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Dimensional studies of Congressional voting have found a single dominant "ideological" dimension, while regression estimates find that constituency variables and party are dominant. Koford (1989b) recalibrated the dimensional studies, and found that several dimensions are important. This study reviews those findings, and then considers additional reasons why dimensional studies might understate the number of dimensions. It then examines the regression estimates for biases that overstate the number of dimensions. Overall, fewer dimensions are found than seem consistent with the wide variety of constituents' preferences on issues.A model is developed in which the transactions costs of building coalitions reduces the number of dimensions visible on roll‐call votes below the underlying dimensionality of preferences in the issue space. When legislative parties build internal coalitions to pass and defeat bills, voting on randomly drawn bills has a single party‐oriented dimension. Natural ideological dimensions are reinforced when parties write bills and logroll along natural lines of cohesion. Numerical examples suggest that these effects could be important, and suggest lines for empirical investigation of the underlying issue space.

The extent to which levels and trends in local unemployment and income influenced the Conservative vote in 633 separate British constituency elections in 1983 is estimated in several regression models. Long-term influences on voting are controlled by the endogenous variables of social class and territoriality. It is argued that this research design is superior to previous ones that have treated general elections as national elections in exploring the economic theory of voting. Sensitivity analysis (the use of several models to illuminate the research problem posed) suggests that, unlike America congressional elections, current rates and trends in local unemployment and income exerted a substantial and systematic influence on constituency voting.

Australia has the oldest and probably the most efficient system of compulsory voting among the established democracies. The main reason for its introduction in the 1920s was to increase turnout, a goal it has achieved without difficulty. Compulsory voting has also made a major contribution to the long-term stability of the party system. However, the compulsory voting system has had two disadvantages. As in other countries which have introduced compulsory voting, historically there has been a very high level of invalid votes, although the levels are now less than they were prior to 1984, as a result of various electoral reforms. Second, the system disadvantages rightwing parties and advantages leftwing and minor parties. Survey evidence from the 1996 federal election suggests compulsory voting reduced the Liberal-National coalition's first preference vote by some 5 per cent, compared to the coalition's expected vote under a voluntary system. If the system is ever removed, it is likely to be for this reason, rather than because of any difficulties in administering it, or because of any philosophical objection to compulsion among voters or politicians.

Australia has the oldest and probably the most efficient system of compulsory voting among the established democracies. The main reason for its introduction in the 1920s was to increase turnout, a goal it has achieved without difficulty. Compulsory voting has also made a major contribution to the long-term stability of the party system. However, the compulsory voting system has had two disadvantages. As in other countries which have introduced compulsory voting, historically there has been a very high level of invalid votes, although the levels are now less than they were prior to 1984, as a result of various electoral reforms. Second, the system disadvantages rightwing parties and advantages leftwing and minor parties. Survey evidence from the 1996 federal election suggests compulsory voting reduced the Liberal-National coalition's first preference vote by some 5 per cent, compared to the coalition's expected vote under a voluntary system. If the system is ever removed, it is likely to be for this reason, rather than because of any difficulties in administering it, or because of any philosophical objection to compulsion among voters or politicians.

Full Participation is the first book-length study of compulsory voting to be published in the English language. About a quarter of all democracies in the contemporary world legally oblige their citizens to vote, making this an important aspect of electoral systems in many settings. The study systematically examines the history of the institution, the normative arguments for and against it, and the influence it has on a range of political phenomena. These include electoral campaigns, political attitudes, electoral integrity, and legitimacy, policy outcomes, and turnout. It also considers the feasibility of introducing compulsory voting in a contemporary democracy, as well as variations on the institution designed to broaden its appeal.

This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study stationary Markov equilibria (SMEs) of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of pure strategy, stage-undominated SMEs of the bargaining game when voters are sufficiently farsighted.

Despite recent periods of unified party control of government in Washington, DC, divided government has been the norm in recent decades. Scholars agree that when both presidential and congressional candidates are on the ballot the driving force behind divided government at the national level is split‐ticket voting. In this study, I present a new psychological model of split‐ticket voting. I posit that ticket splitting is motivated by ambivalence over the two major political parties. I test this partisan ambivalence explanation on split‐ticket votes between president and Congress nationally between 1988 and 2004 and voting for state executive offices in Ohio in 1998. I find that partisan ambivalence predicts ticket splitting at both the national and state levels and does so about as well as some other explanations. The results of this study suggest that divided government occurs, in part, because voters are divided within themselves.

THE PARADOX OF VOTING PRESENTED IN ARROW'S THEOREM HAS HARDLY ANY APPLICATION TO VOTING IN THE REAL WORLD. IN INTRODUCING HIS THEOREM, ARROW SAYS SPECIFICALLY THAT IT DOES NOT APPLY IN THOSE CASES IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS DO NOT VOTE ACCORDING TO THEIR ELEMENTARY PREFERENCES BUT ACCEPT PAYMENT OF SOME SORT TO VOTE AGAINST THEIR TRUE INCLINATIONS. SINCE LOG-ROLLING IS COMMON IN MOST DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATURES, THE THEOREM DOES NOT APPLY.

This study explores the hypothesis that voting in response to economic problems is policy-oriented: voters concerned about unemployment ore predicted to give greater support to Democratic candidates, while those concerned about inflation are predicted to vote more Republican. In light of evidence from previous research, this study investigates the electoral effects of inflation and unemployment as (1) problems directly experienced by the individual, and (2) problems deemed serious for the nation as a whole. Support is strongest for the unemployment side of the hypothesis. Voters personally affected by unemployment gave a modest boost to Democratic candidates in virtually every election. And in years of high unemployment the large percentage of voters who fell it was a serious national problem voted heavily Democratic as well. This study concludes by discussing the important implications these findings have for our understanding of how economic conditions influence voting behavior in American national elections.