pricing policies. There is still a strong need to balance the management of water resources for irrigation purposes, in pursuit of economic objectives and policy dealing with waste minimization and allocation efficiency. It is seen that the volume of water supplied is in fact inadequate to describe the operational costs: the distribution of volumes of water onto land is relevant when it is accounted for considering also the land on which it is distributed. This is easily understandable, because the structures used in the distribution have also costs for activation and continued operation that are more related to their size rather than their operational level. When the water is distributed by gravity, network losses appear, due to technological and organizational needs, which reach even 30% of the water distributed in the channels. These losses do not take any economic value, except perhaps when the water must be pumped over low hills. This is relevant for the management of irrigation service, when we want to adjust the externalities of waste water generated by the consortium through the pricing. The results also shows a substantial under use of the distribution facilities that generate the fixed costs of delivery. So it is important to specify that the implementation of full cost recovery required by current legislation determines that, in some circumstances, farmers are paying the inefficiencies of the systems that manage the water services. Certainly, the mere knowledge of supply costs is incomplete to adopt a proper system of charging. The study of operating costs has nevertheless made a significant contribution to knowledge on the functioning of the consortia of reclamation and irrigation, and the results obtained allow to make some considerations on the indications for pricing introduced by the WFD.

Keywords: national security, national values, national interests, national goals, intellectualproperty Theoretical aspects of national security, the interconnection of values, interestsand goals of the individual, society and the state, their influence on the formation ofnational values, interests and goals in order to develop a state policy on national securityand defense of Ukraine are considered. The need to take into account intellectualproperty issues in these processes has been investigated. The importance of furtherresearch on developing a unified approach to improving the intellectual propertyprotection system and defining it as an integral part of the national security and defenseof Ukraine is outlined.National security theory is built around a framework that is shaped by the socalledtriad: national values — national interests — national goals. National securityis based on national interests established on national values.Therefore, national values, interests and goals are the stumbling blocks in the developmentof guidelines for national security (laws, concepts, doctrines, strategies,programs, etc.). At the same time, national values and interests play a key role. Intellectual property issues are at the intersection of a set of core values, interestsand goals of the individual, society and state.Intellectual security nowadays is a leading component in the national security systembecause, on the one hand, it is connected with the growing role of intellectuallabor, protection of intellectual potential from destruction, and on the other hand –guarantees the security of human intellectual development, protects knowledge asthe most valuable intellectual resource and its the media is the person who createsthe intellectual products. Intellectual security of Ukraine guaranteeing implies makingadequate management decisions and taking consistent, well-structured organizationalmeasures.The threat to national interests and national security of Ukraine in the defensesphere are also intellectual property problems that arise in the development ofweapons and military equipment and in cooperation with foreign defense industrycompanies (investments, joint production, procurement of technology, etc.).Ineffective state policy in the field of intellectual property protection (or lack thereof)has a negative impact on national security. Under these conditions, developing ascience-based public policy on intellectual property protection is now an importanttask. Such state policy should consider intellectual property taking into account notonly economic and scientific and technical indicators, but also threats to the nationalsecurity of Ukraine. ; Ключові слова: національна безпека, національні цінності, національні інтереси,національні цілі, інтелектуальна власність Розглянуто теоретичні аспекти національної безпеки, взаємозв'язок цінностей,інтересів і цілей особистості, суспільства та держави, їх вплив на формування націо-нальних цінностей, інтересів і цілей з метою розроблення державної політики щодозабезпечення національної безпеки та оборони України. Досліджено необхідність ура-хування питань інтелектуальної власності в цих процесах. Зазначено важливістьздійснення подальших досліджень з розроблення єдиного підходу до вдосконаленнясистеми охорони інтелектуальної власності та визначення її як складової сфери забез-печення національної безпеки та оборони України. Посилання 1. Колпаков В. К. Адміністративне право України : навчальний посібник. Київ : Юрінком Інтер, 2004. 544 c. 2. Про національну безпеку України : Закон України від 21.06.2018 № 2469. URL: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19. 3. Горбулін В. П., Качинський А. Б. Методологічні засади розробки стратегії національної безпеки. Стратегічна панорама. 2004. № 3. С. 15−24. 4. Ситник Г. П. Державне управління у сфері національної безпеки (концептуальні та організаційно-правові засади) : підручник. Київ : НАДУ, 2012. 544 с. 5. Конституція України від 28.06.1996 р. URL: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/main. 6. Стратегічне планування: вирішення проблем національної безпеки : монографія / В. П. Горбулін, А. Б. Качинський. Київ : НІСД, 2010. 288 с. URL: http:/www.niss.gov.ua. 7. Гелей С. Д. Основи політології : навч. посіб. / С. Д. Гелей, С. М. Рутар. 3-тє вид., перероб. і допов. Київ : Знання, КОО, 1999. 427 с. 8. Концептуальні засади розвитку системи забезпечення національної безпеки України : аналіт. доп. / О. О. Резнікова, В. Ю. Цюкало, В. О. Паливода, С. В. Дрьомов, С. В. Сьомін. Київ : НІСД, 2015. 58 с. 9. Пучков О. О. Національна безпека як умова модернізації сучасного українського суспільства. Мультиверсум. Філософський альманах. Київ : Центр духовної культури, 2005. № 47. 10. Василенко И. А. Геополитика современного мира. Москва : Гардарики, 2006. С. 223. 11. Скуратівський В. А. Гуманітарна політика в Україні : навч. посіб. / В. А. Скуратівський, В. П. Трощинський, С. А. Чукут. Київ : Вид-во УАДУ, Міленіум, 2002. 262 с. 12. Виклики та загрози гуманітарній безпеці Української Держави : зб. наук.-експерт. мат-лів / за заг. ред. С. І. Здіорука. Київ : НІСД, 2015. 104 с. 13. Ковалюк Р. Т. Національні інтереси України в новій геополітичній ситуації. URL: http://vmv.kymu.edu.ua/v/06/kovaluk.htm. 14. Варналій З. С. Конкурентоспроможність національної економіки: проблеми та пріоритети інноваційного забезпечення / З. С. Варналій, О. П. Гармашова. Київ : Знання України, 2013. С. 141. 15. Савенко В. Г. Загрози економічній безпеці України у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Стратегічна панорама, 2009. № 4. С.109−118. 16. Яворська Т. В., Ревак І. О. Інтелектуальна безпека України: сутність і суб'єкти гарантування. Стратегічні пріоритети, 2015. № 2. 17. Становлення і розвиток недержавних суб'єктів сектору безпеки України (система безпеки підприємництва) : аналіт. доп. / В. В. Крутов, В. Г. Пилипчук; за ред. О. О. Котелянець. Київ : НІСД, 2011. 136 с. 18. Інноваційний розвиток в Україні: наявний потенціал і ключові проблеми його реалізації. Аналітична доповідь центру Разумкова Національна безпека і оборона. 2004 р. № 7. 19. Військово-технічне співробітництво в умовах глобалізації: український вимір: зб. мат-лів круглого столу / В. М. Бегма; за заг. ред. О. В. Литвиненка. Київ: НІСД, 2011. 80 с. 20. Горбулін В. П., Качинський А. Б. Системно-концептуальні засади стратегії національної безпеки України. Київ : ДП «НВЦ «Євроатлантикінформ», 2007. 592 с. 21. Шевченко О. 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Keywords: national security, national values, national interests, national goals, intellectualproperty Theoretical aspects of national security, the interconnection of values, interestsand goals of the individual, society and the state, their influence on the formation ofnational values, interests and goals in order to develop a state policy on national securityand defense of Ukraine are considered. The need to take into account intellectualproperty issues in these processes has been investigated. The importance of furtherresearch on developing a unified approach to improving the intellectual propertyprotection system and defining it as an integral part of the national security and defenseof Ukraine is outlined.National security theory is built around a framework that is shaped by the socalledtriad: national values — national interests — national goals. National securityis based on national interests established on national values.Therefore, national values, interests and goals are the stumbling blocks in the developmentof guidelines for national security (laws, concepts, doctrines, strategies,programs, etc.). At the same time, national values and interests play a key role. Intellectual property issues are at the intersection of a set of core values, interestsand goals of the individual, society and state.Intellectual security nowadays is a leading component in the national security systembecause, on the one hand, it is connected with the growing role of intellectuallabor, protection of intellectual potential from destruction, and on the other hand –guarantees the security of human intellectual development, protects knowledge asthe most valuable intellectual resource and its the media is the person who createsthe intellectual products. Intellectual security of Ukraine guaranteeing implies makingadequate management decisions and taking consistent, well-structured organizationalmeasures.The threat to national interests and national security of Ukraine in the defensesphere are also intellectual property problems that arise in the development ofweapons and military equipment and in cooperation with foreign defense industrycompanies (investments, joint production, procurement of technology, etc.).Ineffective state policy in the field of intellectual property protection (or lack thereof)has a negative impact on national security. Under these conditions, developing ascience-based public policy on intellectual property protection is now an importanttask. Such state policy should consider intellectual property taking into account notonly economic and scientific and technical indicators, but also threats to the nationalsecurity of Ukraine. ; Ключові слова: національна безпека, національні цінності, національні інтереси,національні цілі, інтелектуальна власність Розглянуто теоретичні аспекти національної безпеки, взаємозв'язок цінностей,інтересів і цілей особистості, суспільства та держави, їх вплив на формування націо-нальних цінностей, інтересів і цілей з метою розроблення державної політики щодозабезпечення національної безпеки та оборони України. Досліджено необхідність ура-хування питань інтелектуальної власності в цих процесах. Зазначено важливістьздійснення подальших досліджень з розроблення єдиного підходу до вдосконаленнясистеми охорони інтелектуальної власності та визначення її як складової сфери забез-печення національної безпеки та оборони України. Посилання 1. Колпаков В. К. Адміністративне право України : навчальний посібник. Київ : Юрінком Інтер, 2004. 544 c. 2. Про національну безпеку України : Закон України від 21.06.2018 № 2469. URL: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19. 3. Горбулін В. П., Качинський А. Б. Методологічні засади розробки стратегії національної безпеки. Стратегічна панорама. 2004. № 3. С. 15−24. 4. Ситник Г. П. Державне управління у сфері національної безпеки (концептуальні та організаційно-правові засади) : підручник. Київ : НАДУ, 2012. 544 с. 5. Конституція України від 28.06.1996 р. URL: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/main. 6. Стратегічне планування: вирішення проблем національної безпеки : монографія / В. П. Горбулін, А. Б. Качинський. Київ : НІСД, 2010. 288 с. URL: http:/www.niss.gov.ua. 7. Гелей С. Д. Основи політології : навч. посіб. / С. Д. Гелей, С. М. Рутар. 3-тє вид., перероб. і допов. Київ : Знання, КОО, 1999. 427 с. 8. Концептуальні засади розвитку системи забезпечення національної безпеки України : аналіт. доп. / О. О. Резнікова, В. Ю. Цюкало, В. О. Паливода, С. В. Дрьомов, С. В. Сьомін. Київ : НІСД, 2015. 58 с. 9. Пучков О. О. Національна безпека як умова модернізації сучасного українського суспільства. Мультиверсум. Філософський альманах. Київ : Центр духовної культури, 2005. № 47. 10. Василенко И. А. Геополитика современного мира. Москва : Гардарики, 2006. С. 223. 11. Скуратівський В. А. Гуманітарна політика в Україні : навч. посіб. / В. А. Скуратівський, В. П. Трощинський, С. А. Чукут. Київ : Вид-во УАДУ, Міленіум, 2002. 262 с. 12. Виклики та загрози гуманітарній безпеці Української Держави : зб. наук.-експерт. мат-лів / за заг. ред. С. І. Здіорука. Київ : НІСД, 2015. 104 с. 13. Ковалюк Р. Т. Національні інтереси України в новій геополітичній ситуації. URL: http://vmv.kymu.edu.ua/v/06/kovaluk.htm. 14. Варналій З. С. Конкурентоспроможність національної економіки: проблеми та пріоритети інноваційного забезпечення / З. С. Варналій, О. П. Гармашова. Київ : Знання України, 2013. С. 141. 15. Савенко В. Г. Загрози економічній безпеці України у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Стратегічна панорама, 2009. № 4. С.109−118. 16. Яворська Т. В., Ревак І. О. Інтелектуальна безпека України: сутність і суб'єкти гарантування. Стратегічні пріоритети, 2015. № 2. 17. Становлення і розвиток недержавних суб'єктів сектору безпеки України (система безпеки підприємництва) : аналіт. доп. / В. В. Крутов, В. Г. Пилипчук; за ред. О. О. Котелянець. Київ : НІСД, 2011. 136 с. 18. Інноваційний розвиток в Україні: наявний потенціал і ключові проблеми його реалізації. Аналітична доповідь центру Разумкова Національна безпека і оборона. 2004 р. № 7. 19. Військово-технічне співробітництво в умовах глобалізації: український вимір: зб. мат-лів круглого столу / В. М. Бегма; за заг. ред. О. В. Литвиненка. Київ: НІСД, 2011. 80 с. 20. Горбулін В. П., Качинський А. Б. Системно-концептуальні засади стратегії національної безпеки України. Київ : ДП «НВЦ «Євроатлантикінформ», 2007. 592 с. 21. Шевченко О. Проблемні питання розвитку науково-технологічного потенціалу ОПК України. Стратегічні пріоритети, 2010. № 4. С. 103−108. ================================== 1. Kolpakov V. K. Administratyvne pravo Ukrainy : navchalnyi posibnyk. Kyiv : Yurinkom Inter, 2004. 544 c. 2. Pro natsionalnu bezpeku Ukrainy : Zakon Ukrainy vid 21.06.2018 № 2469. URL: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19. 3. Horbulin V. P., Kachynskyi A. B. Metodolohichni zasady rozrobky stratehii natsionalnoi bezpeky. Stratehichna panorama. 2004. № 3. S. 15−24. 4. Sytnyk H. P. Derzhavne upravlinnia u sferi natsionalnoi bezpeky (kontseptualni ta orhanizatsiino-pravovi zasady) : pidruchnyk. Kyiv : NADU, 2012. 544 s. 5. Konstytutsiia Ukrainy vid 28.06.1996 r. URL: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/main. 6. Stratehichne planuvannia: vyrishennia problem natsionalnoi bezpeky : monohrafiia / V. P. Horbulin, A. B. Kachynskyi. Kyiv : NISD, 2010. 288 s. URL: http:/www.niss.gov.ua. 7. Helei S. D. Osnovy politolohii : navch. posib. / S. D. Helei, S. M. Rutar. 3-tie vyd., pererob. i dopov. Kyiv : Znannia, KOO, 1999. 427 s. 8. Kontseptualni zasady rozvytku systemy zabezpechennia natsionalnoi bezpeky Ukrainy : analit. dop. / O. O. Reznikova, V. Yu. Tsiukalo, V. O. Palyvoda, S. V. Dromov, S. V. Somin. Kyiv : NISD, 2015. 58 s. 9. Puchkov O. O. Natsionalna bezpeka yak umova modernizatsii suchasnoho ukrainskoho suspilstva. Multyversum. Filosofskyi almanakh. Kyiv : Tsentr dukhovnoi kultury, 2005. № 47. 10. Vasylenko Y. A. Heopolytyka sovremennoho myra. Moskva : Hardaryky, 2006. S. 223. 11. Skurativskyi V. A. Humanitarna polityka v Ukraini : navch. posib. / V. A. Skurativskyi, V. P. Troshchynskyi, S. A. Chukut. Kyiv : Vyd-vo UADU, Milenium, 2002. 262 s. 12. Vyklyky ta zahrozy humanitarnii bezpetsi Ukrainskoi Derzhavy : zb. nauk.-ekspert. mat-liv / za zah. red. S. I. Zdioruka. Kyiv : NISD, 2015. 104 s. 13. Kovaliuk R. T. Natsionalni interesy Ukrainy v novii heopolitychnii sytuatsii. URL: http://vmv.kymu.edu.ua/v/06/kovaluk.htm. 14. Varnalii Z. S. Konkurentospromozhnist natsionalnoi ekonomiky: problemy ta priorytety innovatsiinoho zabezpechennia / Z. S. Varnalii, O. P. Harmashova. Kyiv : Znannia Ukrainy, 2013. S. 141. 15. Savenko V. H. Zahrozy ekonomichnii bezpetsi Ukrainy u sferi intelektualnoi vlasnosti. Stratehichna panorama, 2009. № 4. S.109−118. 16. Iavorska T. V., Revak I. O. Intelektualna bezpeka Ukrainy: sutnist i subiekty harantuvannia. Stratehichni priorytety, 2015. №2. 17. Stanovlennia i rozvytok nederzhavnykh subiektiv sektoru bezpeky Ukrainy (systema bezpeky pidpryiemnytstva) : analit. dop. / V. V. Krutov, V. H. Pylypchuk; za red. O. O. Kotelianets. Kyiv : NISD, 2011. 136 s. 18. Innovatsiinyi rozvytok v Ukraini: naiavnyi potentsial i kliuchovi problemy yoho realizatsii. Analitychna dopovid tsentru Razumkova Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona. 2004 r. № 7. 19. Viiskovo-tekhnichne spivrobitnytstvo v umovakh hlobalizatsii: ukrainskyi vymir: zb. mat-liv kruhloho stolu / V. M. Behma; za zah. red. O. V. Lytvynenka. Kyiv: NISD, 2011. 80 s. 20. Horbulin V. P., Kachynskyi A. B. Systemno-kontseptualni zasady stratehii natsionalnoi bezpeky Ukrainy. Kyiv : DP «NVTs «Ievroatlantykinform», 2007. 592 s. 21. Shevchenko O. Problemni pytannia rozvytku naukovo-tekhnolohichnoho potentsialu OPK Ukrainy. Stratehichni priorytety, 2010. № 4. S. 103−108.

Manuscrit terminé en juillet 2004 ; Vorstellung des Themas: Die von Prälat Adam Franz Lennig 1848 zur Verteidigung der Religionsfreiheit gegründeten Katholikentage sollten anfangs lediglich die Vertreter der wichtigsten katholischen Verbände sowie bedeutende Persönlichkeiten versammeln. Im Laufe der darauf folgenden zwanzig Jahre spielten sie eine zentrale Rolle bei der politischen Mobilisierung der Gläubigen. Der preußische Kulturkampf festigte die Bande zwischen dem im Jahre 1870 gegründeten Zentrum und den Katholikentagen, die sich allmählich zu dessen offiziellem Parteitag entwickelten. Gegen 1900 wurden sie dann zu Massenveranstaltungen mit mehreren tausend Teilnehmern, die die Solidarität der Bevölkerung mit der höheren Geistlichkeit einerseits und der Spitze des Zentrums andererseits demonstrieren sollten. Nach einer achtjährigen Unterbrechung wurde 1921 der erste nationale Katholikentag nach dem Krieg in Frankfurt am Main abgehalten. Danach wurden die Kongresse bis 1933 wieder regelmäßig jedes Jahr durchgeführt (außer 1923). In der Weimarer Republik waren die Kongresse die größten Massenveranstaltungen, die regelmäßig stattfanden: 1932 nahmen in Essen etwa 250.000 Katholiken an dem Festgottesdienst teil. Ihr Einfluss ging sogar, dank der Unterstützung durch die Geistlichkeit auf lokaler und nationaler Ebene, durch das Netz der katholischen Vereine sowie dank der Berichterstattung in der Presse erheblich über die zahlenmäßige Bedeutung hinaus. Aktueller Stand der Forschung und Problemstellung: Während das Zentrum bereits Gegenstand zahlreicher Monographien war, wurden die Katholikentage durch die Historiker vernachlässigt. Die wenigen Artikel, die sich mit dieser Frage beschäftigen, behandeln nur die Zeit vor dem Ersten oder nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Dabei wird der demokratische Charakter der Kongresse, die als Vorläufer der von Konrad Adenauer nach 1945 verkörperten Christdemokratie gelten, hervorgehoben. Ziel meiner Dissertation ist es, die Ambivalenzen, welche mit der offiziellen Entpolitisierung der Katholikentage in der Weimarer Republik verbunden waren, aufzuzeigen. Sie hinterfragt die Interpretation, wonach in Europa die autoritären Regime zwischen den Kriegen keine Anziehungskraft auf die deutschen Katholiken, und zwar weder auf die Eliten noch auf den Rest der Bevölkerung, ausübten. Verwendete Archive und Quellen: Zunächst analysierte ich die veröffentlichten Protokolle der Katholikentage, die offiziellen Quellen. In einem zweiten Schritt wertete ich (ergänzend) die Nachlässe der wichtigsten Führungspersönlichkeiten der Kongresse und katholischen Vereine aus. Das Zentralkomitee verfügt für die Zeit vor 1952 über keine Dokumente. Daher musste ich mich auf Quellen in den bischöflichen und städtischen Archiven der Orte, in denen zwischen 1921 und 1933 ein Kongress stattfand, stützen. Insgesamt wurden für die Arbeit Dokumente aus 42 Archiven ausgewertet. Gliederung der Dissertation: Die Dissertation gliedert sich in drei Teile. Im ersten Teil werden die Wiederaufnahme der Kongresse nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, ihre Organisation, Finanzierung und die Art der zeremoniellen Gestaltung analysiert. Im zweiten Teil werden Inhalt und Tenor der zwischen 1921 und 1924 gehaltenen Reden untersucht. Der dritte Teil beschäftigt sich mit den Aussagen der Redner zwischen 1925 und 1932. Zusammenfassung: In den zwanziger Jahren trugen der Episkopat und Alois zu Löwenstein, seit 1920 an der Spitze des Zentralkomitees mit der Organisation der Kongresse betraut, durch die Katholikentage gegen ihren Willen zur Konsolidierung des republikanischen Systems bei, indem sie die Errungenschaften für die katholischen Minderheit durch die Weimarer Verfassung bewahren und ausweiten wollten. Die Aussagen vieler Redner gegen die Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Kulturpolitik der Regierung waren allerdings eine kaum verhüllte Kritik des Zentrums. Durch die verwendete Symbolik wurde der Transzendenz in der Politik eine zentrale Stellung eingeräumt. Diese Symbolik stellte ein universales System der Interpretation der Welt vor, die nach dem Absoluten strebte, und brach damit mit dem republikanischen Pluralismus: Die Einheit sollte in Christus verwirklicht werden und nicht auf dem Wege des Konsens. In der Praxis gab es jedoch keine Opposition. Bei den Kongressen bemühte man sich, wie schon vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, das Bild der Einheit zu wahren. Um diese Einheit aufrecht zu erhalten, unterstrichen die meisten Redner die Bedeutung der Wahrung der christlichen Werte. Zu Beginn der dreißiger Jahre half diese Haltung ihnen einerseits sich gegen die Verführung durch die Nationalsozialisten zu wehren. Andererseits hinderte sie sie daran, sich dauerhaft mit anderen politischen Kräften, insbesondere den Sozialisten, zu verbünden, um die Nationalsozialisten wirksam zu bekämpfen. My Ph.D. thesis, Les catholiques allemands et la République de Weimar: les Katholikentage, 1919 – 1932, is about the Catholic Congresses (Katholikentage) during the Weimar Republic. These unique congresses, which have been neglected by historians, gathered together both laic and clerical forces within the German Catholic Church and were held annually from 1848 throughout Germany. The Catholic Congresses' ecclesiastical and political functions were intended to demonstrate Catholic power and present specific demands to the State. During the Weimar Republic, the organization of the Catholic Congresses depended on the balance of power between laity and clergy, national and local leaders, the Centre Party and other political trends and finally between the various Catholic associations representing different social and economic groups. The Catholic Congresses were thus an exceptional means of assessing the mentality of German Catholics during this era. In my thesis, I shed light on the internal character of German Catholic life as well as its interaction with the political and economic crises, which led to the rise of Nazism. My aim was to answer the following major questions: How did German Catholic leaders view themselves, the laity, the Protestants, and the State? What did German Catholics think about the rapid industrialization of their country, about liberalism and communism, modern values, and democracy? How far did German Catholics follow the political and social teachings of the Papacy? In comparison to right-wing and left-wing extremists, how different or similar were the ideas of German Catholics? ; Fondés en 1848 à Mayence par un ecclésiastique, Mgr Adam Franz Lennig, afin de défendre les libertés religieuses, les Katholikentage – littéralement « Congrès des Catholiques » ou « Journées des Catholiques » – rassemblaient à l'origine les représentants des principales associations catholiques et des personnalités en vue. Au cours des quelque vingt années suivantes, ils jouèrent un rôle majeur dans la mobilisation politique des laïcs. Le Kulturkampf prussien (1872-1878) resserra les liens entre le Zentrum, créé en 1870, et les Katholikentage qui firent progressivement office de congrès annuel du parti. Vers 1900, ils devinrent des assemblées de masse groupant plusieurs dizaines de milliers de participants dans le but de démontrer la solidarité des populations à la fois avec la hiérarchie ecclésiastique et avec les dirigeants du Zentrum. Après une interruption de huit ans, Francfort-sur-le-Main accueillit en 1921 le premier Katholikentag national d'après-guerre et inaugura la reprise des Congrès, organisés ensuite annuellement jusqu'en 1933, à l'exception du Katholikentag prévu en 1923 à Cologne et interdit par les forces d'occupation. Sous la République de Weimar, les Congrès furent les plus grandes assemblées de masse ayant lieu régulièrement : 250.000 personnes assistèrent à la messe dominicale de celui d'Essen, en 1932. Leur influence dépassa largement le nombre de participants, grâce au soutien du clergé au niveau local et national, ainsi qu'à celui du réseau d'associations catholiques et à la presse. Alors que le Zentrum a fait l'objet de nombreuses monographies, les Katholikentage ont été jusqu'à présent négligés par les historiens. Les quelques articles consacrés à la question ne retiennent souvent que la période antérieure à 1914 ou celle postérieure à la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ils mettent en avant le caractère démocratique des Congrès considérés comme les précurseurs de la Démocratie chrétienne incarnée par Konrad Adenauer après 1945. L'un des objectifs de cette thèse est de montrer les ambiguïtés liées à la dépolitisation officielle des Katholikentage sous la République de Weimar, période qui a été jusque-là soigneusement ignorée. Elle cherche à vérifier entre autre l'interprétation selon laquelle la séduction exercée par les régimes autoritaires sur les élites et les populations notamment européennes pendant la période de l'entre-deux-guerres n'aurait pas influencé les catholiques allemands avant le 30 janvier 1933. Les comptes rendus publiés des Katholikentage sont des sources officielles qui ont constitué la première étape de mon travail. Celui-ci a ensuite été complété par les archives privées des principaux dirigeants des Congrès et des associations catholiques. Comme le Comité central ne possède aucun fonds pour la période antérieure à 1952, j'ai dû rassembler des sources réparties dans les archives ecclésiastiques et civiles de chacune des villes où un Congrès a été organisé entre 1921 et 1933. Au total, 42 fonds d'archives différents ont été consultés. La thèse est divisée en trois parties. La première a pour objet d'analyser la reprise des Congrès au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, leur organisation, leur financement et la nature de leur cérémonial. La seconde partie étudie le contenu et l'esprit des discours tenus aux Katholikentage de Francfort-sur-le-Main en 1921, de Munich en 1922 et de Hanovre en 1924. La troisième partie est consacrée aux messages délivrés par les conférenciers à partir du Katholikentag de Stuttgart en 1925 jusqu'au Katholikentag d'Essen en 1932. Pendant les années vingt, aux Katholikentage, l'épiscopat et le prince Alois zu Löwenstein, à la tête du Comité central chargé de l'organisation des Congrès, contribuèrent contre leur gré à la consolidation du système républicain car ils cherchèrent avant tout à préserver et à étendre les acquis obtenus par la minorité catholique grâce à la Constitution de Weimar. Certes, les propos tenus par de nombreux conférenciers contre la politique économique, sociale et culturelle du gouvernement étaient des critiques à peine voilées du Zentrum. De plus, la symbolique utilisée accordait une place centrale à la transcendance en politique. Elle proposait un système global d'interprétation du monde tendant vers l'absolu, en rupture avec le pluralisme républicain : l'unité était à réaliser en Christ et non sur le terrain du consensus. Cependant, cette opposition ne s'incarna pas dans la pratique car les Congrès s'efforcèrent de préserver l'image de l'unité comme ils l'avaient fait avant la Première Guerre mondiale. Pour préserver cette unité, la plupart des intervenants aux Katholikentage adoptèrent une attitude de repli, arc-boutés sur la défense des valeurs chrétiennes. En un sens, cette attitude les protégea au début des années trente de la séduction exercée sur beaucoup par les nationaux-socialistes. Toutefois, elle les empêcha de s'allier durablement à d'autres forces politiques, en particulier aux socialistes, pour lutter efficacement contre les nationaux-socialistes.

Manuscrit terminé en juillet 2004 ; Vorstellung des Themas: Die von Prälat Adam Franz Lennig 1848 zur Verteidigung der Religionsfreiheit gegründeten Katholikentage sollten anfangs lediglich die Vertreter der wichtigsten katholischen Verbände sowie bedeutende Persönlichkeiten versammeln. Im Laufe der darauf folgenden zwanzig Jahre spielten sie eine zentrale Rolle bei der politischen Mobilisierung der Gläubigen. Der preußische Kulturkampf festigte die Bande zwischen dem im Jahre 1870 gegründeten Zentrum und den Katholikentagen, die sich allmählich zu dessen offiziellem Parteitag entwickelten. Gegen 1900 wurden sie dann zu Massenveranstaltungen mit mehreren tausend Teilnehmern, die die Solidarität der Bevölkerung mit der höheren Geistlichkeit einerseits und der Spitze des Zentrums andererseits demonstrieren sollten. Nach einer achtjährigen Unterbrechung wurde 1921 der erste nationale Katholikentag nach dem Krieg in Frankfurt am Main abgehalten. Danach wurden die Kongresse bis 1933 wieder regelmäßig jedes Jahr durchgeführt (außer 1923). In der Weimarer Republik waren die Kongresse die größten Massenveranstaltungen, die regelmäßig stattfanden: 1932 nahmen in Essen etwa 250.000 Katholiken an dem Festgottesdienst teil. Ihr Einfluss ging sogar, dank der Unterstützung durch die Geistlichkeit auf lokaler und nationaler Ebene, durch das Netz der katholischen Vereine sowie dank der Berichterstattung in der Presse erheblich über die zahlenmäßige Bedeutung hinaus. Aktueller Stand der Forschung und Problemstellung: Während das Zentrum bereits Gegenstand zahlreicher Monographien war, wurden die Katholikentage durch die Historiker vernachlässigt. Die wenigen Artikel, die sich mit dieser Frage beschäftigen, behandeln nur die Zeit vor dem Ersten oder nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Dabei wird der demokratische Charakter der Kongresse, die als Vorläufer der von Konrad Adenauer nach 1945 verkörperten Christdemokratie gelten, hervorgehoben. Ziel meiner Dissertation ist es, die Ambivalenzen, welche mit der offiziellen Entpolitisierung der Katholikentage in der Weimarer Republik verbunden waren, aufzuzeigen. Sie hinterfragt die Interpretation, wonach in Europa die autoritären Regime zwischen den Kriegen keine Anziehungskraft auf die deutschen Katholiken, und zwar weder auf die Eliten noch auf den Rest der Bevölkerung, ausübten. Verwendete Archive und Quellen: Zunächst analysierte ich die veröffentlichten Protokolle der Katholikentage, die offiziellen Quellen. In einem zweiten Schritt wertete ich (ergänzend) die Nachlässe der wichtigsten Führungspersönlichkeiten der Kongresse und katholischen Vereine aus. Das Zentralkomitee verfügt für die Zeit vor 1952 über keine Dokumente. Daher musste ich mich auf Quellen in den bischöflichen und städtischen Archiven der Orte, in denen zwischen 1921 und 1933 ein Kongress stattfand, stützen. Insgesamt wurden für die Arbeit Dokumente aus 42 Archiven ausgewertet. Gliederung der Dissertation: Die Dissertation gliedert sich in drei Teile. Im ersten Teil werden die Wiederaufnahme der Kongresse nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, ihre Organisation, Finanzierung und die Art der zeremoniellen Gestaltung analysiert. Im zweiten Teil werden Inhalt und Tenor der zwischen 1921 und 1924 gehaltenen Reden untersucht. Der dritte Teil beschäftigt sich mit den Aussagen der Redner zwischen 1925 und 1932. Zusammenfassung: In den zwanziger Jahren trugen der Episkopat und Alois zu Löwenstein, seit 1920 an der Spitze des Zentralkomitees mit der Organisation der Kongresse betraut, durch die Katholikentage gegen ihren Willen zur Konsolidierung des republikanischen Systems bei, indem sie die Errungenschaften für die katholischen Minderheit durch die Weimarer Verfassung bewahren und ausweiten wollten. Die Aussagen vieler Redner gegen die Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Kulturpolitik der Regierung waren allerdings eine kaum verhüllte Kritik des Zentrums. Durch die verwendete Symbolik wurde der Transzendenz in der Politik eine zentrale Stellung eingeräumt. Diese Symbolik stellte ein universales System der Interpretation der Welt vor, die nach dem Absoluten strebte, und brach damit mit dem republikanischen Pluralismus: Die Einheit sollte in Christus verwirklicht werden und nicht auf dem Wege des Konsens. In der Praxis gab es jedoch keine Opposition. Bei den Kongressen bemühte man sich, wie schon vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, das Bild der Einheit zu wahren. Um diese Einheit aufrecht zu erhalten, unterstrichen die meisten Redner die Bedeutung der Wahrung der christlichen Werte. Zu Beginn der dreißiger Jahre half diese Haltung ihnen einerseits sich gegen die Verführung durch die Nationalsozialisten zu wehren. Andererseits hinderte sie sie daran, sich dauerhaft mit anderen politischen Kräften, insbesondere den Sozialisten, zu verbünden, um die Nationalsozialisten wirksam zu bekämpfen. My Ph.D. thesis, Les catholiques allemands et la République de Weimar: les Katholikentage, 1919 – 1932, is about the Catholic Congresses (Katholikentage) during the Weimar Republic. These unique congresses, which have been neglected by historians, gathered together both laic and clerical forces within the German Catholic Church and were held annually from 1848 throughout Germany. The Catholic Congresses' ecclesiastical and political functions were intended to demonstrate Catholic power and present specific demands to the State. During the Weimar Republic, the organization of the Catholic Congresses depended on the balance of power between laity and clergy, national and local leaders, the Centre Party and other political trends and finally between the various Catholic associations representing different social and economic groups. The Catholic Congresses were thus an exceptional means of assessing the mentality of German Catholics during this era. In my thesis, I shed light on the internal character of German Catholic life as well as its interaction with the political and economic crises, which led to the rise of Nazism. My aim was to answer the following major questions: How did German Catholic leaders view themselves, the laity, the Protestants, and the State? What did German Catholics think about the rapid industrialization of their country, about liberalism and communism, modern values, and democracy? How far did German Catholics follow the political and social teachings of the Papacy? In comparison to right-wing and left-wing extremists, how different or similar were the ideas of German Catholics? ; Fondés en 1848 à Mayence par un ecclésiastique, Mgr Adam Franz Lennig, afin de défendre les libertés religieuses, les Katholikentage – littéralement « Congrès des Catholiques » ou « Journées des Catholiques » – rassemblaient à l'origine les représentants des principales associations catholiques et des personnalités en vue. Au cours des quelque vingt années suivantes, ils jouèrent un rôle majeur dans la mobilisation politique des laïcs. Le Kulturkampf prussien (1872-1878) resserra les liens entre le Zentrum, créé en 1870, et les Katholikentage qui firent progressivement office de congrès annuel du parti. Vers 1900, ils devinrent des assemblées de masse groupant plusieurs dizaines de milliers de participants dans le but de démontrer la solidarité des populations à la fois avec la hiérarchie ecclésiastique et avec les dirigeants du Zentrum. Après une interruption de huit ans, Francfort-sur-le-Main accueillit en 1921 le premier Katholikentag national d'après-guerre et inaugura la reprise des Congrès, organisés ensuite annuellement jusqu'en 1933, à l'exception du Katholikentag prévu en 1923 à Cologne et interdit par les forces d'occupation. Sous la République de Weimar, les Congrès furent les plus grandes assemblées de masse ayant lieu régulièrement : 250.000 personnes assistèrent à la messe dominicale de celui d'Essen, en 1932. Leur influence dépassa largement le nombre de participants, grâce au soutien du clergé au niveau local et national, ainsi qu'à celui du réseau d'associations catholiques et à la presse. Alors que le Zentrum a fait l'objet de nombreuses monographies, les Katholikentage ont été jusqu'à présent négligés par les historiens. Les quelques articles consacrés à la question ne retiennent souvent que la période antérieure à 1914 ou celle postérieure à la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ils mettent en avant le caractère démocratique des Congrès considérés comme les précurseurs de la Démocratie chrétienne incarnée par Konrad Adenauer après 1945. L'un des objectifs de cette thèse est de montrer les ambiguïtés liées à la dépolitisation officielle des Katholikentage sous la République de Weimar, période qui a été jusque-là soigneusement ignorée. Elle cherche à vérifier entre autre l'interprétation selon laquelle la séduction exercée par les régimes autoritaires sur les élites et les populations notamment européennes pendant la période de l'entre-deux-guerres n'aurait pas influencé les catholiques allemands avant le 30 janvier 1933. Les comptes rendus publiés des Katholikentage sont des sources officielles qui ont constitué la première étape de mon travail. Celui-ci a ensuite été complété par les archives privées des principaux dirigeants des Congrès et des associations catholiques. Comme le Comité central ne possède aucun fonds pour la période antérieure à 1952, j'ai dû rassembler des sources réparties dans les archives ecclésiastiques et civiles de chacune des villes où un Congrès a été organisé entre 1921 et 1933. Au total, 42 fonds d'archives différents ont été consultés. La thèse est divisée en trois parties. La première a pour objet d'analyser la reprise des Congrès au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, leur organisation, leur financement et la nature de leur cérémonial. La seconde partie étudie le contenu et l'esprit des discours tenus aux Katholikentage de Francfort-sur-le-Main en 1921, de Munich en 1922 et de Hanovre en 1924. La troisième partie est consacrée aux messages délivrés par les conférenciers à partir du Katholikentag de Stuttgart en 1925 jusqu'au Katholikentag d'Essen en 1932. Pendant les années vingt, aux Katholikentage, l'épiscopat et le prince Alois zu Löwenstein, à la tête du Comité central chargé de l'organisation des Congrès, contribuèrent contre leur gré à la consolidation du système républicain car ils cherchèrent avant tout à préserver et à étendre les acquis obtenus par la minorité catholique grâce à la Constitution de Weimar. Certes, les propos tenus par de nombreux conférenciers contre la politique économique, sociale et culturelle du gouvernement étaient des critiques à peine voilées du Zentrum. De plus, la symbolique utilisée accordait une place centrale à la transcendance en politique. Elle proposait un système global d'interprétation du monde tendant vers l'absolu, en rupture avec le pluralisme républicain : l'unité était à réaliser en Christ et non sur le terrain du consensus. Cependant, cette opposition ne s'incarna pas dans la pratique car les Congrès s'efforcèrent de préserver l'image de l'unité comme ils l'avaient fait avant la Première Guerre mondiale. Pour préserver cette unité, la plupart des intervenants aux Katholikentage adoptèrent une attitude de repli, arc-boutés sur la défense des valeurs chrétiennes. En un sens, cette attitude les protégea au début des années trente de la séduction exercée sur beaucoup par les nationaux-socialistes. Toutefois, elle les empêcha de s'allier durablement à d'autres forces politiques, en particulier aux socialistes, pour lutter efficacement contre les nationaux-socialistes.

Manuscrit terminé en juillet 2004 ; Vorstellung des Themas: Die von Prälat Adam Franz Lennig 1848 zur Verteidigung der Religionsfreiheit gegründeten Katholikentage sollten anfangs lediglich die Vertreter der wichtigsten katholischen Verbände sowie bedeutende Persönlichkeiten versammeln. Im Laufe der darauf folgenden zwanzig Jahre spielten sie eine zentrale Rolle bei der politischen Mobilisierung der Gläubigen. Der preußische Kulturkampf festigte die Bande zwischen dem im Jahre 1870 gegründeten Zentrum und den Katholikentagen, die sich allmählich zu dessen offiziellem Parteitag entwickelten. Gegen 1900 wurden sie dann zu Massenveranstaltungen mit mehreren tausend Teilnehmern, die die Solidarität der Bevölkerung mit der höheren Geistlichkeit einerseits und der Spitze des Zentrums andererseits demonstrieren sollten. Nach einer achtjährigen Unterbrechung wurde 1921 der erste nationale Katholikentag nach dem Krieg in Frankfurt am Main abgehalten. Danach wurden die Kongresse bis 1933 wieder regelmäßig jedes Jahr durchgeführt (außer 1923). In der Weimarer Republik waren die Kongresse die größten Massenveranstaltungen, die regelmäßig stattfanden: 1932 nahmen in Essen etwa 250.000 Katholiken an dem Festgottesdienst teil. Ihr Einfluss ging sogar, dank der Unterstützung durch die Geistlichkeit auf lokaler und nationaler Ebene, durch das Netz der katholischen Vereine sowie dank der Berichterstattung in der Presse erheblich über die zahlenmäßige Bedeutung hinaus. Aktueller Stand der Forschung und Problemstellung: Während das Zentrum bereits Gegenstand zahlreicher Monographien war, wurden die Katholikentage durch die Historiker vernachlässigt. Die wenigen Artikel, die sich mit dieser Frage beschäftigen, behandeln nur die Zeit vor dem Ersten oder nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Dabei wird der demokratische Charakter der Kongresse, die als Vorläufer der von Konrad Adenauer nach 1945 verkörperten Christdemokratie gelten, hervorgehoben. Ziel meiner Dissertation ist es, die Ambivalenzen, welche mit der offiziellen Entpolitisierung der Katholikentage in der Weimarer Republik verbunden waren, aufzuzeigen. Sie hinterfragt die Interpretation, wonach in Europa die autoritären Regime zwischen den Kriegen keine Anziehungskraft auf die deutschen Katholiken, und zwar weder auf die Eliten noch auf den Rest der Bevölkerung, ausübten. Verwendete Archive und Quellen: Zunächst analysierte ich die veröffentlichten Protokolle der Katholikentage, die offiziellen Quellen. In einem zweiten Schritt wertete ich (ergänzend) die Nachlässe der wichtigsten Führungspersönlichkeiten der Kongresse und katholischen Vereine aus. Das Zentralkomitee verfügt für die Zeit vor 1952 über keine Dokumente. Daher musste ich mich auf Quellen in den bischöflichen und städtischen Archiven der Orte, in denen zwischen 1921 und 1933 ein Kongress stattfand, stützen. Insgesamt wurden für die Arbeit Dokumente aus 42 Archiven ausgewertet. Gliederung der Dissertation: Die Dissertation gliedert sich in drei Teile. Im ersten Teil werden die Wiederaufnahme der Kongresse nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, ihre Organisation, Finanzierung und die Art der zeremoniellen Gestaltung analysiert. Im zweiten Teil werden Inhalt und Tenor der zwischen 1921 und 1924 gehaltenen Reden untersucht. Der dritte Teil beschäftigt sich mit den Aussagen der Redner zwischen 1925 und 1932. Zusammenfassung: In den zwanziger Jahren trugen der Episkopat und Alois zu Löwenstein, seit 1920 an der Spitze des Zentralkomitees mit der Organisation der Kongresse betraut, durch die Katholikentage gegen ihren Willen zur Konsolidierung des republikanischen Systems bei, indem sie die Errungenschaften für die katholischen Minderheit durch die Weimarer Verfassung bewahren und ausweiten wollten. Die Aussagen vieler Redner gegen die Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Kulturpolitik der Regierung waren allerdings eine kaum verhüllte Kritik des Zentrums. Durch die verwendete Symbolik wurde der Transzendenz in der Politik eine zentrale Stellung eingeräumt. Diese Symbolik stellte ein universales System der Interpretation der Welt vor, die nach dem Absoluten strebte, und brach damit mit dem republikanischen Pluralismus: Die Einheit sollte in Christus verwirklicht werden und nicht auf dem Wege des Konsens. In der Praxis gab es jedoch keine Opposition. Bei den Kongressen bemühte man sich, wie schon vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, das Bild der Einheit zu wahren. Um diese Einheit aufrecht zu erhalten, unterstrichen die meisten Redner die Bedeutung der Wahrung der christlichen Werte. Zu Beginn der dreißiger Jahre half diese Haltung ihnen einerseits sich gegen die Verführung durch die Nationalsozialisten zu wehren. Andererseits hinderte sie sie daran, sich dauerhaft mit anderen politischen Kräften, insbesondere den Sozialisten, zu verbünden, um die Nationalsozialisten wirksam zu bekämpfen. My Ph.D. thesis, Les catholiques allemands et la République de Weimar: les Katholikentage, 1919 – 1932, is about the Catholic Congresses (Katholikentage) during the Weimar Republic. These unique congresses, which have been neglected by historians, gathered together both laic and clerical forces within the German Catholic Church and were held annually from 1848 throughout Germany. The Catholic Congresses' ecclesiastical and political functions were intended to demonstrate Catholic power and present specific demands to the State. During the Weimar Republic, the organization of the Catholic Congresses depended on the balance of power between laity and clergy, national and local leaders, the Centre Party and other political trends and finally between the various Catholic associations representing different social and economic groups. The Catholic Congresses were thus an exceptional means of assessing the mentality of German Catholics during this era. In my thesis, I shed light on the internal character of German Catholic life as well as its interaction with the political and economic crises, which led to the rise of Nazism. My aim was to answer the following major questions: How did German Catholic leaders view themselves, the laity, the Protestants, and the State? What did German Catholics think about the rapid industrialization of their country, about liberalism and communism, modern values, and democracy? How far did German Catholics follow the political and social teachings of the Papacy? In comparison to right-wing and left-wing extremists, how different or similar were the ideas of German Catholics? ; Fondés en 1848 à Mayence par un ecclésiastique, Mgr Adam Franz Lennig, afin de défendre les libertés religieuses, les Katholikentage – littéralement « Congrès des Catholiques » ou « Journées des Catholiques » – rassemblaient à l'origine les représentants des principales associations catholiques et des personnalités en vue. Au cours des quelque vingt années suivantes, ils jouèrent un rôle majeur dans la mobilisation politique des laïcs. Le Kulturkampf prussien (1872-1878) resserra les liens entre le Zentrum, créé en 1870, et les Katholikentage qui firent progressivement office de congrès annuel du parti. Vers 1900, ils devinrent des assemblées de masse groupant plusieurs dizaines de milliers de participants dans le but de démontrer la solidarité des populations à la fois avec la hiérarchie ecclésiastique et avec les dirigeants du Zentrum. Après une interruption de huit ans, Francfort-sur-le-Main accueillit en 1921 le premier Katholikentag national d'après-guerre et inaugura la reprise des Congrès, organisés ensuite annuellement jusqu'en 1933, à l'exception du Katholikentag prévu en 1923 à Cologne et interdit par les forces d'occupation. Sous la République de Weimar, les Congrès furent les plus grandes assemblées de masse ayant lieu régulièrement : 250.000 personnes assistèrent à la messe dominicale de celui d'Essen, en 1932. Leur influence dépassa largement le nombre de participants, grâce au soutien du clergé au niveau local et national, ainsi qu'à celui du réseau d'associations catholiques et à la presse. Alors que le Zentrum a fait l'objet de nombreuses monographies, les Katholikentage ont été jusqu'à présent négligés par les historiens. Les quelques articles consacrés à la question ne retiennent souvent que la période antérieure à 1914 ou celle postérieure à la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ils mettent en avant le caractère démocratique des Congrès considérés comme les précurseurs de la Démocratie chrétienne incarnée par Konrad Adenauer après 1945. L'un des objectifs de cette thèse est de montrer les ambiguïtés liées à la dépolitisation officielle des Katholikentage sous la République de Weimar, période qui a été jusque-là soigneusement ignorée. Elle cherche à vérifier entre autre l'interprétation selon laquelle la séduction exercée par les régimes autoritaires sur les élites et les populations notamment européennes pendant la période de l'entre-deux-guerres n'aurait pas influencé les catholiques allemands avant le 30 janvier 1933. Les comptes rendus publiés des Katholikentage sont des sources officielles qui ont constitué la première étape de mon travail. Celui-ci a ensuite été complété par les archives privées des principaux dirigeants des Congrès et des associations catholiques. Comme le Comité central ne possède aucun fonds pour la période antérieure à 1952, j'ai dû rassembler des sources réparties dans les archives ecclésiastiques et civiles de chacune des villes où un Congrès a été organisé entre 1921 et 1933. Au total, 42 fonds d'archives différents ont été consultés. La thèse est divisée en trois parties. La première a pour objet d'analyser la reprise des Congrès au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, leur organisation, leur financement et la nature de leur cérémonial. La seconde partie étudie le contenu et l'esprit des discours tenus aux Katholikentage de Francfort-sur-le-Main en 1921, de Munich en 1922 et de Hanovre en 1924. La troisième partie est consacrée aux messages délivrés par les conférenciers à partir du Katholikentag de Stuttgart en 1925 jusqu'au Katholikentag d'Essen en 1932. Pendant les années vingt, aux Katholikentage, l'épiscopat et le prince Alois zu Löwenstein, à la tête du Comité central chargé de l'organisation des Congrès, contribuèrent contre leur gré à la consolidation du système républicain car ils cherchèrent avant tout à préserver et à étendre les acquis obtenus par la minorité catholique grâce à la Constitution de Weimar. Certes, les propos tenus par de nombreux conférenciers contre la politique économique, sociale et culturelle du gouvernement étaient des critiques à peine voilées du Zentrum. De plus, la symbolique utilisée accordait une place centrale à la transcendance en politique. Elle proposait un système global d'interprétation du monde tendant vers l'absolu, en rupture avec le pluralisme républicain : l'unité était à réaliser en Christ et non sur le terrain du consensus. Cependant, cette opposition ne s'incarna pas dans la pratique car les Congrès s'efforcèrent de préserver l'image de l'unité comme ils l'avaient fait avant la Première Guerre mondiale. Pour préserver cette unité, la plupart des intervenants aux Katholikentage adoptèrent une attitude de repli, arc-boutés sur la défense des valeurs chrétiennes. En un sens, cette attitude les protégea au début des années trente de la séduction exercée sur beaucoup par les nationaux-socialistes. Toutefois, elle les empêcha de s'allier durablement à d'autres forces politiques, en particulier aux socialistes, pour lutter efficacement contre les nationaux-socialistes.

Manuscrit terminé en juillet 2004 ; Vorstellung des Themas: Die von Prälat Adam Franz Lennig 1848 zur Verteidigung der Religionsfreiheit gegründeten Katholikentage sollten anfangs lediglich die Vertreter der wichtigsten katholischen Verbände sowie bedeutende Persönlichkeiten versammeln. Im Laufe der darauf folgenden zwanzig Jahre spielten sie eine zentrale Rolle bei der politischen Mobilisierung der Gläubigen. Der preußische Kulturkampf festigte die Bande zwischen dem im Jahre 1870 gegründeten Zentrum und den Katholikentagen, die sich allmählich zu dessen offiziellem Parteitag entwickelten. Gegen 1900 wurden sie dann zu Massenveranstaltungen mit mehreren tausend Teilnehmern, die die Solidarität der Bevölkerung mit der höheren Geistlichkeit einerseits und der Spitze des Zentrums andererseits demonstrieren sollten. Nach einer achtjährigen Unterbrechung wurde 1921 der erste nationale Katholikentag nach dem Krieg in Frankfurt am Main abgehalten. Danach wurden die Kongresse bis 1933 wieder regelmäßig jedes Jahr durchgeführt (außer 1923). In der Weimarer Republik waren die Kongresse die größten Massenveranstaltungen, die regelmäßig stattfanden: 1932 nahmen in Essen etwa 250.000 Katholiken an dem Festgottesdienst teil. Ihr Einfluss ging sogar, dank der Unterstützung durch die Geistlichkeit auf lokaler und nationaler Ebene, durch das Netz der katholischen Vereine sowie dank der Berichterstattung in der Presse erheblich über die zahlenmäßige Bedeutung hinaus. Aktueller Stand der Forschung und Problemstellung: Während das Zentrum bereits Gegenstand zahlreicher Monographien war, wurden die Katholikentage durch die Historiker vernachlässigt. Die wenigen Artikel, die sich mit dieser Frage beschäftigen, behandeln nur die Zeit vor dem Ersten oder nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Dabei wird der demokratische Charakter der Kongresse, die als Vorläufer der von Konrad Adenauer nach 1945 verkörperten Christdemokratie gelten, hervorgehoben. Ziel meiner Dissertation ist es, die Ambivalenzen, welche mit der offiziellen Entpolitisierung der Katholikentage in der Weimarer Republik verbunden waren, aufzuzeigen. Sie hinterfragt die Interpretation, wonach in Europa die autoritären Regime zwischen den Kriegen keine Anziehungskraft auf die deutschen Katholiken, und zwar weder auf die Eliten noch auf den Rest der Bevölkerung, ausübten. Verwendete Archive und Quellen: Zunächst analysierte ich die veröffentlichten Protokolle der Katholikentage, die offiziellen Quellen. In einem zweiten Schritt wertete ich (ergänzend) die Nachlässe der wichtigsten Führungspersönlichkeiten der Kongresse und katholischen Vereine aus. Das Zentralkomitee verfügt für die Zeit vor 1952 über keine Dokumente. Daher musste ich mich auf Quellen in den bischöflichen und städtischen Archiven der Orte, in denen zwischen 1921 und 1933 ein Kongress stattfand, stützen. Insgesamt wurden für die Arbeit Dokumente aus 42 Archiven ausgewertet. Gliederung der Dissertation: Die Dissertation gliedert sich in drei Teile. Im ersten Teil werden die Wiederaufnahme der Kongresse nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, ihre Organisation, Finanzierung und die Art der zeremoniellen Gestaltung analysiert. Im zweiten Teil werden Inhalt und Tenor der zwischen 1921 und 1924 gehaltenen Reden untersucht. Der dritte Teil beschäftigt sich mit den Aussagen der Redner zwischen 1925 und 1932. Zusammenfassung: In den zwanziger Jahren trugen der Episkopat und Alois zu Löwenstein, seit 1920 an der Spitze des Zentralkomitees mit der Organisation der Kongresse betraut, durch die Katholikentage gegen ihren Willen zur Konsolidierung des republikanischen Systems bei, indem sie die Errungenschaften für die katholischen Minderheit durch die Weimarer Verfassung bewahren und ausweiten wollten. Die Aussagen vieler Redner gegen die Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Kulturpolitik der Regierung waren allerdings eine kaum verhüllte Kritik des Zentrums. Durch die verwendete Symbolik wurde der Transzendenz in der Politik eine zentrale Stellung eingeräumt. Diese Symbolik stellte ein universales System der Interpretation der Welt vor, die nach dem Absoluten strebte, und brach damit mit dem republikanischen Pluralismus: Die Einheit sollte in Christus verwirklicht werden und nicht auf dem Wege des Konsens. In der Praxis gab es jedoch keine Opposition. Bei den Kongressen bemühte man sich, wie schon vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, das Bild der Einheit zu wahren. Um diese Einheit aufrecht zu erhalten, unterstrichen die meisten Redner die Bedeutung der Wahrung der christlichen Werte. Zu Beginn der dreißiger Jahre half diese Haltung ihnen einerseits sich gegen die Verführung durch die Nationalsozialisten zu wehren. Andererseits hinderte sie sie daran, sich dauerhaft mit anderen politischen Kräften, insbesondere den Sozialisten, zu verbünden, um die Nationalsozialisten wirksam zu bekämpfen. My Ph.D. thesis, Les catholiques allemands et la République de Weimar: les Katholikentage, 1919 – 1932, is about the Catholic Congresses (Katholikentage) during the Weimar Republic. These unique congresses, which have been neglected by historians, gathered together both laic and clerical forces within the German Catholic Church and were held annually from 1848 throughout Germany. The Catholic Congresses' ecclesiastical and political functions were intended to demonstrate Catholic power and present specific demands to the State. During the Weimar Republic, the organization of the Catholic Congresses depended on the balance of power between laity and clergy, national and local leaders, the Centre Party and other political trends and finally between the various Catholic associations representing different social and economic groups. The Catholic Congresses were thus an exceptional means of assessing the mentality of German Catholics during this era. In my thesis, I shed light on the internal character of German Catholic life as well as its interaction with the political and economic crises, which led to the rise of Nazism. My aim was to answer the following major questions: How did German Catholic leaders view themselves, the laity, the Protestants, and the State? What did German Catholics think about the rapid industrialization of their country, about liberalism and communism, modern values, and democracy? How far did German Catholics follow the political and social teachings of the Papacy? In comparison to right-wing and left-wing extremists, how different or similar were the ideas of German Catholics? ; Fondés en 1848 à Mayence par un ecclésiastique, Mgr Adam Franz Lennig, afin de défendre les libertés religieuses, les Katholikentage – littéralement « Congrès des Catholiques » ou « Journées des Catholiques » – rassemblaient à l'origine les représentants des principales associations catholiques et des personnalités en vue. Au cours des quelque vingt années suivantes, ils jouèrent un rôle majeur dans la mobilisation politique des laïcs. Le Kulturkampf prussien (1872-1878) resserra les liens entre le Zentrum, créé en 1870, et les Katholikentage qui firent progressivement office de congrès annuel du parti. Vers 1900, ils devinrent des assemblées de masse groupant plusieurs dizaines de milliers de participants dans le but de démontrer la solidarité des populations à la fois avec la hiérarchie ecclésiastique et avec les dirigeants du Zentrum. Après une interruption de huit ans, Francfort-sur-le-Main accueillit en 1921 le premier Katholikentag national d'après-guerre et inaugura la reprise des Congrès, organisés ensuite annuellement jusqu'en 1933, à l'exception du Katholikentag prévu en 1923 à Cologne et interdit par les forces d'occupation. Sous la République de Weimar, les Congrès furent les plus grandes assemblées de masse ayant lieu régulièrement : 250.000 personnes assistèrent à la messe dominicale de celui d'Essen, en 1932. Leur influence dépassa largement le nombre de participants, grâce au soutien du clergé au niveau local et national, ainsi qu'à celui du réseau d'associations catholiques et à la presse. Alors que le Zentrum a fait l'objet de nombreuses monographies, les Katholikentage ont été jusqu'à présent négligés par les historiens. Les quelques articles consacrés à la question ne retiennent souvent que la période antérieure à 1914 ou celle postérieure à la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ils mettent en avant le caractère démocratique des Congrès considérés comme les précurseurs de la Démocratie chrétienne incarnée par Konrad Adenauer après 1945. L'un des objectifs de cette thèse est de montrer les ambiguïtés liées à la dépolitisation officielle des Katholikentage sous la République de Weimar, période qui a été jusque-là soigneusement ignorée. Elle cherche à vérifier entre autre l'interprétation selon laquelle la séduction exercée par les régimes autoritaires sur les élites et les populations notamment européennes pendant la période de l'entre-deux-guerres n'aurait pas influencé les catholiques allemands avant le 30 janvier 1933. Les comptes rendus publiés des Katholikentage sont des sources officielles qui ont constitué la première étape de mon travail. Celui-ci a ensuite été complété par les archives privées des principaux dirigeants des Congrès et des associations catholiques. Comme le Comité central ne possède aucun fonds pour la période antérieure à 1952, j'ai dû rassembler des sources réparties dans les archives ecclésiastiques et civiles de chacune des villes où un Congrès a été organisé entre 1921 et 1933. Au total, 42 fonds d'archives différents ont été consultés. La thèse est divisée en trois parties. La première a pour objet d'analyser la reprise des Congrès au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, leur organisation, leur financement et la nature de leur cérémonial. La seconde partie étudie le contenu et l'esprit des discours tenus aux Katholikentage de Francfort-sur-le-Main en 1921, de Munich en 1922 et de Hanovre en 1924. La troisième partie est consacrée aux messages délivrés par les conférenciers à partir du Katholikentag de Stuttgart en 1925 jusqu'au Katholikentag d'Essen en 1932. Pendant les années vingt, aux Katholikentage, l'épiscopat et le prince Alois zu Löwenstein, à la tête du Comité central chargé de l'organisation des Congrès, contribuèrent contre leur gré à la consolidation du système républicain car ils cherchèrent avant tout à préserver et à étendre les acquis obtenus par la minorité catholique grâce à la Constitution de Weimar. Certes, les propos tenus par de nombreux conférenciers contre la politique économique, sociale et culturelle du gouvernement étaient des critiques à peine voilées du Zentrum. De plus, la symbolique utilisée accordait une place centrale à la transcendance en politique. Elle proposait un système global d'interprétation du monde tendant vers l'absolu, en rupture avec le pluralisme républicain : l'unité était à réaliser en Christ et non sur le terrain du consensus. Cependant, cette opposition ne s'incarna pas dans la pratique car les Congrès s'efforcèrent de préserver l'image de l'unité comme ils l'avaient fait avant la Première Guerre mondiale. Pour préserver cette unité, la plupart des intervenants aux Katholikentage adoptèrent une attitude de repli, arc-boutés sur la défense des valeurs chrétiennes. En un sens, cette attitude les protégea au début des années trente de la séduction exercée sur beaucoup par les nationaux-socialistes. Toutefois, elle les empêcha de s'allier durablement à d'autres forces politiques, en particulier aux socialistes, pour lutter efficacement contre les nationaux-socialistes.

With President Milei's election in Argentina, dollarization is suddenly on the table. I'm for it. Here's why. Why not? A standard of valueStart with "why not?'' Dollarization, not a national currency, is actually a sensible default. The dollar is the US standard of value. We measure length in feet, weight in pounds, and the value of goods in dollars. Why should different countries use different measures of value? Wouldn't it make sense to use a common standard of value? Once upon a time every country, and often every city, had its own weights and measures. That made trade difficult, so we eventually converged on international weights and measures. (Feet and pounds are actually a US anachronism since everyone else uses meters and kilograms.  Clearly if we had to start over we'd use SI units, as science and engineering already do.) Moreover, nobody thinks it's a good idea to periodically shorten the meter in order to stimulate the economy, say by making the sale of cloth more profitable. As soon as people figure out they need to buy more cloth to make the same jeans, the profit goes away. PrecommitmentPrecommitment is, I think,  the most powerful argument for dollarization (as for euorization of, say, Greece): A country that dollarizes cannot print money to spend more than it receives in taxes. A country that dollarizes must also borrow entirely in dollars, and must endure costly default rather than relatively less costly inflation if it doesn't want to repay debts. Ex post inflation and devaluation is always tempting, to pay deficits, to avoid paying debt, to transfer money from savers to borrowers, to advantage exporters, or to goose the economy ahead of elections. If a government can precommit itself to eschew inflation and devaluation, then it can borrow a lot more money on better terms, and its economy will be far better off in the long run. An independent central bank is often advocated for precommitment value. Well, locating the central bank 5,000 miles away in a country that doesn't care about your economy is as independent as you can get!The Siren Vase. Greek 480-470 BC. Source: The Culture CriticPrecommitment is an old idea. See picture. It's hard. A country must set things up so that it cannot give in to temptation ex post, and it will regret and try to wriggle out of that commitment when the time comes. A lot of the structure of our laws and government amount to a set of precommitments. An independent central bank with a price-level mandate is a precommitment not to inflate. A constitution and property rights are precommitments not to expropriate electoral minorities. Especially in Argentina's case, precommitment is why full dollarization is better than an exchange rate peg or a currency board. A true exchange rate peg -- one dollar for one peso, as much as you like -- would seem to solve the temptation-to-inflate problem. But the country can always abrogate the peg, reinstitute currency controls, and inflate. An exchange rate peg is ultimately a fiscal promise; the country will raise enough taxes so that it can get the dollars necessary to back its currency. When that seems too hard, countries devalue the peg or abandon it altogether. A currency board is tougher. Under a currency board,  every peso issued by the government is backed by a dollar. That seems to ensure adequate reserves to handle any conceivable run. But a strapped government eyes the great Uncle-Scrooge swimming pool full of dollars at the currency board, and is tempted to abrogate the board, grab the assets and spend them. That's exactly how Argentina's currency board ended. Dollarization is a burn the ships strategy. There is no return. Reserves are neither necessary nor sufficient for an exchange rate peg. The peg is a fiscal promise and stands and falls with fiscal policy. A currency board, to the governmentFull dollarization -- the country uses actual dollars, and abandons its currency -- cannot be so swiftly undone. The country would have to pass laws to reinstitute the peso, declare all dollar contracts to be Peso contracts, ban the use of dollars and try to confiscate them. Dollars pervading the country would make that hard. People who understand their wealth is being confiscated and replaced by monopoly money would make it harder -- harder than some technical change in the amount of backing at the central bank for the same peso notes and bank accounts underlying a devalued peg or even an abrogated currency board. The design of dollarization should make it harder to undo. The point is precommitment, to make it as costly as possible for a following government to de-dollarize, after all. It's hard to confiscate physical cash, but if domestic Argentine banks have dollar accounts and dollar assets, it is relatively easy to pronounce the accounts in pesos and grab the assets. It would be better if dollarization were accompanied by full financial, capital, and trade liberalization, including allowing foreign banks to operate freely and Argentinian banks to become subsidiaries of foreign banks. Absence of a central bank and domestic deposit insurance will make that even more desirable. Then Argentinian bank "accounts" could be claims to dollar assets held offshore, that remain intact no matter what a future Peronist government does. Governments in fiscal stress that print up money, like Argentina, also impose an array of economy-killing policies to try to prop up the value of their currency, so the money printing generates more revenue. They restrict imports with tariffs, quotas, and red tape; they can restrict exports to try to steer supply to home markets at lower prices; they restrict currency conversion and do so at manipulated rates; they restrict capital markets, stopping people from investing abroad or borrowing abroad; they force people to hold money in oligopolized bank accounts at artificially low interest rates. Dollarization is also a precommitment to avoid or at least reduce all these harmful policies, as generating a demand for a country's currency doesn't do any good to the government budget when there isn't a currency. Zimbabwe dollarized in 2009, giving up on its currency after the greatest hyperinflation ever seen. The argument for Argentina is similar. Ecuador dollarized successfully in much less trying circumstances. It's not a new idea, and unilateral dollarization is possible. In both cases there was a period in which both currencies circulated. (Sadly, Zimbabwe ended dollarization in 2019, with a re-introduction of the domestic currency and redenomination of dollar deposits at a very unfavorable exchange rate. It is possible to undo, and the security of dollar bank accounts in face of such appropriation is an important part of the dollarization precommitment.) The limits of precommitmentDollarization is no panacea. It will work if it is accompanied by fiscal and microeconomic reform. It will be of limited value otherwise. I'll declare a motto: All successful inflation stabilizations have come from a combination of fiscal, monetary and microeconomic reform. Dollarization does not magically solve intractable budget deficits. Under dollarization, if the government cannot repay debt or borrow, it must default.  And Argentina has plenty of experience with sovereign default. Argentina already borrows abroad in dollars, because nobody abroad wants peso debt, and has repeatedly defaulted on dollar debt.  The idea of dollar debt is that explicit default is more costly than inflation, so the country will work harder to repay debt. Bond purchasers, aware of the temptation to default, will put clauses in debt contracts that make default more costly still. For you to borrow, you have to give the bank the title to the house. Sovereign debt issued under foreign law, with rights to grab assets abroad works similarly. But sovereign default is not infinitely costly and countries like Argentina sometimes choose default anyway. Where inflation may represent simply hugging the mast and promising not to let go, default is a set of loose handcuffs that you can wriggle out of painfully. Countries are like corporations. Debt denominated in the country's own currency is like corporate equity (stock): If the government can't or won't pay it back the price can fall, via inflation and currency devaluation. Debt denominated in foreign currency is like debt: If the government can't or won't pay it back, it must default. (Most often, default is partial. You get back some of what is promised, or you are forced to convert maturing debt into new debt at a lower interest rate.) The standard ideas of corporate finance tell us who issues debt and who issues equity.  Small businesses, new businesses, businesses that don't have easily valuable assets,  businesses where it is too easy for the managers to hide cash, are forced to borrow, to issue debt. You have to borrow to start a restaurant. Businesses issue equity when they have good corporate governance, good accounting, and stockholders can be sure they're getting their share. These ideas apply to countries, and the choice between borrowing in their own currency and borrowing in foreign currency. Countries with poor governance, poor accounting, out of control fiscal policies, poor institutions for repayment, have to borrow in foreign currency if they are going to borrow at all, with intrusive conditions making default even more expensive. Issuing and borrowing in your own currency, with the option to inflate, is the privilege of countries with good institutions, and democracies where voters get really mad about inflation in particular. Of course, when things get really bad, the country can't borrow in either domestic or foreign currency. Then it prints money, forcing its citizens to take it. That's where Argentina is. In personal finance, you start with no credit at all; then you can borrow; finally you can issue equity. On the scale of healthier economies, dollarizing is the next step up for Argentina. Dollarization and foreign currency debt have another advantage. If a country inflates its way out of a fiscal mess, that benefits the government but also benefits all private borrowers at the expense of private savers. Private borrowing inherits the inflation premium of government borrowing, as the effective government default induces a widespread private default. Dollarization and sovereign default can allow the sovereign to default without messing up private contracts, and all prices and wages in the economy. It is possible for sovereigns to pay higher interest rates than good companies, and the sovereign to be more likely to default than those companies. It doesn't always happen, because sovereigns about to default usually grab all the wealth they can find on the way down, but the separation of sovereign default from inflationary chaos is also an advantage. Greece is a good example, and a bit Italy as well, both in the advantages and the cautionary tale about the limitations of dollarization. Greece and Italy used to have their own currencies. They also had borders, trade controls, and capital controls. They had regular inflation and devaluation. Every day seemed to be another "crisis" demanding another "just this once" splurge. As a result, they paid quite high interest rates to borrow, since savvy bondholders wanted insurance against another "just this once."They joined the EU and the eurozone. This step precommitted them to free trade, relatively free capital markets, and no national currency.  Sovereign default was possible, but regarded as very costly. Having banks stuffed with sovereign debt made it more costly.  Leaving the euro was possible, but even more costly. Deliberately having no plan to do so made it more costly still. The ropes tying hands to the mast were pretty strong. The result: borrowing costs plummeted. Governments, people and businesses were able to borrow at unheard of low rates. And they did so, with aplomb. The borrowing could have financed public and private investment to take advantage of the new business opportunities the EU allowed. Sadly it did not. Greece soon experienced the higher ex-post costs of default that the precommitment imposed. Dollarizaton -- euroization -- is a precommitment, not a panacea. Recommitments impose costs on yourself ex post. Those costs are real.  A successful dollarization for Argentina has to be part of a joint monetary, fiscal, and microeconomic reform. (Did I say that already? :) ) If public finances aren't sorted out, a default will come eventually. And public finances don't need a sharp bout of "austerity" to please the IMF. They need decades of small primary surpluses, tax revenues slightly higher than spending, to credibly pay down any debt. To get decades of revenue, the best answer is growth. Tax revenue equals tax rate times income. More income is a lot easier than higher tax rate, which at least partially lowers income. Greece and Italy did not accomplish the microeconomic reform part. Fortunately, for Argentina, microeconomic reform is low-hanging fruit, especially for a Libertarian president. TransitionWell, so much for the Promised Land, they may have asked of Moses, how do we get there? And let's not spend 40 years wandering the Sinai on the way. Transition isn't necessarily hard. On 1 January 1999, Italy switched from Lira to Euro. Every price changed overnight, every bank account redenominated, every contract reinterpreted, all instantly and seamlessly. People turned in Lira banknotes for Euro banknotes. The biggest complaint is that stores might have rounded up converted prices. If only Argentina could have such problems. Why is Argentina not the same? Well, for a lot of reasons. Before getting to the euro, Italy had adopted the EU open market. Exchange rates had been successfully pegged at the conversion rate, and no funny business about multiple rates. The ECB (really the Italian central bank) could simply print up euros to hand out in exchange for lira. The assets of the Italian central bank and other national central banks were also redenominated in euro, so printing up euros to soak up national currencies was not inflationary -- assets still equal liabilities. Banks with lira deposits that convert to Euro also have lira assets that convert to euro. And there was no sovereign debt crisis, bank crisis,  or big inflation going on. Italian government debt was trading freely on an open market. Italy would spend and receive taxes in euros, so if the debt was worth its current price in lira as the present value of surpluses,  it was worth exactly the same price, at the conversion rate, in euro. None of this is true in Argentina. The central problem, of course, is that the government is broke. The government does not have dollars to exchange for Pesos. Normally, this would not be a problem. Reserves don't matter, the fiscal capacity to get reserves matters. The government could simply borrow dollars internationally, give the dollars out in exchange for pesos, and slowly pay off the resulting debt. If Argentina redenominated interest-bearing peso debt to dollars at a market exchange rate, that would have no effect on the value of the debt. Obviously, borrowing additional dollars would likely be difficult for Argentina right now. To the extent that its remaining debt is a claim to future inflationary seigniorage revenues, its debt is also worth less once converted to dollars, even at a free market rate, because without seigniorage or fiscal reforms, budget deficits will increase. And that leads to the primary argument against dollarization I hear these days. Yes it might be the promised land, but it's too hard to get there. I don't hear loudly enough, though, what is the alternative? One more muddle of currency boards, central bank rules, promises to the IMF and so forth? How do you suddenly create the kind of stable institutions that Argentina has lacked for a century to justify a respectable currency? One might say this is a problem of price, not of quantity. Pick the right exchange rate, and conversion is possible. But that is not even clearly true. If the state is truly broke, if pesos are only worth anything because of the legal restrictions forcing people to hold them, then pesos and peso debt are genuinely worthless. The only route to dollarization would be essentially a complete collapse of the currency and debt. They are worth nothing. We start over. You can use dollars, but you'll have to export something to the US -- either goods or capital, i.e. stock and bonds in private companies -- to get them. (Well, to get any more of them. Lots of dollars line Argentine mattresses already.) That is enough economic chaos to really put people off. In reality, I think the fear is not a completely worthless currency, but that a move to quick dollarization would make peso and peso claims worth very little, and people would rebel against seeing their money holdings and bank accounts even more suddenly worthless than they are now. Maybe, maybe not. Just who is left in Argentina counting on a robust value of pesos? But the state is not worth nothing. It may be worth little in mark to market, or current dollar borrowing capacity. But a reformed, growing Argentina, with tax, spending, and microeconomic reform, could be a great place for investment, and for tax revenue above costs. Once international lenders are convinced those reform efforts are locked in, and Argentina will grow to anything like its amazing potential, they'll be stumbling over themselves to lend. So a better dollarization plan redeems pesos at the new greater value of the post-reform Argentine state. The question is a bit of chicken and egg: Dollarization has to be part of the reform, but only reform allows  dollarization with a decent value of peso exchange.  So there is a genuine question of sequencing of reforms. This question reminds me of the totally fruitless discussion when the Soviet Union broke up. American economists amused themselves with clever optimal sequencing of liberalization schemes. But if competent benevolent dictators (sorry, "policy-makers") were running the show, the Soviet Union wouldn't have failed in the first place. The end of hyperinflation in Germany. Price level 1919-1924. Note left-axis scale. Source: Sargent (1982) "The ends of four big inflations." A better historical analogy is, I think, the ends of hyperinflation after WWI, so beautifully described by Tom Sargent in 1982. The inflations were stopped by a sudden, simultaneous, fiscal, monetary, and (to some extent) microeconomic reform. The fiscal problem was solved by renegotiating reparations under the Versailles treaty, along with  severe cuts in domestic spending, for example firing a lot of government and (nationalized) railroad workers. There were monetary reforms, including an independent central bank forbidden to buy government debt. There were some microeconomic reforms as well. Stopping inflation took no monetary stringency or high interest rates: Interest rates fell, and the governments printed more money, as real money demand increased. There was no Phillips curve of high unemployment. Employment and the economies boomed. So I'm for almost-simultaneous and fast reforms. 1) Allow the use of dollars everywhere. Dollars and pesos can coexist. Yes, this will put downward pressure on the value of the peso, but that might be crucial to maintain interest in the other reforms, which will raise the value of the peso. 2) Instant unilateral free trade and capital opening. Argentina will have to export goods and capital to get dollars. Get out of the way. Freeing imports will lower their prices and make the economy more efficient. Capital will only come in, which it should do quickly, if it knows it can get out again. Float the peso. 3) Long list of growth - oriented microeconomic reforms. That's why you elected a Libertarian president.  4) Slash spending. Reform taxes. Low marginal rates, broad base. Subsidies in particular distort prices to transfer income. Eliminate. 5)  Once reforms are in place, and Argentina has some borrowing capacity, redenominate debt to dollars, and borrow additional dollars to exchange pesos for dollars. All existing peso contracts including bank accounts change on the date. Basically, you want people to hold peso bills and peso debt in the interim as claims on the post-reform government. Peso holders have an incentive to push for reforms that will raise the eventual exchange value of the peso.   6) Find an interim lender. The central problem is who will lend to Argentina in mid stream in order to retire pesos. This is like debtor in possession financing but for a bankrupt country. This could be a job for the IMF. The IMF could lend Argentina dollars for the purpose of retiring pesos. One couldn't ask for much better "conditionality" than a robust Libertarian pro-growth program. Having the IMF along for the ride might also help to commit Argentina to the program. (The IMF can force conditionality better than private lenders.) When things have settled down, Argentina should be able to borrow dollars privately to pay back the IMF. The IMF might charge a decent interest rate to encourage that. How much borrowing is needed? Less than you think. Interest-paying debt can simply be redenominated in dollars once you pick a rate. That might be hard to pay off, but that's a problem for later. So Argentina really only needs to borrow enough dollars to retire cash pesos. I can't find numbers, but hyper inflationary countries typically don't have much real value of cash outstanding. The US has 8% of GDP in currency outstanding. If Argentina has half that, then it needs to borrow only 4% of GDP in dollars to buy back all its currency. That's not a lot. If the peso really collapses, borrowing a little bit more (against great future growth of the reform program) to give everyone $100, the sort of fresh start that Germany did after WWII and after unification, is worth considering. Most of the worry about Argentina's borrowing ability envisions continued primary deficits with slow fiscal adjustment. Make the fiscal adjustment tomorrow."You never want a serious crisis to go to waste," said Rahm Emanuel wisely. "Sequencing" reforms means that everything promised tomorrow is up for constant renegotiation. Especially when parts of the reform depend on other parts, I'm for doing it all as fast as possible, and then adding refinements later if need be. Roosevelt had his famous 100 days, not a 8 year sequenced program. The Argentine reform program is going to hurt a lot of people, or at least recognize losses that had long been papered over in the hope they would go away. Politically, one wants  to make the case "We're all in this, we're all hurting. You give up your special deal, preferential exchange rate, special subsidy or whatever, but so will everyone else. Hang with me to make sure they don't get theirs, and in a year we'll all be better off." If reforms are in a long sequence, which means long renegotiation, it's much harder to get buy in from people who are hurt earlier on that the ones who come later will also do their part.  The standard answersOne standard critique of dollarization is  monetary policy and "optimal currency areas." By having a national currency, the country's wise central bankers can artfully inflate and devalue the currency on occasion to adapt to negative shocks, without the inconvenience and potential dislocation of everyone in the country lowering prices and wages. Suppose, say, the country produces beef, and exports it in order to import cars. If world demand for beef declines, the dollar price of beef declines. The country is going to have to import fewer cars. In a dollarized country, or with a pegged exchange rate,  the internal price of beef and wages go down. With its own country and a floating rate, the value of the currency could go down, leaving beef and wages the same inside the country, but the price of imported cars goes up.  If lowering prices and wages causes more recession and dislocation than raising import prices, then the artful devaluation is the better idea.  (To think about this question more carefully you need traded and non-traded goods; beef, cars, and haircuts. The relative price of beef, cars, and haircuts along with demand for haircuts is also different under the two regimes). Similarly, suppose there is a "lack of demand'' recession and deflation. (90 years later, economists are still struggling to say exactly where that comes from.) With its own central bank and currency, the country can artfully inflate just enough to offset the recession. A country that dollarizes also has to import not-always-optimal US inflation. Switzerland did a lot better than the US and EU once again in the covid era. This line of thinking answers the question, "OK, if Argentina ($847 bn GDP, beef exports) should have its own currency in order to artfully offset shocks, why shouldn't Colorado ($484 bn GDP, beef exports)?''  Colorado is  more dependent on trade with the rest of the US than is Argentina. But, the story goes, people can more easily move across states. A common federal government shoves "fiscal stimulus" to states in trouble. Most of all, "lack of demand" recessions seem to be national, in part because of the high integration of states, so recessions are fought by national policy and don't need state-specific monetary stimulus. This is the standard "optimal currency area" line of thinking, which recommends a common currency in an integrated free trade zone such as US, small Latin American countries that trade a lot with the US, and Europe. Standard thinking especially likes a common currency in a fiscal union.  Some commenters felt Greece should keep or revert to the Drachma because the EU didn't have enough common countercyclical fiscal policy. It likes independent currencies elsewhere.I hope you're laughing out loud by now. A wise central bank, coupled with a thrifty national government, that artfully inflates and devalues just enough to technocratically exploit price stickiness and financial frictions, offsetting national "shocks" with minimum disruption, is a laughable description of Argentina's fiscal and monetary policies. Periodic inflation, hyperinflation and default, together with a wildly overregulated economy with far too much capital and trade controls is more like it. The lure of technocratic stabilization policy in the face of Argentina's fiscal and monetary chaos is like fantasizing whether you want the tan or black leather on your new Porsche while you're on the bus to Carmax to see if you can afford a 10-year old Toyota. Another reason people argue that even small countries should have their own currencies is to keep the seigniorage. Actual cash pays no interest. Thus, a government that issues cash earns the interest spread between government bonds and interest. Equivalently, if demand for cash is proportional to GDP, then as GDP grows, say 2% per year, then the government can let cash grow 2% per year as well, i.e. it can print up that much cash and spend it. But this sort of seigniorage is small for modern economies that don't have inflation. Without inflation, a well run economy might pay 2% for its debt, so save 2% by issuing currency. 2% interest times cash which is 10% of GDP is 0.2% of GDP. On the scale of Argentinian (or US) debt and deficits, that's couch change.  When inflation is higher, interest rates are higher, and seigniorage or the "inflation tax" is higher. Argentina is living off that now. But the point is not to inflate forever and to forswear bigger inflation taxes. Keeping this small seigniorage is one reason for countries to keep their currency and peg to the dollar or run a currency board. The currency board holds interest-bearing dollar assets, and the government gets the interest. Nice. But as I judge above, the extra precommitment value of total dollarization is worth the small lost seigniorage.  Facing Argentina's crisis, plus its catastrophic century of lost growth, lost seigniorage is a cost that I judge far below the benefit. Other countries dollarize, but agree with the US Fed to rebate them some money for the seigniorage. Indeed, if Argentina dollarizes and holds 10% of its GDP in non-interest-bearing US dollars, that's a nice little present to the US. A dollarization agreement with Argentina to give them back the seignorage would be the least we can do. But I don't think Argentina should hold off waiting for Jay Powell to answer the phone. The Fed has other fires to put out. If Argentina unilaterally dollarizes, they can work this sort of thing out later. Dollarization would obviously be a lot easier if it is worked out together with the US government and US banks. Getting cash sent to Argentina, getting banks to have easy payment systems in dollars and links to US banks would make it all easier. If Argentina gets rid of its central bank it still needs a payment system to settle claims in dollars. Accounts at, say, Chase could function as a central bank. But it would all be easier if the US cooperates. Updates:Some commenters point out that Argentina may be importing US monetary policy just as the US imports Argentine fiscal policy. That would lead to importing a big inflation. They suggest a Latin American Monetary Union, like the euro, or using a third country's currency. The Swiss franc is pretty good. Maybe the Swiss can set the world standard of value. Both are good theoretical ideas but a lot harder to achieve in the short run. Dollarization will be hard enough. Argentines have a lot of dollars already, most trade is invoiced in dollars so getting dollars via trade is relatively easy, the Swiss have not built out a banking infrastructure capable of being a global currency. The EMU lives on top of the EU, and has its own fiscal/monetary problems. Building a new currency before solving Argentina's problems sounds like a long road. The question asked was dollarization, so I stuck to that for now. I imagined here unilateral dollarization. But I didn't emphasize enough: The US should encourage dollarization! China has figured this out and desperately wants anyone to use its currency. Why should we not want more people to use our currency? Not just for the seigniorage revenue, but for the ease of trade and international linkages it promotes. The Treasury and Fed should have a "how to dollarize your economy" package ready to go for anyone who wants it. Full integration is not trivial, including access to currency, getting bank access to the Fed's clearing systems, instituting cyber and money laundering protocols, and so forth. Important update: Daniel Raisbeck and Gabriela Calderon de Burgos at CATO have a lovely essay on Argentinian dollarization, also debunking an earlier Economist article that proclaimed it impossible. They include facts and comparison with other dollarization experiences, not just theory as I did. (Thanks to the correspondent who pointed me to the essay.) Some quotes:At the end of 2022, Argentines held over $246 billion in foreign bank accounts, safe deposit boxes, and mostly undeclared cash, according to Argentina's National Institute of Statistics and Census. This amounts to over 50 percent of Argentina's GDP in current dollars for 2021 ($487 billion). Hence, the dollar scarcity pertains only to the Argentine state....The last two dollarization processes in Latin American countries prove that "purchasing" the entire monetary base with U.S. dollars from one moment to the next is not only impractical, but it is also unnecessary. In both Ecuador and El Salvador, which dollarized in 2000 and 2001 respectively, dollarization involved parallel processes. In both countries, the most straightforward process was the dollarization of all existing deposits, which can be converted into dollars at the determined exchange rate instantly.in both Ecuador and El Salvador, dollarization not only did not lead to bank runs; it led to a rapid and sharp increase in deposits, even amid economic and political turmoil in Ecuador's case....There is a general feature of ending hyperinflation: People hold more money. In this case, people hold more bank accounts once they know those accounts are safe. Short summary of the rest, all those dollar deposits (out of mattresses into the banking system) allowed the central bank to retire its local currency liabilities. Emilio Ocampo, the Argentine economist whom Milei has put in charge of plans for Argentina's dollarization should he win the presidency, summarizes Ecuador's experience thus:People exchanged their dollars through the banks and a large part of those dollars were deposited in the same banks. The central bank had virtually no need to disburse reserves. This was not by design but was a spontaneous result.In El Salvador also, Dollar deposits also increased spontaneously in El Salvador, a country that dollarized in 2001. By the end of 2022, the country's deposits amounted to 49.6 percent of GDP—in Panama, another dollarized peer, deposits stood at 117 percent of GDP.El Salvador's banking system was dollarized immediately, but the conversion of the circulating currency was voluntary, with citizens allowed to decide if and when to exchange their colones for dollars. Ocampo notes that, in both Ecuador and El Salvador, only 30 percent of the circulating currency had been exchanged for dollars four months after dollarization was announced so that both currencies circulated simultaneously. In the latter country, it took over two years for 90 percent of the monetary base to be dollar‐​based.Cachanosky explains that, in an El Salvador‐​type, voluntary dollarization scenario, the circulating national currency can be dollarized as it is deposited or used to pay taxes, in which case the sums are converted to dollars once they enter a state‐​owned bank account. Hence, "there is no need for the central bank to buy the circulating currency" at a moment's notice.Dollarization starts with both currencies and a peg. As long as people trust that dollarization will happen at the peg, the conversion can take a while. You do not need dollars to soak up every peso on day 1. Dollarization is, above, a commitment that the peg will last for years, not a necessary commitment that the peg will last a day. I speculated about private borrowing at lower rates than the sovereign, once default rather than inflation is the only way out for the sovereign. This happened: ... as Manuel Hinds, a former finance minister in El Salvador, has explained, solvent Salvadorans in the private sector can borrow at rates of around 7 percent on their mortgages while international sovereign bond markets will only lend to the Salvadoran government at far higher rates. As Hinds writes, under dollarization, "the government cannot transfer its financial costs to the private sector by printing domestic money and devaluing it."A nice bottom line: Ask people in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama what they think:This is yet another lesson of dollarization's actual experience in Latin American countries. It is also a reason why the vast majority of the population in the dollarized nations has no desire for a return to a national currency. The monetary experiences of daily life have taught them that dollarization's palpable benefits far outweigh its theoretical drawbacks. Even more important update:From Nicolás Cachonosky How to Dollarize Argentina  The central problem is non-money liabilities of the central bank. A detailed plan. Many other blog posts at the link. See his comment below.  Tyler Cowen on dollarization in Bloomberg. Great quote: The question is not how to adopt a new currency, it is how to adopt a new currency and retain a reasonable value for the old one. Dollarization is easy. Hyperinflate the Peso to zero a la Zimbabwe.  Repeat quote. Emilio Ocampo on dollarization as a commitment device. One of the main reasons to dollarize is to eliminate high, persistent, and volatile inflation. However, to be effective, dollarization must generate sufficient credibility, which in turn depends critically on whether its expected probability of reversal is low.... The evidence suggests that, in the long-run, the strongest insurance against reversal is the support of the electorate, but in the short-run, institutional design [dollarization] can play a critical role.Fifty years ago, in testimony to U.S. Congress, Milton Friedman argued that "the whole reason why it is an advantage for a developing country to tie to a major country is that, historically speaking, the internal policies of developing countries have been very bad. U.S. policy has been bad, but their policies have been far worse. ... (1973, p.127)."In this respect, not much has changed in Argentina since. Craig Richardson explains how dollarization failed in Zimbabwe, a wonderful cautionary tale. Deficits did not stop, the government issued "bonds" and forced banks to buy them, bank accounts became de linked from currency. Gresham's law prevailed, the government "bonds" circulating at half face value drove out cash dollars. With persistent government and trade deficits there was a "dollar shortage." 

Tes per compendi de publicacions. Aplicat embargament des de la data de defensa fins juny 2019 ; Bridging the gap between the predicted and actual energy performance of buildings is necessary to increase the energy performance of existing buildings and achieve the European Union's energy efficiency targets in the "2030 climate & energy framework". Construction is considered the sector with the most potential for energy saving. Specifically, buildings space heating has considerable potential for energy saving. Thermal transmittance is the fundamental parameter to characterise the heat losses of building envelopes. However, several research authors evidenced that assumptions regarding heat loss from a home pre-retrofit and post-retrofit were incorrect. In this sense, accurate on-site measurements are necessary to provide information on the actual thermal transmittance of façades. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to reduce the energy performance gap of residential buildings. Therefore, the aim of the thesis is to enhance the accuracy of in situ measurements of the actual thermal transmittance of façades of existing residential buildings using the heat flux meter method to ensure successful decision-making during the energy renovation processes of existing buildings, and to confirm energy performance strategies for new nearly zero-energy buildings. The analysis of testing parameters for the in situ measurement process of the thermal transmittance are not fully specified by the standard ISO used extensively. Relating to calculation methods to conduct research on the thermal behaviour of façades, the standardised average method is widely used by authors. Very few initiatives used the standardised dynamic method because it is more complex than the average method. This research assesses the implications of using the different standardised calculation methods in order to verify which best fits theoretical values. Moreover, the usability of the standardised dynamic method is promoted and facilitated through a calculation procedure, defining a programmed spreadsheet accessible to practitioners. The dissertation proposes a classification system of façades to facilitate the selection of façades to conduct a systematic analysis of the thermal performance of façades in the housing sector. The classification of façades of existing residential buildings for subsequent analysis is based on the characterization of the opaque part of façades. The dissertation continues with the exploration of the boundaries of the requirements for using the standardised heat flow meter method to refine the testing conditions in low U-value façades. Façades with low thermal transmittance values are increasingly promoted due to comply with Directive 2010/31/EC targets. However, as several researchers shown, conducting accurate in situ measurement of low thermal transmittance façades is a challenging task. Investigating the limits of application of the HFM method for the in situ measurement of U-values in low thermal transmittance façades would allow to ensure compliance with policies to transition the existing building stock to nearly zero-energy buildings, and to confirm energy performance strategies for new nearly zero-energy buildings. To enhance the usability of the heat flux meter method, the dissertation compares different criteria for determining conditions for stopping the test during in situ experimental campaigns when measuring the thermal transmittance of existing buildings' façades using the heat flow meter method. This will help to reduce practitioners' uncertainty about the duration of experimental campaigns for obtaining accurate actual thermal transmittance of existing buildings' façades. The dissertation concludes by outlining the main contributions of this research. The subjects that were raised during the research undertaken although they could not be addressed are commented and proposed as future work. ; Reduir la diferència entre el rendiment energètic previst i real dels edificis és necessari per tal d'augmentar el rendiment energètic dels edificis existents i assolir els objectius sobre eficiència energètica de la Unió Europea en el "Marc sobre clima i energia per al 2030". La construcció és considerada el sector amb més potencial d'estalvi energètic. Concretament, el condicionament tèrmic dels edificis mitjançant calefacció té un potencial d'estalvi energètic considerable. La transmitància tèrmica és el paràmetre fonamental per caracteritzar les pèrdues de calor a través de les envolvents de l'edifici. Tanmateix, diversos investigadors han demostrat que les hipòtesis sobre la pèrdua de calor dels edificis abans i després d'una rehabilitació no són correctes. En aquest sentit, es fa necessari realitzar mesures in situ amb elevada precisió per proporcionar informació sobre la transmitància tèrmica real de les façanes. El propòsit d'aquesta tesi és contribuir a reduir la bretxa del rendiment energètic en els edificis residencials. Per això, l'objectiu d'aquesta dissertació és millorar la precisió en la realització de mesures in situ de la transmitància tèrmica real de les façanes dels edificis residencials existents usant el mètode estandarditzat del mesurador de flux de calor (HFM), per assegurar l'èxit en la presa de decisions durant els processos de renovació energètica dels edificis existents i confirmar estratègies d'eficiència energètica per a nous edificis de consum d'energia quasi nul. L'anàlisi dels paràmetres d'assaig per a la mesura in situ de la transmitància tèrmica no està totalment especificada en l'estàndard ISO utilitzat extensivament. Pel que fa als procediments de càlcul, el mètode que s'utilitza de forma més àmplia pels investigadors és el mètode de mitjanes. Poques iniciatives utilitzen el mètode dinàmic degut a la seva complexitat. La investigació avalua les implicacions d'utilitzar els diferents mètodes de càlcul estandarditzats per verificar quin s'ajusta millor als valors teòrics de referència. A més, es fomenta i facilita la usabilitat del mètode dinàmic estandarditzat mitjançant un procediment de càlcul, definint un full de càlcul programat accessible per als professionals. La dissertació proposa un sistema de classificació de façanes per facilitar la selecció de façanes per a la seva posterior anàlisi del rendiment tèrmic de les façanes del sector de l'habitatge. La classificació de façanes d'edificis residencials existents es basa en la caracterització de la part opaca de les façanes. La dissertació continua explorant els límits dels requisits per a la utilització del mètode HFM per a refinar les condicions d'assaig en les façanes amb baixa transmitància tèrmica. Aquestes façanes es promouen cada vegada més per tal de complir amb els objectius de la Directiva 2010/31/CE. Tot i així, diversos investigadors han demostrat que realitzar mesures in situ precises en aquest tipus de façanes és un repte. Investigar els límits d'aplicació del mètode HFM per a la mesura in situ de la transmitància tèrmica en façanes amb baixa transmitància tèrmica permetrà assegurar el compliment de les polítiques de transició d'edificis existents a edificis de consum energètic quasi nul (nZEB), i confirmar estratègies d'eficiència energètica per a nous edificis nZEB. Per millorar la usabilitat del mètode HFM, aquesta tesi analitza diferents criteris per a determinar les condicions d'aturada de l'assaig durant les campanyes experimentals per mesurar in situ la transmitància tèrmica de les façanes. Els resultats ajudaran a reduir la incertesa sobre la durada de les campanyes experimentals per obtenir una transmitància tèrmica real precisa de les façanes dels edificis existents. La tesi conclou resumint les principals aportacions d'aquesta investigació. Els temes que s'han plantejat durant la investigació realitzada, i que no s'ha pogut abordar, es comenten i es proposen com a línies de treball futures ; Postprint (published version)

Due to the globalization of education, it has become prevalent to strengthen the quality systems to ensure that educational actors in higher education institutions are the best. In this context teachers are given a main role since they are cornerstones in educational processes. Currently, teacher quality is assessed through an assessment or evaluation system. Almost every university evaluates its teachers, but there is no legal regulation on how to do it, in most institutions there is a professional in charge of designing and applying assessment instruments according to the authors he/she prefers. In most universities, on the one hand, it is used a traditional questionnaire aiming to collect data about dimensions associated with teaching, on the other hand, there is another option in which assessment models include self-evaluation, as in some cases in Chile. That's why one of the concerns of this research is to propose guidelines for a more qualitative and formative assessment not exclusively following political parameters –based on administrative decisions–, but following emerging proposals with a deeper analysis. Nowadays the main actors in teacher evaluation are teachers, students and administrative staff, every six months these actors are evaluated by using an assessment tool that they usually do not know. The research investigates the perception actors in teacher evaluation have regarding its objectives, methods and stages, so they put forward ideas on how to restructure the current institutional assessment and propose improvements aiming at both the quantitative aspect and the qualitative analysis of performances and skills. ; Frente a la globalización de la educación se ha hecho imperante fortalecer los sistemas de calidad que garanticen que los actores educativos involucrados en las instituciones de educación superior sean los mejores, siendo protagonistas los profesores como ejes fundamentales en los procesos educativos. La forma como actualmente se evalúa la calidad del docente es a través de una evaluación o un sistema de evaluación. La evaluación docente se hace en casi todas las universidades, pero no existe una reglamentación legal que obligue a hacerla de alguna manera, en la mayoría de las instituciones existe un profesional frente a la tarea de aplicar y diseñar instrumentos de evaluación de acuerdo a su inclinación por algún autor. En la mayoría de las universidades se utiliza el tradicional cuestionario que intenta obtener datos sobre dimensiones asociadas a la labor, la otra opción establece modelos de evaluación con autoevaluación como en algunos casos de Chile. Es por eso que una de las preocupaciones de esta investigación es proponer lineamientos para una evaluación más cualitativa y formativa que no siga ligada a los parámetros exclusivamente políticos, resultados de tomar decisiones administrativas, si no a propuestas emergentes con mayor profundidad de análisis. Los principales actores de la evaluación docente son hoy los profesores, los estudiantes y los administrativos, semestralmente estos actores son evaluados con un instrumento de evaluación que muchas veces ellos mismos desconocen. El trabajo de investigación indaga sobre la percepción de los actores de la evaluación docente desde sus objetivos, métodos y momentos, de tal forma que se planteen ideas para reestructurar la actual evaluación institucional y generar propuestas de mejora no solo en términos cuantitativos si no que incorporen el estudio cualitativo de desempeños y competencias. ; Face à la mondialisation de l'éducation il devient impératif de renforcer les systèmes de qualité garantissant que les acteurs éducatifs, impliqués dans les institutions d'éducation supérieure, soient les meilleurs, les professeurs étant les protagonistes en tant qu'axes fondamentaux dans les processus éducatifs. La manière dont est évaluée, actuellement, la qualité des enseignants se fait au moyen d'une évaluation ou d'un système d'évaluation. L'évaluation des enseignants se réalise dans presque toutes les universités, mais il n'existe aucune réglementation légale obligeant à la réaliser d'une certaine manière, dans la majorité des institutions, il existe un professionnel dont la tâche est d'appliquer et concevoir des outils d'évaluations, conformément à son penchant pour certains auteurs. Dans la majorité des universités on utilise le questionnaire traditionnel qui vise à obtenir des données quant aux dimensions associées au travail, l'autre option établit des modèles d'évaluation par autoévaluation comme c'est le cas par exemple au Chili. C'est la raison pour laquelle une des préoccupations de cette recherche est de proposer des lignes directrices, pour une évaluation plus qualitative et formative et qui ne reste plus associée à des paramètres exclusivement politiques, résultant de prises de décisions administratives, sinon à des propositions émergentes ayant un approfondissement d'analyse plus important. Les principaux acteurs de l'évaluation des enseignants sont, de nos jours, les professeurs, les étudiants et le personnel administratif, semestriellement, ces intervenants sont évalués au moyen d'un outil d'évaluation que bien souvent ils ne connaissent pas euxmêmes. Le travail de recherche enquête au sujet de la perception des acteurs de l'évaluation des enseignants selon leurs objectifs, leurs méthodes et le moment, de telle manière que l'on formule des idées pour restructurer l'actuelle évaluation institutionnelles et élaborer des propositions d'amélioration, non seulement sur le plan quantitatif, mais incorporant également l'étude qualitative de rendements et de compétences. ; Frente à globalização da educação se tem feito imperante os sistemas de qualidade que garantissem que os atores educativos envolvidos nas instituições de ensino superior sejam os melhores, sendo protagonistas os professores como eixos fundamentais nos processos educacionais. A forma como atualmente se avalia a qualidade do professor é a traves de uma avaliação ou um sistema de avaliação. A avaliação docente se faz em quase todas as universidades, mas não existe uma regulamentação legal que bligue a fazê-la de alguma forma, na maioria das instituições existe um profissional na frente da tarefa de aplicar e desenhar instrumentos de avaliação em acordo a sua inclinação por algum autor. Na maioria das universidades se utiliza o tradicional questionário que tenta obter dados sobre dimensões associadas à tarefa, a outra opção estabelece modelos de avaliação com auto-avaliação como em alguns casos do Chile. Por causa disso uma das preocupações desta pesquisa é propor lineamentos para uma avaliação mais qualitativa e formativa que não siga ligada aos parâmetros exclusivamente políticos, resultados de tomar decisões burocráticas, se não a propostas emergentes com maior profundidade de análise. Os principais atores da avaliação docente são hoje os professores, os alunos e os administrativos, semestralmente estes atores são avaliados com um instrumento de avaliação que muitas vezes estes mesmos desconhecem. O trabalho de pesquisa indaga a percepção de atores da avaliação docente desde seus objetivos, métodos e momentos, e assim se explanam ideias para reestruturar a atual avaliação institucional e gerar propostas de melhora que não só apontem ao quantitativo se não ao estudo qualitativo de desempenho e competências.

Esta tesis presenta el diseño de un modelo de arquitectura empresarial para un colegio privado del Floridablanca Santander utilizando un framework de Togaf para plantear un modelo de arquitectura As – Is, ya que la institución no cuenta con un marco referencial referente de arquitectura, con base en este modelo se estudian los procesos institucionales y se seleccionan cuatro procesos que orientados a los objetivos del negocio alineen la institución con el área tecnológica y le ayude a mejorar. Los procesos seleccionados fueron Gobierno escolar, Matriculas, recibos de pensión y registro de notas. Se mostró la adaptabilidad de Togaf utilizando solo las cinco primeras fases del ADM preliminar, Fase A visión de arquitectura, Fase B arquitectura de negocio, Fase C arquitectura de sistema de información datos y aplicaciones, Fase D arquitectura tecnológica, también se plateo la hoja de ruta para la implementación del modelo de arquitectura teniendo en cuenta necesidades de la institución. Durante dichas fases se planteó un modelo de arquitectura To – Be que busca mejorar los proceso seleccionados brindando un mayor apoyo a la institución. Para la elaboración de estas faces se utilizaron diferentes herramientas como UML, Archimete, Bonita y visio. para presentar de forma gráfica cada fase en el modelo de arquitectura As -Is y en el modelo de arquitectura To – Be. ; 1. ANTECEDENTES 14 2. MARCO CONCEPCTUAL 15 2.1 ESTADO DEL ARTE 15 2.1.1 Historia de la Arquitectura Empresarial 15 2.1.2 Historia de la Educación en Colombia 17 2.2 MARCO CONCEPTUAL 18 2.2.1 Arquitectura Empresarial (EA) 20 2.2.2 Framework 22 2.2.3 Dominios de la Arquitectura Empresarial. 23 2.2.4 The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) 24 2.2.5 Fases del ADM TOGAF 25 2.2.6 Bussiness Process Model and Notation (BPMN) 29 2.2.7 Ministerio de Educación 29 2.2.8 Secretaria de Educación Departamental 31 2.2.9 Secretaria de Educación Municipal 34 2.2.10 Colegios 36 3. JUSTIFICACION 38 4. OBJETIVOS 39 4.1 OBJETIVO GENERAL 39 4.2 OBJETIVOS ESPECIFICOS 39 5. METODOLOGIA 40 5.1 PRIMER METODO DE ANALISIS 40 5.2 RESULTADOS ESPERADOS 41 5.3 ACTIVIDADES A REALIZAR 41 5.3.1 Objetivo 1 41 5.3.2 Objetivo 2 42 5.3.3 Objetivo 3 42 5.3.4 Objetivo 4 43 6. DESARROLLO 44 7. FASE PRELIMINAR 45 7.1 MODELO ORGANIZACIONAL DE ARQUITECTURA EMPRESARIAL 45 7.1.1 Descripción General 45 7.1.2 Historia 45 7.1.3 Actualidad 46 7.1.4 Organigrama 47 7.1.5 Servicios 47 7.1.6 Misión 48 7.1.7 Visión 48 7.1.8 Mapa de Procesos 49 7.2 ALTO NIVEL EN LA GESTION DEL COMPROMISO 49 7.2.1 Interesados 49 7.3 ACUERDOS DEL ALCANCE 50 7.4 ESTABLECER PRINCIPIOS 50 7.4.1 Principios de Negocio 51 7.4.2 Principios de Datos 53 7.4.3 Principios de Aplicación 54 7.4.4 Principios de Tecnología 56 7.5 ESTRUCTURA DEL GOBIERNO 57 7.5.1 Participantes en el Proyecto 57 7.6 PARTICIPANTES DEL PROYECTO 57 7.7 PERSONALIZACION DEL TOGAF 58 7.7.1 Fase A: La visión de Arquitectura 58 7.7.2 Fase B: Arquitectura de Negocio 59 7.7.3 Fase C: Arquitectura de Sistemas de Información 59 7.7.4 Fase D: Arquitectura de Tecnología 59 8. FASE A: VISION DE ARQUITECTURA 60 8.1 REQUERIMIENTOS DEL NEGOCIO 60 8.2 VISION DE LA ARQUITECTURA 60 8.3 DEFINICIO DE LAS RESTRICCIONES 61 8.4 MATRIZ DE STAKEHOLDERS. 61 8.5 DIAGRAMA CADENA DE VALOR 64 8.6 DIAGRAMA DE CONCEPTO DE LA SOLUCION 64 8.7 PRINCIPIO DE NEGOCIO OBJETIVOS Y MOTIVADORES 64 8.7.1 Principios de Negoio 64 8.7.2 Objetivos de Negocio 65 8.7.3 MOTIVADORES DE NEGOCIO 65 8.8 EVALUAR LAS CAPACIDADES DEL NEGOCIO 66 8.8.1 Escenario de Negocio 1 67 8.8.2 Escenario de Negocio 2 67 8.8.3 Escenario de Negocio 3 68 8.8.4 Escenario de Negocio 4 69 8.9 DEFINICION DE ALCANCE 69 8.9.1 Requerimientos 70 9. FASE B: VISIÓN DE ARQUITECTURA 71 9.1 PRINCIPALES FUNCIONES DEL NEGOCIO 71 9.2 CATALOGOS 74 9.2.1 Catálogo de Procesos 74 9.2.2 Catálogo de la Organización 81 9.2.3 Catálogo Actor 82 9.2.4 Catálogo de Roles 85 9.2.5 Catálogo de Funciones de Negocio 86 9.3 IDENTIFICAR Y DOCUMENTAR LA AQUITECTURA ACTUAL 89 9.3.1 Gobierno Escolar 90 9.3.1.1 Consejo Estudiantil 90 9.3.1.2 Consejo de Padres 100 9.3.1.3 Consejo Académico 107 9.3.1.4. Consejo Directivo 107 9.3.2 Proceso de Matricula 116 9.3.2.1. Entorno Técnico de la Institución 120 9.3.2.2. Identificación del Problema 122 9.3.2.3. Vista del Proceso TO – BE 122 9.3.3 Proceso Entrega Recibos de Pensión 126 9.3.3.1 Entorno Técnico de la Institución 129 9.3.3.2. Identificación del Problema 130 9.3.3.3. Vista del Proceso TO – BE 130 9.3.4 Proceso de Notas 131 9.3.4.1. Entorno Técnico del Problema 134 9.3.4.2. Identificación del Problema 138 9.3.4.3. Vista del Proceso TO – BE 138 9.4 ANALISIS DE BRECHA 144 9.4.1 Análisis de todos los Procesos 145 9.4.2. Proceso Elección Consejo de Estudiantes 146 9.4.3. Proceso Elección Consejo de Padres 148 9.4.4. Proceso Elección Consejo Directivo 149 9.4.5 Proceso de Matricula 151 9.4.6 Proceso de entrega de Recibos de Pensión 153 9.4.7 Proceso de Notas 154 10. FASE C: ARQUITECTURA DEL SISTEMA DE INFORMACIÓN, DATOS Y APLICACIONES 157 10.1. ARQUITECTURA DE DATOS 157 10.1.1. Modelo de Datos AS – IS 157 10.1.2 Modelo de Datos TO – BE 158 10.1.3 Catalogo de Entidades 160 10.1.4. Análisis de la Brecha de Datos 161 10.1.5 Ciclo de Vida de los datos 161 10.1.6. Esquema de Seguridad Datos TO – BE 162 10.1.7. Protección del Código Web 163 10.1.8. Protección de Comunicación TO – BE 163 10.1.9 Roles, Perfiles y Modulos. 164 10.2. ARQUITECTURA DE APLICACIONES 177 10.2.1. Arquitectura de Aplicaciones AS – IS 177 10.2.2 Catalogo de Aplicaciones 177 10.2.3 Catálogos de Componentes TO – BE 179 10.2.3.1. Modelo de Arquitectura TO – BE 179 10.3 ANALISIS DE BRECHA 181 11. FASE D: ARQUITECTURA DE LA TECNOLOGIA 183 11.1 ARQUITECTURA AS – IS 183 11.2 PROPUESTA DE ARQUITECTURA 185 11.3 ANALISIS DE BRECHA 186 12. HOJA DE RUTA 187 CONCLUSIONES 188 REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS 189 ; Maestría ; This thesis presents the design of a business architecture model for a private school in Floridablanca Santander using a framework of Togaf to propose an As - Is architecture model, since the institution does not have a referential frame of reference, based on This model examines the institutional processes and selects four processes that orientate the business objectives to align the institution with the technological area and help it to improve. The processes selected were School Government, Matriculas, pension receipts and record of notes. It was shown the adaptability of Togaf using only the first five phases of the preliminary ADM, Phase A architecture vision, Phase B business architecture, Phase C information system architecture data and applications, Phase D technology architecture, Route for the implementation of the architecture model taking into account the needs of the institution. During these phases, a To - Be architecture model was proposed that seeks to improve the selected processes by providing greater support to the institution. For the elaboration of these faces different tools like UML, Archimete, Bonita and visio were used. To graphically present each phase in the As -Is architecture model and the To-Be architecture model.