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The political and social renascence that took place in the latter part of the 19th century made possible the revival of economic, cultural, and artistic activities. This became particularly evident in the building activity spreading, as in the rest of Europe of that period, in the wake of the then fashionable neo-styles that made a somewhat belated appearance at Vis. A Neo-Gothic building, designed to house the premises of the Hrvatski Dom, was built in the central part of the water-front (luka) et the very beginning of the current century, while a Neo-Renaissance dwelling-house was erected for the Tramontana family in 1911. The local school, designed by the native architect Marinković, was built in the Neo-Classicist style in 1910. The building housing the Army Club premises (Dom JNA) and the new fishmarket were also erected in the Neo-Classicist style. Some Neo-Classicist tombs may be seen on the cemetery where the Neo-Renaissance Dojmi Chapel stands out among other monuments. A Neo-Renaissance dwelling-house, belonging to the Mardešić Gariboldi family, was built at Komiža in in the early part of the current century, while the construction of a building in the Secessionist style (The Hum Café) followed shortly. The trend prevailing at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries is evident also in a series of simple, modest houses designed in no definite style at all, but containing elements of various neo-styles or of the Viennese Secession in their facades. Gutters for carrying off rain water, usually sunk in decorative roof cornices supported by consoles; rows of tall windows with simply dressed stone frames that were molded in some cases; standard shop entrances in the ground floor; balconies with wrought-iron balustrades; basement windows protected with iron grating, etc., all these elements were commonplace during that period lasting through the thirties of the current century when the increasing use of concrete almost entirely repleced stone as building material, rendering the facade construction an utterly simple affair. Among the movables dating from the above mentioned period, the Neo-Gothic furniture of the pharmacy (Narodna Apoteka) at Komiža, and the home furniture owned by the Lučić-Roki family at Vis (designed by Dragutin Inkiostri Medenjak, painter and decorator, 1866-1942) are worth mentioning. So are several pieces of furniture, etc., dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries scattered in various houses on the island. Two painters native from Komiža, Vinko Foretić and Miho Marinković, contributed to the development of the modern art in Croatia during the early part of the current century. While the former returned to his native island after years of youthful wanderings, dedicating his ability to landscape painting and portraying of life and people of Komiža, the latter ended his days as a university professor (member of the Faculty of Architecture) in Belgrade. Boasting marvellous scenery and views of the sea, picturesque water-front and interesting fishermen popular even abroad, Komiža has attracted a number of artists for a long period now. One of them was Đuro Tiljak who came to live on the island time and again where he painted considerable number of his canvases. A memorial collection of his works, comprising all his creations involving the island, was opened at Komiža in 1967. The Island of Vis, having played a most important part in the People's Revolution, has a special niche in its history. Owing to its geographical position, lying far from the mainland in the open sea, the island, turned into a wartime garrison by the People's Liberation Army as soon as Italy surrendered to the Allies in 1943, became an impregnable fortress in the Adriatic, successfully resisting the attacks of German forces in the area. That is why a number of localities and structures on the island, reminding us of those eventful years, are significant not only for the history of Dalmatia but of the whole of Yugoslavia. The glorious days of the recent past are re-awakened by memorial tablets or slogans found on old stone-built houses in the island villages and hamlets; by graves of fallen partisans scattered in a number of grave-yards and on the former aerodrome – once a lonely window flung open to the outer world and now a peaceful green vineyard; and also by miscellaneous articles or documents surviving in the silanders' homes. Numerous traces of red – or blue – painted slogans still found on the walls of houses at Vis, Komiža, Podšpilje, Marinje Zemlje, Dračevo Polje, Podstražje, and other villages and hamlets on the island, bear eloquent testimony to the wartime events, particularly to the significant ones in 1944. The cave located to the nort-west of Borovik is no doubt the most important monument belonging to that period as it served as sheltered headquarters for the People's Liberation Army from where its Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, controlled its activities in the field aiming at the liberation of the country. The cave has therefore been named Titova Špilja. Several memorial tablets have been erected in the post-war period, either to mark some historic spots or to honour the victims of the Fascist persecution, fallen partisans, etc., Among the memorial tablets set up at Komiža, the one on the Tower is in memory of the 1940 municipal election victory of the workpeople of Komiža when 18 councilmen were returned, who directed the municipal affairs under the leadership of the Communist Party of Croatia; others, set up on various houses at Vis, mark the one-time seats of the District Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia for the central Dalmatian archipelago, and of the Regional Committee of the People's Liberation Movement, etc. A memorial tablet, set up on the Kučić Family house at Komiža, reminds us of the decision made by the local Communist Party Committee in 1941 to start attacking the invader's forces, while the inscription on another tablet erected on the house owned by Luka Borčić (at Žena Glava), records the spot where – from January through October 1944 – the Dalmatian Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia conducted the armed revolt of the people against the Fascist invader. Fallen partisans have been hounoured by memorial tablets set up at Vis, Komiža, Podstražje, Marinje Zemlje, Podšpilje, and on the Island of Biševo. Both native and British airmen, killed in action in the course of the struggle for liberation, have also been honoured, the native flyers at Velo Polje and the British at the Čunkovica crossroads. Monuments remind us of the executed hostages at Vis and Komiža in 1943 while a memorial tablet records the spot where Nikola Marinković – Top was killed. As a part of the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the stay on the island (in 1944) of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, of the headquarters of the People's Liberation Army, and of Marshal Tito himself, several buildings were dedicated in 1964 to the fighters killed in action and to the victims of Fascist cruelty. Among such buildings are the memorial school, designed by the Architect N. Šegvić, and the memorial premises for popular meetings, etc., designed by S. Planić. A memorial well built at Podšpilje bears the inscription of some verses by J. Franičević and of names of the fallen fighters. A large monolith erected at Vis marks the spot where the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the People's Liberation Army, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, reviewed the First Dalmatian Brigade decorating it for bravery with the Order of People's Liberation. A sentence from his speech reading: »Tuđe nećemo – svoje ne damo« (We do not what is not ours but we will not surrender what is ours) has been cut in the monolith. A number of buildings at Vis bear inscriptions recording various wartime events, e. g. the stay there (in 1944) of the presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council of Yugoslavia, of the People's Committe, of the Vis Island District Committee, etc. Some buildings at Komiža are marked in a similar way, and we learn from the inscriptions which of the houses were occupied by the Military Command, Military Hospital, Refugee Collecting Station, etc. Memorial tablets have also been set up at Borovik Village, in order to mark the houses once occupied by the Centrl Comittee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the 26th Division Headquarters, and the Soviet, British, and American military missions. The Dalmatian Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, the Agitprop, the Slobodna Dalmacija Editorial Office, etc., were housed at Žena Glava Village, while various aerodrome services etc. had their quarters at Marinje Zemlje. The headquarters of the 1st Dalmatian Brigade and 3rd Overseas Brigade were at Podselje. A number of miscellaneous movable articles connected with the People's War of Liberation have been preserved and are now on show at the Museum at Vis as also in some private homes. A significant architectural contribution has been recorded on the island in the field of building construction. The Yugoslav Army Club premises at Komiža and a number of handsome dwelling-houses (all designed by the Architect Vitić) and the large Wine Cellars (designed by the Architect Fabris) are particularly noteworthy.

From the nostalgia of the Promised Land to the nostalgia of the exile land of the Moroccan Israelites The disappearance of the Jews in Morocco, noticed after the fact, gave rise to a great deal of questioning: were the motives behind this phenomenon mystical or Zionist in nature? Or were they the result of persecution? In the Morocco of the 1980's, the mellah showed the only remnants of the civilization, the testament of a bygone existence. Both recent and distant past in the memories of those living alongside the Jews. In pre-Protectorate Morocco, the Judeo-Arabic coexistence gave way to socio-economic organization that can ultimately be called interdependence. Economically speaking, the Jewish existence was seen as necessary for the Muslim society. It was the result of a coexistence, varying according to the era in question and the reigning symbiosis and hostility. Trades a Muslim could not or did not wish to take on were left to the Jews, from import-export trade to peddling. This division of work, perceived as both discrimination and allocation, is representative of the ambiguity of the Judeo-Arabic relation. This ambiguity disturbs the work of researchers in the field. If Jews were merely tolerated, subject to their discriminatory status, so be it, but their presence was still generally seen as necessary by the Muslim. By the same token, the Jews' political substatus in Muslim society represented a permanent strength against assimilation, and the preservation of an ancestral link with the homeland. The mellah, symbolizing exclusion, also allowed the Jewish community to be a homogenous social, political, economical and cultural group, a micro-society whose religious identity was constant and rigorous growth, through a series of rituals and practices. Tradition kept identity alive: the Jewish identity, alive in a single prayer to return to Holy Land. The fragile Judeo-Arabic equilibrium, little-known by those who dreamt of colonizing North Africa (beginning in the 19th century), was upset by the French Protectorate of Morocco (1912-1956). With its colonialist ideology, the latter imposes a policy that widened the gap between Jews and Muslims, exacerbating their religious differences and affecting their relations. The Protectorate Morocco had a rude awakening to a number of outside influences -the invasion of European capitalism, administrative reforms and modernism- causing rapid destruction of traditional values. The population grew poorer in their inability to maintain the furious pace of this revolution, while the Muslim intellectual youth, deprived of its traditional privileges, took up the struggle against the foreign stranglehold on its country. The spare of early nationalism driven by the Protectorate's so-called Berber politics, whose project was to distinguish between Berbers and Moroccans through possible conversion to Catholicism and the French language. The anticolonialist struggle found its way in a growing Islamic identity which attracted the masses and united Moroccan leaders behind the struggles of North Africa. In the Jewish community, the effect of the Protectorate is more significant. The westernization process attracts an elite aspiring to rise to the European level using the French language and culture, and wishing to legitimately free itself from the demeaning dhimma status. A long way from the parent population whose fate is the same as the Muslims, privileged individuals of the Jewish community distance themselves both from the religious tradition of the Jewish identity as well as the age-old Judeo-Arabic rituals. This distinction manifests itself in education and travel, or simply moving away. The new class of Europeanized Jews abandons the use of the vernacular for French and leaves the mellah to the poor, the uneducated, and the destitute. The tensions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, intensified by the Balfour Declaration (1917), also feed the Muslim-Arabic identity whose followers include Muslim nationalists. This option distances the Jewish community from the political scene and thus future Moroccan perspectives. While the Muslim mass is won through this struggle, the Jewish mass continues, away from the political upheavals shaking the Arabic world, to dream of the Promised Land and nurture a sense of nostalgia. This nostalgia is fulfilled with the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, thus launching the Moroccan 'aliya. Exile was the great memory, the mystical nostalgia, wandering and danger, uprooting and spiritual affirmation. Moroccan roots were merely of convenience despite lasting so many generations, though Moroccan Jews had buried there their forefathers, created shared ways and customs, tended to their cherished cemeteries, developed their languages. and nonetheless Morocco spiritually had only ever been a temporary home, a land of transition, a lesser evil in adversity? Once the wandering and danger over, what of this Promised Land? Did some nourishment, for the mind and body, heart and soul, rise from this new breeding ground where the long awaited and conflicted resettlement occurred? The components of the plural memory have come together in the great gathering: places, values and manners, feelings, social perceptions, exposing to all the divide, the diversity and marks of exile, showing the socio-theologico-political disparities. Disparities that Zionism, in its hope for Jewish unity, planned to standardize and smooth into unity. A project impossible without the cultural uprooting and the identity crisis of North Africans. Taken to Israel beginning in 1948, Moroccan Jews met with a Western model established by the pioneers of European socialism: the Ashkenazi. Very early, the Israeli population was divided into two groups; the Ashkenazi, founders of the country they lead, and their recently immigrated coreligionists: the North Africans, who, for the first twenty years of their lives in Israel, would be members of the proletariat. The messianic ideal motivating the Moroccan 'alya confronted the secular conception of the Israeli state. This conception involves the rejection of the Diaspora heritage and the Exile of the Jews in favour of a new "normal" nation in the image of developed Western societies. The secular State based on legitimate representation of the Jewish people, replaces religious identification with a state identification or nationalism, a status unknown to Moroccan immigrants barely removed from their secular status as traditional religious minority. To the Judaism by choice succeeds Judaism by nature and community organization becomes a complex state organization closed to new citizens. For new Moroccan immigrants, the Jewish identity should suffice for integration into the Promised Land, but once arrived, the reality of significant differences regarding religious practice, language, rituals, tradition, and economic differences caused disillusion of the sacred dream: "In Morocco, he was Jewish, Jewish through the heritage of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Jewish tangled in the holy and sacred Law of Moses. (.) In Israel, he became -what a turn of events!- Arabic." Out of this disillusion arose nostalgia, nostalgia for the first nostalgia, nostalgia for the exile that some authors (Ami Bouganim, Erez Bitton) would continue to sing: "She sings the exile, a nostalgic tone in the voice, the exile from Jerusalem, the exile from Spain, the exile from Morocco. (.) She sings a Spanish serenade then a French song, an Arabic threnody then a hymn in Hebrew. (.) Without end, Zohra's songs recreate the fabulous scenery of her past." Recreate the scenery of one's past to struggle against the oblivion of the deads and the depersonalization of the livings. Recalling an identity lost in a process of assimilation imposing the oblivion of the Jewish Diaspora and the rebirth of Modern Hebrew. Memory finds its place once again: recreating an identity and a culture parallel to the national Israeli identity and culture. And this reconstitution is first reactivated through maternal memory, a domestic memory constituting ancestral rituals, smell of cooking, laughters, household tasks, games, festive music, superstitions and rumours, jokes in local dialect. folkloric memories. Because the mother is the character who embodies tradition, who has been the least touched by the maelstrom of the 'alya. It is in the literary expression of Moroccan Israelites that we see this nostalgia, through characters who do not feel they are part of a coherent Israeli entity. The language, the culture and the mentality exacerbate these differences, and allow their particularism take its course. Even though it is an historical fact, the creation of the Israeli society underwent the rules of immigration. More than elsewhere, the Israeli terrain is best suited for a review of immigration issues: integration, acculturation, ethnic mix, as a hypothesis of the future of societies in the growing globalization of our world. ; De la nostalgie de la terre promise à la nostalgie de la terre d'exil chez les Israéliens originaires du Maroc La disparition, constatée après coup, des Juifs du Maroc suscita bien des interrogations : les motivations de cette envolée étaient-elles de nature mystique ou sioniste ? Ou la conséquence de persécution ? Dans le Maroc des années 80, le mellah seul en montrait les vestiges et témoignait d'une existence révolue. Un passé proche et lointain gisant dans les mémoires de ceux pour qui le Juif fut du voisinage. Dans le Maroc d'avant le Protectorat, la coexistence judéo-arabe donnait lieu à une organisation socio-économique que l'on peut, malgré tout, qualifier d'interdépendance. L'existence juive en société musulmane était reconnue nécessaire au plan économique. Il en découlait une coexistence dont la nature variait selon les périodes et les règnes entre symbiose et hostilité. Les corps de métiers qu'un musulman ne pouvait ou ne voulait faire étaient laissés aux Juifs depuis l'import-export jusqu'au commerce itinérant. Ce partage de fonction qui est perçu à la fois comme une discrimination et une répartition, comporte en soi l'ambiguïté du rapport juif-arabe. Cette ambiguïté embarrasse le travail du chercheur dans ce domaine. Que le Juif ne fut que toléré, soumis au statut discriminatoire, soit, il n'en demeure pas moins que sa présence était généralement reconnue nécessaire par le Musulman. Parallèlement, le sous-statut politique du Juif dans la société musulmane lui était une force permanente contre l'assimilation et pour le maintien d'un lien ancestral avec la terre antique. Le mellah qui symbolisait l'exclusion, permettait aussi à la communauté juive d'être un groupe social, politique, économique et culturel homogène, une micro-société dont l'identité religieuse se cultivait continuellement et rigoureusement en un ensemble de rites et de pratiques. La tradition véhiculait l'identité ; celle d'être juif, animée par une seule prière celle de retrouver la Terre Sainte. Le fragile équilibre judéo-arabe, méconnu par ceux qui rêvent de coloniser l'Afrique du Nord (à partir du 19ème siècle), se déstabilise avec le Protectorat français (1912-1956) au Maroc. Par son idéologie colonialiste, ce dernier avance une politique éloignant encore plus les Juifs des Musulmans en exacerbant leurs différences religieuses et en affectant leurs rapports. Le Maroc du Protectorat s'ouvre brutalement aux influences extérieures : invasion du capitalisme européen, réformes administratives et modernisme, causent une destruction accélérée des valeurs traditionnelles. La masse populaire s'appauvrit, faute de pouvoir suivre le rythme effréné de cette révolution, tandis que la jeunesse intellectuelle musulmane, privée de ses privilèges traditionnels, élabore des formes de lutte contre la mainmise étrangère sur son pays. La flamme naissante du nationalisme est attisée par la politique dite --berbère-- du Protectorat, dont le projet est de distinguer les berbères du peuple marocain par une possible conversion française et catholique. La lutte anti-coloniale trouve alors sa voie dans une identité islamique accrue qui attire les masses et rallie les leaders marocains aux luttes d'Orient. Dans la communauté juive, l'effet du Protectorat est plus conséquent. Le processus d'occidentalisation attire une élite qui aspire à s'élever au niveau des Européens par le moyen de la langue et de la culture française, et veut légitimement s'affranchir du statut réducteur de la dhimma. Loin de la population de base qui subit le même sort que les musulmans, les privilégiés de la communauté juive s'écartent à la fois de la tradition religieuse véhiculant l'identité juive et des coutumes judéo-arabes séculaires. Cette distinction se traduit par l'instruction et l'éloignement géographique. La nouvelle classe juive européanisée abandonne l'usage de la langue vernaculaire au profit du français et laisse le mellah aux pauvres, non instruits, démunis. Les tensions entre Juifs et Arabes en Palestine, affûtées par la Déclaration de Balfour (1917), alimentent, par effet sympathique, l'identité arabo-musulmane à laquelle s'identifient et adhèrent les nationalistes musulmans. Cette option éloigne la communauté juive de la scène politique et donc des perspectives marocaines d'avenir. Tandis que la masse musulmane est gagnée au combat, la masse juive continue, à l'écart des bouleversements politiques qui secouent le monde arabe, à rêver de la terre Promise et en cultiver la nostalgie. Nostalgie qui trouve son accomplissement à la déclaration de l'Etat d'Israël en 1948 et commence alors la 'aliya marocaine. L'exil c'était la grande mémoire, la nostalgie mystique, l'errance et la précarité, le déracinement et l'affirmation du spirituel. L'ancrage marocain ne fut que de circonstance quand bien même il perdura tant et tant de générations, quand bien même les Juifs du Maroc y ont enterré la cohorte de leurs aïeux, créé des us et coutumes partagés, entretenus leurs chers cimetières, forgé leurs langues.et néanmoins le Maroc ne fut, spirituellement, qu'une terre d'attente, un lieu transitoire, un moindre mal dans l'adversité ? Errance et précarité ne sont plus, mais qu'en-est-il de cette terre promise ? Une sève nourricière pour le corps et l'esprit, l'âme et le cœur, a-t-elle monté dans ce nouveau terreau où s'est accompli le réenracinement si longtemps différé ? Dans le grand rassemblement se sont affrontées les composantes de la mémoire plurielle : lieux, mœurs, sentiments, perceptions sociétales, dénonçant au grand jour les lignes de partage, les diversités et les empreintes d'exils, faisant apparaître les disparités socio-théologico-politiques. Disparité que le sionisme, dans son aspiration à l'unité du peuple juif, projetait d'uniformiser et de dissoudre dans l'unicité. Projet qui ne parvint pas sans éviter aux Orientaux le déracinement culturel et la crise d'identité. Envolés vers Israël à partir de 1948, les Juifs marocains rencontrent un modèle occidental établi par les pionniers issus du socialisme européen : les Ashkénazes. Très tôt, la population israélienne est divisée en deux classes ; les Ashkénazes, fondateurs du pays dont ils sont l'élite dirigeante, et leurs coreligionnaires récemment immigrés : les Orientaux, qui durant les vingt premières années de leurs vie israélienne en constitueront le prolétariat. L'idéal messianique qui motivait la 'alya marocaine se heurte à la conception laïque de l'état israélien. Conception qui implique le rejet de l'héritage diasporique et du Juif de l'exil pour une nouvelle nation "normale" à l'image des sociétés occidentales évoluées. L'état, laïque, basé sur une représentation légitime du peuple juif, remplace l'identification religieuse par une identification nationale, statut inconnu des immigrants marocains à peine coupés de leur statut séculaire de minorité religieuse traditionnelle. Au judaïsme de condition succède un judaïsme d'élection et à l'organisation communautaire une organisation étatique complexe et hermétique aux nouveaux citoyens. Aux yeux des immigrés marocains, l'identité juive devait suffire à les intégrer en terre promise, mais une fois là, la mise en présence de différences notables concernant la pratique religieuse, la langue, les coutumes, la tradition, les disparités économiques, produisirent la désillusion du rêve sacré confronté à la réalité concrète : "Au Maroc, il était juif, juif de par l'héritage d'Abraham, d'Isaac et de Jacob, juif empêtré dans la sainte et sacré Loi de Moïse. (.) En Israël, il est devenu --ô farce du destin !- arabe". De cette désillusion naquit la nostalgie, nostalgie de la nostalgie première, nostalgie de l'exil que certains auteurs (Ami Bouganim, Erez Bitton) chanteront sans cesse : "Elle chante l'exil, un embrun nostalgique autour de la voix, l'exil de Jérusalem, l'exil d'Espagne, l'exil du Maroc. (.) Elle passe d'une sérénade en espagnole à une chanson en français, d'une mélopée en arabe à un cantique en hébreu. (.)Sans cesse, les chants de Zohra reconstituent les décors fabuleux de son passé." Reconstituer les décors du passé pour lutter contre l'oubli des morts et la dépersonnalisation des vivants. Retrouver une identité perdue au cours d'un processus d'assimilation qui imposait l'oubli du Juif de la diaspora et la renaissance de l'Hébreu moderne. Ainsi la mémoire retrouve son rôle ; celui de reconstituer une identité et une culture parallèle à l'identité et à la culture nationale israélienne. Et c'est par la mémoire maternelle d'abord que se réactive cette reconstitution, une mémoire domestique faite de coutumes ancestrales, d'odeur de cuisine, de rires, de petits devoirs, de jeu, de musique festives, de superstition et de rumeurs, de blagues en parler local.mémoire folklorique. Car la mère est le personnage de la tradition que le maelström de la 'alya a corrodé le moins. C'est dans l'expression littéraire d'Israéliens issus du Maroc que pointe cette nostalgie avec des personnages qui ne se sentent pas dans une entité israélienne cohérente. Le parler, la culture, la mentalité exacerbent leurs différences et laissent agir leur particularisme. Bien que ce soit une particularité historique, la formation de la société israélienne a subi les règles de l'immigration. Plus qu'ailleurs, le terrain israélien est celui qui, le mieux, se prête à l'examen des problèmes posés par l'immigration : intégration, acculturation, mélange ethnique, en tant qu'hypothèse du devenir des sociétés dans la mondialisation.

Dogajanje v času komunistične revolucije bistveno vpliva tako na stanje kot tudi na razumevanje sodobne slovenske družbene situacije. V disertaciji avtorica v luči idejnega nasprotja med krščanstvom in komunizmom ter na podlagi konflikta, ki se je obenem razvil v obdobju revolucije, razišče vzroke in podlage za omenjeni vpliv. Avtorica v delu pokaže na temeljno povezanost sodobnega položaja in komunistične revolucije na Slovenskem. Kot pojmovni okvir ter orodje za razumevanje izbere Girardovo mimetično teorijo in teorijo o grešnem kozlu. Girard namreč kulturo opisuje kot mimetični cikel, kjer posameznik posnema drugega (tako se začne že v samem otroštvu, ko otrok posnema starše in s tem postane družbeno bitje). Posnemanje je gonilo vsake družbe. Poleg tega pa posnemanje lahko omogoči tudi uničenje družbe, kulture. Girard vpelje grešnega kozla kot razrešitev konflikta, kjer imata dva subjekta enako željo in se skupaj obrneta proti grešnemu kozlu, ki zanju predstavlja vzrok mimetične krize, in je njegovo žrtvovanje pogoj za ponovno vzpostavitev družbenega reda in socialne varnosti. Ta teo-retični okvir omogoča tudi raziskovanje preteklih družbenih konfliktov, posebej pa tudi njihovih posledic v sodobnosti, vključno z vidiki spravnih procesov ter tranzicijske pra-vičnosti. Zato ga avtorica plodno uporabi pri omenjenem raziskovanju. Kot dve nasprotujoči idejni podlagi avtorica predstavi krščanstvo in komunizem, ki sta že v svojem idejnem temelju diametralno nasprotni, posebej pa ju prikaže preko Girar-dove teorije. Krščanstvo s krističnim pojmovanjem osebne svobode izstopi iz cikličnosti mehanizma grešnega kozla, komunizem pa prav nasprotno temelji na mimetičnosti. Žrt-vena znamenja v Girardovem pojmovanju, ki opravičijo umor grešnega kozla, temeljijo na dejstvih, ki postanejo sprejemljiva za umor, ne glede na (ne)resničnost le-teh. Implementacija Girardove teorije na slovensko situacijo zajema dva ključna vidika. Prvi vidik je žrtvovanje nasprotnikov komunistične revolucije z žrtvenimi znamenji kolabo-racije, nemirov … Omenjeno žrtvovanje omogoči vzpostavitev totalitarnega komunisti-čnega režima v kraljevini Jugoslaviji in s tem tudi na Slovenskem. Komunizem kot tota-litarni režim ne dopušča alternative, človeka uniformira in osami. Obenem vzpostavi totalni nadzor in teror. Krščanstvo po drugi strani človeka opolnomoči z bogopodobnos-tjo in s tem edinstvenostjo, nedotakljivostjo, nezamenljivostjo ter svobodo. Drugi vidik pa zadeva dejstvo, da konflikt iz časa komunistične revolucije še vedno ni razrešen ter je vladavina prava in vzpostavitev demokratične družbe še vedno nedokon-čan projekt. Kljub demokratični državni ureditvi in propadu komunizma kot dolgoroč-nega družbenopolitičnega in ekonomskega sistema avtorica poudari dva izziva sodobne družbe na Slovenskem. Prvi je prisotnost komunistične ideologije v razmišljanju in delovanju posameznikov, drugi izziv pa je nezadostna uveljavitev tranzicijske pravično-sti. Omenjeni vidiki analize temeljijo najprej že v samem idejnem nasprotju in zasnovi tako komunizma kakor tudi krščanstva. Krščanstvo in komunizem sta v svojem temelju različna. Poseben poudarek je na vidikih dojemanja človeka kot svobodnega in razumskega bitja v obeh idejnih okvirih. Komunizem s komunistično revolucijo nastopi proti človeku, proti človekovemu dostojanstvu in proti človekovi svobodi in s tem krščanstvo postavi v obrambno držo. S tem pa tudi Cerkev, ki je kot ene vidnejših institucij komunistična revolucija ni prevzela in obvladovala, postane braniteljica človekovega življenja in človekovih pravic, obenem pa je postavljena nasproti komunistični revoluciji. Krščanstvo in tudi Cerkev se posluži različnih načinov obrambe in upora, ki niso vselej povsem skladni s krščanskim naukom. Metode obrambe so bile: krščanska drža v odnosu do vojne, do sočloveka, do okupatorja in do revolucionarnih sil, fizična obramba, sodelovanje tako z okupacijskimi kakor tudi revolucionarnimi silami, kulturna, medijska in politična udejstvovanja. Kljub temu je revolucionarno nasilje eskaliralo predvsem v zadnjih letih druge svetovne vojne in prvih letih po revoluciji. Situacije, v katere so bili postavljeni posamezniki na Slovenskem, niso bile enoznačne ali enostavne. Ni šlo zgolj za izbiro med revolucionarno ali protirevolucionarno stranjo, temveč so bile okoliščine zaradi okupacijskih sil bolj zapletene. Ljudem je grozilo neodobravanje, preganjanje ali nasilje z vseh strani. Komunistična partija je monopolizirala odpor proti okupacijskim silam. Že zametki kakršnekoli druge neodvisne organizacije upora so bili lahko kaznovani. Nemalo kristjanov je z namenom domoljubnosti ali nezmožnosti izognitve mobilizaciji postalo del osvobodilnega gibanja, ne glede na ideološko podlago gibanja ali organizacije, ki je gibanje organizirala. Cerkev kljub temu ni bila preveč zaželen partner v uporu, o čemer priča tudi Kardeljevo navodilo: "Duhovne v četah vse postreljajte" (Griesser-Pečar 1996, 109). Ne zgolj navodilo, tudi načrtno degradiranje duhovnikov z zaporom, priporom, deportacijami in usmrtitvami so priča odnosu komunistične partije do cerkvenih dostojanstvenikov. Revolucionarno nasilje je pustilo neslutene posledice ne zgolj v tedanjem obdobju, temveč tudi za sedanji čas, pri čemer pri avtoričinem raziskovanju teh posledic pomembno vlogo igrajo tudi osebne zgodbe, odgovornost na osebni ter družbeni ravni in medgeneracijski prenos travm, ki onemogočajo pravo tranzicijo iz totalitarnega v demokratični sistem. Tranzicija in tranzicijska pravičnost je torej mehanizem, ki si prizadeva v polnosti izpeljati tranzicijo na osebni in družbeni ravni ter vzpostaviti zaupanje v državne institucije, delovanje državnih struktur. Situacija na Slovenskem sicer nakazuje na nekatere pozitivne učinke tranzicijske pravičnosti, kot sta denacionalizacija in odprtje arhivov. Še vedno pa umanjka uveljavitev pravičnosti na osebni ravni, pri čemer so pomemben vidik spravni procesi ter prekinitev medgeneracijskega prenosa travm. Podobno kot na osebni ravni umanjka pravičnost v javni sferi, na primer pluralizacija medijskega prostora, urejene gospodarske pobude, dialog med različnimi družbenimi skupinami, vključno z vstopanjem verskih skupnosti v javno razpravo, vzpostavljanjem zaupanja v državne institucije ipd. Pogled na komunistično revolucijo na Slovenskem skozi prizmo Girardovega grešnega kozla ponudi edinstven okvir, ki poveže razumevanje komunistične revolucije in komu-nističnega sistema s sodobnim položajem slovenske družbe. Po eni strani Girardov mehanizem grešnega kozla lahko razumemo kot dopolnjenega v komunistični revoluciji, po drugi strani pa mehanizem stremi k dopolnitvi v smislu celovite uveljavitve tran-zicijske pravičnosti. ; The events during the communist revolution significantly influence the state and understanding of the contemporary Slovenian social situation. In the dissertation, in the light of the ideological contradiction between Christianity and Communism, and on the basis of the conflict that developed during the revolution, the author explores the causes and grounds for this influence. In this work the author shows the fundamental connection between the contemporary situation and the communist revolution in Slovenia. She chooses Girard's mimetic theory and scapegoat as a conceptual framework and tool for understanding. Girard describes culture as a mimetic cycle, where the individual imitates the other (this starts from the very childhood, when the child imitates his parents and thus becomes a social being). Imitation is the driving force of every company. In addition, imitation can also become a destruction of society, culture. Girard therefore implements the scapegoat as a conflict resolution where the two entities share the same desire and together turn against the scapegoat, which causes them a mimetic crisis and its sacrifice is a condition for restoring social order and social security. This general theoretical framework also makes it possible – to explore past social conflicts, and in particular their consequences in the present, including aspects of reconciliation processes and transitional justice. Therefore, the author fruitfully uses it in the mentioned research. The author embraces Christianity and communism as two opposing ideological bases, which are already diametrically opposed in their conceptual bases, and are especially illuminated by Girard's theory. Christianity, with its cristian notion of personal freedom, stands out from the cyclical nature of the scapegoat, but communism is, on the contrary, based on mimeticism. Victims of character in Girard's conception that justify the murder of a scapegoat are based on facts that become acceptable for murder, regardless of the (un) reality of them. The implementation of Girard's theory on the Slovenian situation thus encompasses two key aspects. The first aspect is the sacrifice of the opponents of the communist revolution with the sacrificial signs of collaboration, riots, … This sacrifice makes it possible to establish a totalitarian communist regime in Yugoslavia, and thus in Slovenia. Communism, as a totalitarian regime, does not allow an alternative, it uniforms and isolates man. At the same time, it establishes total control and terror. Christianity, on the other hand, empowers man with uniqueness, inviolability, irreplaceability and freedom. Another aspect concerns the fact that the conflict from the communist revolution has still not been resolved, and that the rule of law and the establishment of a democratic society are still, in the eyes of many Slovenians, an unfinished project. Despite the democratic state system and the collapse of communism as a long-term socio-political and economic system, the author emphasizes two challenges of contemporary society in Slovenia. The first is the presence of communist ideology in the thinking and action of individuals, and the second challenge is the insufficient implementation of transitional justice. The aforementioned aspects of the analysis are based first of all on the very conceptual contradiction and conception of both communism and Christianity. Christianity and communism are fundamentally different. Particular emphasis is placed on aspects of the perception of man as a free and rational being in both conceptual frameworks. Communism, by communist revolution, stands against man, against human dignity and against human freedom, thereby placing Christianity in a defensive posture. In doing so, the Church, which as one of the most prominent institutions has not been taken over and controlled by the Communist Revolution, becomes a defender of human life and human rights, while at the same time it stands against the Communist Revolution. Christianity, as well as the Church, uses various methods of defense and rebellion that are not always completely in line with Christian teaching. The methods of defense were the Christian stance in relation to war, to fellow human beings, to the occupier and to the revolutionary forces, physical defense, cooperation with both occupation and revolutionary forces, cultural, media and political activities. Nevertheless, revolutionary violence escalated, especially in the last years of World War II and the first years after the revolution. The situations in which individuals in Slovenia were placed were not straightforward or straightforward. It was not merely a choice between a revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary party, but the circumstances were more complex rather than straightforward because of the occupying forces. People were threatened with disapproval, persecution or violence from all sides. The Communist Party monopolized resistance to the occupation forces. The rudiments of any other, independent organization of resistance could have been punished. Quite a few Christians, for the sake of patriotism or inability to evade mobilization, became part of the liberation movement, regardless of the ideological basis of the movement or the organization that organized the movement. The church was not, however, a much-desired partner in the resistance, as evidenced by Kardelj's instruction: "Shoot the priests in the troops." (Griesser-Pečar 1996, 109) Not only the instruction, but also the deliberate degradation of priests through imprisonment, detention, deportation and execution, are witnesses to the Communist Party's attitude towards Church dignitaries. Revolutionary violence has left unprecedented consequences not only in that time but also in the present, with the author's exploration of these consequences also playing a significant role in personal stories, personal and social responsibility, and the intergenerational transmission of traumas that they preclude a real transition from a totalitarian to a democratic system. Transition and transitional justice is thus a mechanism that seeks to fully complete the transition on a personal and social level, and to establish trust in state institutions, the functioning of state structures. Although the situation in Slovenia points to some of the positive effects of transitional justice, such as denationalization, the opening of archives, it still lacks the enforcement of justice on a personal level ; for example, with regard to aspects of media pluralization, orderly economic initiatives, dialogue between different social groups, including the entry of religious communities into public debate, building confidence in state institutions, etc. The view of the communist revolution in Slovenia through the prism of Girard the scapegoat offers a unique framework that connects the understanding of the communist revolution and the communist system with the contemporary position of Slovene society. On the one hand, Girard's mechanism of the scapegoat can be understood as supplemented in the communist revolution, and on the other, the mechanism seeks to supplement in the sense of the full implementation of transitional justice.

RESUMEN: Al crecer entre cubanos de generaciones anteriores, muchos de nosotros no pudimos evitar la proverbial frase " más se perdió en la guerra ". Ya sea en respuesta a la caída accidental de la porcelana más preciada en el suelo de la cocina o al desempeño mediocre de un niño en un examen en la escuela, nuestras abuelas y tía-abuelas especialmente parecían encontrar consuelo en la comparación de decepciones relativamente menores con las profundas cicatrices sufridas cuando Cuba había estado en guerra. Sin duda, cuatro siglos de esclavitud, tres luchas independentistas contra España, intervenciones militares de Estados Unidos e innumerables protestas armadas para derrocar o transformar gobiernos no representativos, dejaron recuerdos imborrables de dolor y una sed de justicia política cuyo legado perdura. Después de más de dos años de aislamiento impuesto por la pandemia y de una innumerable serie de crisis que han ido engullendo a la isla de Cuba, compartimos esta pequeña colección de diez documentos inéditos y prácticamente desconocidos procedentes de dos de las colecciones de archivos y manuscritos más importantes de Cuba. Leídas en conjunto, estas voces olvidadas y poco escuchadas abarcan las múltiples formas en que la guerra, el militarismo y la violencia sumergieron las esperanzas e identidades individuales de los cubanos en la búsqueda colectiva de la salvación y en lo que podría llamarse "la tarea generacional de salvar al mundo salvando a la nación". A continuación se presentan ejemplos sorprendentes de cartas que ciudadanos anónimos escribieron al legendario general cubano Máximo Gómez, así como los escritos y la correspondencia personal que recibieron varias grandes patriotas femeninas como "la Cubanita" Ritica Suárez del Villar y Suárez del Villar (1862–1961), María Cabrales Viuda de Maceo (1842–1905) y "La Delegada" Magdalena Peñarredonda (1846–1937), capitana del Ejército Libertador de Cuba a la que José Martí designó para representar al Partido Revolucionario Cubano en la crucial provincia de Pinar del Río, así como operativa estratégica y amiga personal del general Antonio Maceo. En conjunto, estos documentos revelan no solo una politización integral que a algunos les puede resultar sorprendente, sino un sentido explícito de orgullo e igualdad de género ya alcanzado en la camaradería de la crisis, el activismo y la guerra. Aunque predominantemente extraídos del ciclo de luchas y traumas producidos durante la última Guerra de Independencia de Cuba en 1895 y la posterior ocupación militar de los Estados Unidos (1898–1902), también hemos incluido tres impactantes documentos de la colección personal de Ofelia Domínguez Navarro, militante del Partido Comunista y abogada de Cienfuegos conocida por su trabajo en favor de los derechos de la mujer y su elección para la Convención Constitucional de Cuba de 1940. Aunque se hizo famosa por su temprano activismo y persecución en la lucha para derrocar al presidente convertido en dictador de Cuba, Gerardo Machado, el período de tres años de Domínguez Navarro como Ministra de Propaganda de Fulgencio Batista durante la única presidencia elegida de Batista (1940–1944) ha sido borrado casi por completo de la historia. A partir de 1941, cuando Cuba se unió a las potencias aliadas para luchar contra los nazis y los japoneses, ningún soldado sirvió en ningún frente. Sin embargo, Domínguez Navarro no solo supervisó la organización y el entrenamiento de un cuerpo de Defensa Civil, sino que emitió programas de radio semanales en los que detallaba la naturaleza de las políticas genocidas del Tercer Reich y la amenaza radical que representaba el fascismo en este hemisferio. Uno de los aspectos más destacados de esta selección de documentos es un cartel diseñado bajo la supervisión de Domínguez Navarro que atribuye vínculos históricos directos entre la visión antirracista, antiimperialista y democrática de la nación que los cubanos abrazaron durante sus guerras de independencia del siglo XIX y el tipo de apoyo, incondicional a la causa aliada, necesario para derrotar al totalitarismo moderno. Hoy en día, pocos historiadores de Cuba discutirían los pronunciados cambios en las narrativas antes aceptadas que han marcado las últimas décadas en nuestro campo. Sorprendentes descubrimientos de nuevos conocimientos y audaces interpretaciones de archivos ocultos han abierto y, en ocasiones, derribado antiguos tabúes. Tal vez no se hayan producido mayores avances en la historiografía de Cuba que los relacionados con la centralidad, la agencia, el liderazgo, las contribuciones intelectuales, la resistencia y la represión de los cubanos negros, los esclavizados y otros afrodescendientes. Sorprendentemente, la experiencia de las mujeres cubanas, sea cual sea su clase, identidad racial o herencia, sigue siendo menos examinada, subsumida —algunos podrían argumentar— en la a menudo gargantuesca tarea de simplemente obtener acceso en Cuba a cualquier archivo o colección de fuentes primarias de la biblioteca. Esto es especialmente cierto cuando se trata de ciertos períodos de la historia, como de los años 30 a los 50, por no hablar de temas clave, como la historia poscomunista de Cuba de la reforma agraria, las relaciones industriales, el uso punitivo de los campos de trabajo, las confiscaciones de propiedades y similares. Por esta razón, a menudo es tan desafiante como tentador encontrar voces inesperadas del pasado que hablan de forma tan familiar como exótica y desconocida. Esperamos que este dossier de Voces Olvidadas inspire a los lectores a examinar más a fondo la fe incesante en la capacidad de Cuba para corregir los fallos del pasado y el optimismo permanente, incluso implacable, en el futuro que evocan sus palabras. ABSTRACT: Growing up among Cubans of older generations, many of us could not escape the proverbial phrase más se perdió en la Guerra (far more was lost in the war). Whether responding to the accidental crash of cherished porcelain on the kitchen floor or a child's lackluster performance on an exam at school, our abuelas and tía-abuelas especially seemed to find solace in comparing relatively minor disappointments with the profound scars suffered when Cuba had been at war. No doubt four centuries of slavery, three independence struggles against Spain, US military interventions, and countless armed protests intended to topple or transform nonrepresentative governments left indelible memories of pain and a thirst for political justice, the legacies of which live on. In the wake of more than two years of pandemic-imposed isolation and an innumerable array of crises that have steadily come to engulf the island of Cuba, we share this small collection of ten previously unpublished and virtually unknown documents from two of Cuba's most important archival and manuscript collections. Read together, these forgotten, seldom-heard voices encompass the many ways war, militarism, and violence immersed Cubans' individual hopes and identities in the collective search for salvation and what one might call "the generational task of saving the world by saving the nation." Below follow startling examples of letters that anonymous citizens wrote to Cuba's legendary general Máximo Gómez as well as the writings and personal correspondence received by several great female patriots like "la Cubanita," Ritica Suárez del Villar y Suárez del Villar (1862–1961), María Cabrales Viuda de Maceo (1842–1905) and "La Delegada" Magdalena Peñarredonda (1846–1937), captain of the Liberating Army of Cuba whom José Martí appointed to represent the Partido Revolucionario Cubano in the pivotal province of Pinar del Río as well as the strategic operative and personal friend of General Antonio Maceo. Together these documents reveal not only an all-encompassing politicization that some may find surprising but an explicit sense of pride and gender equality already achieved in the camaraderie of crisis, activism, and war. Although predominantly drawn from the cycle of struggle and trauma produced during Cuba's last War for Independence in 1895 and the subsequent US military occupation (1898–1902), we have also included three striking documents from the personal collection of Ofelia Domínguez Navarro, a Communist Party militant and lawyer from Cienfuegos known for her work on behalf of women's rights and her election to Cuba's 1940 Constitutional Convention. Although made famous by her early activism and persecution in the fight to oust Cuba's president-turned-dictator Gerardo Machado, Domínguez Navarro's three-year-stint as Fulgencio Batista's minister of propaganda during Batista's only elected presidency (1940–1944) is almost entirely erased from history. From 1941, when Cuba joined the Allied powers to fight the Nazis and Japanese, no soldiers ever served in any front. However, Domínguez Navarro not only oversaw the organization and training of a Civil Defense corps; she also broadcast weekly radio shows detailing the nature of the Third Reich's genocidal policies and the radical threat that fascism represented in this hemisphere. One of the highlights of this selection of documents is a poster designed under Domínguez Navarro's watch that ascribes direct historical links between the anti-racist, anti-imperialist, and democratic vision of nation Cubans espoused during their nineteenth-century independence wars and the kind of unconditional support for the Allied cause needed to defeat modern-day totalitarianism. Today, few historians of Cuba would dispute the pronounced shifts in once-accepted narratives that have marked the past few decades in our field. Astonishing discoveries of new knowledge and bold interpretations of hidden archives have cracked open and sometimes demolished long-standing taboos. Perhaps no greater strides have been made in the historiography of Cuba than those related to the centrality, agency, leadership, intellectual contributions, resistance, and repression of Black Cubans, the enslaved and others of African descent. Remarkably, female Cubans' experience, whatever their class, racial identity, or heritage, remains less examined, subsumed—some might argue—into the often gargantuan task of simply gaining access in Cuba to any archives or library's primary source collections. This is especially true when it comes to certain periods of history, such as the 1930s to the 1950s, let alone key topics, such as Cuba's postcommunist history of agrarian reform, industrial relations, punitive use of labor camps, property confiscations, and the like. For this reason, it is often as challenging as it is tantalizing to encounter unexpected voices from the past that speak in ways that are familiar while also exotic and unknown. We hope that this dossier of Forgotten Voices inspires readers to examine further the unceasing faith in Cuba's ability to correct the failings of the past and abiding— even relentless—optimism in the future that their words evoke.

Jevrejski istorijski muzej (JIM) u Beogradu predstavlјa jednu celovitu, po mnogo čemu jedinstvenu muzejsku ustanovu u Srbiji. To je jedini jevrejski muzej u našoj zemlјi, tematski specijalizovan, a sadržajno veoma kompleksan. Osim muzejskog materijala, Jevrejski istorijski muzej ima sopstveni, srazmerno veliki arhiv čija dokumentacija i foto-dokumentacija svedoči kako o Holokaustu, u kojem su mnoge jevrejske opštine bukvalno nestale, tako i o životu i aktivnostima jevrejskih zajednica iz Srbije i sa teritorije cele bivše Jugoslavije u 19, još više 20. veku, uklјučujući i savremene periode. Jevrejski istorijski muzej je osnovan 1948. godine u okviru Saveza jevrejskih opština bivše Jugoslavije. Zanimlјiva je činjenica da je ideja o osnivanju muzeja ovakvog tipa mnogo starija. Već posle prvog Redovnog kongresa Saveza jevrejskih veroispovednih opština Kralјevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca održanog 1921. godine u Zagrebu, bilo je predloga i planova za stvaranje muzeja - pravog mesta za čuvanje jevrejske baštine i kulturnog identiteta. Ipak, ova ideja nije ostvarena. Imajući u vidu Drugi svetski rat i događaje koju su usledili počev od 1941. godine u Jugoslaviji, sa ove vremenske distance, može se slobodno reći da je ״sreća u nesreći" što jevrejski muzej nije tada osnovan. Pošto je uspeo da se obnovi, kao vodeća institucija preživelih jevrejskih opština oslobođene Republike Jugoslavije, Savez se, u jesen 1945. godine, obratio svojim članicama sa molbom da prikupe sve raspoložive podatke o Holokaustu i učešću Jevreja u Norodnooslobodilačkoj borbi. Bio je to prvi, ali sasvim konkretan korak ka muzeju. Relativno brzo, u Zagrebu je formiran Muzejsko-istorijski odsek u okviru Pravnog odelјenja Saveza. Otpočelo je sistematsko traganje za sačuvanom arhivskom građom. Godine 1952. do tada sakuplјena građa je preselјena u Beograd, kada se nastavilo sa traganjem i sakuplјanjem. ״Odsek" je počeo da se razvija u pravcu kompletne muzejske ustanove. Te 1952. godine, organizovana je izložba povodom otkrivanja impresivnog spomenika Bogdana Bogdanovića na sefardskom groblјu u Beogradu, posvećenog jevrejskim žrtvama Holokausta. Povodom obeležavanja desetogodišnjice obnove, Savez je 1955. postavio još jednu izložbu o radu celokupne jevrejske zajednice u tadašnjoj Jugoslaviji. Za sve to vreme, kao osnivač i vlasnik Muzeja, Savez je bio u stalnom kontaktu sa svim svojim jevrejskim opštinama, obnovlјenim posle neviđenog stradanja 1941-1945. godine. Za zajednički Muzej i dalјe su stizali materijali koji su se odnosili na istoriju jugoslovenskih Jevreja. Pozivu Saveza su se odazivali i pojedinci, preživeli Jevreji koji su donosili poneki predmet ili porodične fotografije, kolekcionari čije su zbirke opstale sakrivene, i drugi . Mnogi su Muzeju zaveštali predmete iz porodičnih kuća od istorijskog, etnološkog ili umetničkog značaja, a povremeno je vršen i otkup eksponata, u zavisnosti od trenutnih uslova. Počev od datuma osnivanja, pa do 1959. godine, sakuplјen je muzejski i arhivski materijal, dovolјan da se iste godine otvori lepa, slikovita - prva stalna, muzejska postavka. Na dan 19. maja 1960. godine, za javnost je otvoren Muzej Saveza jevrejskih opština Jugoslavije, u istoj zgradi u kojoj je i Savez. Posle izvesnog vremena, naziv muzeja je preinačen u Jevrejski istorijski muzej (JIM), što mnogo više odgovara njegovoj nameni i sadržaju. Sa sakuplјanjem i stručnom obradom materijala se nastavilo, pa je 1969. godine otvorena druga stalna postavka Jevrejskog istorijskog muzeja, znatno bogatija i izražajnija. Za njenu koncepciju je bila zaslužna prof. dr Vidosava Nedomački, prvi upravnik Muzeja. Posle raspada Jugoslavije 1992. godine, formiran je Savez jevrejskih opština Srbije u kojem se okupilo deset jevrejskih opština, koliko ih ukupno ima u našoj zemlјi. Status Jevrejskog istorijskog muzeja ostao je isti - on je deo Saveza jevrejskih opština Srbije. Iako je u sastavu Saveza, Muzej se razvio u instituciju za sebe, sa svojim specifičnim životom, svojom stručnom ekipom i svojim poslovnim kontaktima sa drugim muzejima. S obzirom na to da je stalna izložbena postavka Muzeja otvorena mnogo pre raspada Jugoslavije, ona se bavi istorijskim, etnološkim i opštekulturnim temama vezanim za jevrejstvo celokupnog nekadašnjeg jugoslovenskog područja. Usled teških političkih i ekonomskih problema koji su, počev od 1992. godine pritiskali našu zemlјu, Srbiju, nisu se zasad stekli uslovi za izradu nove, drugačije koncipirane postavke. Međutim, ako imamo u vidu činjenicu da su Jevreji ovog dela Balkana imali zajedničku istoriju i kulturna obeležja - onda je neizbežno da i koncept nove postavke zadrži, bar delimično, širi pristup u svojoj budućoj prezentaciji. Zbog svega toga, a i zahvalјujući složenoj i veoma suptilno osmišlјenoj koncepciji, realna starost stalne izložbene postavke Jevrejskog istorijskog muzeja nikome ne smeta, jer ne utiče na izvanredan kvalitet informacija o jevrejskoj istoriji i načinu života. ; The Jewish Historical Museum (JHM) in Belgrade is a comprehensive and, in manу ways, a unique museum in Serbia. It is the only Jewish museum in the country, thematically specialized, and very complex in terms of contents. Apart from museum exhibits, the Jewish Historical Museum also has its own, relatively large, archives whose documentation and photo documentation are testimony both of the Holocaust, during which manу Jewish communities literally perished, and of the life and activities of Jewish communities from Serbia and the whole territory of former Yugoslavia during the 19th and, even more, the 20th century, including the present times. The Jewish Historical Museum was founded in 1948, as part of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that the idea of founding a museum of this type dates much further back. Already after the First Congress of the Federation of Jewish Religious Communities of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, held in 1921 in Zagreb, there were recommendations and plans concerning the foundation of such a museum as the right place to preserve the heritage and cultural identity. Yet, the idea had not materialized. Having in mind the World War II and the events that followed from 1941 in Yugoslavia, from this time perspective one could say that it is, in fact, a lucky coincidence that the Jewish museum had not been founded at that time. After the Federation managed to revive itself as the leading institution of the surviving Jewish communities of the liberated Republic of Yugoslavia, in autumn of 1945, it invited its members to collect all data available about the Holocaust and the participation of Jews in the National Liberation Movement. This was the first and very specific step towards founding a museum. Relatively soon afterwards, the Museum - Historical Department was established in Zagreb within the Legal Division of the Federation. Systematic efforts to identify and preserve the archives began. In 1952 all the archives collected until that time were moved to Belgrade, and the search and collection efforts continued. The ״Department" was beginning to develop towards a full museum institution. The same уеаг, 1952, an exhibition was organized on the occasion of launching the impressive monument by artist Bogdan Bogdanovic at the Sephardic cemetery in Belgrade, dedicated to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. On the occasion of commemorating the tenth anniversary of its revival, in 1955, the Federation staged another exhibition on the topic of activities of the whole Jewish community in the then Yugoslavia. During that period, the Federation, as the founder and owner of the Museum, was in permanent contact with all the member Jewish communities that were revitalized after the unprecedented persecution during the period 1941-1945. The Museum continued to receive materials relevant to the history of Yugoslav Jews. The individual, surviving Jews also responded to the invitation of the Museum and contributed individual exhibits and family photographs, and there were contributions from collectors whose collections were hidden and preserved, and others as well. Маnу of them made legacies to the Museum containing artefacts from their families and homes, and these legacies possessed historical, ethnological and artistic value; also depending on its resources available the Museum on occasions also purchased exhibits. From its very establishment, until the уеаг 1959, the Museum had managed to collect sufficient museum and archive materials to establish that same уеаг a good and picturesque permanent museum exhibition. On 19 Мау 1960, the Museum of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia was opened to the public, in the same building which presently houses the Federation. Soon afterwards, the name of the Museum was changed to The Jewish Historical Museum (JHM), which is much better suited to its purpose and content. The collection and professional processing of collected materials continued, so that in 1969 the second permanent exhibition of the Jewish Historical Museum, much richer and more expressive, was presented. The credit for its concept goes to Vidosava Nedomacki, Ph.D., the first Museum Manager. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1992, The Federation of Jewish Communities of Serbia was established, consisting of ten Jewish communities, which is the total existing in our country. The status of the Jewish Historical Museum remained unchanged - it is an integral part of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Serbia. Although existing within the framework of the Federation, the Museum developed into an institution of its own right, living its own specific life, its professional team and business contacts with other museums. Since the permanent exhibition of the Museum was opened long before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, it deals with the historical, ethnological and general cultural topics relevant to the Jewery of the overall then Yugoslav region. Due to the grave political and economic difficulties which, beginning in 1992, overwhelmed our country, Serbia, it has not yet been possible to develop a new, differently designed museum exhibition. However, having in mind the fact that the Jews from this part of the Balkans have had a common history and cultural features - it is unavoidable that the concept of such a new exhibition should maintain, at least partially, a more comprehensive approach to such a presentation which will develop in the future. For all of these reasons, and thanks to the complex and subtly designed concept, the actual age of the permanent exhibition of the Jewish Historical Museum does not bother аnyone, as it does not have an impact on the excellent quality of information regarding Jewish history of the way of life. ; 2. dopunjeno izdanje (2nd enlarged edition). ; Uporedo srpski tekst i engleski prevod. ; Ilustracija za korice knjige: Tora i jad - pokazivač za tekst Tore iz Judaika zbirke Jevrejskog istorijskog muzeja (motive for the cover page: The Torah scroll with a Torah pointer from the Judaica collection of the Jewish Historical Museum).

David J. Bier


President Biden has used the immigration authority known as "parole" to permit many immigrants to enter the country or remain in the country legally. But his actions have deep historical precedent. Under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)), the Attorney General and later the Secretary of Homeland Security has had the authority to waive the normal restrictions on entry and allow certain noncitizens to enter the United States since 1952.
Table 1 provides a list of 126 programmatic or categorical parole orders, meaning orders that were nationalized policies intended to permit the entry of certain defined types of noncitizens. This list is certainly not exhaustive. Until recently, programmatic or categorical uses of parole were often not publicized in any formal, consistent, or even public way. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) would simply create internal guidance that would only become public if stakeholders or the media publicized it.











For example, one instance in Table 1 is an INS official in 1990 listing six separate categories for parole in operation at the time that no other document refers to before or since. That is an exceptional case. In many cases, however, Congress acknowledged these uses of parole through subsequent or previous congressional actions, allowing for parolees to adjust to legal permanent residence or receive refugee benefits. In some cases, it just acknowledged that these procedures were in effect or expressed support for them.
This list helps dispel some myths. Since the creation of the parole power in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952—which codified executive powers already in use—Congress has substantively amended the parole authority twice: in the Refugee Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–212, March 17, 1980), barring refugees from being paroled into the United States, and in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208), which made two statutory changes. First, the standard for paroling someone changed from "emergent" or "public interest" reasons to "urgent humanitarian" or "significant public benefit" reasons. Second, each determination had to be made on a case‐​by‐​case basis.
Few at the time thought these changes were substantive, and the categorical parole regulations then in effect were reenacted verbatim. Moreover, the case‐​by‐​case basis requirement was in effect for decades, including for large‐​scale programmatic uses of parole, such as for Cubans and Vietnamese. Case‐​by‐​case determinations always meant an individual determination, even if someone's categorization created a presumption that they met the "emergent/​humanitarian" or "public interest/​significant public benefit" requirement.
In many cases, these parole programs have received almost no attention in many years but contain precedents that the current administration should consider reimplementing. For example, parole used to be available in 1990 for children aging out of eligibility for green cards. In the 1950s, it was used for the employment‐​based first preference category (skilled immigrants) when immigrant visas were unavailable under the cap. These two issues are particularly relevant now, with the employment‐​based cap being exhausted even for Nobel laureates and their children.
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive set of statistics for the number of people paroled since 1952. Figure 1 shows the data that the INS published from 1982 to 2003. Table 2 shows the programmatic grants under various programs from the 1950s through the year 2000.






















Humanitarian and public interest parole categories (1952—present): This type of parole has evolved over time in the types of categories that fall under it. In 1964, the INS associate commissioner listed several categories of immigrants who would be granted parole: to "either attend to sickness or burial or some close family affair," "accompany servicemen, members of the Armed Forces where the wife or some child would have been technically inadmissible," reunite a mentally handicapped child who would otherwise be excludable with their family, or deal with medical emergencies. Since 1982, at least some of these reasons have been included in regulations. In 1980, the INS provided examples of parole, including children coming for medical treatment, people coming to donate a kidney, and a Chinese woman who was allowed to visit her 81‐​year‐​old adoptive mother, who had been expelled by the communists from China. In 1990, the INS described a "small sampling" of the kinds of humanitarian and public interest categories of parole available at the time: 1) Someone's immediate family member just died or is dying, and consular officers lack time to process a visa or deny the visa; 2) People coming for organ, blood, or tissue donation; 3) Extradited criminals, informants, witnesses; and 4) National security assets (e.g., Soviet dissidents and foreign U.S. spies). In September 2008, ICE, USCIS, and CBP signed a memorandum of agreement on the use of parole by the agencies. This document listed, among other programs described below, parole categories for 1) registered sources of the U.S. intelligence community, 2) transiters through the United States to legal proceedings in a third country, 3) trainees, 4) individuals necessary for prosecutions or investigations, 5) confidential informants, 6) extraditions, 7) civil court participants, and 8) international organization event participants.
Parole from detention (1954—1980): On November 12, 1954, Ellis Island and several other INS detention centers were closed, and detainees were paroled into the United States. The number of detained immigrants fell from a monthly average of 225 to less than 40. Paroles were carried out under section 212(d)(5) of the INA. The INS promulgated a regulation on January 8, 1958, authorizing this practice of parole from ports of entry rather than detention. From 1954 until 1981, "most undocumented aliens detained at the border were paroled into the United States." Even after 1982, when the use of parole was narrowed, its use continued "when detention is impossible or impractical." The INS associate commissioner testified in 1964 that the closing of the detention facilities met the requirement of the parole statute because "it created a better image of the American Government and American public."
Orphan parole (1956): The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 created 4,000 slots for orphans adopted by U.S. citizens, but when the slots were filled, the attorney general authorized the entry of additional orphans under his parole authority on October 30, 1956. A total of 925 orphans were paroled.
Adjustment of status: On September 11, 1957, Congress enacted Public Law 85–316, which authorized the adjustment of status to legal permanent residence of any eligible orphaned paroled into the United States.
Hungarian parole (1956): On November 13, 1956, President Eisenhower ordered that 5,000 Hungarians be paroled into the United States. On December 1, 1956, he revised the limit to 15,000 Hungarians before eliminating the limit on January 2, 1957. By June 30, 1957, 27,435 parolees had entered, and the total reached 31,915 by 1958. For context, only 109 immigrants were admitted from Hungary in 1956, and only 321,625 immigrants were admitted worldwide. The Justice Department said in 1957 that this was "the first time that the parole provision has been applied to relatively large numbers of people." Several U.S. charitable organizations helped prepare their parole applications and to find housing and jobs for them.
Adjustment of status: On July 25, 1958, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 85–559) that allowed Hungarians to adjust their status to legal permanent residence if they were "paroled into the United States" at any point after October 23, 1956 (including after the enactment of the act) if they had been in the United States for at least two years. Ultimately, 30,491 received legal permanent residence in this way. This set a precedent for handling adjustments of later parolees.
Pre‐​Examination Parole (1957—1959): Regulations of December 6, 1957 provided that someone who was subjected to pre‐​examination in the United States prior to requesting an immigrant visa in Canada who was found inadmissible in Canada "shall be paroled" into the United States. This regulation was revoked in 1959.
Crew Members Parole (1957—present): Regulations of December 6, 1957 provided for the parole of noncitizen crewmembers under certain circumstances and stated that shipwrecked or castaway crew members "shall be paroled." On December 8, 1961 and March 22, 1967, expanded the grounds for parole to asylum seekers from communist countries. On July 27, 1990, this parole was expanded to crewmen facing persecution in any country. On March 6, 1997, this provision was updated and reenacted, and it was revised and reenacted again on February 19, 1999. On April 4, 2004, the parole of lightering crews that were not eligible for D‑1 visas for technical reasons was authorized. The parole of crew members was recognized in Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(A)).
Cuban parole (1959—1965): Starting about January 1, 1959, following the communist revolution, the Eisenhower administration used parole to allow a "small percentage" of Cubans who had left the island and entered illegally into the United States (INS 1960). By June 1961, there were 4,000 paroled Cubans in the United States (INS 1961). By December 31, 1961, there were 12,200 in parole status. In 1962, Cuban illegal entrants ceased to be referred for deportation hearings and were instead paroled into the United States (INS 1962). By June 1962, the number of Cubans on parole rose to 62,500 (INS 1962). Commercial travel between the U.S. and Cuba was suspended in 1962, and only a few thousand more Cubans made it off the island through the Red Cross (INS 1963). Altogether, about 107,116 Cubans were paroled into the United States from 1959 to 1965.
Adjustment of status: The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89–732, November 2, 1966) made it possible for Cuban parolees, including future parolees, to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States if they entered after 1959.
Guam parole (1959—1974): Starting in April 1959, the INS began to parole into the United States some Filipinos to work with the Defense Department and the Government of Guam on the island under the Parolee Defense program. At least 16 orders establishing and renewing Guam parole programs went out between 1960 and 1969, and an INS internal memo of January 27, 1960 established the initial rules for the program. Workers received INS Form I‑94 stamped, "Paroled into Guam under section 212(d)(5) I&N Act until the purpose of parole has been served not exceeding—–." Parolees could enter for up to a year and could be extended at least twice. On November 15, 1962, the INS created the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Parole Program to parole workers from the Philippines and the Trust Islands into Guam to help with emergency repairs to homes and defense installations following a storm (INS 1963). From FY 1963 to FY 1974, 26,501 workers received parole to enter Guam temporarily. The Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Parole Program ended in 1970, and the Parolee Defense program was eliminated in 1975 in favor of admitting workers under the H‑2 nonimmigrant work visa program.
Refugee‐​escapee parole (1960—1965): On July 14, 1960, Congress passed the Fair Share Law (Public Law 86–648), a joint resolution to "enable the United States to participate in the resettlement of certain refugees." The law directed the INS to parole into the United States any refugee who fled from a communist or Middle Eastern country in an amount not to exceed 25 percent of the total number of such refugees accepted by other countries in the world, and it allowed any of those paroled to receive legal permanent residence after two years. During fiscal year 1961, 2,942 refugees entered as parolees (INS 1961), the largest portion of which were from Yugoslavia. In 1962, the total reached 8,260 (INS 1962). By 1966, the total had reached 19,705 (INS 1966). Public Law 86–648 included a sunset date for this use of parole of July 1, 1962, but authorization to continue to parole was extended indefinitely by section 6 of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act Public Law 87–510 (July 1, 1962). Section 16 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 ended this parole program, and the law introduced a new capped category of immigrant visas for refugees.
Adjustment of status: Public Law 86–648 of 1960 (the original statute establishing the refugee‐​escapee parolees) allowed parolees to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States. Section 16 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 terminated this provision.
First Preference parole (1961): In January 1962, the INS reported that "recent changes in regulations" allowed for the parole of two groups of first preference skilled workers who could not receive green cards or immigrant visas as a result of the annual caps: 1) those who were abroad if they will be coming to work in defense industries; and 2) anyone in the United States. It's not clear exactly what change in regulation made this possible, but in 1964, the INS associate commissioner testified that this was the policy for "many years." He testified, "The basis for this policy was this incompatible situation that seemed to exist in that, with one hand, the Service was in effect making a finding that the alien's services were urgently needed and, at the same time, in contradiction, we were seeking to expel him." Congress revised the caps in 1965, which may have ended this practice.
Hong Kong Chinese parole (1962—1965): On May 23, 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy ordered the INS to parole into the United States Chinese who had fled to Hong Kong so long as they were "relatives of United States citizens and resident aliens" or "Chinese persons possessing special skills needed in the United States" (INS 1962). By the end of FY 1963, the total number reached 7,047 (INS 1963). Processing continued into 1964, during which the total reached 10,617 (INS 1964). The number reached 13,619 in 1965 (INS 1965). By 1966, the total reached 14,757 (INS 1965, Table 14B). A few stragglers were approved in 1966 but did not arrive until later, bringing the total to 15,111 (INS 1966). The program ended in June 1965.
Adjustment of status: The INA was amended in 1960 to allow parolees to adjust their status to legal permanent residence for the first time—which many were eligible to do since parolees generally had to meet the standards for an immigrant visa except for a cap spot being available—but no law provided any special category for Hong Kong parolees. Nonetheless, when Congress created a new general refugee category in December 1965, the administration used it to enable most other Hong Kong Chinese refugees to adjust their status. On October 5, 1978, P.L. 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."

Russian Orthodox Old Believer parole (1963): The Russian Orthodox Old Believer church was being forced out of Turkey to the Soviet Union, where they would be persecuted. In response, the INS authorized the parole of 210 church members on May 10, 1963.
Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, P.L. 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."

Cuban airlift parole (1965—1973): Starting on December 1, 1965, based on a November 6, 1965 memorandum of understanding with the Cuban government, the Johnson administration operated daily "Freedom Flights" from Cuba to Miami. During its operation, 281,317 Cubans were paroled into the United States. At its peak year, 46,670 Cubans arrived via parole in 1971. This compares to 361,972 total immigrants that year. The airlifts were funded by congressional appropriations. In May 1972, the flights were suspended by the Cuban government before being terminated permanently on April 6, 1973.
Adjustment of status: The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 made it possible for Cuban parolees entering after 1959, including future parolees, to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States.
Czechoslovak parole (1970): Following the failed uprising against the Soviets in Czechoslovakia on September 4, 1968, Secretary of State David Rusk asked the president to authorize the attorney general to parole for Czechoslovaks fleeing the fallout of the failed anti‐​communist uprising. When the refugee numbers permitted under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 ran out, every member of the House Judiciary Committee wrote in November 1969 to the administration to request that it parole Czechoslovakian refugees. On January 2, 1970, the attorney general authorized the use of parole. Nearly 5,000 were processed from February to November 1970, with 6,500 total. These parolees were given I‑94 documents that stated that the period of admission was "indefinite" and the purpose of the parole was "refugee." This type of indefinite parole document was still available throughout the 1980s for other parole types.
Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."

Soviet Union minority religious groups (1971): Following a letter from Rep. Peter Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee, on October 1, 1971, Attorney General John Mitchell announced that the United States would parole Soviet religious minorities who secured exit permits from the Soviet Union. The first four arrived on January 7, 1972, and in FY 1973, 200 were processed this way (INS 1973).
Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."

Advance Parole (1971): Advance parole appears to date to 1971 when the INS implemented a regulation in 1971 deeming an adjustment of status application abandoned if a person left the country while it was still pending unless "he had previously been granted permission by the Service for such absence." If someone had entered with a nonimmigrant visa and tried to adjust status, they would have had to prove "nonimmigrant intent" (i.e., intention to leave) upon reentry, which would be impossible with a pending adjustment of status application, and the only alternative to a visa is parole. Advance parole would not have helped prior to the effective date of the 1960 act, which authorized parolees to adjust their status (under a normal immigrant visa category) for the first time. The first advance parole regulation from 1982 stated that "parole [may be] authorized for an alien who will travel to the United States without a visa." Since then, advance parole has often been the top reason for granting parole. In several acts since then (1986, 1990, and 1996), Congress specifically mentioned how "advance parole" can be granted to people already paroled into the United States (8 U.S.C. 1151(c)(4)(A)).
Ugandan Asian parole (1972): The Ugandan government ordered Ugandan Asians to leave the country in 1972, and Attorney General Mitchell responded by initially ordering the INS to parole 1,000 Ugandan Asians. It ended up paroling almost 1,200 into the United States in FY 1973 (INS 1973). Another roughly 1,300 came thereafter.
Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, P.L. 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."

Asylum parole (1972—1980): Following the United States acceding to the Protocol to the U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1968, the INS had no uniform process or status providing to asylum recipients because Congress had not created a specific status for them, but some were granted "individual parole." The April 10, 1979 regulations specifically provided for immigration judges to "grant asylum by parole under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act."
Adjustment of Status: The Refugee Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–212, March 17, 1980) provided the opportunity for those granted asylum to adjust their status to receive legal permanent residence.

Cuban third country parole (1973—1978): On October 26, 1973, the INS created a parole program for Cubans outside of Cuba who had family in the United States (INS 1975). A total of 11,577 were paroled in FY 1974, 6,940 in FY 1975, 2,341 in FY 1976, 413 in FY 1977, and 580 in FY 1978.
Adjustment of status: The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 made it possible for Cuban parolees entering after 1959, including future parolees, to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States.

South American/​Chilean parole (1975—1979): On June 12, 1975, the INS permitted 400 detained Chilean dissidents (and their families) to be paroled into the United States. A total of 1,600 people were ultimately paroled from 1975 to 1977. On October 27, 1976, the INS again authorized parole of 200 households, representing 800 people in FY 1977, and included some Uruguayans and Bolivians. On June 14, 1978, the parole of 500 households was authorized, and 2,000 people were admitted, including some Brazilians and Argentinians. More would have come if the government of Argentina had allowed more of them to leave.
Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."

Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian parole (1975—1980): In late March 1975, a parole program was authorized for Vietnamese orphans, and the first 2,279 Vietnamese orphans were flown out on April 2, 1975 (INS 1975), and on April 18, 1975, the president authorized a large‐​scale evacuation to Guam using parole. In FY 1975 alone, about 135,000 received parole. Congress funded (partially retroactively) the processing under the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (Public Law 94–23, May 23, 1975). In August 1975, the program was expanded to Cambodians and Vietnamese with special connections to the United States, and on May 6, 1977, 11,000 more were authorized from Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos. The three countries were grouped together in expansive programs starting August 11, 1977, January 25, 1978, June 14, 1978, December 5, 1978, April 13, 1979, October 16, 1979, and December 15, 1979. From 1975 to the middle of 1980—when the Refugee Act was enacted and replaced the parole programs—more than 330,000 Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians were paroled into the United States. These refugees were all assessed on a case‐​by‐​case basis.
Adjustment of status: In 1977, Congress passed Public Law 95–145 (October 1977) that authorized adjustment of status to anyone from Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia who was paroled as a refugee before March 31, 1979—that is, about two years in the future. On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 extended the date to September 30, 1980 and allowed any refugee to adjust from any country.
Soviet and Eastern European parole (1977—1980): On January 13, 1977, the attorney general created a Special Parole Program for 4,000 Soviet Jewish refugees (INS 1977). In December 1978, another program was initiated for 5,000 Soviet Jews and Romanians (INS 1978). On June 14, 1978, the INS launched another parole program for Eastern European refugees, with 3,260 processed in FY 1978 and 8,740 processed in FY 1979 (INS 1978). On April 12, 1979, 25,000 additional entries were authorized and occurred under parole in 1979. On October 16 and December 15, 1979, 3,000 additional entries were authorized per month until the enactment of the Refugee Act in March 1980.
Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."

Lebanese parole (1978): On December 6, 1978, the attorney general announced the creation of a new parole program for 1,000 victims of civil strife in Lebanon, and by 1980, 349 had been used, and 107 were pending.
Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."

Cuban prisoner parole (1978, 1985): On December 6, 1978, following an invitation by the Castro regime to take them, the attorney general announced the creation of a new parole program for 3,500 political prisoners who were then imprisoned or released since August 1978 plus their family. Ultimately, 12,000 Cubans were paroled in FY 1979. On December 14, 1984, Cuba and the United States signed an agreement under which the United States would take 3,000 Cuban political prisoners through parole and the refugee program. In fiscal year 1988, the State Department and INS approved 2,040 prisoners for entry to the United States, and 928 entered the United States.
Adjustment of status: The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 made it possible for Cuban parolees entering after 1959, including future parolees, to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States.

Iranian parole (1979—1982): On April 16, 1979, following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the INS granted "extended voluntary departure" to Iranians in the United States and began paroling others into the country. Precise parole figures were not kept, but "a large number" ("thousands") were paroled. Part of this parole effort was a program under which—as the State Department put it—"not too many questions were asked" about B‑2 visa applicants from Iran, and those clearly not qualified were often paroled anyway. In 1983, Iranians were included under the Refugee Act cap for the first time, which—the administration said—replaced "the practice of the past several years of admitting them through the Attorney General's parole authority."
Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."

Cuban/​Haitian entrant parole (1980): In April 1980, thousands of Cubans began arriving in Florida from Mariel, Cuba, by boat. Initially, these Cubans were granted parole for 60 days and allowed to seek asylum under the procedures of the newly‐​passed Refugee Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–212, March 1980). As the crisis escalated, INS declared on June 20, 1980 that it would extend 6‑month parole documents to Cubans and Haitians who had already arrived. On October 21, 1980, these 6‑month paroles were then authorized to be extended again to those who arrived before October 10, 1980. More than 125,000 Cubans and 25,000 Haitians were paroled. Congress passed a statute that recognized the existence of the Cuban and Haitian "entrant status" parole in 1981. Congress specifically authorized benefits for both past and future Cuban and Haitian parolees in The Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–422, October 10, 1980). On December 28, 1987, INS finalized a special regulation on the parole of Mariel boatlift Cubans detained since the boatlift ended, which resulted in about 7,000 additional paroles (or re‐​paroles).
Adjustment of Status: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1980 (P.L. 99–603, November 6, 1986) allowed any Cuban or Haitian who entered before 1982 and either received Cuban/​Haitian entrant status or had a "record created" with the INS.

Parole from detention (1982—present): In 1981, the INS reversed its prior practice of not detaining people unless they were deemed a flight risk or a danger to the community. A court enjoined the policy, and the INS issued an interim regulation on July 9, 1982 that detailed the grounds under which it would issue parole from detention. On October 19, 1982, it finalized the regulation. This included the following categories of people eligible for parole from detention: people needing medical care, pregnant women, young children and teenagers whose processing will take longer than 30 days and who cannot be held with an accompanying adult; people with U.S. family eligible to petition for an immigrant visa for them; witnesses going to testify; people subject to prosecution; any other person whose "continued detention is not in the public interest." On March 6, 1997, INS reiterated its categories for those eligible for parole under the language of the new parole statute. On December 21, 2000, the INS revised its procedures for the parole of people ordered removed who could not be removed.
Khmer border parole (1986): In May 1986, the attorney general created a parole program for Cambodians who fled the Khmer government to Thailand, had approved immigrant petitions filed by U.S. citizen family in the United States, and had no visa available to them because of the caps. A total of 53 approvals were made in 1986, and only 418 were made as of March 1988. In 1991, 1,123 received parole. This program ended in FY 1992. About 3,500 total paroles were issued.
Adjustment of Status: The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1989 (P.L. 101–167, November 21, 1989) allowed any Cambodian paroled into the United States between 1988 and September 30, 1990 (about ten months in the future) to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year if they had been denied refugee status.

Parole for U.S. expats (1987): On December 12, 1987, the United States announced that it would parole former‑U.S. citizens who renounced their U.S. citizenship and then were ordered deported by their new state of nationality.
Soviet/​Moscow Refugee Parole (1988—present): In August 1988, the attorney general overturned the presumption that Soviet Jews qualified as refugees. On December 8, 1988, he created a "public interest" parole program for 2,000 Soviets per month who were denied refugee status. Parolees needed to have sponsors in the United States and were not eligible for refugee benefits. A total of 7,652 were paroled in FY 1989. Congress reinstated the presumption of refugee status for Jews and Evangelical Christians from the Soviet Union in 1989 (P.L. 101–167, November 21, 1989). Parole continued after this change in part because Jews had a plausible offer of alternative resettlement in Israel and continued after the Soviet Union dissolved under the label of the Moscow Refugee Parole Program. About 17,000 Soviets were paroled from 1992 to 1998 (INS 1996, 1998). On August 6, 2007, responsibility for the Moscow Refugee Parole Program was transferred to USCIS. In July 2011, it was canceled.
Adjustment of Status: The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1989 (P.L. 101–167, November 21, 1989) allowed any Soviet paroled into the United States between 1988 and September 30, 1990 (about ten months in the future) to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year if they had been denied refugee status. In 1992, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were added explicitly. This provision was then repeatedly reauthorized.

Orderly Departure Vietnam parole (1989—1999): In February 1989, the attorney general created a parole program to supplement the Orderly Departure refugee program from Vietnam, which was offered only to those denied refugee status. About 770 entered in 1989. Parole was also used for Vietnamese with immigrant visa petitions approved but who could not immigrate due to the caps. Some Laotians and Cambodians also were paroled. This program was created after the attorney general overturned the presumption that Vietnamese (and others) in refugee camps qualified as refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980. Parolees had to prepay their travel expenses. The program was closed at the end of fiscal year 1999 after about 32,000 paroles.
Adjustment of Status: The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1990 (P.L. 101–167, November 21, 1989) allowed any Vietnamese paroled into the United States between 1988 and September 30, 1990 (about ten months in the future) to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year if they had been denied refugee status. On November 6, 2000, Congress enacted the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 2001 (Public Law 106–429), which authorized adjustment of status for citizens or natives of Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos paroled before October 1, 1997, even if they had not been denied refugee status.

Hungarian and Polish parole (1989): In the middle of 1989, Hungary and Poland's communist governments fell, meaning that refugees from those countries no longer feared persecution on political grounds. On November 21, 1989, the INS began denying them refugee status and paroled some 832 people who were already in the process, had been interviewed, and had family in the United States.
Adjustment of Status: Section 646 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208, September 30, 1996) granted legal permanent residence to these parolees.

Undated 1990s parole categories: In 1990, the INS described the following grounds for parole at the time without giving a date for when they started being used:
Spouses of U.S. military members who cannot qualify for visas because of the caps;
Aged‐​out children of immigrant visa applicants who had waited for years for a visa;
Children of immigrant visa recipients who failed to immigrate soon after visa receipt and for whom a visa number is not immediately available;
Someone who was trying to legalize their status by getting an immigrant visa, but the State Department erred in scheduling an appointment because there were no visa numbers available for them and is attempting to return to their U.S. residence.
Adopted children of U.S. citizens who do not qualify as orphans; and
Unaccompanied children in refugee camps with family in the United States.

Chinese parole (1990): On April 11, 1990, the president ordered the attorney general to defer the removal of unauthorized Chinese until January 1, 1994. The INS determined that parole for detained Chinese should be considered in the public interest.
Adjustment of Status: Congress enacted the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–404, October 9, 1992) that provided permanent residence to Chinese who were covered by the president's order and in the United States on April 11, 1990, if they were inspected and admitted or paroled.

Parole of asylum seekers (1990—present): Paroling asylum seekers is a subset of parole under the 1982 regulations, the final category of which (public interest) was amenable to several interpretations. On May 1, 1990, INS launched a "pilot parole program" for detained asylum seekers with a limit of 200. The pilot was expanded and made permanent everywhere on April 20, 1992. From 1993 to 1996, there were about 3,800 to 4,500 asylum paroles. On October 7, 1998, the INS made having established a "credible fear" of persecution a presumptive category of eligibility for parole. On November 6, 2007, DHS eliminated this presumption. On December 8, 2009, DHS reinstated the presumption to parole those establishing a credible fear of persecution. Despite a memorandum from the DHS secretary in 2017 that stated parole should be used "sparingly," the 2009 directive remained in force, though widely flouted during the Trump administration years. On March 29, 2022, DHS lowered the standard to parole someone who had not yet established credible fear.
Haitian Guantanamo parole (1991): A 1991 coup led to refugee flows by sea from Haiti to the United States. The U.S. government intercepted the boats and relocated Haitians to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for processing. In September 1991, the INS announced a new parole program for Haitians at Guantanamo Bay who demonstrated a "credible fear" of persecution. The program continued until May 1992 when it was suspended. A small number of Haitians continued to be paroled thereafter, but they faced a strong presumption that they should be returned to Haiti. They received one‐​year parole authorizations. About 13,000 Haitians received parole from 1992 to 1996 (INS 1996, 1998; INS Parole Report 1999).
Adjustment of Status: The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (P.L. 105–277, October 21, 1998) provided for the adjustment of status to legal permanent residence for any Haitian in the United States as of December 31, 1995 who applied for asylum or was paroled into the United States after a finding of credible fear.

ABC Settlement Parole (1991): On January 31, 1991, the INS settled a lawsuit that challenged its asylum adjudication policies for certain Salvadorans and Guatemalans. As part of the agreement, certain Salvadorans and Guatemalans were permitted to reapply for asylum. Among these were 20,000 who were paroled into the United States to reapply in fiscal years 1993 and 1994.
Adjustment of Status: Section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (P.L. 105–100, November 2019) permitted these Guatemalans and Hondurans subject to the settlement agreement to apply for suspension of deportation (which provides legal permanent residence) under the lower pre‐​1996 standards.

Adoptee parole (1994): On November 25, 1994, the INS created a new parole program for children adopted by U.S. citizens who did not fall into the "orphan" category required to receive an immigrant visa.
Adjustment of Status: Congress passed Public Law 104–51 (November 15, 1995) to amend the definition of "child" to create green card eligibility for these children and other adoptees moving forward.

Cuban Migration Accord paroles (1994—present): On September 9, 1994, the United States and Cuba signed an agreement to pursue policies designed to reduce illegal immigration, including the United States maintaining a minimum level of 20,000 legal admissions of Cubans per year. The U.S. Coast Guard interdicted Cubans and moved them to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. On October 14, 1994, the White House announced that the INS would parole unaccompanied children, people over age 70, and chronically ill people at Guantanamo Bay. On December 2, 1994, it announced it would consider paroling family units if children would be adversely affected by staying in Guantanamo Bay on a case‐​by‐​case basis. On May 2, 1995, the United States agreed to accept all 18,500 Cubans currently detained at Guantanamo Bay detention facility through parole, but end the practice of taking Cubans there and simply return them to Cuba. In order to meet the 20,000 immigration quota, the United States created the Special Cuban Migration Program to grant parole to about 5,000 Cubans per year through a lottery (which was restricted to those who met at least two of the following criteria: 1) having any relatives living in the United States, 2) 3 years of work experience, and 3) a high school or college degree). In 1995, 1,898 were granted parole through the lottery out of 189,000 applicants. On March 15, 1996, the second parole lottery registration was opened. There were 433,000 applicants. On June 15, 1998, the final registration period was opened for the lottery, and 541,00 applied by July 15, 1998. Those qualifying under the 1998 registration continued to be paroled thereafter. Since 1998, the Cuban government has refused to allow another registration to occur in the country. Around 75,000 Cubans were paroled under these programs from 1994 to 2003 (the last year that statistics were available).
Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.

Cuban Wet Foot, Dry Foot parole (1995—2017): On May 2, 1995, the U.S. government announced that it would not parole any Cubans intercepted at sea, even if in U.S. waters, but it would parole anyone on U.S. soil or arriving at a port of entry. The Customs and Border Protection field manual provided that Cuban asylum seekers "may be paroled directly from the port of entry" except for those who "pose a criminal or terrorist threat." Subsequently, the number of Cubans paroled at ports of entry (mainly along the southwest border) increased significantly. From 2004 to 2016, 226,000 Cubans were paroled at U.S. land borders. On January 12, 2017, DHS canceled the wet foot, dry foot parole process.
Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.

Iraqi parole (1996): On September 17, 1996, the United States began airlifting some Iraqi Kurds to Guam, where they were granted parole. A total of 6,550 Iraqi Kurds who worked with the United States and 650 opposition activists were granted parole starting in September 1996.
Adjustment of Status: The FY 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act (Public Law 105–277, October 21, 1998) waived the cap on green cards for those adjusting after receiving asylum for Iraqis evacuated via parole but did not create a special green card category.

Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) Program (2006—2017): On August 11, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created a new parole program for Cuban doctors in third countries conscripted by the government of Cuba. In fiscal year 2007, 480 of 28,000 Cuban physicians applied for parole. As of December 2010, 1,574 physicians were paroled. On January 12, 2017, DHS canceled the program except for dependents of the physicians already in the program.
Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.

Parole in Place for family of U.S. veterans (2007—present): On June 21, 2007, DHS announced that it would grant parole to a spouse of a U.S. active duty soldier, enabling the spouse to adjust to a green card. This policy continued for the next six years. On November 15, 2013, DHS issued a memorandum that provided clearer guidance on this program and expanded it to include veterans of the armed forces. On November 23, 2016, DHS expanded the program to cover family of deceased veterans and adult or married children of veterans. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2020 (P.L. 116–92) expressed congressional support for an ongoing parole program for relatives of U.S. military members.
Adjustment of Status: Spouses of U.S. citizens have an uncapped opportunity to apply for a green card, but parole enables them to apply for a green card by allowing them to meet the requirement that they were "admitted or paroled" prior to applying.

Cuban Family Reunification Parole (2007—2017, 2021—present): On November 21, 2007, the DHS created a new parole program for any Cuban with an approved family‐​based petition for legal permanent residence. In December 2017, USCIS shut down its field office in Cuba and suspended the program. In 2014, DHS started requiring a fee for the parole program. On May 16, 2022, DHS announced that it would resume processing Cuban Family Reunification Parole cases.
Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.

Haitian Orphan Parole Program (2010): Following a 2010 Earthquake, on January 18, 2010, DHS announced that it would parole Haitian orphans in the process of being adopted by U.S. citizens. It accepted applications through April 2010.
Adjustment of Status: Help Haitian Adoptees Immediately to Integrate Act of 2010 (Help HAITI Act, Public Law 111–293, December 2010) authorized DHS to adjust the status of adoptees to legal permanent residence even if the formal adoption process was not complete in Haiti as a result of the Earthquake.

Haitian Earthquake paroles (2010—2016): Following a 2010 Earthquake, on January 13, 2010, ICE suspended deportations to Haiti, and ICE began to generally parole detained Haitians. CBP at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border likewise began to parole Haitians rather than detain them for transfer to ICE. On January 25, 2010, DHS authorized an automatic extension of advance parole documents through March 12, 2010 for Haitians who had traveled outside the United States prior to the Earthquake after receiving advance parole. From 2010 to 2016, about 16,000 Haitians were paroled after being deemed inadmissible at ports of entry.
Central American Minors (CAM) parole (2014—2017, 2021—present): On November 14, 2014, DHS and the State Department announced a combination refugee and parole program for Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran children with U.S. family sponsors in legal status in the United States (and the minor children of the child and in‐​country parent of the child if married to the sponsoring U.S. parent). On July 26, 2016, DHS expanded the program to include other relatives, including siblings and any in‐​country biological parent of the child. On August 16, 2017, DHS announced it would be canceling the parole program. On March 10, 2021, DHS and the State Department announced it would be restarting the program for those who previously applied before the termination in 2017. On June 15, 2021, they announced the program would reopen to new applicants, including children whose parents were in the United States with pending asylum applications. The parole is indefinite. On April 11, 2023, it expanded the program to allow sponsorship by parents of children who have pending T visa applications. As of December 2016, there were 10,758 applicants for the CAM program. Of these applicants, 873 had received refugee status, and 2,086 had received parole. In 2017, another 2,700 were permitted to enter.
Haitian Family Reunification Parole (2014—present): On December 18, 2014, DHS created a new parole program for any Haitian with an approved family‐​based immigrant visa petition if they have a priority date within two years of being current. On August 2, 2019, DHS announced it would terminate the program but would extend the parole of current participants. On October 12, 2021, it reversed its decision and continued the program.
Filipino World War II Veterans Parole (FWVP) program (2016—present): On May 9, 2016, DHS created a new parole program for Filipino World War II veterans who have approved family‐​based immigrant visa petitions. On August 2, 2019, DHS announced its plans to terminate the program but would extend the parole of current participants. On December 28, 2020, it proposed a regulation to finalize this change. On October 12, 2021, it reversed its earlier decision and continued the program.
International Entrepreneur Parole (2017): On January 17, 2017, DHS created a parole program for certain entrepreneurs. On July 11, 2017, DHS published a rule delaying the effective date of the program. In December 2017, the rule delaying the rule was vacated by a court and was forced to implement the rule. From 2017 to 2019, 30 people applied, and only one approval was granted.
Parole + Alternatives to Detention program (2021): On July 31, 2021, Border Patrol created a policy of paroling detained immigrants at the border when ICE cannot accept custody of the person, there isn't a risk to national security or public safety, processing capacity exceeds 75%, and arrivals exceed discharges, the average processing time exceeds two days, and arrivals will likely exceed discharges the following day. On November 2, 2021, the Border Patrol chief formalized this policy with respect to family units. On July 18, 2022, Customs and Border Protection expanded this policy to cover both families and single adults. On March 8, 2023, the policy was blocked by a federal district court judge after about 700,000 paroles.
Afghan evacuation parole (2021): After the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, the U.S. military began to fly thousands of Afghans to U.S. military bases in the region. On August 23, 2021, DHS launched a new parole operation under Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). In the next few weeks, it paroled more than 75,898 Afghans into the United States. After the initial evacuation, DHS received 50,000 parole requests from Afghans, adjudicated about 9,500, and denied all but about 500. In September 2022, DHS stated that Afghans abroad would generally no longer be considered for parole at all. On June 8, 2023, DHS announced it would extend the parole of Afghan parolees in the United States. The Extending Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act of 2021 (P.L. 117–43, May 2022) provided refugee benefits to Afghan parolees, explicitly appropriating money for those benefits, and directing the creation of a plan to process pending Afghan parole applications between July 31, 2021, and September 30, 2022 or paroled into the United States after September 30, 2022 if a spouse or child of an Afghan parolee or parent or legal guardian of an unaccompanied Afghan child.
Uniting for Ukraine (2022): After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, DHS decided to parole Ukrainians arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border ports of entry, formally announcing the policy on March 11, 2022, and about 23,000 were paroled with 1‑year admissions. On April 27, 2022, DHS created a new parole program for Ukrainians with U.S. sponsors. As of May 2022, DHS had paroled about 125,000 Ukrainians under the Uniting for Ukraine sponsorship program with 2‑year admissions. The Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022 (P.L. 117–128, May 2022) provided refugee benefits to Ukrainians paroled between February 24, 2022 and September 30, 2023 or paroled into the United States after September 30, 2022 if a spouse or child of a Ukrainian parolee or parent or legal guardian of an unaccompanied Ukrainian child. On March 13, 2022, DHS extended the parole of the 23,000 paroled at ports of entry.
Adjustment of Status: A Ukrainian Adjustment Act (H.R.3911) was introduced in 2023.

Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan parole sponsorship processes (2022—2023): On October 19, 2022, DHS created a parole program for Venezuelans with U.S. sponsors modeled on Uniting for Ukraine with a cap of 24,000. On January 9, 2023, DHS replaced this cap with a combined 30,000 per month cap for Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua (each of which received its own parole sponsorship programs the same day). 1.5 million applicants had applied by May 2023, and about 131,000 had been admitted.
Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. A Venezuelan Adjustment Act (H.R. 7854) was introduced in 2022.

Family Reunification Parole Processes (2023): On July 10, 2023, DHS created family reunification parole programs for Colombians, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans who have approved immigrant visa petitions. Parole applicants had to be invited by the U.S. government. This announcement followed up on the May 2023 announcement that the United States wanted to accept as many as 100,000 individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras through the family reunification pathway. As of May 2023, there were 73,500 eligible for the program, but many more were waiting for their immigrant visas to be approved.

Movement has been part of human history; it is and has been integrated inside every human, becoming active as a result of various factors which at a moment are more or less dominant in one's life. It is like a code written down in everyone's DNA, making humans unable or better said "hungry" to be free and always look for better. Starting in March 2010, the Arab Spring opened a door for the biggest migration flow in modern history. Such as conflicts were crossing borders from one state to another in the fight for democracy and freedom from regimes, as domino effect migration did the same. Numbers increased every day and during 2015, in time of Syrian crisis, we were witnessing a mayor migration flow to Europe since the European colonization and the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Mentioning the theory of push and pull factors as a starting point, although it has been used to explain the everyday movement of people, victims of human trafficking, towards rich countries which at the end become their countries of destination in the labyrinth of exploitation, lured by stories of well-paid jobs and good life, it can also be discussed in the context of migration movements during the 2015 and the beginning of 2016. Pushed by terror and war and pulled by the possibilities for a better life, a chance to stay alive, hundreds of thousands of people have fled their countries of origin and moving through the Balkan migration route are already inside or in front of the European Union's doors. Moving through Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia to Croatia, Slovenia, Austria or Germany; or to Hungary, Austria, Germany or Sweden (or other EU member country), some of them managed to get at the end of their destination, some of them were smuggled, some trafficked, unfortunately some ended their journeys among the waves of the Mediterranean Sea or some stayed into metal fences "hugs". During this global movement with so wide framework, several categories of people were put in the same basket, not even making an effort to draw a line between migrants and refugees. And it was the first important step for additional solutions. Instead of being practical, EU became an ignorant and selfish entity, lost in its quarrels between member states. Some started opening their borders wide, not thinking of tomorrow and others started building fences, locking up people and feeding them in a way even animals should not be fed. Was this the Union which arose from the ashes of the bloodiest war in human history? Or every atom of humanity was lost in the games of political intrigues and different interests? The protection of refugees has many aspects. It includes safety from being returned to the dangers they have fled; access to asylum procedures that are fair and efficient; and measures to ensure that their basic human rights are respected to allow them to live in dignity and safety while helping them to find a longer-term solution. States bear the primary responsibility for this protection. UNHCR therefore works closely with governments, advising and supporting them as needed to implement their responsibilities. (UNHCR, 2016) Migrants choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons. Unlike refugees who cannot safely return home, migrants face no such impediment to return. If they choose to return home, they will continue to receive the protection of their government. For individual governments, this distinction is important. Countries deal with migrants under their own immigration laws and processes, but countries deal with refugees through norms of refugee protection and asylum that are defined in both national legislation and international law. (UNHCR, 2016) Starting with Lombroso's homo criminalis where immigrants were part of the analyzed possible criminals, through the Chicago School, whose conclusions were that foreigners have powerful criminal tendencies, immigration has always been connected to crime, trying to divide societies into "us' and "them", leave newcomers at the margins, exclude them and if possible, try to push them away. And today, the word immigrant, although being a bit wide (all foreigners with no importance of their ethnic, social, economic or professional background), always is narrowed into a direction in which it points out to those non - citizens who are not white, are poor, have no working skills, are coming from non - developed or developing countries, they will just steal our jobs or will be begging on the streets, and in worst cases will bring diseases etc. It is a picture of threatening asylum seekers, Muslim terrorists, Balkan "barbarians", criminal immigrants who will only destroy what we have worked for centuries. (Stanojoska, 2016) It is a modern fear wrapped in classical paper, that fear from strangers explained through sociological perspectives or as Garland (2001) says that all those others are endangering what we have and that our society should protect itself from their "vicious" attacks, rather than to think what to do afterwards in the need to rehabilitate everything they'll destroy. It starts with Durkheim's theory of anomie and his opinion of strengthening bonds and solidarity among individuals in the society and ends with Merton's strain theory. Namely, in his works, Emilie Durkheim speaks about punishment seen as an element or mechanism which helps into building and maintaining social solidarity and structure, so using it the community will try to push aside and suffocate all those foreign elements trying to threat local ones. Using such measures excludes immigrants who cannot "put their hands" onto cultural goals with their "instrumentum operandi", so being at the edge of survivor, their changing their "modus operandi" using different, in most cases unaccepted cultural means. (Stanojoska, 2016) Robin Cohen (1994:189) called this groups "third world immigrant" or "helots"; that is those immigrants who, in addition to being deprived of many rights enjoyed by citizens - principally, the right to vote and be elected - are in much worse situation than other foreigners in a given receiving country because they belong to an ethnic minority, are unskilled, and are poor. The difference between foreigners coming from poor and rich countries is also manifested in the enforcement of controls over borders: states do not distribute burden evenly. Foreigners coming from different parts of the globe are treated differently concerning formal and informal practices - visa requirements, restrictions on the right to entry and stay, enjoyment of civil rights, and judicial and extrajudicial treatment. (Aliverti, 2013) And at the end there is always a difference between "crimmigrants" or those seen as a danger, undocumented, maybe terrorists, people with criminal background) and "travelers (bona fide) or people who are privileged and can move without problems. (Franko Aas, 2011) The word "crimmigrant" is coinage and as a term originates from the words criminal and immigrant, and is used in purpose to describe the perception of immigrants and today, refugees coming from Arab countries, as potential criminals. (Stanojoska, 2016) The migration route is a path which moves on the same steps as the one of organized crime. A migration flow is like an open market for smugglers who can sell their products (in this case the possibility to get out of conflict zones and then get in the EU). Smuggling of migrants, but also trafficking in human beings is out there, on those paths, living among people's destinies, becoming their everyday life. As European Union member countries acted on the rivers of people, their path changed into the quest of salvation. In 2012, Greece finished its fence on the border land with Turkey, migrants and refugees started moving using Bulgaria (from Turkey). When, in 2014, Bulgaria finished its fence on the border with Turkey, people started using the Eastern Mediterranean Route to get to European land (from Izmir and Bodrum to Kos and Lesbos) and afterwards the Western Balkan Route to EU. After this path became alive, some member countries started building fences on their borders. At first Hungary built fence on its border with Serbia which moved migrants and refugees to Croatia (and then Hungary). Making such step was an alarm for Hungarian authorities who continued building fences, this time on the border with Croatia, which influenced another change of paths towards Slovenia. During the period of free movement towards EU countries, mostly Germany and Sweden, there were times of barriers on the borders between Croatia and Slovenia, which eventually culminated with barriers between Austria and Slovenia. Closing of the Western Balkan Route, without having another effective solution just opened another routes for such organized crime groups, which continued to use another path towards EU. Possible alternative routes are those from Greece towards Italy after crossing the Mediterranean Sea, or from Greece to Albania crossing the Adriatic Sea, or from Egypt towards Lampedusa in Italy or even from Turkey crossing the Black Sea towards Bulgaria or Romania. In other words, it would be something as the British ex-prime minister Mrs.Thatcher once bluntly put it, "we joined Europe to have free movement of goods…I did not join Europe to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, plant and animal diseases and rabies and illegal immigrants". (Eriksen, 2007) Criminal networks are typically composed of several key individuals. The organizer or leader of the network is usually located in a key migration hub and is responsible for the overall coordination within the network. Members of migrant smuggling networks typically work autonomously with a number of lower-level contacts who are part of their personal network. Low-level contacts are used as drivers, crew members, scouts, or recruiting agents. These contacts typically operate as part of a network only for a limited time and are exchanged regularly. Migrant smuggling networks are flexible and adapt to changing business demands by relying on auxiliary members as necessary. These auxiliary members act as money handlers, guarantors or forgers. These individuals provide services to the network, but do not form part of networks' core memberships. (Europol, 2015) March the 18th will be known as one of the days when EU once again has shown its two faced game in this migration flow to its territories. Although Germany was the loudest promoter of giving shelter to refugees inside EU, at the end this whole charade of one for all, 28 for themselves, ended with an EU - Turkey Agreement, which should end migratory movements to EU. The two most important points accented with this Agreement should help the Union to stop movement towards its territories. Namely, every irregular migrant crossing from Turkey to Greece or found on Greek territory will be returned back to Turkey and for every returned migrant with Syrian origin, EU will accept another Syrian who is in Turkey. Seen through prism of humanity, we do not get a solution, because the Agreement will just worsen things up, which is already happening with people living in tents in subhuman conditions on the Greek - Macedonian border and of course, with an increased number of asylum applications in Greece which stops the returning of irregular migrants. Is this the Europe we all dreamed off? Or is it just a dream, as it is for refugees and immigrants? Also, being in the prism of interest, but also happening, terrorism is a phenomenon directly connected to ISIS and Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Penetrating in Turkey, through the shape of the Kurdish Workers' Party, terrorism has never been more alive and breathing at the doorstep of the European Union. Fear is associated with opinions declaring that using refugees many ISIS members will enter the Union, many sleeper cells among Europe will be awaken and will commit terrorist attacks in European metropolitan areas as revenge and part of the Holy War against infidels. Paris and Brussels will always be engraved in our memories as examples of how long can ISIS's hands be, and which consequences the so called "zombie" politics can suffer common European citizens.

The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. 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The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. Tourgée Albion W. The Story of a Thousand: Being a History of the Service of the 105th Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the War for the Union, from August 21, 1862, to June 6, 1865. Edited by Peter C. Luebke. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2011.Watkins, Samuel R.Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011

International audience ; En 1685, sous la pression diplomatique du Roi de France Louis XIV, son oncle par alliance, le jeune duc de Savoie Victor-Amédée II est sommé d'aligner la politique religieuse de ses États sur celle de la révocation du fameux édit de Nantes. Sur le versant italien des Alpes occidentales, dans le Val Pellice et le Val Saint-Martin, deux des trois vallées vaudoises du Piémont actuel puisque le Val Cluson relève de la France jusqu'aux rectifications frontalières inhérentes aux Traités d'Utrecht de 1713, débute alors une violente répression du culte réformé prospérant là, sur une souche « hérétique » médiévale, depuis le XVIe siècle. De combats en déportations, les localités montagnardes se vident rapidement de la quasi totalité de leurs habitants et, courant 1686, le fisc ayant confisqué les terres des proscrits, l'administration ducale organise le repeuplement des confins en y installant des populations catholiques par le biais de conditions financières avantageuses. De grosses colonies de sujets savoyards appâtées par l'activisme des agents recruteurs mandatés par Turin, quittent par conséquent leurs villages de Maurienne, de Tarentaise, de Savoie-Propre et, à un degré moindre, du Faucigny et du Chablais, où elles vendent leurs biens pour venir s'installer sur les lots piémontais acquis du Trésor ducal afin d'y fonder « la nouvelle Savoie dellaz les monts ». La suite des évènements, tout aussi dramatique, est toutefois demeurée assez mal connue jusqu'à nos jours. Car suite à l'épopée de la « Glorieuse rentrée » des Vaudois dans leurs contrées d'origine, en 1689, Victor-Amédée II échouant à soumettre militairement les insurgés leur accorde l'amnistie, à l'été 1690, pour pouvoir prendre part à la Ligue d'Augsbourg contre la France, enfin libéré de ce singulier front de résistance armé à l'intérieur de ses possessions. La situation des colons savoyards, dans ce contexte, très mal documentée avant les fructueuses recherches entreprises depuis une décennie par Noël Simon-Chautemps, se révèle évidemment catastrophique. Malmenés par des compatriotes vaudois ivres de vengeance, abandonnés sans aucune indemnisation par le Pouvoir turinois, ceux d'entre eux qui ne perdent pas la vie dans cette funeste aventure, s'en retournent en effet outre-monts désespérés, en ayant tout perdu.En deux temps, la présente communication s'offre par conséquent de replacer dans son contexte géopolitique et idéologique un épisode aussi dramatique que largement oublié, voire sous-estimé par l'historiographie classique de la politique religieuse pugnace menée dans les États de Savoie des Temps Modernes. Puis d'évoquer la litanie d'exactions commises en son nom, — lesquelles mériteraient aujourd'hui assurément le qualificatif pourtant polysémique et à ce titre ambigu de « crime contre l'humanité » —, tant à l'égard des Vaudois qu'à l'encontre, ensuite, de leurs infortunés adversaires savoyards.

International audience ; En 1685, sous la pression diplomatique du Roi de France Louis XIV, son oncle par alliance, le jeune duc de Savoie Victor-Amédée II est sommé d'aligner la politique religieuse de ses États sur celle de la révocation du fameux édit de Nantes. Sur le versant italien des Alpes occidentales, dans le Val Pellice et le Val Saint-Martin, deux des trois vallées vaudoises du Piémont actuel puisque le Val Cluson relève de la France jusqu'aux rectifications frontalières inhérentes aux Traités d'Utrecht de 1713, débute alors une violente répression du culte réformé prospérant là, sur une souche « hérétique » médiévale, depuis le XVIe siècle. De combats en déportations, les localités montagnardes se vident rapidement de la quasi totalité de leurs habitants et, courant 1686, le fisc ayant confisqué les terres des proscrits, l'administration ducale organise le repeuplement des confins en y installant des populations catholiques par le biais de conditions financières avantageuses. De grosses colonies de sujets savoyards appâtées par l'activisme des agents recruteurs mandatés par Turin, quittent par conséquent leurs villages de Maurienne, de Tarentaise, de Savoie-Propre et, à un degré moindre, du Faucigny et du Chablais, où elles vendent leurs biens pour venir s'installer sur les lots piémontais acquis du Trésor ducal afin d'y fonder « la nouvelle Savoie dellaz les monts ». La suite des évènements, tout aussi dramatique, est toutefois demeurée assez mal connue jusqu'à nos jours. Car suite à l'épopée de la « Glorieuse rentrée » des Vaudois dans leurs contrées d'origine, en 1689, Victor-Amédée II échouant à soumettre militairement les insurgés leur accorde l'amnistie, à l'été 1690, pour pouvoir prendre part à la Ligue d'Augsbourg contre la France, enfin libéré de ce singulier front de résistance armé à l'intérieur de ses possessions. La situation des colons savoyards, dans ce contexte, très mal documentée avant les fructueuses recherches entreprises depuis une décennie par Noël Simon-Chautemps, se révèle évidemment catastrophique. Malmenés par des compatriotes vaudois ivres de vengeance, abandonnés sans aucune indemnisation par le Pouvoir turinois, ceux d'entre eux qui ne perdent pas la vie dans cette funeste aventure, s'en retournent en effet outre-monts désespérés, en ayant tout perdu.En deux temps, la présente communication s'offre par conséquent de replacer dans son contexte géopolitique et idéologique un épisode aussi dramatique que largement oublié, voire sous-estimé par l'historiographie classique de la politique religieuse pugnace menée dans les États de Savoie des Temps Modernes. Puis d'évoquer la litanie d'exactions commises en son nom, — lesquelles mériteraient aujourd'hui assurément le qualificatif pourtant polysémique et à ce titre ambigu de « crime contre l'humanité » —, tant à l'égard des Vaudois qu'à l'encontre, ensuite, de leurs infortunés adversaires savoyards.

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security.The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once.







1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.







3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.







In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.







A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.







And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "transitioning away from" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.







Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.







CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security. The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once. 1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "leave behind" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Issue 46.5 of the Review for Religious, September/October 1987. ; REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS (ISSN 0034-639X), published every two months, is edited in collaboration with the faculty members of the Deparlment of Theological Studies of St. Louis University. The editorial offices are located at Room 428; 3601 Lindell Blvd.; St. Louis, MO. 63108-3393. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS is owned by the Missouri Province Educational Institute of the Society of Jesus, St. Louis, MO. ©1987 by REWEW FOR RELtG~OtJS. Single copies $2.50. Subscriptions: U.S.A. $11.00 a year; $20.00 for two years. Other countries: add $4.00 per year (surface mail); airmail (Book Rate): $18.00 per year. For subscription orders or change of address, write: REVIEW FOR RELI(;IOUS: P.O. Box 6070; D~luth, MN 55806. Daniel F.X. Meenan, S.J. Dolores Greeley, R.S.M. Iris Ann Ledden, S.S.N.D. Richard A. Hill, S.J. Jean Read M. Anne Maskey, O.S.F. Editor Associate Editor Review Editor Contributing Editor Assistant Editors September/October, 1987 Volume 46 Number 5 Manuscripts, books for review and correspondence with the editor should be sent to Rt:wEw voR Rt:Lmu)us; Room 428; 3601 Lindell Blvd.; St. Louis, MO 63108-3393. Correspondence about the department "Canonical Counsel" should be addressed to Richard A. Hill, S.J.; J.S.T.B.; 1735 LeRoy Ave., Berkeley, CA 94709. Back issues and reprints should be ordered from REVIEW t'OR REI.I(:IOUS; Room 428; 3601 Lindell Blvd.; St. Louis, MO 63108-3393. "Out of print" issues and articles not published as reprints are available from University Microfilms International; 300 N. Zeeb Rd.; Ann Arbor, M1 48106. A major portion of each issue is also available on cassette recordings as a service for the visu-ally impaired. Write to the Xavier Society for the Blind; 154 East 23rd Street; New York, NY 10010. What Do the Laity Expect of Religious Life Guzm6n Carriquiry This article was prepared for the USIG (International Union of Superiors General) and originally appeared in the USIG Bulletin (no. 73, 1987). It is reprinted here with permission. Dr. Carriquiry, a native of Uruguay, is married and father of four. He is head of the Pontifical Council for the Laity and a professor at the Pontifical University Urbaniana. Two Remarks and a Propitious Occasion '~(ou have proposed and requested a very difficult task. Probably I accepted it with a considerable lack of awareness. Preparing for this meeting, I was able to realize the predicament in which I had placed myself. I am not a theologian by profession and even less an expert on the theology of religious life. I have had to read and reflect a good deal on the theme, but even so, I feel very inadequate in facing such a delicate question. I will limit myself, therefore, t.o giving some impressions, reflections and challenges, without any pretense at having a profound penetration into the "mystery" of the religious life. I would like to make a second remark., through a concern for hon-esty. "What do the laity expect. ?" is the question. When we speak of "laity," however, we are referring to many different people. It is good to suspect, or at times to smile at, those who with an excessive fa-cility and pretension claim to be "representatives" of the laity (or of youth, or of the poor, or of women . . .). We are tempted to dress our-selves in plumed clothing in order to hide our nakedness and to give our-selves a better or stronger "image." I am going to answer the question-- What do the laity expect. ? knowing that there will be much that is 641 1542 / fleview for Religious, September-October, 1987 personal to this individual layman, to this poor Christian, as a result of his own journey, experience and convictions. The fact of working in the Pontifical Council for the Laity for many years, however, has placed me in a privileged situation because if one wishes to serve the participation of the laity in the life and mission of the Church effectively--which is the competency of this Dicastery--then it is necessary to listen to and follow with special attention the sensitivities, demands, needs and ex-periences which are part of this multifaceted lay world. I hope to be able to transmit some of this rich experience to you. If, however, there are two evident limitations to this contribution, there is no doubt that it comes at an opportune and propitious moment in the life of the Church. We are in the time between the recent past extraordinary Synod--a commemoration, verification and actualization of Vatican Council II twenty years after its conclusion--and the next ordinary Synod of 1987, which will have as its theme "The vocation and mission of the laity in the Church and in society." The relations between laity and religious are adequately clarified by the knowledge the Church has at present of its mystery of communion and of the demands of i(s mission. And all, bish-ops, priests, deacons, religious and laity--as is stated in the final mes-sage of the extraordinary Synod--are invited to participate in the work of preparation for the next Synod, which "should constitute a decisive step so that all Catholics might receive the grace of Vatican II." From an Ecclesiology of Communion We can begin from an obvious daily experience. Many walls of sepa-ration- material, cultural, ecclesiastical--have been torn down, and to-day a close, simple, fraternal experience of collaboration between the la-ity and religious is lived and shared. This occurs within the most diverse Christian communities, in the most varied works of the Church, in asso-ciations and movements, in structures of "communion and participa-tion" of the combined pastoral team of the local Churches . It is like an immediate, accessible, verified evidence of fraternal collaboration and of common participation. No one can deny it. It can be stated that this is like a reflection and a fruit, a sign and a realization of the "ecclesiology of communion" of Vatican Council II. This I give here as something taken for granted. I find it interesting to point out a double movement, indivisible, in the carrying out of this con-ciliar ecclesioiogy. On one hand, we have gradually gone beyond a cor-porate or governmental division between clergy, religious and laity, com-partmentalized and sometimes in tension or in struggle for the division Expectations of Religious Life / 643 of "power" in the Church. What is anterior and interior to any dis-tinction has been affirmed and accented in this developing movement; that is, what is more essential, common to all, more original and radical in all Christian life. We are members of the great family of the "Chris-tian faithful," incorporated into Christ by baptism, participants in his priesthood, called to holiness, with equal dignity in the eyes of God, all co-responsible for the communion and the mission of the Church. But all "in their own way" because, at the same time, we experience that we are distinct, that this unity of all does not reduce us to uniformity and impoverish us by it, but that it develops fruitfully in the diversity of vo-cations, ministries and charisms which express and enrich the commun-ion and mission of the Church. It is with this ecclesiological basis and in intense ecclesial experience that we pose the question of what the laity expect of religious life . The Laity Expect "Something More" In the first place, I believe that many lay people would be surprised and somewhat disconcerted with the question, unable to respond in a con-scious and well-planned way. However, I think that, instinctively, in-tuitively, their response would be that of expecting "something more" of religious. Yes, they expect something more! Something more radical, more total, more definitive, more profound, more demanding and chal-lenging, in the relationship with God. They expect something more of holiness. In giving this spontaneous response, I pictured the alert, concerned, astonished reaction of the sister who says: "but, Dr . are not the laity also called to sanctity? . . ." And she says something obviously true if considered in the light of present ecclesial self-knowledge, but not so obvious in the understanding of all Christians. That conventional and arbitrary prejudice which seems to reserve holiness to the religious state, judging it in some way the monopoly of the following of Christ or of the evangelical counsels--has been gradually abandoned, and yet, at the same time, the lay condition was often considered a second-class Chris-tian life, a concession to human weaknesses. Ai times, the ideal of holi-ness was seen as a heroic and somewhat "aristocratic" option of per-fection, attained through the initiative of superior men and women. But, be at peace; good sister, because in ever greater numbers, the laity are becoming conscious of this universal vocation to holiness to which Chapter 15 of Lumen Gentium refers in a clear and distinct man-ner. 644 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 This being accepted, perhaps you still remain disturbed that the laity continue expecting from religious a greater radicality of commitment and donation to God (the three vows are like dimensions of a unique vow--I read this some days ago--of the vow of one's whole self, the gift of the entire person, offering oneself to God with all one's energies.); they expect a greater, more immediate and more total liberty and availability in order to follow-imitate-serve Christ; they expect a more direct and tan-gible referenceto the presence of the mystery of God in human life. They are very sure of what they expect even though they cannot always ex-press it well. For this reason, the ordinary lay person is much more exi-gent in observing and in judging the witness given by religious than that given by lay people. In general, this is so. It is surprising that this ex-pectation- which rises up from the "sensum fidei," from this "super-natural instinct" of simple Christians--corresponds perfectly to what the Church considers the radical originality of the religious life: to give wit-ness to and "impulse" in the area of the growth of life, of sanctity. Con-sciously or intuitively, the laity expect that religious will keep as a high priority the primacy, the radicality of the witness to sanctity, not as .a,pat-rimony or goal exclusively their own, but as a call and warning, a chal-lenge and attraction for all the members of the people of God toward this vocation and program of life. It is right that religious should be a bit disturbed when they feel them-selves burdened with such expectations because they feel that it is not. a question of a privilege but of a grave responsibility. In other words, there is a preferential love of God for each one of you--it was he who chose you first and who put his "aspiration" in you, and not you your-selves who decided to be more holy--which burdens you with responsi-bility in the response to God in the Church, I would say before the most "insignificant" of the baptized . . . and even before the most "care-less" of human beings. And it is not sufficient to p~ut on the habit~t~) say, "Lord, Lord." This vocation must be carried out effectively as the will of the Father. Saints or Reformers? In the long history of the Church one can find strong confirmation of what the laity today expect of the religious life. They expect what the Church has always expected, an assurance that they will never be de-prived of this "special gift" which is the religious life. Almost two mil-lennia of life teach that the crucial periods or phases of renewal of the Church--in its communion and in its mission--were brought about and' carried out through the great and liberated energies of holiness, and that Expectations of Religious Life / 645 in the "vanguard" of these holy and reforming energies the numerous and diverse charisms of the religious life proved powerful and fruitful. Let us have a bird's eye view of all this. - When the Church lived under the tension of the seducing powers of "worldliness" on the one hand and of vigorous heretical movements on the other, during the Roman-Christian Empire, the tradition of con-secrated life, of which the first witnesses are already met within the New Testament writings, flowered in the monastic experience, raising up a new spiritual "oxygenation," a passion for unity and a lively responsi-bility for the truth. - Shortly,afterwards, when Ambrose saw "the end of the world" in the total destruction of the Roman Empire of the West and before the invasion of the "barbarians," there came the charism of a Benedict-- as well as of Cyril and Methodius--whose cloistered disciples and fol-lowers would be nothing less than the evangelizers of the new peoples and the principal protagonists of the construction of a new civilization, medieval Christianity. - When the liberty of the Church was being strangled in the suffo-cating and corrupting embrace of feudal chains, currents of sanctity ra-diating from Cluny and Cister made possible the Gregorian reform and a sort of "second evangelization" of medieval Christianity. - And before the upheaval of the urban-mercantile-university revo-lution of the later medieval period--when the sectarian phenomena were swarming like so many devious responses to new sensitivities and cul-tural demands which went beyond the limits of the feudal "order"-- God enriched the communion and mission of the Church with the men-dicant orders for the most incisive and suitable evangelization of the new world and the new culture in process of being born. - And how is it possible to speak of the "Catholic reform" at the moment of the Council of Trent in face of the drama and challenge of the "Protestant reform" and the new missionary needs created by the European expansion at the dawn of modem times without considering the holy charisms of Ignatius, Teresa of Avila, Philip Neri, Angela Merici, Francis de Sales, Vincent de Paul. ? - In the second half of the nineteenth century, the intellectual, spiri-tual and missionary revival of the Church, harassed by the impetus of the secularizing and anti-clerical modernism, had its strong point in the multiplication of religious orders, masculine and feminine, which it would take too long to mention . 646 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 This is a mere schematic outline, certainly, but substantially true in what I wish to demonstrate. Speaking to Superiors General, after hav-ing mentioned the names of great and holy founders, John Paul II con-cluded: All these names testify that the paths of holiness, to which the members of the people of God are called, passed and continue to pass in great part through religious life. And there is no need to marvel at that, given the fact that religious life was founded on the most precise "prescription" for holiness, constituted by love lived according to the evangelical coun-sels. Also, mentioning two essential criteria for the renewal of religious life, the Pope said during his trip to Brazil: The first criterion is that religious life (and concretely every religious community) is not seriously renewed if the objective of the renewal is, in fact, the seeking of the greatest ease and convenience, but only if this objective is the seeking of what is most authentic in religious life and most harmonious with it. The second criterion is that religious life is re-newed by being ever more a road of sanctity. This is nothing else than what is stated by the conciliar decree Per-fectae Caritatis in Number 21. All this brings to mind a marvelous reminder of John Paul II to the laity, when he celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the conciliar de-cree Apostolicam Actuositatem in November, 1985: The Church needs great currents, movements and testimonies of holi-ness among the Christian faithful because it is from holiness that all authentic renewal of the Church is born, all enrichment of the intelli-gence of faith and of the following of Christ, a vital and fruitful re-actualization of Christianity in meeting with human needs, renewed forms of presence in the heart of human existence and in the culture of the nations. More than "reformers," the Church needs saints--frequently re-peats the Pope because saints are the best reformers. And this is the same point stressed by all the participants in the recent extraordinary Synod. Twenty years after the end of Vatican Council II the "univer-sal vocation to sanctity" must have the primacy. Between Crises and Hopes Well. twenty years after the end of Vatican Council II, that great gift of God to the Church of our times, in this crucial phase of renewal of the Church. how does it appear to you? Are religious in the van- Expectations of Religious Life / 647 guard, as first and primary witnesses of those energies and currents of sanctity which effectively renew the Church and the world? A lay per-son responds with fear and trembling: it does not seem to me to be so. Certainly there are not lacking admirable personal and communitarian tes-timonies in religious life--we have them present here--which have an impact far beyond the visible limits of the Church. Thanks be to God! But, in general, there are also the weighty results of the convulsive cri-sis which occurred during the first phase of the "post-conciliar times." The great yon Balthasar says that the strong crisis felt by the Church in the immediate post-conciliar time, and which was partially a crisis of secularization and partially a crisis of comprehension of authority in the Church, affected the priesthood and the religious state in the very depths of its theology and in a manner in-comparably stronger than for the laity who had no great reason to re-flect on its identity and to question itself. What a painful distance there was between the great conciliar hopes of an "adequate renewal of religious life" and the heavy price of un-certainty and instability, of disquiet and disoriented nervousness, of secu-larization and crisis which followed it: so heavy a price that some are still suffering from the results of it and many were ruined by it. A heavy price which indicates, on the one hand, how fossilized and anachronis-tic were some forms inherited from the past--already hatching a crisis under a rather sclerotic shell--and which signals, on the other hand, de-vious and unilateral interpretations and actions in the realization of the renewal desired by Council;, in which there tended to predominate worldly criteria rather than an authentic and rigorous discernment "of the spirit." And this is not the result of expert examinations. The ordinary laity witnessed this crisis when, for example, sending their children to Catho-lic schools, they realized that many religious were leaving their commu-nities, that there were very few novices, that those who remained were usually the oldest . But where do vocations come from? From the grace of God which is never lacking, and from the response of lay men and women who wish to live their baptism more radically. These have not been lacking in these twenty post-conciliar years either. So? We tend to take refuge in a detailed and often rather intellectual enumeration of all the obstacles which are found on the road of total commitment: secu-larism, consumerism, pansexualism, and so forth. Who can deny this? But the "worldly" difficultie~ ought to make even more evident the chal-lenging vigor in the sign, the witness, thecalling. Perhaps the most se- Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 rious,reply with regard to the "crisis" is that, in these last decades, re-ligious life has failed to be radical enough in its following of Christ, suf-ficiently rooted in the full certainties of life, passionate enough as an ex-pression of the mystery of communion, challenging enough for con-version, vigorous enough in its apostolate, transparent enough in its wit-ness to awaken amazement, fascination, admiration, imitation among the many laity made aware of the requirements of baptism and of their Chris-tian responsibility. Today the "uneasy time" has passed. Serenity has been regained. There are promising signs of an increase of vocations. From the at-tempted experimentations there have come more criteria to consolidate the positive and reject the negative. There is a different atmosphere. Re-ligious life is beginning to reflect the new ecclesiai climate. But the Church expects much more from it. It should be strengthened in the Lord. A crisis is fully overcome when the reasons which caused it are discerned in depth: crisis of spiritual discipline, crisis of authority, obe-dience, crisis of communion . It is necessary to "refound" relig-ious life, said Don Egidio Viganb a few years ago. And the great con-necting threads for this new phase of the carrying out of the Council, which gave direction to this refoundation, seem clear: radicality on the road of holiness, passion for the truth, solidity and fidelity to com-munion, missionary impetus of a new evangelization. New Forms of Consecrated Life If there has been a crisis of religious institutes--also states Balthasar--it cannot be said that there has been a crisis of consecrated life because, in addition to the traditional forms of religious life, there have been developing lately new forms of consecration, new forms of "monastic" experiences in the world. In the vigorous "ecclesial move-ments" at the present time--such as the Focolarini, Communion and Lib-eration, Charismatic Renewal in the Spirit--and also in very many other communitarian experiences on local levels, there have been maturing per-sons and groups of persons who have decided, privately, to assume as a radical commitment the practice of the evangelical counsels in life com-munities. These types of vocations have abounded and a great number of new vocations, especially to the contemplative religious life, come from these movements. To be sure, history teaches that different impulses of renewal of re-ligious life are generated from strong charismatic and communitarian ex-periments which do not fit easily into existing forms and which were gen-erating--- or were heading toward--new roads of sanctity. But those more Expectations of Religious Life / 649 and more numerous lay vocations to live the evangelical counsels in a radical form, in forms that are different from the traditional forms of "consecration," should constitute a questioning and challenging sign for religious institutes. Why do they not have a similar attraction? On the other hand, the institutes have a precious patrimony of traditions and of spiritual wisdom which, revitalized and clarified, could be of primary im-portance in facing and directing the new forms which are arising. In the Return of the Sacred Not a few attentive observers at the present time note the emerging signs of a complete process of cultural transition, as if we were in mo-ments of maximum realization and, at the same time, of exhaustion 'from the process of secularization stirred up by the secularist and materialis-tic ideologies: a nihilistic phase, the indifferent absence of great motives and ideals of life, spiritual emptiness and lethargy, the predominance of the miserable idols of money, pleasure, power. At the same time there are emerging everywhere, at times with surprising or ambiguous mani-festations, new sensitive, new "significant" dem~inds, new "religious" expectations. Do we, perhal~s, 'see this under such varied signs as the re-vitalization of the cultural-religious substratum of some nations-- Poland, the Philippines, Haiti;--the resistance to secularizing modern-ism: the renewal of Islam; the accelerated and dangerous expansion of sects and of "mysterious" and "esoteric" cults; the sensitive "relig-ious" antennae of the new generations of youth; the increase of priestly and religious vocations; the great number of places in which individuals and whole peoples claim at the present time to have enjoyed apparitions of the Virgin; the enormous popular repercussions of the apostolic trips of the Holy Father; the growing flood of pilgrims going to the sanctuar-ies of their country? And in so many other and varied ways . "In s.pite of secular-ism," says the final message of the extraordinary Synod, "there exist also signs of a return to the sacred . . , of a new hunger and thirst for the transcendent and the divine . We should open the way to the di-mension of the 'divine' or of the 'mystery.' " This resurgence of the sacred--states a synodal father--will be more vigorous yet in the perspective of the end of the second millennium, but care must be taken so that the response and satisfaction of this new sen-sitivity and need is not given through devious channels and forms, frus-trating in the end because it will appear that the Catholic Church does not itself refer sufficiently to the sacred. 650 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 The whole Church is challenged, but I ask if there is not a special warning call to religious life. Instead of pursuing a retarded and submis-sive adaptation to a secularist culture in process of disintegration, the signs of an emerging culture can be fed on and deciphered only by the signs of the Absolute of God, by the radical testimony of the Mystery of God in human life. In the Agitation of the Secular Life Now let us be more specific. Let us look more carefully at the con-crete and daily experience of lay people. It is their specific work to or-der the world according to the designs of God, to live their Christian vo-cation in the ordinary conditions of family, work, and social life, in the logic and even dullness of created things. This is the road-~diversified in an enormous multiplicity of ways---of their sanctification. Yes, in-deed! I believe that there are many silent, hidden, daily witnesses to sanc-tity among lay people. At times, however, it is truly wearying to have to endure a certain "idealism" or a great deal of ecclesiastical rhetoric when reference is made to the lay state, to the "adult lay person". One gets the im-pression that often it is an abstraction of the real rhythm and weight of the normal day of an ordinary lay person. It is necessary to sanctify and to sanctify oneself in the family, professional and social life. But, how avoid being "pulled about," absorbed by a permanent agitation of the rhythm of life in order to obtain those material and spiritual times nec-essary to give "breath," "feeling" and an orientation to one's own life? Generally, in order to find these moments, as, for example, to as-sist at Mass, to pray in the family, to speak of God with one's children, to grow spiritually as a couple, to be silent., it is necessary to strug-gle and even more, to acquire a "discipline" and to respect it and to put it into practice. Most often one is pulled along by the bustle of the activities, preoccupations, responsibilities and the immediate anxieties of daily life to such a point that life becomes opaque, gray, is impover-ished of spiritual content, goes on marginalizing "the religious" to de-termined ritual moments which become ever more infrequent. And yet more . The laity are asked to assume ecclesiai and secu-lar responsibilities which are on a large scale and require time and la-bor. They are asked to be "militant." And that i~ fine. But what does it mean concretely? That the hours dedicated as catechist in the parish or in teams of service, or to meetings of movements or apostolic groups to which they belong, or absorbed by union responsibilities or participa-tion in the political party--and in this type of commitment the demands Expectations of Religious Life / 651 always seem to multiply if one wishes things to go along better continu-ally-. those hours of "militancy" have to be taken or "stolen" from the domestic and family life at the end of a day's work. For this reason, lay militants are always unstable minorities, threat-ened with discontinuity, doubly sacrificed, in abnegation and dedication. This is not to be regretted; it is their normal habitual condition. Great institutions are not built nor great works done with "extra" hours. Two remarks seem important for service of religious life in face of these situations of the laity. The first is to realize the need that the lay people have--today more than ever---of time, signs and specific spaces of prayer, of being filled with the perspective of the kingdom, savoring the things of God, becoming impregnated with the spirit of the beatitudes which can provide specific nourishment for their family, professional or political life. Many lay people look at and are seeking the contemplative life of religious communities so as to enter into contact with their spiri-tual radiation. You know how difficult it is to be contemplatives in the secular life, since many of your communities are dedicated to works of the apostolate. You can imagine how much more difficult it is for the laity . The second remark refers to the availability of religious for the serv-ice of the Gospel when compared to the obligations of lay people. When I end my day's work, I return home, not in order to rest but to help my wife who is carrying out her duties for the children, to bathe the little ones, to attend to a thousand little domestic needs . I would like to read so many things that could help me grow--and my wife also, natu-rally- but I do not have the time. I would like to visit friends in diffi-culty, to participate in ecclesial or cultural meetings which seem impor-tant to me, to get to know important persons or experiences. But I can-not sacrifice more than a minimum of family time. It is in my marriage and in my family that I see my first and most important responsibilities as a Christian. I am a happy man, but at times I admire and envy the "full time" workers for the Gospel, the "professional revolutionaries" of the Church, those who consecrate themselves exclusively and totally to the Lord. They should show a liberty and availability of tremendous energies for the most varied services for the Christian people. Does it perhaps happen that where there is more time to dispose of, there is more time to waste? On Political Participation If the chief witness of the laity is the Christian presence in the con-duct of the economy of creation, this does not mean that this is a field 659 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 exclusively reserved to them. The witness of lay people challenges re-ligious to go beyond caricatures of flight from the world and to consider their own consecration to God a radical commitment in the service of hu-man beings and of society. The great contributions of the religious life in social construction and progress can be found throughout history; but it is a fact that since the Council they have been going beyond the nar-row horizons, the so-called exclusivity or spiritual incompetence in the name of which religious life degenerated into forms of insensitivity in the face of situations and conditions of injustice and oppressiori suffered by persons, social groups, entire peoples. If the struggle for justice is a constitutive dimension of evangeliza-tion; if the defense and promotion of the dignity, rights and liberties of all human beings are a necessary part of the mission of the Church; if the kingdom of God--kingdom of peace and of justice, of truth and of love--is growing mysteriously in human, history--no religious can con-sider extraneous to her own peculiar vocation these commitments and tasks. It also falls to the religious "to evangelize the political' '--as says the Puebla document--in the sense of values of the Gospel and in con-formity with them. Up to this point, everything is clear. But there are cases in which, in the face of flagrant situations of injustice, misery and violence, when a vigorous and incisive commitment on the part of lay people is lacking, religious feel called to a more direct, surer, more incisive social and po-litical action. No one can be "neutral" in face of such situations. Even in these cases, however, it is necessary, on the one hand, to control the "immediate reaction" which ends up by absorbing and weakening the original vocation of the religious, and on th~ other, to prevent their ac-tions ending up in a well-determined political praxis, in a militant, dis-ciplined commitment, organized in a political party or strategy, with a basic reference to power. In taking this road, the premises for "secularization" are created. In addition, there is the "clerical" temptation of using prestige, social weight and the cultural representativity of ecclesiastics--above all, in Christian environments--as a basis to affirm definite political options worthwhile and free in themselves, and left then to the prudence of each Christian. In cases in which this "political praxis" of religious exists, many of the laity are conscious of a great lack of preparation of an "idealis-tic" voluntarism which substitute forms of "moral indignation" for the complex calculation of political .analysis. Expectations of Religious Life The categorical imperative "it is necessary to become committed" is identified, by some religious, in a mech'anical or simplistic manner with a "plunging into" the agitation of political matters without discern-ment. And this "plunging," with their lack of technical and political preparation, with their "ecclesiastical" condition of life far from the re-alistic stability of family and professional life and responsibility, with their lack of respect for the "weightiness" of the daily life of ordinary mortals, and with their counting on the particular protection of the Church--all this ends up by creating a particular type of untrustworthy political person and confused religious. The ease and simplicity with which some religious pass from traditional forms of life to political radi-calizations and moralistic ideologies is incredible. They are easily ma-nipulated and absorbed into a horizon which gradually becomes a prior-ity and then into a respect which becomes a substitute for ecclesial communion. Truly the Pope is right in insisting that it is not the proper role for religious to be converted into political or union leaders, and even less into state functionaries! Various Methods of Service to Humanity In these experiences of specific political participation, there is, on the part of religious, even if not consciously, a certain devaluation of their particular vocation and, consequently, an inferiority complex which makes one want to excel in the typically lay manner of service to human-ity. This service seems identified with social and political militancy if it is to be truly efficacious. Anything else seems like alienation, indif-ference and even the complicity of religious with injustice and oppres-sion. With this attitude as a basis, there comes a loss of confidence in the specificity of the religious consecration as a fundamental manner of serv-ice to humanity. The council was already warning about this when it said: Let no one think that, by their consecration, religious have become strang-ers to their feliowmen or useless citizens of this earthly city. But, even though in some instances they do not directly mingle with their contem-poraries, yet in a more profound sense, these religious are united with them in the heart of Christ and cooperate with them spiritually. In this way the work of building up the earthly city can always have its foun-dation in the Lord and can tend toward him. Otherwise, those who build this city will perhaps have labored in vain (LG n. 46). Does not the witness of St. Th6r~se of Lisieux teach us the incom- 654 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 parable value of prayer for all human service? Those who take on as a priority the construction of the world through matrimony, the administra-tion of goods and power--such are the laity--greatly need those who ac-company them with prayer as a priority, who remind them that we are in the world but not of the world and that we cannot conform ourselves to the present time; that we must safeguard and strengthen our Christian liberty in face of the seductions of the idols of money, power and pleas-ure; that the "logic" of the beatitudes is authentically revolutionary; that Christ is the cornerstone of all social construction which is to be truly human; that it is worth the trouble to struggle and sacrifice in order to continue creating conditions and experiences of greater justice, solidar-ity and peace so that nothing will be forgotten and all will be redeemed when God grants us "new heavens and a new earth". The best and most radical service to humanity is the testimony of a life which manifests the total supremacy of the love of God. For this rea-son, the special road of service to humanity for religious life consists, today more than ever, in being centered in one's "consecration," in a special care and cultivation of its religious dimension, of its discipline of life and spiritual growth. Living and Manifesting a Specific Charism This life according to the Spirit is diversified and deepened in the fol-lowing of the "charism of the founders." The apostolic exhortation Evangelica Testificatio and the decree Mutuae Relationes emphasized this in a special way. For the majority of lay people, however, I believe that this statement would not be well understood because there is the dan-ger of considering religious life generically, with little variations, with more or less uniform ways, barely differentiated into families with dif-ferent names and habits. It is necessary to ask if the various religious com-munities witness effectively to the gift they have received, to their own original spiritual richness, their particular contribution to the Christian enrichment of all the people of God. If fidelity to one's own charism is a form of obedience to the grace of Christ, if it characterizes the origi-nality of an evangelical project for the following of Christ and encour-ages the discovery of new lights and new dimensions of the totality of Christian life, if it is a specific way of sanctification, the greatest contri-bution of a religious community to the life of the Church and of each Christian is to keep'very much alive the fidelity to this charism, to live it with the same radicality as the founder lived it, to regenerate and radi-ate its relevancy before the needs of the Church and the people, I believe that thus the whole of the people of God would feel more "encouraged" Expectations of Religious Life / 655 and "worked upon" by the powerful ferment of renewal of Christian life. The laity who have contact with religious communities, directly or through schools, clinics, and so forth, would be much more "struck" by these radical charisms. All of that is contained in the generic term-- the Sisters. In this sense, we find much to the point the words of John Paul II in Brazil when, after having emphasized the great pastoral and apostolic service accomplished by religious, he stated: It is not because it is useful to the pastoral work that religious life occu-pies a very definite place in the Church and has an indispensable value. The contrary is true: religious life lends an efficacious service to the pas-toral work because it is and keeps itself firmly faithful to the position it occupies in the Church and to the charisms which characterize this po-sition. In addition, I ask myself if religious communities should not put more emphasis on the witness of the sanctity of their founders or spiri-tual teachers. Many times witness is of more value than words and Chris-tians need "models," fathers and teachers on the road of faith. Life Communities in the Church Permanent life communities which fully involve the person are found in the life of the Church only in religious communities and in Christian families. The differences between these two are obvious. The famil~ is a "natural" community, whose matrimonial nucleusbin the loving and fruitful union of the man and woman--is "sacramentalized" by the Church. The religious community does not have a "natural" base and those who participate in it freely sacrifice precious goods--such as the whole field of conjugal love, the free disposal of material goods, indi-vidual autonomy for the great decisions of life--for a Good, for a Love which is much greater. ~But in both cases we see, in different forms, the mystery of commun-ion which there is in the human origin and destiny and which becomes a daily miracle. In societies which are ever more disunited and frag-mented, where the powerful and uniforming tides of massification break up social bonds in the social fabric--much has been written about th'is-- these very forms of community life acquire even more importance and a great "impact." There is an intense desire for personal recognition, friendship, solidarity, authentic reconciliation, deeper and fuller human encounters and relationships so that people are very sensitive to the hu-man witness and acceptance of these life communities. 656 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 There are beautiful analogies which could be made between religious communities and. family communities. Do not the various aspects of hu-man love which are found ,in family life and which reflect the insepara-ble dimensions of divine love exist in their own manner and even more fully in the religious community as signs, glimpses, first-fruits of the king-dom? Both communities are based on the indestructible and fruitful foun-dation of a spousal love. While in the person-to-person encounter of the man and his wife, their passionate experience of love truly reflects the covenant of Christ with his Church, the religious lets herself be grasped directly and tota~lly by the limitless love of Christ, in the immediilcy of the covenant between Spouse and spouse, with the totality and sublima-tion of a commitment to which all human love is called. Cohsecrated vir-ginity- lived in its serene and mysterious fullness~is the sign of p~ssi-bility and of example to order and encourage the "chastity" of married life in this vital, delicate and fragile complex between the spi,ritual sway and instinctive impulses. There is a complete education to lib~rty, to do-minion over selfl which 'is a ~:ondition of authentic love--so important and urgent today on the level of tlae' new generations, determined and marked by a hedonist mentality and an atmosphere of flagrant eroticism-- which shines through a healthy religious life. ~ ~ The family, although implicitly, also requires a "rule" for i!s com-munity life, and authority is the prinqiple and guarantee of communion. In the rule of rules--that of St. Benedict--the "superior".of the com-mu~ nity is called "father"--abbot. It is good that the superior is recog-nized as "mother" and all are "sisters." Without paternity (maternity) we would remain orphans, community would disintegrate because it would be without a source and point of reference. This is the value of "authority" as derived from "augere," that which helps to increase, to grow in life, which permits the human to grow in persons. It i~ always a reflection on the paternity (maternity) of God, who giyes us life, makes. it grow in faith, brings it to plentitude. There is a spiritual fruitfulness which~.engenders abundant fruits of Christian life. Lay people often observe with special attention the life of r~eligious communities so as to see if they discover, if they perceive that "some-thin~ more" which they expect. For this reason, excessive formalism, minor quarrels, divisions, absence of human warmth, and more dull the communitarian witness. It is as if community were more an obligatory formality than a radiation of liberty and life. The laity must be able to see in the life of religious communities the carrying out in a small way of this reconciliation in depth, of this fraternity and solidarity,, of this Expectations of Religious Life / 657 peace and happiness in communion for which all human beings yearn in their heart, a strong sign of "reconciled humanity" in the interior of the mystery of communion of the Church, a model of "the new society" in which can be found united liberty and solidarity, where authority is exercised as paternity (maternity), where there is a different attitude to-wards riches, in which human relations are brought to their fullness by liberty and do not degenerate into domination, and which brings all its members to an ordered participation;'and "above all," as says a beauti-ful text bf the Puebia document: where it is unequivocally manifested that, without a radical communion with, God in Jesus Christ, any form of purely human communion re-mains in the long run incapable of being sustained and ends totally in tu'rning against the human person. In other words, nothing less than a corner of heaven! Some Priority Areas Lay people are very sensitive to the way religious life witnesses to poverty, and they are also very demanding, at times too demanding, with religious and little, indeed, with themselves. It is good, howev.er, to be challenged by this exigency. More than an "area" of work or of commitment, poverty is a radi-cal dimension of "cbnsecration" insofar as it is detachment from mate-rial goods and affirmation of the liberty which recognizes God as its only good. These are admirable witnesses. On too many occasions, however, the laity do not succeed in seeing how this vow of poverty is manifested concretely as detachment and liberty. Even more, many times, with no malice, they notice that religious liv~e rather conveniently~---even comfort- ~ably--x~ith all material problems settled in the present and in the future, and that in environments which show nothing of "poverty." It'is not a question of their asking for "romantic" gestures nor of exaggerat)ng criticism. But, at least a greater austerity and severity of life is required, a more generous availability in the sharing of material and spiritual goods, the elimination of all that is superfluous . This exigency is even more challenging since it is within a Church which is ever more conscious of and determined concerning the so-called "preferential option for the poor." "This preferential option for the poor," says Don Egidio Viganb in a very expressive synthesis which we cannot examine in detail now, questions religious very concretely, especially the institutes of active life. It demands a review of the specific mission in light of those receiv- Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 ing it. It requires a study and replanning of the presence of the religious. It deepens the sacramental meaning of the vow of poverty, places in dia-logue the great values of evangelical poverty with the pressing obliga-tions of social misery, proclaims with ever greater clarity that the pov-erty of the beatitudes is a challenge to materialism and opens doors to solutions which are alternatives to those of the consumer society. Religious should also take to heart the criteria mentioned by the magis-terium of the Church as to the evangelical authenticity of this "option": it is not exclusive nor excluding because the message of salvation is di-rected to all; it is animated by an intention which is primarily religious and not political; it does not let itself be entrapped by nor reduced to a class dialectic; it takes into consideration the existence of various forms of poverty in situations of 'hunger and misery, of unemployment and marginalization, of deprivation of liberty, of physical or mental health or other material and/or moral privations. In this preferential love for the poor as derived from the love of Christ for all is found in great measure the witness of religious life today. A special attention to the young also seems to be a basic and urgent requirement for religious communities of our times. There is a long and impressive religious tradition of the education of youth which shou!d not be abandoned but should be renewed and deepened. The point is clear; an individual becomes social and is educated, from the most tender age, fundamentally through the family and the school. These are the two ba-sic "channels" to lead youth to reality. But could it be that the States, political parties, ideological strategists would take a strong interest in the school in order to "penetrate" into the world of youth and direct it ac-cording to their various criteria and interests, while the Church-- especially religious communities--would underestimate its educational tradition and its educational institutions and responsibilities? In times of crisis of credibility and of search for "ideologies," when the most no-ble energies and concerns remain dissatisfied with the suffocating mate-rialism of the consumer society, it is more important than ever to offer to the young great and vigorous proposals, ideal certainties of life as signs and guides for their own education. Christian lay people, parents of families, need to count on the help of the Catholic school because the first responsibility for education falls on the parents, and the family is the basic place for growth in the faith of its members. Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of catecheti-cal instruction, of Christian attitudes, of fruitful joining of faith with cul-ture which is acquired in. the environment and activity of the school. The Expectations of Religious Life I 659 most fruitful means is that of an active and co-responsible educational collaboration between the family and the Catholic school. I am sure that it is not without concern to the laity that educational religious communi-ties are abandoning the field of the school. On the contrary, they should intensify their commitment involving the collaboration of the laity, es-pecially of the parents, and should go beyond the "administrative" and routine activities in the running of the school, transforming it ever more into a vigorous, radiant, highly educational environment and seek means to make their services always more accessible and fruitful. Here there is much to rethink, to plan and to carry out along the line of a scholastic pastoral which meets all these demands. I think also of other milieux and human activities which have been converted into new frontiers of the ecclesial mission, in which the pres-ence of the Church cannot be limited to some free-lance laity. There surely is no lack of religious charisms for the apostolic work among in-tellectuals, artists, professionals of social communication, factory work-ers . According to the Measure of the Gift of Christ One last remark. The Council says that while profession of the evangelical counsels involves the renunciation of goods which undoubtedly deserve to be highly valued, it does not con-stitute an obstacle to the true development of the human person, but by its nature is supremely beneficial to that development (LG 46). Thus the renunciation should not diminish the human but rather help to develop the human stature according to the measure of the gift of Christ. This "something more," this "much more," of holiness, which the laity expect of religious finds its response in the witness of new men, of new women, penetrated with the Absolute of God, radically incorpo-rated into Christ, totally dedicated to the service of others. If Christ re-veals to human persons the 'fullness of their being and their destiny, all radical following of Christ can be only a path of integral fulfillment for humanity. It is necessary to show that what one abandons in order to fol-low Christ will be recovered even now, multiplied, as more human riches more full of humanity. Lay people hope to meet in religious well-balanced Christian person-alities because they are centered in God and, therefore, persons having an effective equilibrium and emotional serenity (how many "argu-ments" reveal psychological immaturity !) of ever more solid intellectual formation (why in the past did one so rarely meet religious on this 660 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 level?), with 'a great liberty because a great obedience radiates a richness of life from their "interior castle." They expect them to be attentive and generous in dedication and service, spreading a happiness and a joy which come from within, persons of whom one can speak and think of as models for women of hidden but full life, in the image of Mary, first and greatest disciple of Christ. Words, Words, Words How glibly do we toss them off, precious self-wrought jewels, precious beyond diamond, sapphire or pearl: Mined from quickened breath, warmed by channeled blood, carried live on currents of air they glow to foul or fair. Let us then nourish them ~with care, knowing their fire can rage uncontrolled to devastating No or curved to simple Yes, can make a world of bleak distress spin in giddy joy, and bring a God to birth while angels sing! Marcella M. Holloway, C.S.J. 6321 Clemens Avenue, Saint Louis, Missouri 63130 The Public and Witness Religious Life Dimension of David F. O'Connor, S.T. Father O'_Connor, past president of the Canon Law Society of America, is chairman of the Department of Church Law at the Washington Theological Union. He resides at the Holy Trinity Mission Seminary; 9001 New Hampshire Avenue; Silver Spring, Maryland 20903. Religious life has a public dimension to it which is intended by the Church. Religious, both in their personal and their corporate lifestyles, are meant to be identifiable as Church-people and to witness Gospel val-ues. They engage in' forms of the apostolate and in ministry always in the name of the Church and under the authority of their respective relig-ious SUl~eriors and local bishops. All of this manifests their distinctive character, their place in the Church and their canonical status. An awareness of this--and it is not always viewed by everyone as an unambigtious biessing~--helps us better understand some of the events occurring on the contemporary scene; for example, the reaction of the hierarchy to religious who are seeking public office or those who sign published statements which a.ppear to be contrary to Church positions. The following article is iritended to elaborate somewhat on this pub-lic dimension of the religious life and some of its implications for relig-ious. The Institutionalizing of a Charismatic Fbrm Since Vatican II, we have a renewed awareness of the religious life as a charismatic vocation, a gift of the Spirit to the Church.2 This has helped deepen our understanding and appreciation of its place and role in the Church. For the Holy Spirit is not only the source of the inspira- 661 662 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 tion of the founders, but also of those who have followed after them down through the succeeding generations. These charisms have contrib-uted in a significant and special way to the very holiness of the Church and to its ability to fulfill its mission in this world.3 A religious commu-nity is obliged to hand on an awareness of its charism to new members so that these gifts of the Spirit may be lived, safeguarded, deepened and constantly developed.4 Charisms are given within the Church for the building up of the Church community. Whenever a claim is made by a group of the faith-ful that it is living a radical form of the Gospel life, such a claim cannot be ignored by the wider Church, especially by the bishops who are the pastors and guardians of the faith.5 The assertion that one is being led by the Spirit, now as in the past, needs to be examined and authenticated by the wider Church community before it can be given credence and ac-ceptance. Historically, ecclesial recognition was given informally and im-plicitly for the first few centuries. But, beginning in the fourth century, bishops of the local churches, aware of certain abuses and of the disrup-tiveness of some wandering monks, required monastic groups to have of-ficial and explicit approval before establishing a foundation. Indeed, the canons of the Council of Chalcedon (45 I) established the norms Which regulated the relationship of bishops and monasteries up until the Mid-dle Ages. Then, because of the development of large and centralized re-ligious orders in the thirteenth century, official recognition was fre-quently reserved to Rome. It is a fact, then, that ecclesial recognition and authentication of charis-matic groups existed in some form from the beginning of the devel-opment of religious life. It was necessary in order to determine whether or not a particular group or rule truly was presenting a viable form of Gospel life. Ecclesial or canonical approbation had the added benefit of helping to preserve the original charism of the founder and the first mem-bers by institutionalizing it within the visible community of faith. Ca-nonical authentication of a particular style of Gospel life has helped it to be passed on to succeeding generations of men and women, and this has redounded to the benefit of the wider Church. The religious life, as we know it today, is canonically established only through the official recognition of the Church's pastors, the hierar-chy. This has helped safeguard the faithful from. being led astray by ab-errant forms of Christianity which, in the past, frequently ended up in fanaticism, schism or heresy. The Church possesses within itself the charism of discerning spirits, and this is exercised by the bishops as part Witness of Religious Life / 663 of their pastoral office. As Karl Rahner has stated: " . . . the official Church is also the guardian and guide of the charismatic element--she herself possesses the gift of the discernment of spirits."6 Canonical Approval of a Religious Institute The Church, through the pastoral office of its bishops, is forced at various times and places to state what it considers to be compatible or incompatible with the Gospel because the Church does sponsor groups, institutions and agencies which publicly and officially represent it. These public institutions have to be supervised lest they present a distorted pic-ture of the gospel values which the Church incarnates. Religious insti-tutes are one such form. Both the institutes as such and its members rep-resent the Church. Once canonical or ecclesiastical recognition is granted to a religious community, that community no longer exists as a private and independ-ent group of the faithful, nor does the institute exist in isolation from par-ties external to it, even though it does enjoy some canonical autonomy.7 For, once having sought and been granted official recognition and ap-proval, the religious institute takes upon itself an added identity--it be-comes an ecclesial institute and is linked to the hierarchy in a special man-ner. 8 Official Church recognition identifies the institute as a Church in-stitution, and it identifies its members, women or men religious, as Church-people, involved in a life of public dedication and service in the name of the Catholic Church.9 Membership in a canonically approved form of consecrated life, which requires the profession of public vows, involves an ecclesial form of commitment that distinguishes religious from other members of the faithful, even those who may be in secular institutes. The latter do not represent the Church in its public life, but live somewhat anonymously, maintain their secular vocation, and qui-etly work to Christianize their milieu. ~0 A Personal Witness That Is Public Religious, as publicly consecrated members of the faithful, are ex-pected, as is every Christian, to witness a personal commitment to Christ. But because they are called by their vocation to an ecclesiai form of public consecration, they are expected tO bear a visible witness to a deep, personal experience of Christ and to share the faith, hope and love which it inspires. ~ For religious, above all, are consecrated to the Lord. Their development in holiness of life is more important than the good works they perform. As John Paul II has remarked: "What counts most 664/Review for Religious~ September-October, 1987 is not what religious do, but what they are as persons consecrated to the Lord." ~2 The canons of the Code of Canon Law reassert some of these essen-tial personal obligations. Canon 662 states that religious are to have as their highest rule of life the ['ollowing of Christ as it is proposed in the Gospel and in their constitutions. The constitutions of each institute help specify and make the Gospel particular for their religious, how it is to be lived in service to others in the name of Christ and of his Church. Re, ligious are to bemen and women of prayer. Their first and foremost duty is the contemplation of divine things, and assiduous union with God in prayer. ~3 They are expected to use the traditional forms ,of, worship and devotion: daily participation in the eucharistic sacrifice, the prayerful read-ing of Sacred Scripture, mental prayer, devotion to Our Lady, and the Liturgy of the Hours. ~'~ .Religious, as individuals,.are ,to engage, in the asceticism required for personal conversion of heart through a daily ex-amination o~ conscience and by frequently receiving the sacrament of pen-ance. 15 These devotional obligations are assumed personally by every relig-ious who takes his or her spiritual life seriously. The cultivation of the interior life is an absolute necessity if the public consecration of a relig-ious is not to become a charade. Without a deep, personal spiritual life, perseverance in a public form of consecrated life becomes tenuous and the fulfillment of the vows turns int~) a heavy burden. " Th~ faithful have a right to expect that those who have publicly ded-icated their lives to Christ by religious profession will be living exam-ples of a GoSpel life. The Church presents religious to the world as pub-lic witnesses of evangelibal values. Holiness of life and a generous, un-selfish service of the People of God are a'rightful expect, ation from each religious. A Corporate Witness That Is Public Religious life is characterized by a communitarian lifestyle. All reli-gious are expected to live in some form of common life which is proper to the specific institute to which they belong. 16 Because of the centrality of the enclosure for monastic religious and some form of active service for apostolic religious, the styles of their common life will be radically different. Indeed, monastic institutes which are totally ordered to the con-templative life are prohibited from engaging in any form of pastoral min-istry outside the monastery,. ~7 However, all religious are expected to live in a house of their own institute with their.brothers or sisters. ~8 Their life together is intended to be a microcosm of the Church, idealized in the Witness of Religious Life / 665 Jerusalem community described in the Acts of the Apostles (2:44): "The faithful all lived together and owned everything in common; they sold their goods and possessions and shared among themselves according to what each one needed." Religious community life is to be filled with pray-erfuines~ and with Christian service and love. Religious life is actually lived on the local level, in a pa.rticular house with specific women or men. The locai community takes on certain char-acteristics, principally because of the individual religious who live to-gether, and secondarily because of the apostolates in which they are en-gaged. The image or witness which they project will depend upon many factors, especially the expectations and experience of the people with whom the religious interact. If the religious are perceived as prayerful, charitable, joyful and generous in their community life together, their cor-porate or collective witness will evidence the Gospel ideal and they will be what the Church intends--living witnesses of Christian love. It may be well to recall the fact that a group is frequently able to wit-ness better than individual persons. An individual can be--all too easily-- simply dismissed as just an eccentric. However, a community of Chris-tian men or women, living a similarly dedicated lifestyle, cannot be so perfunctorily ignored or written-off. Moreover, the members of a relig-ious community can offer support to one another by their companionship and prayerfulness, especially when the Gospel values they embody are countercultural. Living witnesses are a powerful sign. Reflective people will be forced to examine the faith dimension and Gospel values which are the foundation of their own religious lifestyle. Those who do not share our Christian values may be led to a greater appreciation of them by the wit-ness of a vibrant, faith-filled religious community. In fact, it was just such an experience which led the famous~ agnostic, British commenta-tor, Malcolm Muggeridge, to become a Christian-- and later a Catholic-- after his experience in Calcutta with Mother Teresa and her Missionar-ies of Charity. Few people can remain totally indifferent to a corporate Christian wit-ness. Either they will reject it or accept it. That is why the Church pre-sents religious as living witnesses of Christ, as Lumen Gentium, 46, states: Let religious see well to it that the Church truly show forth Christ through them with ever increasing clarity to believers and unbelievers alike --- Christ in contemplation on the mountain, or proclaiming the king-dom of God to the multitudes, or healing the sick and maimed and con- 666 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 verting sinners to a good life, or blessing children and doing good to all people, always in obedience to the will of the Father who sent him. The Witness of Public Vows Religious profess the evangelical counsels as public vows in the con-text of their community lifestyle. Their vows cannot be properly under-stood or appreciated apart from the context of their common life. The Witness of Consecrated Poverty The public vow of poverty, as professed in religious institutes, would be better appreciated and offer a better public witness if it were presented as a vow of common life and goods. Too often the term "poverty" is judged by socio-economic criteria and religious are misjudged as lack-ing because they are not "poor" in that ordinary meaning of the term. Those of us who are educated or who live in comfortable houses, drive automobiles, eat three meals a day, and so forth, (and that is the vast majority of American religious) are sometimes even thought to be vio-lating our commitment. We are judged as hypocritical for professing a "vow of poverty," when it is obvious that we are not "poor." There certainly is a socio-economic dimension to how we are to live our religious life. Our lifestyle must be adapted to the particular cultural and economic situation in which we live, so that we do not give the appearance of being wealthy. Also, there are ascetical demands made upon us, personally and corporately, to live simply and avoid the dele-terious influences of the larger consumer society. Nevertheless, we are not, in fact, invited by our vow to embrace a debilitating, crushing, in-humane form of economic poverty as the ideal of our commitment. That is not religious poverty. That is not the purpose of our vow. Religious poverty can only be valued and offer edification if it is recognized as an essential aspect of community life and, where applica-ble, a dimension of an apostolate. Thus everything a religious acquires as a member of the institute is acquired for the institute. 19 The religious community, in turn, provides for the needs of its members so that they can fulfill the purpose of their vocation in that specific religious family.2° Ascetically, religious are urged to forego standards of comfort and conven-ience which may be legitimate for others and to exercise a certain re-straint in the forms of relaxation and entertainment they choose.2~ All of this is intended to promote the spiritual life of the religious and to help free us from the desire to accumulate things and, positively, to liberate our hearts for the things of God. Witness of Religious Life / 667 When religious undertake apostolates among the socio-economically and culturally deprived, they are required to adapt their style of living to the demands of their apostolate. This will often involve a style of life approximating that of the people among whom they live and work. Life on the missions is not like life at home. Life among the poor in the rural areas of Appalachia or in the inner-city of our large urban centers will bring with it many restrictions and the call for a special asceticism. Those religious can well be viewed as living "poorly" in the more ordinary sense of the word. Generally, if religious are seen as lix;ing a rather simple lifestyle, per-sonally and communally, this will be a source of great edification, espe-cially if they are serving others generously and unselfishly. The Gospel ideal of poverty and simplicity can be beautifully manifested by such a public witness. The faithful are reminded that superfluous goods are not necessary for happiness and contentment. The unencumbered life of reli-gious can help people to look beyond the present world. It can support the credibility of the Gospel° message which religious are to preach by their lifestyle. Religious poverty can be a reminder to every member of the faithful that we are all called to rely upon the Lord, and to manifest a loving concern for our neighbor, especially the needy and the .deprived, whoever they may be. The Witness of Consecrated Chastity If there is anything that is truly countercultural in our modern soci-ety, it is the value of Christian chastity and marital fidelity. A life of dedi-cated chastity and celibacy runs directly contrary to the pleasure princi-ple which is so dominant in our post-Christian western world. Our contem-poraries cannot ignore the witness of thousands of men and women who profess to live chastely and celibately out of love for God and in the serv-ice of others. Those who share our common faith and values, especially those who are themselves without spouses because of circumstances be-yond their control, find great support and consolation in the awareness that many of their sisters and brothers in the Lord live happy and fulfill-ing lives as celibate religious. The community lifestyle of religious provides them with their princi-ple support group.22 Their life shared in common with their religious brothers or sisters is a Christian and humane lifestyle that offers an ideal context for their vowed life. Apostolic religious especially benefit from a communal dimension to their dedication to mission. While their pri-mary orientation may be to serving others, their religious community set-ting on the local level should be the base to which they return for spiri- 668 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 tual ,and fraternal/sisterly refreshment. Again, the fact that a group can offer a better witness than individuals is an important consideration when it involves a chaste and celibate Christian lifestyle. Individuals find their commitment under assault or too heavy a burden if they live alone and apart. Living celibately in a communal setting can witness that religious do not live lonely and eccentric single lives, but live in a Christian faith community and in hope of complete fulfillment in the eschaton. The Witness of Consecrated Obedience Religious have willingly accepte~d,a pattern of life that is largely laid down for them.23 They follow a,rule or constitution and live in residence under the authority of those who have been elected or appointed as reli-gious superiors.24 Their vow of obedience has limited their freedom and their options so that they might pursue the cor~mon good and the corpo-rate mission of their particular religious institute. Ultimately, they seek, as women and men of faith, to discern the will of God in the commands they are given in holy obedience. This enalSles their institute to under-take corporate commitments and helps galvanize the personal investmeni of time and talent into a commhnity endeavor. ' The life of religious obedience requires a great sense of faith. The generosity that this clemands can help foster the spiritual maturity of re-ligious as they strive humbly to imitate the obedience and love of Jesus who sought only.to do the will of his Father. Certainly, jn a society and culture that exaggerates the importance of individual freedom, Christian obedience is truly countercultural. The obedience of religious is fre-quently denigrated as a "blind obedience" by those who do not share our faith values. However, our brothers and sisters in the faith often find it a rather Christ-like response and are disedified when they perceive the opposite in the lives of religious. All Christians are obliged to seek the will of the Lord. Thus the hum-ble example of obedient religious can only help to build up the Body of Christ. Canonical Consequences of the Public Dimension Appropriate Attire Since religious life has a public dimension to it, it seems reasonable, all things considered, that a distinctive style of garb might have some advantages, especially in many apostolates, and in our commitment to a simple lifestyle. It is quite common to find that people in "service" roles, even professional ones, are recognizable .by their uniform or pro- Witness of Religious Life / 669 fessional'attire. We tend to expect that these people will be readily iden-tifiable when we need their services. 'Indeed, the sign or witness dimension is referred to in the canon which concerns the garb of religious.25 While a religious "habit," in the strict sense of the term, is more appropriately a monastic garment, custom and tradition among many apostolic institutes has provided them with a style of dress which identified them as pertaining to a particular religious family. Often enough it was a form of dress suitable to another age or culture. Frequently, too, apostolic groups adopted the contempo-rary clerical dress, if they were men religious. While not adopting a habit, as such, they did choose a style of dress that gradually became a traditional garb that went unchanged and unadapted to times and circum-stances. It was for the most part a post-Vatican II phenomenon that, in-stead of guitably adapting the dress, as was expected, it was often dis-carded entirely in part because of the difficulty of deciding on something acceptable to all the members. Another purpose for wearing a religious garb is that it is intended to be a sign of simplicity of lifestyle and religious poverty. It is appropri-ate that a public witness to the Gospel should evidence a certain degree of Christian detachment and modesty. Experience has shown that it is difficult to,dress attractively and appropriately for every occasion with-out having to invest in a.rather extensive wardrobe. A simple garb which is modest, becoming and dignified solves this problem. However, the rules and regulations of each institute, the expectations of the local Church, the demands of the apostolate and the requirements of the particular culture and clime all have to be considered when it comes to deciding in concrete situations how one ought to be dressed. There is no requirement in Canon Law that the habit or religious garb be worn on every occasion, nor at all times, nor in all places. Indeed, the Apostolic~ See itself has stated that a secular style of dress, without any recognizable sign or symbol, can be permitted when a habit would be an impediment to the everyday exercise of activities which should be undertaken by the relig'ious.26 Mission in the Name,.of the Church All forms of apostolic activity are to be undertaken by men and women religious only in the name of the Church and in communion with it.27 The exercise of the apostolate by religious is never entirely a pri-vate and personal ministry. It is always, in some sense, a public and cor-porate one.28 The Vatican Council stated that one of the essential ele-ments of the Christian apostolate is that it be conducted in union with 670 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 those whom the Holy Spirit has assigned pastorally to govern the Church.29 It is the duty of the local bishop to coordinate all forms of the apostolate among his portion of the People of God.3° Religious are' al-ways to be subject to their own superiors and to the local bishop in the exercise of all forms of the external apostolate.3~ Unbecoming Activities Church law has always recognized that the public nature of the cleri-cal ministry and the religious life places certain restrictions on the ac-tivities in which clerics or religious may engage. However, what may be inappropriate at one time and place may not be so in another. Times change and so do the circumstances. As a result, the 1983 Code of Canon Law is both different and simi-lar to the 1917 Code. It is different insofar as some of the activi, ties which were considered unbecoming for clerics and religious, such as the prac-tice of medicine, especially surgery, are no longer prohibited by the re-vised code. It is the same in that a number of activities which were proscribed by the old code appear again in the new one-~especially the general prohibition that forbids religious and clerics to engage in any ac-tivity which is foreign to their way of life.32 No specific unbecoming are enumerated here. Such determination is be left to the good judgment and prudence of mature women and men religious as they con-sider the demands of the apostolate in their .particular culture, time and place. Of course, specific directives can be given by the proper religious superiors and by the local bishops. These would have to be observed. Public or Political Office The new code continues the prohibition of the old one that religious are not to assume a public office to which is attached the exercise of civil authority, such as the office of mayor, attorney general, governor, or sim-ilar offices.33 The reason seems self-evident--persons holding such of-rices confuse Church ministry with a civil role, and inhibit a Gospel and prophetic stance. Religious are meant to be°at the service of people as heralds of the Gospel in the name of the Church. Similarly, they are not to take an active role in partisan political par-ties nor in the management of labor unions, unless they have the permis-sion of their ecclesiastical superiors.34 Again, the reason for this general proscription is that the public image and identity of a religious is that of a representative of the Church community. When publicly dedicated Church-people become too closely identified with a specific ideology, any Gospel witness is blunted, and the situation often distracts people Witness of Religious Life / 671 from the various social justice and public stands which the Church may want to make through its pastors.35 Finally, religious are supposed to be agents of reconciliation, not division. They should foster peace and jus-tice as servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God.36 Secular Financial Responsibilities , Another general area which religious are wisely urged to avoid, un-less good reasons indicate otherwise--in which cases permission can be granted--is the acceptance of secular financial responsibilities or involve-ment in business and trade activities. The canons prohibit religious, gen-erally, from undertaking the management of property owned by the la-ity and from assuming any secular office which require financial accountability.37 However, today it is easy to envision situations in which a religious might be expected to do so. For example, the demands of a certain apostolate may require that, at least for the time being, a re-ligious administer the finances of an organization, especially when no one else is in a position to do so. Likewise, a religious may find himself or herself having to take care of the financial affairs of an incapacitated relative or friend. Charity and common sense may simply demand this. However, the general prohibition is a wise one and should force a relig-ious to consider alternatives. And having to explain a request to do so to the religious superior can help prevent an imprudent decision. The same type of consideration should be given to the matter of a religious becoming involved in business or trade, personally or on be-half of others.38 The present code is more lenient than the 1917 one and expressly indicates that permission to do so can be granted, presumably for good reasons. Again, it is not difficult to imagine situations where this may be necessary or beneficial, at least for a reasonable period of time. If, for example, a religious is an only child and inherits a small family business with which he or she had been most familiar before en-tering religion, the most prudent decision could be for the religious tem-porarily to oversee the business until other provisions can be made. The above prohibitions are, in general, completely consonant with the nature of the religious life. Yet it is eminently reasonable that excep-tions be permitted. The dangers present for religious, in becoming too hastily and imprudently involved in financial matters that have nothing to do with their community, are all too evident. It is especially fitting that religious not be burdened with financial involvements when they have responded to a vocation which requires them to develop an asceti- 679 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 cism of detachment and a life of simplicity. Military Service and Civil Exemptions Finally, since religious are followers of the Prince of Peace, it is par-ticularly incongruous that they volunteer to bear arms in times of con-flict, unless they are legally bound to do so. Therefore, the canons state that religious are not to volunteer for military service and they should take advantage of civil exemptions, if they exist, to avoid this and any other public or civic duty which is foreign to religious life.39 Certainly this prohibition does not apply to service as military chaplains or any simi-lar type of ministry. The prohibition would seem to apply to accepting jury duty in criminal cases also, especially if they are capital offenses, when an exemption is possible. It seems most inappropriate that a relig-ious be in a position of determining the guilt of citizens and playing part in their incarceration or execution. Again, canon law recognizes that there can be exceptional cases in which the proper religious superior and ecclesiastical authority can grant permission to a religious to act contrary to the general canonical norm that the above activities are to be avoided. Conclusion Ecclesial authentication of charismatic forms of the Gospel life ex-isted from the beginning. At first, ,such approbation was given unoffi-cially and implicitly. Later, it became an official and explicit necessity. The religious life is a charismatic and an ecclesial form of public conse-cration. Religious institutes are public agencies of the Church which pre-sents the members as public witnesses of Gospel values. The personal and corporate lifestyles of religious, as well as their apostolic activities, are at the service of the Church and are supervised by their superiors and the bishops. Since religious are iri apublic form of consecrated life, they are expected, all things considered, to be recognizable, and to avoid those activities which muddle or confuse their ecclesiai image. Above all, religious are expected to be living examples of evangelical values: chastity for the sake of the kingdom; Gospel simplicity in lifestyle; hum-ble~ and Christ-like obedience; and complete dedication to a loving serv-ice of people in the name of the Church. The counterculturai witness of religious is meant to speak eloquently of a deep faith conviction that Je-sus is the way, and the truth and the life. NOTES See Carolyn Osiek in Vatican H and Its Documents: An American Reappraisal, ed., Witness of Religious Life / 6"/3 Timothy E. O'Connell0(Michael Glazier, Inc., Wilmington, Delware, 1986), pp. 86- 87. 2 Perfectae caritatis, 1; canon 575. 3 Lumen Gentium, 39. '~ Mutual Relations, II (Henceforth MR). 5 See Raymond Hostie, The Life and Death of Refigious Orders (CARA, Washing-ton, D.C., 1983), p. 21. 6 See The Dynamic Element in The Church (Herder, New "fork, 1964) p. 62; Lumen Gentium, 43; canon 573, §1 and §2. 7 Canon 586, §1. 8 Canons 573, §2, 575-579. 9 Canon 675, 93. l0 Canons 710-730. I~ Essential Elements, 33. (Henceforth EE). ~z Papal Message to the Plenary Assembly of CRIS, March 1980; EE, 33. ~3 Canon 663, 91. ~4 Canon 663, §2, §4. ~5 Canon 664. 16 Canons 607, 92 and 665. ~7 Canon 674. 18 Canon 665, 91. ~9 Canon 668, §3. 20Canon 679; see David F. O'Connor, "Two Forms of Consecrated Life; Religious and Secular Institutes," REvmw voR Rv.~.m~ous, 46, n. 2 (1986) pp. 205-219. z~ Christus Dominus, 33-35. ~ Canons 599, 602 and 607, §2. 23EE, 34. 24Canons 601,608 and 665. 25Canon 669. 26See Canon Law Digest, 7 (1975) pp. 534-535. 27Canon 675, §3. 28EE, I 0. 29Apostolicam actuositatem, 23; MR, 9 (a). 30Canons 394, 91 and 680; MR, Chapt. II. 3~ Canon 678. 32Canons 285 and 672. 33Canons 285, §3 and 672. 34 Canons 287 and 672. 35 See George Aschenbrenner, "Currents in Spirituality," Rv.w~w voR R~L~o~ous, 42, n. 2 (I 983), pp. 183-186. 36 CRIS, "Religi6us and Human Promotion," Canon Law Digest, 9 (1983), pp. 379-410; David F. O'Connor, "Religious in Politics," R~wEw ~oa R~L~6~ous, 41, n. 6 (1982), pp. 834-848. 37 Canons 285, §4 and 672. 38 Canons 286 and 672. 39 Canons 289 and 672. The Religious as "Sentry": A Reflection on the Prophet Ezekiel James Fitz, S.M. Father Fitz is a member of the Provincial Administration of his congregation's Cin-cinnati Province. An earlier article, "Religious Life as Acted Prophecy," appeared in the issue of November/December, 1982. Father Fitz may be addressed at the Mari-anist Provincialate; 4435 East Patterson Road; Dayton, Ohio 45430-1095. [~uring my twenty-one years as a religious, I have attended many vow cer-emonies in support of brothers and sisters saying "yes" to their call from the Lord. At these liturgies the first reading has often come from the Old Testament prophets--the call of Isaiah or Jeremiah, for exam-pie-- to indicate that those making profession identify with the call Of these prophets. But, I have yet to attend a ceremony where the call of Ezekiel is the Old Testament reading. In fact, it is not even one of the optional readings in the Lectionary for the Mass of Religious Profession. Yet, I believe the call of Ezekiel as sentry is an apt model and image for religious life today. The Value of an Image In recent years, theologians and spiritual writers have used images and models to describe the mysteries of our Christian faith. In so doing they have imitated Jesus himself, ~who often used images to evoke understanding: "The kingdom of heaven may be compared to a man who sowed good seed in his field.; the kingdom of heaven is like the yeast a woman took and mixed in with three measures of flour.; the kingdom of heaven is like a mustard seed.; the kingdom of heaven is like treasure hidden in a field.; the kingdom of heaven is like a drag- 674 The Religious as Sentry / 675 net. " These images helped Jesus' hearers enter into the mystery of faith. The Second Vatican Council used images when it described the mys-tery of the Church in its Dogmatic Constitution, Lumen Gentium. Im-ages like "the People of God," "a sheepfold," "the edifice of God," "our Mother," "the body of Christ," "a pilgrim in a foreign land," "a kind of sacrament" help elucidate the mystery of the Church. Avery Dulles' book, Models of the Church,~ uses images and mod-els in a similar way. Images and models, then, can be helpful ways to penetrate the richness of a mystery of our faith, to evoke an understand-ing of some complex reality of our tradition. Images and models have been helpful also in the understanding of religious life. The authors of Shaping the Coming Age of Religious Life,2 for example, have imagined religious in the different eras of religious life as ascetics, monks, mendicants, soldiers and apostolic servants. These images help elucidate the predominant understanding of religious life during the various eras of Church history. This article will explore the image of the prophet Ezekiel as sentry in the belief that it helps elucidate our contemporary understanding of religious life. The Call of Ezekiel In the third chapter of Ezekiel, we hear: "Child of the earth, I have appointed you as a sentry to the House of Israel. When you hear a word from my mouth, you shall warn them for me" (3:16). The third chapter continues to expand on this call. If God says to wicked people, "You shall surely die" (3:18), and Ezekiel does not warn them or speak out to dissuade them from their wicked conduct, the wicked people will die for their sins but God will hold Ezekiel responsible for their death. If Ezekiel speaks out and the people do not change, then Ezekiel is not held responsible. Not only is Ezekiel to challenge the wicked but he is also to be a prophet to the virtuous. If virtuous people turn away from virtue and Ezekiel does not warn them, then God will hold him responsible for their death. However, if Ezekiel does warn them, then the virtuous will surely live and Ezekiel will also save his life (3:16-21). This same de-scription of the prophet's role is repeated in Chapter 33:1-9. In explor-ing the image of prophet as sentry as appropriate for the role of the re-ligious in the world today, this article will first examine the role of the sentry, and then how this role might illuminate the role of religious in 676 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 the Church today. The Role of the Sentry The role of the sentry has four characteristics which I believe help explicate the mystery of the call to religious life. Call to See. The sentry's first responsibility is to see, to be watch-ful. This seeing is twofold: to announce the signs of good news and to warn of coming danger. The sentry is to be watchful for the signs of good news. For exam-ple, the sentry on a ship watches for the sign of land; the sentry at the gate of a medieval city watches for the signs of the coming of a beloved monarch in order to prepare the people for this great event; or the sentry watches for the runner returning from battle to share the news of victory. The sentry also needs to be watchful of signs of danger. The sentry on the ship needs to be conscious of the signs of bad weather so that the crew can be prepared to respond; the sentry at the gate needs to be con-scious of the signs of an approaching enemy. Call to Discern. A second responsibility of a sentry is to discern signs. Is the approaching rider friend or foe? Is the moving wind the sign of an approaching storm or the advent of good weather? Is it land that is seen or a mirage, a trick of the imagination? This discernment is an important responsibility. If a sentry is fearful or shallow, then he or she will proclaim good news that does not come to pass, or give false warn-ings of events that fail to materialize. People will no longer take seri-ously any message of the sentry. Responsibility to Proclaim. Once the se~lt.r.y has discerned the signs, the next responsibility is to announce the good news or the approach of danger to the people. When he or she has completed this proclamation, the responsibility for action is no longer just the sentry's but the respon-sibility of the entire community--as we have seen in the call of Ezekiel. In fact, the role of the sentry may now become secondary to the role of others who move the community to ,action. One Role Among Many. A sentry is often on the margins of society, outof synchronization with the rest of society, even while interdepend-ent with them.~As the sentry is watching, others are busy about other activ-ities.~ To have a sense of security, the people have need of the sentry. However, the sentry cannot survive without the people who are doing other activities (e.g., producing food, clothing and the other necessities of life), The sentry is, then, one role among many---different, but nei- The Religious as Sentry / 67'7 ther more nor less important than the other roles in society. The Religious as Sentry How does the role of the sentry, and more specifically, the call of Ezekiel, help us to understand religious life in the Church today? I be-lieve that the four characteristics just described can help illuminate the mystery of religious life. Call to See. Religious are called to be attentive, to be watchful. They do this first and foremost as people of prayer. Prayer, of course, is not ¯ the occupation of religious alone--all Christians are called to pray. How-ever, one cannot be a good religious without prayer, without attentive-ness to the religious dimension of life. Contemplation (to see clearly) has traditionally been part of religious life, whether one speaks of the con-templative life as manifested in the monastic movement or contemplation-in- action as manifested in service-oriented religious orders. I believe this responsibility of being attentive and watchful is very important to relig-ious today. Clearly we need people to read the signs of the times. Prayer-ful religious can contribute this gift to the Church. Call to Discern. For the religious to see clearly, there needs to be discernment. The first step in this discernment is honesty with oneself in order not to project danger where there is none or to characterize as hopeful movements that are contrary to the Gospel. A sentry who is fear-ful or shallow will give false warnings and proclamations. Eventually peo-ple will cease to take his or her word seriously. The practice of self-knowledge (achieved through prayer, examen, spiritual direction, and similar helps) will be essential to the religious who hopes to see clearly and proclaim what is seen in a way that will truly build up the commu-nity of the Church and the world. Discernment is not an easy task. What is heralded as good news by some is seen as danger by others. We witness this, for example, in the various responses to the development of new technology. Some see in this advancement the liberation of humankind; others feel we are being enslaved and controlled by these same technological advances. Discern-ment is an important task in the Church today, a task in which religious clearly have a role. Responsibility to Proclaim. Once the signs have been seen and dis-cerned, the religious has the responsibility of proclaiming the message, that is, the word of the Lord. If religious are good sentries, they will be able to proclaim the good news (the signs of the reign of God) and warn of danger (signs of the counterspirit). Ezekiel is a good model for relig-ious in this proclamation. Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 First of all, Ezekiel, like all the prophets, denounces and announces; he afflicts the comfortable and comforts the afflicted. His book not only contains oracles that are warnings of danger to the Chosen People (4- 24), the nations (25-32), and the shepherds of Israel (34), but powerful statements of hope such as the vision of dry bones (37) and the raising of a good shepherd for Israel (34). Secondly, Ezekiel is a good model for religious because he proclaims the word of God in both words and symbolic action. His signs are par-ables in action. For example, Ezekiel performs acts symbolic of siege and exile (4-5); prepares his baggage and digs a hole in the wall of the city as an act symbolic of exile (12); groans bitterly to symbolize the city's coming fall(12); neglects the normal mourning customs at the death of his wife as symbolic of the fact that Israel will not be able to mourn when the city of Jerusalem is besieged (24); and, finally, joins two sticks as a symbolic prophecy of the new covenant people (37). These actions raise questions among the people which allow the prophet to proclaim the word of the Lord: "Will you not tell us what all these things that you are doing mean for us?" (24:19; 39:18). This proclamation of God's word by prophetic action is a valuable way of viewing our living of the vowed life. The vows are symbolic ac-tions that often open to religious the possibility of proclaiming a word of the Lord. Religious life is acted prophecy.3 The lived vows can warn of danger and proclaim good news. For example, the vow of poverty can warn of the dangers of consumerism and can challenge the prevailing be-lief that more is better. It can also proclaim good news. The sharing of common goods lived by religious, for example, can proclaim that shar-ing is a life-giving alternative to greed and exclusive possess!on. The sym-bolic action of living the vows will hopefully lead others to ask questions: "Why do you do this? . What does this mean?" Thus re-ligious will have an opportunity to further proclaim the word of the Lord. As I mentioned earlier, once the sentry has proclaimed what has b~en seen, it is no longer solely his or her responsibility to act. This is clear in the call of Ezekiel. The role of Ezekiel is to be the sentry, the watcher and proclaimer. The responsibility to act is the responsibility of the en-tire people. The important thing for the religious is to proclaim clearly the message of the Lord in our world today, even though religious can-not ¯ control the response to the proclamation. As Ezekiel is told: "And whether they heed or resist--for they are a rebellious house--they shall know that a prophet has been among them" (2:5). The call to religious, then, is to stand for certain values and to speak those values in word, The Religious as Sentry / 679 and especially in deed, so that people will know that a word of the Lord has been spoken in their midst. Would it not have a tremendous impact on our modern world if people would know that a prophet has been among them? One Role Among Many. Another characteristic of the sentry is to have a uniquely different role, a role that can be out of synchronization with the rest of society. The vowed life of religious often places them out of synchronization with others. In the past this uniqueness has been explained as a form of life superior to other Christian lifestyles. The im-age of the sentry helps us image the complementarity of different life-styles. To say that religious have a unique role in the Church and society is not to say that it is better or more important than the roles of others. By their gifts, religious contribute to the world, but they are at the same time dependent on the gifts and lifestyles of others. All contribute to the common good. In the past, to be a sentry often meant to live on the margins of soci-ety. Religious, too, have often moved to the margins of society. Relig-ious houses were set up on the fringes of the city or separated from the city in the desert or countryside. There is a need for this type of sentry today. But signs of good news and omens of danger are also in the midst of society. In our day, when we read about terrorist attacks almost daily, we know that the greatest danger may come from within the city gates themselves. Those who can harm us live in our midst. Therefore, there will be need for religious immersed in society to read the signs of God's reign, that is, the movement of the Spirit in the midst of the world. At the same time, they will need to read the signs of peril and danger, that is, of the counterspirit in the midst of the world. Conclusion I believe that reflection upon Ezekiel and his call as sentry can en-rich the vision of the prophetic role of religious in our day, can be for religious a new way of imagining their role. Many religious will ask whether they are worthy or capable of such a call. Most honest religious will feel unworthy, as did Ezekiel, who fell upon his face when he was called (I :28). To take up the challenge can only be in response to God's call. "Child of the earth. Stand up! I wish to speak to you" (2: I). The call of the religious will be a response to the Spirit moving within. This will be the source of the authentic voca-tion to be a sentry for God's people and for the world. Finally, since the call to be a sentry will be a call from the Lord, he will be with the relig-ious on the journey. "Fear them not," (3:10) the Lord tells Ezekiel. The 680 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 Lord tells religious today the same: He will be with the sentry today, as he was with Ezekiel, Jeremiah, Isaiah and the other prophets. "I am with you always, yes, even to the end of time" (Mt 28:20). NOTES ~Avery Dulles, S.J., Mddels of the Church (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974). 2Lawrence Cada, S.M. et al., Shaping the Coming Age of Religious Life (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), pp. I 1-50~ 3See my article "Religious Life as Acted Prophecy" REvmw ~OR REt.mIOUS 41, n. 6, November/December, 1982, pp. 923-927. ,From Tablet to Heart: Internalizing New Constitutions I and II by Patricia Spillane, M.S.C. Address: Price: $1.25 per copy, plus postage. Review for Religious Rm 428 3601 Lindell Blvd. St. Louis, Missouri 63108 The Fathers in the Office of Readings: St. Cyprian of Carthage Anthony Daly, S.J. Father Anthony Duly has been a member of the faculty of the Languages Depart-ment of Saint Louis University. He has published several of these descriptive and brief biographies of Fathers of the Church who have been used in the Office of Read-ings of the Liturgy of the Hours. His last contribution appeared in the issue of Sep-tember/ October 1983. He may be addressed at Jesuit Hall; 3601 Lindell Blvd.; St. Louis, Missouri 63108. The third-century writings of St. Cyprian, bishop and martyr, are impor-tant today because they furnish otherwise unknown details of the life of both the Christians and pagans of his day and because they provide an illustration, hard to interpret though it is, of third-century African epis-copal attitudes toward the Roman papacy, a topic, however, which is not treated here. More directly, the writings reveal the character of St. Cyprian him-self, an interesting man with qualities people of any era can admire and imitate and who has many things to say which will never go out of date. What follows is first a brief overall sketch of St. Cyprian's life and then a more detailed account of certain matters which seemed likely to be of interest to readers of the Liturgy of the Hours. Well educated in the secular tradition of his times, Cyprian was a man who actively and thoroughly integrated his knowledge and experi-ence within a completely Christian ideology. He appears as an effective rhetorician, a competent bishop and administrator, a practical leader who knows how to make the best of a difficult situation, and a man of great personal charm, courage, and compassion. But perhaps his most strik-ing characteristic is his ability to face martyrdom, that of others and then 681 61~9 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 finally his own, not only with equanimity but even with joy and satis-faction. ~ The selections from his writings in the Liturgy of the Hours com-municate a spirit of firm religiosity which is rendered more attractive by human charm and more realistic by a moderate cast of mind. His mar-tyrdom adds to his words the weight of tested sincerity and makes more telling his exhortations to hope, courage, and joy. Thascius Caecilianus Cyprianus (c.205-258) was an African, born per-haps at Carthage, of wealthy pagan parents. He lived at Carthage where he was an orator and prominent citizen, and, like the more famous St. Augustine who for a time, but more than a century later, also lived in that North African city, Cyprian was a teacher of rhetoric. In midlife he took stock of his own character and of the repugnant pagan society in which he lived. This led him in the year 246 to become a Christian. He gave his money to the poor, took a vow of chastity, was ordained a priest, and in 248-49 he was consecrated bishop of Carthage. The ideal of personal integrity seems to have been what first attracted Cyprian to Christianity, an ideal which he found fulfilled for him there as a gift from God. He seems never to have lost it again, and secure in it, he began to devote himself to helping others. This was especially true as he performed his episcopal tasks of encouraging the faithful, teach-ing sound doctrine, and governing well, always seeking to preserve and foster the unity of the Church. But his desire to help others seems to have accompanied his conversion itself, for one of the first things he did as a Christian was write To Donatus, the purpose of which was to convert to Christianity his friend Donatus and others. Cyprian's election as bishop was unusual in that it occurred not very long after his conversion to Christianity. That the choice fell upon him seems to have been due to his obvious sincerity, his high standing in the local community, his eminent personal qualifications, and the fact that he had already published at least one and perhaps as many as three of his Christian writings.2 Although the exact process of his election is not known, it is clear that it involved the agreement of a majority of the clergy, of the neighboring bishops who assembled to ordain him, and of the laity who were his strongest supporters. Confidence in Adversity His episcopal career was stormy right from the time of his election as bishop. There were some who opposed selecting him, and among them were a certain Novatus and some other elderly presbyters at St. Cyprian of Carthage [ 683 Carthage, who, although they may have had other motives as well, prob-ably were jealous of Cyprian. Soon, in 250, the Roman emperor Decius instituted the first truly sys-tematic and universal persecution of Christians. Commissions were set up throughout the empire which were to witness certain acts of worship of the pagan gods which were to be performed by everyone as a relig-ious test. Some of the Ch?istians complied; others were able to secure official certificates of compliance (libelli) even though they had not in fact worshiped; still others refused to comply and were subject to impris-onment, torture, or even death. Cyprian was among yet a fourth class of Christians who avoided the confrontation by going into hiding. He was criticized for this, but, as he explained it, when the edict against Christians was promulgated, the pagan populace at Carthage called for him to be brought forward. He fled not so much for his own safety, he explained, but in order to avoid a public uprising which he feared would endanger his flock. He further explained that despite his physical sepa-ration he kept in close touch with his people by letter.3 Some of these communications are included in the collection of his extant letters. In this, in other episcopal decisions, and in the general conduct of his personal life, St. Cyprian displays remarkable self-confidence. In this episode, he gives his reasons for withdrawing from Carthage, expects them to be accepted, and does not seem at all embarrassed to return, show his face, and even to admonish in certain matters those who had suffered or were still in prison for the faith, the confessors. Cyprian found it necessary to warn the confessors not to try to usurp the role of the bishop in granting ecclesiastical pardon to those who had given in to the authorities, the lapsed. Not altogether unreasonably, the custom was gaining ground according to which some of the lapsed were securing from the confessors requests for full and immediate reinstate-ment in the Church, and these requests, either written or oral, were gen-erally being honored, thus gaining quasi-hierarchical authority. In addi-tion to cautioning the confessors in this matter, Cyprian also admonished them not to give in to softness and vice once their trials had ended. Cyprian'.s is an attractive self-confidence, not haughty, a self-confidence based on truth and courageous love. One wonders if it en-tailed an inner struggle for Cyprian; if so, it is part of his private life and is not reflected in his writings. The Novatian Schism Probably because the severity of the persecution was unpopular with most pagans, and because the courage of the martyrs was probably at- Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 tracting enough converts to make the persecution self-defeating, it was ended early in 251. At that point Cyprian was faced with a controversy over how the bishops and clergy themselves should treat the lapsed, both those who had obeyed the edict and sacrificed to idols, and those who had obtained fraudulent certificates, or libelli. Cyprian, who adopted moderate and individualized attitude toward those who had lapsed in these ways, was able to make his view prevail'. His guiding principle was that those guilty of serious sin should be given an opportunity to achieve genuine repentance, a state of soul which he thought a sinner could ex-perience only through undergoing a suitable period of penance. But at the same time he insisted that sin can in fact be forgiven and that no re-pentant person should be deprived of hope, that each should be readmit-ted to the Church at the appropriate time. Against Cyprian were both those who wanted everyone readmitted to the Church without further com-plication and those who advised that reconciliation with the Church be forever withheld from those who had fallen. Chief among the proponents of this last course of action were the No-vatianists, so called because they were followers of Novatian, a rigorist Roman bishop who claimed the papal throne. Because his claim was re-jected by the Church at large and because of his rigorism, he and his fol-lowers became schismatic, and their rival church, widespread through-out the empire, was not entirely reconciled with Catholics until the end of the seventh century. Baptism by Heretics Under the Emperor Gallus (25 ! -53) a second persecution took place which was itself followed, in the years 255-57, by another major con-troversy, this time over the validity of baptism administered by heretics, chiefly the Novatianists. The difficulty arose over whether those origi-nally baptized by Novatianists and others not in communion with the Church should be rebaptized when they were accepted into the Catholic communion. Cyprian championed the losing cause, maintaining that the baptisms administered by heretics had no value. He appears still to have been of this opinion when, under the Emperor Valerian (253-60), a third persecution cost him his life. Although the Church later determined that baptism administered by non-Catholics is valid provided certain elements are present, on the un-derstanding that it is Christ himself who truly baptizes rather than the in-dividual who happens to be administering the rites, the whole matter was not yet worked out in Cyprian's day. Clearly he too would attribute the effects of the sacraments to Christ, but in his mind heresy and schism, St. Cyprian of Carthage / 685 since they involve separation from the Church, are tantamount to reject-ing Christ. How, he reasoned, could someone who rejects Christ bap-tize in his name? By the same token, such a person "shall not come to the rewards of Christ," even if he suffers martyrdom.4 His position on the matter underscores the importance he placed on unity in the Church. In the year 258 Cyprian ended his life in stirring fashion, boldly em-bracing his martyrdom. The account of his death forms the alternate sec-ond reading of the Office of Readings on his feast day. It is celebrated on September 16, along with that of Pope Cornelius whom Cyprian sup-ported against the rival claimant to the papacy mentioned above, Nova-tian. Writings Cyprian's treatise On the Lord's Prayer furnishes the largest single group of selections from his writings in the Liturgy of the Hours. These are nearly matched in volume by extracts from his Letters, and the ma-terial is rounded out by single samples from several works: On the D?ess of Virgins, On the Value of Patience, On Man's Mortality, and the Ex-hortation to Martyrdom, Addressed to Fortunatus. Finally there is the description of his martyrdom by an unknown author, taken from The Pro-consular Acts. There are eight other works by Cyprian not included in the Liturgy. Of these, To Demetrianus is a work similar to the longer, more famous City of God by St. Augustine. Both works deny that Christians are to be held responsible for wars and natural disasters, and attribute them instead to the vices of the pagans. Another title of Cyprian's often likened to a writing of St. Augustine, in this instance the Confessions, is To Donatus, mentioned earlier, which describes Cyprian's conversion to Christianity from paganism. Here Cyp-rian rejoices in his new life which he attributes to the cleansing of sav-ing water and the effects of "a quickening act of divin~ grace." Through power given by God he has been enabled to abandon lavish banquets, expensive clothing, and public honors in favor of a private life, simple clothes, and thrift. Although he once thought he could never be rid of his sins which he had come to indulge as "proper and belonging to" him, he had left hard drinking behind, together with exaggerated self-importance, anger, covetousness, cruelty, ambition and lust. He empha-sizes that his new way of life is not to be attributed to himself, but to God.5 As has been mentioned, because it recounts Cyprian's conversion from sin through the power of God, and because he wrote it to help oth- 61~6 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 ers experience a similar conversion, To Donatus has been compared to the Confessions of St. Augustine. Nevertheless, there are three sharp dif-ferences between the two works. Most obvious is their difference in length, Cyprian's work being much shorter. Second, Augustine is spe-cific in recounting his sins and the steps by which he became a Chris-tian, whereas Cyprian summarizes his experiences in general terms. Third, Augustine addresses God directly in the Confessions and always emphasizes his personal love for God. Cyprian addresses his friend Do-natus; he attributes to God his newfound mastery over himself, but he does not dwell on his relationship with God. Instead, his attention cen-ters on treasuring his newly purified way of life and on contrasting it with the wickedness of the pagan society which he has left behind. Cyprian pities the world and gives thanks to God for having escaped from it with its robbers, pirates, wars, and gladiatorial contests.6 He be-lieves the themes of the tragedies presented in the theater corrupt private morals: parricide, incest, and adultery which "is learned as it is seen"; and these things are all the worse because they are presented with the approval of public authority. Men make themselves effeminate on stage, and Venus, Mars, and Jupiter are depicted as unchaste, Jupiter even ad-vancing to "the raping of young boys . Ask now whether he who looks upon this can be healthy-minded or chaste. One imitates the gods whom he venerates. For these poor wretches sins become even religious acts. ' ' 7 Further evils in society include homosexuality, prostitution, litigious-ness, bribery and collusion, fraud, forgery, perjury, and the falsification of charges. In court the wicked fare better than the innocent. To secure a place of prominence in society, men become sycophants, spendthrifts on public spectacles, or they build up estates, dispossessing the poor, and must live in fear of thieves and lawsuits.8 Cyprian recounts all of this in order to show the goodness of God who saves us from becoming wicked or vain.9 The Christian way to live in such a world is to raise one's eyes from earth to heaven, to be next to God in mind, to ignore what is seemingly sublime and great in human affairs, and to be greater than the world, for a religiously oriented way of life is a greater prize than anything the world has to offer. Five other works not included in the Liturgy of the Hours have fairly self-explanatory titles: The Lapsed, The Unity of the Church, Works and Almsgiving, Jealousy and Envy, and That the Idols Are Not Gods, a work sometimes considered spurious.~° A final work not used in the Liturgy is To Quirinus: Three Books of Testimonies. This treatise, which seems St. Cyprian of Carthage actually to represent two separate works by Cyprian which were com-bined later, perhaps by someone else, lists scriptural passages designed to show that the Christians h~ve inherited the promises made to the Jews, texts which illustrate the mysteries of Christ, and passages designed to show how to live the Christian life. Interpreting Cyprian Three aspects of the life of St. Cyprian seem particularly significant for interpreting and appreciating his writings: first, he was a rhetorician; second, he became a bishop; and then finally, he died a martyr. As a rheto-rician he knows how to use words to achieve the result he wants; but he uses them in a less literal sense than does a philosopher or a speculative theologian, and he gives more weight to various ideas and attitudes than would a disinterested writer who is unaffected by the press of circum-stances. Thus it is often necessary to consider carefully the context in which he is writing, and to subordinate the literal meaning of what he says to the effect he seems to be trying to achieve,, A bishop's preoccupation with his duty to guide, instruct, protect, and correct his people permeates the writings of Cyprian. In this office, it is obvious that he is motivated first and last by his love of Christ and the Church, and that he views everything else from a Christian perspec-tive. Constantly he shows good common sense and a sane grasp of the limits and potential of human nature. Finally, the atmosphere of hostility to the faith in which Cyprian ex-ercised his episcopacy'and which finally resulted in his death shaped and sharpened his vision of the world and how it is to be approached; this may well be the most important factor influencing his strong emphasis on eternal life. He quotes the Scriptures, both Old Testament and New, with a natu-ral ease which indicates true familiarity; having made a thorough study of them at the time of his conversion to Christianity, he seems to have continued this study throughout his career as a bishop. Quotations are always at hand to reinforce and embellish the points he wants to make. Among his works are the To Quirinus described above, and another col-lection of Scripture texts briefly mentioned as a work quoted in the Lit-urgy of the Hours, the Exhortation to Martyrdom, Addressed to Fortu-natus. Here, under twelve headings, are texts bearing generally on mar-tyrdom which a preacher or writer could use to encourage Christians liv-ing under the threat of persecution. Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 Literary Style Cyprian's style is clear, orderly, and often ornate, marked by a lib-eral but tasteful use of rhetorical figures such as parallel clauses whose grammatical structures are similar, phrases ending in the same sound, and the strategic repetition of words. His love of metaphors, some of which are quite engaging, is not obscured by translation into English. Vir-gins, for instance, are termed blossoms;~ like the emperor or one of his generals, God watches us doing battle with evil;~2 "the commands of the Gospel. are the rudder for keeping us on the right course";~3 and the Christian victorious over "earth's torment and suffering" is com-pared to a soldier returning home in triumph after defeating the enemy. ~4 On the Lord's Prayer This treatise, more than a third of,which has been included in the Lit-urgy ofothe Hours, has been praised throughout history as a fine com-mentary, certainly among the best non-technical ones ever written. Three points from the material in the Liturgy seem especially note-worthy. The first is Cyprian's insistence that prayer should have a social dimension: "We do not say 'My Father, who art in heaven,' nor 'Give me this day my daily bread'. Rather, we pray., not for one in-dividual but for all. For the people of God are all one." ~5 Second, there is Cyprian's sober awareness that we all sin every day and stand in con-stant need of sanctification. 16 A third point is Cyprian's stirring expres-sion of Christian steadfastness. When he speaks of accepting suffering and even death with Christ who suffered for us, we are reminded of the terrible hostility which confronted him and his fellow Christians.~7 Portions of the work not quoted in the Liturgy show that Cyprian's caution about the world is remarkably well balanced. This is especially true if the pagan culture in which he lived is fully taken into account. For instance, despite superficial similarity between pagan Stoicism and his remarks about rising above the world, Cyprian clearly shows that he does not underestimate the value of material creation; on the contrary, he advises us to pray that by the help of God we experience a harmony between the flesh an°d the spirit, the earthly and' the heavenly; and he un-derstands that Christ renews and preserves humanity. ~8 ~;imilarly, in his warning about the entangling effect of riches, Cyprian may have been more emphatic than he would otherwise have been because he realized that the thought of losing property kept many from confessin~ Christ dur-ing the persecution. 19 Off the negative side, the work includes an embar-rassingly strong and wholesale condemnation of the Jews; Cyprian goes so far as to say that they can no longer call God their Father, since they St. Cyprian of Carthage / 689 rejected and killed Christ.2° On the Dress of Virgins The final work to be considered here is On the Dress of Virgins, ex-cerpts from which make up the second reading in the Common of Vir-gins. (There is an alternate second reading taken from the Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life of the Second Vatican Council.) In the excerpts (chs. 3-4, 22, 23) St. Cyprian describes virgins adorned with right conduct as beautiful, as "the image of God that re-flects the holiness of the Lord," and as "the most illustrious members of Christ's flock." He interprets the virginal life as beginning to be "now what we shall all be in the future," in the kingdom of heaven, he means, where there is no marriage. As a matter of fact, Cyprian's thought goes even further. He sees virginity as a part of the image of the heavenly man, Christ, to whom we are encouraged to conform ourselves. Virgins are "equal to God's angels." ~ Humbled by the thought of them, and not, he says, in a spirit of cen-sure or even of authority, but out of concern for them, he exhorts them to "persevere in chastity and virginity." Having renounced the pleas-ures of the flesh, "they should not strive to adorn themselves or give pleasure to anyone but the Lord." In this way, having passed "through this world without the world's infection," they "will receive a glorious prize" for their virtue.2~ The passages from this treatise which are included in the Liturgy of the Hours express sound and encouraging attitudes good for all time; some of the material not included sounds strange to modern ears. This material, because it is historically conditioned on the one hand or rheto-rically condemnatory on the other, is harder to understand. . Although the excerpts seem to concern women rather than men, else-where in the treatise Cyprian states that he intends .his general remarks for "men as well as women, boys as well as girls, every sex and every age."22 This does not mean, however, that he viewed men and women as equal in every respect, or even that he disagreed with the traditional Roman view of women as the weaker sex. For instance, regarding mar-tyrs in The Lapsed, he says, "Joining.~the victory of their men, come the women too, triumphing over the world and over their sex alike."23 So too, he uses as an. argumeht on behalf of virginity that it frees a woman not.only from the pains of childbirth but also from the dominion of a husband.24 On the warrant of Scripture Cyprian insists that physical adornments should be rejected by virgins, who should strive to please God rather than 690 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 men.25 Furthermore, women are to avoid being an occasion of sin for men.26 Even if a woman has wealth, it is false to argue that she should make use of it to improve her physical appearance; rather, things "that have been acquired in the world and will remain here with the world, should be despised (contemni) just as the world itself is despised."27 In-deed, virgins should be like martyrs in that they should avoid the "wide and broad roads" in favor of the "hard and steep path which ascends to glory," for the devil uses allurements and pleasures "that he may kill.' ,28 Today many would consider the judicious and modest use of makeup simply a part of formal dress. From this point of view Cyprian's invec-tive against necklaces, earrings, makeup, and red articles of clothing seems overdrawn. But for Cyprian such things are not innocent. Not only for virgins but for all women makeup and earrings are, to his mind, in-ventions of the devil: "the work of God and his creature and image should in no way be falsified;., everything that comes into existence is the work of God. whatever is changed, is the work of the devil."29 The difference between today's view and his seems to stem neither from licentiousness in us nor from prudishness in him, but from Cyprian's an-cient cultur

U studiji se, nasuprot uvriježenim mišljenjima, dokazuje da su blokovi sjevernog dijela Dioklecijanove palače bili izvorno projektirani i izvedeni za potrebe gineceja kojemu se u Notitia Dignitatum spominje nadstojnik (Procurator gynaecii lovensis Dalmatiae -Aspalato). Opskrbljivao ga je akvedukt kapaciteta 1500 1/sec. = 129.600 m3 na dan. Problem obilnog ispiranja riješen je odgovarajucim kanalizacijskim sistemom koji je postojao samo duž ulica sjevernog dijela Palače u kojem su se nalazili pogoni carskih tkaonica. Tehnologija je (uz sustav bazena arheološki uočenih u prizemlju Papalićeve palače) ukljucivala sumporavanje, za što su bili na raspolaganju brojni izvori sumporne vode uz samu Palaču. Čitava građevina savršeno se uklapa u dugački niz tetrarhijskih javnih radova. Bila bi to izvorna, osnovna funkcija građevine u koju se Dioklecijan povukao nakon što je 305. g. bio prisiljen na abdikaciju. ; In scholarly literature, the term "city" was first mentioned by Lj. Karaman, talking of the beginnings of medieval Split in Diocletian's Palace, and then by Andre Grabar in his Martyrium (I: 232-233).2 Noel Duval, in a series of studies he wrote, asks whether Diocletian's residence should be classified as palatium, villa, castrum, urban settlement or some special type of architecture, considering that in comparison with genuine imperial palaces like those in Constantinople, Antioch, Philippopolis and Ravenna, it was wanting a number of "attributes": proposed the term "chateau".3 -5 The term was thoroughly investigated by Slobodan Čurčić, discussing late antique palatine architecture, showing convincingly that the urban character of these residences was undoubted (of Antioch , Nicomedia, Salona, Constantinople, Split) - although the miniature municipal quarters in them had an only slightly more than symbolic significance.6 Diocletian's building in Split really does not have the external look of a Roman imperial villa. In Split, in particular with respect to the two architectural masses in the northern part of the building, we note, its innate anti-landscape character, both the internal and the external disposition of the architectural elements, which is almost inorganically formalised. Not even in the narrow residential area, within which the halls are interconnected only via the "cryptoportico" having no direct contacts with the surrounding landscape, we do not find any of the characteristics that in the nature of things we would expect in a residence in which, it was always considered, the emperor intended to while away his final years. The Split edifice is really primarily an example of fortification. But here too we can be surprised. The sentry patrol corridor should be on the top of the walls and should be protected with a parapet, while here it is on the first floor, perforated with hardly defensible apertures (3 x 2m). The building was clearly primarily motivated by the desire to impress the surroundings, with its emphatic delineation of military presence and power. The Golden and Silver Gates and the great apertures of the sentry corridor on the three sides of the walls onto the mainland must have been walled up before the Byzantine-Gothic wars of the 530s.7 But it would seem that we can understand its form - so very particular that it evades the usual, in some sense fossilized, terminology – only through some new reading of the original meaning and purpose of the building itself. In author's opinion, this is proffered by a very simple question. The aqueduct that brought water into the palace from the source of the river Jadro was, in the design and execution of the imperial architects, undoubtedly related to the construction of his final dwelling place. Although it is a rare specimen of a Roman monument of this kind that is still being used today (reconstructed in 1878), in the literature and in research it has been almost entirely neglected, and has certainly never been interpreted in the original context. The aqueduct provided 1500 l/ sec. (129.600 m3 a day), which in terms of our standards would be enough for a population of 173,000. 8,9 The sheer amount of water inevitably leads to the question of what it was meant for, because it far exceeded the needs of the relatively modest bath complexes in the Palace. The answer might be hidden in an almost neglected item of information from Notitia Dignitatum OC XI 48 (ed. 0 . Seeck, 150) where there is a mention of the Procurator genaecii Iovensis Dalmatiae - Aspalato- warden of the imperial weaving shop for the production of woollen clothing for the army that worked in Split, under the title of Jupiter. So far it has always been thought, on the rare occasions when this fact has been mentioned at all (and then only by-the-bye) that this gynaeceum was only after Diocletian's death "inscribed" into the Palace, which was for the whole of the 5th century a kind of pensiopolis of dethroned emperors or pretenders to the throne. It has been considered that the northern part of the Palace was reserved for the Imperial Guard, for stables and the like. 10,11 Notitia Dignitatum, a long list of all the senior offices in the Empire, civilian and military, is certainly of a composite character. The basic text was created probably in about 408 (in partibus Occidentis changes were recorded up to 420), but it conceals a lot of information about the periods before the revision of the basic copy, mirroring the order that Diocletian had brought into the state, which certainly relates to the Split gynaeceum, which alone of the 14 such complexes located in the most important cities of the empire bears the characteristic predicate Iovense: it must in itself constitute a terminus post quem non to do with the origin of the factory of military uniforms of wool in the building in Split. 12,13,15 Although the gynaecea were never mentioned in the context of Diocletian's reforms, it is generally accepted that they were created at the time of the first Tetrarchy. The concentration of the labour force, the range of specialised jobs, the degree of organisation and their connection with urban centres makes them, in the judgement of historians, the closest to the modern industrial factory. State factories (fabricae) were set up in the late Empire to eliminate or at least to alleviate the difficulties concerning the supply of the state and the army with certain products. It was necessary to clothe the approximately half a million soldiers that Diocletian 's army reforms had raised, as well as no small number of clerks. Archaeology, however, has never made any direct contribution to the understanding of their internal organisation, except in the case of the otherwise well documented gynaeceum in Carthage, which lay in the heart of the city, on the edge of the celebrated Circular Harbour. 16,17 The state operated, through the comes sacrarum largitionum, a number of weaving mills, both for woolen and linen fabrics, and dyeworks 18 The Split gynaeceum should have probably been in some kind of complementary relationship with the gynaeceum moved to Salona, perhaps for security reasons, from Bassiana (Donji Petrovci, Pannonia Inferior) also noted by Notitia Dignitatum, XI, 46 (Procurator gynaecii Bassanensis Pannoniae Secundae translati Salonis). In Salona, thus, there was a large cloth dyeworks (In Not. dign. the Procurator bafii Salonitani Dalmatiae was also mentioned) and weaving mill. At Five Bridges in Salona artisan workshops were actually found, probably a dyer's workshop, and fulling mills for cloth and the dyeing of cloth. Also to be seen is the reservoir from which the water to drive the mills ran, and a building for the habitation of the workers. 19 In one inscription in Salona, a magister conquilarius is mentioned (CIL III 2115 + 8572), clearly the head of the state workshops in which purple was extracted from shellfish, perhaps for the gynaeceum in Aspalathos. 22 Another inscription found in Salona mentions a certain Hilarus, who was the purpurarius, dyer of red garments or, perhaps, negotiator artis purpurae. 23 That the Salona baffeum and the Split gynaeceum were mentioned only in the Notitia Dignitatum, says that their production was a strictly channelled state monopoly, and that the products from them did not make their way to the general market as other goods did. The army was supplied directly, without the agency of merchants. Although not all the technological details of the gynaeceum, the fullonica and the baffeum have been revealed, we can conjure up in the northern half of the Palace an image of the whole system of pools in which the fabrics were washed, softened and finished by being trampled on with bare feet in a solution of potash , fuller's earth, human and animal urine. Here then there was a very large demand for water.28 Garments were rubbed with chalk, and fumigated with sulphur. It is particularly important to remember that the technology included, among other things, sulphur treatment (sulfure sulfire ), for which there were the many springs of sulphurous water alongside the Palace itself, which were used for the washing and bleaching of cloth right up to the first half of the 20th century, by St Francis church on the Shore.29 The problem of copious rinsing was solved by the extraordinarily handled sewage system that existed only along the the cardo and decumanus and the perimeter streets of the northern part of the Palace , in which the mentioned plant was located. Among other things, the extreme western part of the sewer under the decumanus, at the exit from the Palace, has been explored. It passed under the western gate (Porta ferrea), and moved in a gentle arc towards the south-west, finishing some forty metres further in a stone portal (below the kitchen of today's Hotel Central). Thence in an open channel all this water flowed into the bay of the sea, in the immediate vicinity of the grandest corner of the Palace.30 The monumental cross-section of this sewage system corresponds perfectly to the cross-section of the aqueduct. We should underscore the fact that the sewage system was located only along the streets of the northern part of the Palace, while we might expect it to be primarily in the residential southern part, which also shows that it was constructed for the purpose of the production inside the gynaeceum. Unfortunately, there are practically no archaeological records of the small finds from investigations of the northern part of the Split building. But, during excavations of the crossing place of the cardo and decumanus (in order to establish the original level of the street and the Peristyle) M. Suić in 1974 did observe, "a very thick layer of fine sediment of a markedly red colour of non-organic origin", which had been deposited in the cloaca, and which had retained its intensity for centuries. This must prove the existence of fullonica, which must have been located within the gynaeceum.31, 32, 55, 56 Gynaeciarii, like other craftsmen, were associated into corporations or collegia, but were not able to leave their work, being nexu sanguinis ad divinas largitiones perlinenles, which makes the construction of the northern part of the Palace, in which they lived alongside their workshops even more logical. 36 - 4 0 Their patron saint in 5th c. might have been, as I have already speculated, St Martin - patron of soldiers and weavers -to whom the little church in the sentries' walk over the Golden Gate, walled-in very early on, was dedicated. 41 All this also suggests that Christianity was alive in the Palace from day one. Along with the bishop and the praetorians, the weavers were probably that industrial revolutionary guard of the time. It is not at all surprising that a martyr like St. Anastasius - a fullo, the co-patron of Split, should have come precisely from the milieu of the fullers, probably working in the baffeum in Salona. In Split, Diocletian's gynaeceum was probably reliant upon a manufacture that already existed, one linked with the sulphurous water and perhaps on the broom, genisla acanlhoclada, from which a colouring agent for dying the cloth was obtained, and according to which, it is believed, Aspalathos actually obtained its name.43 There was raw material in Dalmatia within reach. Immediately following the Second World War there were about one million sheep in the central hinterland of the Adriatic coast. Delm or Dalm in Old Illyrian means shepherd, herder, flock, and hence Delminium means the place of pasture, and delme- dalme still today in Albanian means sheep.44 - 49 Evidence of the organised weaving industry in Roman Dalmatia can be seen in the form of the weaving industry around Split, which all the way through the Middle Ages and until quite recently was different from that in the other regions. 51 The Gynaeceum iovense might have been special precisely in the fact that this was not a remodelled and expanded production area already in existence, the expropriation of some extant minor complexes (as is assumed to have happened in Carthage), but a green field project, an exemplarily constructed industrial unit. And for this reason, of all such establishments, it was the only one to have such a flowery dedication and name. At the end one should also draw attention to an almost neglected reference concerning the palace, that is, the first description of it, uttered by the most authoritative mouth of all. In the Oralio ad Sanclorum coelum which he delivered in Antioch in 325, Emperor Constantine said that the colossal pile of the palace was a "loathed dwelling" in which the Emperor Diocletian shut himself up after this abdication: "After the massacre in the persecutions, after he had condemned himself by depriving himself of power, as a man of no utility, acknowledging the damage he had done with his imprudence, he remained hidden in his really contemptible dwelling place". 61 This surprising statement of Constantine might be an allusion to the fact that Diocletian had to spend his last days in a building that in spite of all the sumptuousness of its centre and the residential quarters looking onto the sea- must also have had the features of a military factory, to which the form of the castrum must have been in all respects much more suitable than to a charming imperial residence. The whole of the building fits perfectly in with the long series of tetrarchic public works. It is important to stress the autonomy of the cardo and the decumanus (12 metres broad) with their own lastricatus and their own porticatus, independent of the blocks that they hid. I would even say that the form of the castrum is more logical for a gynaeceum than it is for a palace. What should be actually highlighted is the surprising pragmatism, as well as the great social focus of the lllyrian emperors, who really did want to renew the "fervent patriotism and iron duty in the evil days" (Syme). Probus in Egypt worked on an important improvement of the navigation of the Nile; temples, bridges, porticoes, palaces, all were put up by the army. Galerius himself was a devotee of public works, and undertook an operation worth of a monarch, says Gibbon, diverting the excess of water from Lake Pelso (Balaton) to the Danube, at the border with Noricum. He had the endless woods all around cleared, and gave the whole reclaimed area between the Drava and the Danube to his Panonian subjects to be cultivated, naming it Valeria after his wife. 65, 66 Most of the buildings that Diocletian put up were of a utilitarian purpose, such as mints and the factories that Lactantius mentions, or border forts, roads and bridges. Dozens of extant inscriptions tell us of the dedications of new and restored temples, aqueducts, nymphea and public buildings - "vetustatu con lapsum" or "Ionge incuria neglectum"- dilapidated from age and long neglect. 67 According to Lactantius's writing, Diocletian had an infinitam cupiditatem aedificandi, an infinite desire to build. 68 Today we are apt to count mostly the imperial palaces in connection with this statement, and to forget the whole framework of comprehensive public works that were undertaken during the first tetrarchy. Twenty years of relaxation from civil wars and barbarian invasions, and the gradual suppression of local unrest, led to the renovation of the prosperity in cities all round the Empire, hence the major number of public dedications, the revival of overall construction activity. The Tetrarchan New Deal - with Diocletian as the Roosevelt of the ancient world - is often understood in a formalist way, as a series of legislative and political attempts to halt inflation, overlooking exploits like Galerius's round Balaton, or this one in Split. The construction of the Split Palace, then, no kind of imperial Xanadu, as it is often held to be, justified its investment. More than that: its existence enabled antiquity in Dalmatia, even after the 7th century catastrophe, not to be extinguished with a sudden death, but over long centuries to be merged into the modern age, remaining until this day a lesson in and criterion for every creative architectural operation into the tissue of the city, which developed organically within the precise, almost dry geometry of the Emperor's palace-cumfactory. * The article was published in English, in: Das Imperium zwischen Zentralisierung und Regionalisierung: Palaste- Regionen- Volker (ed. A. Demand, A. Goltz und H. Schlange-Schoningen), Berlin - New York 2004: 141-162.

Short synopsis and layout of Chapters of the thesis entitled, A study of Gelugpa sect with comparison to Nyingma Pa sect of Buddhism in TibetAround 2500 years ago, a prince of Skya clan rose against the anguish of life & death and determined to find out the way through which these torments end. That prince was Siddhartha; and whole world came to know him by his enlightened name; Buddha; his path became famous after his name Buddhism. Centuries gone, millennium changed its numbers; still the path showed by the Skya prince is guiding us towards every solution of problem. Today, according to latest sources, nearly 18 countries are more or less Buddhist countries and every fourth person of the world is Buddhist by faith. In past 2500 years, Buddhism crossed all geographical boundaries, spread over continents, touches every sphere of our lives, enjoyed royal patronage as well as sometimes-lethal disservice. However, one thing that makes it above all is that it served the goods. Everywhere it went, it acquired local colours, amalgamated with the local beliefs and reached the culmination theory of the master, Lord Buddha. Nevertheless, some countries were destined to play a little more than merely following the Buddhist rites and rituals. Tibet is one among these countries.Though Tibetan Buddhism is being studied all over, the world at research level but very few research works are being done at home (India). Tibetan has lost their homeland and in India, the Sthaviravdina, the orthodox school of thought was/is in vogue with the exception of the Himalayan region where the Mahayana is being practised since long. So many research works have been done by the scholars from United States and other countries, but most of them are limited to the translation works of the Tibetan Lamas visiting to States or elsewhere. Jeffery Hopkins, Alex Wayman, Michael Rosh is some of the names which have already gain popularity in this regard. It is noteworthy that Buddha taught everyone who came and asked for it. He never attempted to attract people into his new order or he never tried to formulate a new religion. As A K Warder has noted, It is most characteristic of Buddha that he always adapts his talk to the person he is conversing with. His courtesy in argument result from this: it is certainly not his way to denounce the opinions, practice of another to his face, and challenge him to justify them. His method rather is to seem to adopt the others point of view and than by question and answer to improve it until a position, compatible with his own has been arrived at. Thus, he leads his partner in discussion towards the truth as he has discovered it, but so that the partner seems himself to continue his own quest, in whatever form he had taken, and to arrive at higher truth he had previously been aware of, or more convincing moral ideas. Buddhism is the third largest religious system of the world (beside Christianity and Islam at the first two places) and it is the only religious system, which originated in Indian sub-continent and spread all over the world. To know the social, political and economic history of India during the time of Buddha i.e. 6th century BC, there are several sources. However, either to know the ideas and philosophical order of that time, we have to rely upon the testament within the said system and the literature or that of archaeological remains that tell many ideas that can be decipher to date. Both left the scope of interpretation and speculation, which is although, needed to some extent; sometimes portray a shadow over the crux of the systems of ancient era. Nevertheless, I have chosen to discuss about the two religious order of Buddhism of Tibet. The idea itself seems to be very delightful but in the presence of meagre resource materials often discourages a fruitful research and applying the modern research methodology. However, research methodology is not only to solve the problem but quite often to raise a problem instead solving them is also a method to invite further research and hence itself is called an independent research.Tibet, one of the highest countries in the world had received Buddhism from India in 7th century AD when Padmasambhava established the monastic order there. That branch of Buddhism was known as Nyingma or the Red Hats. That was under the reign of King SrongTsan Gampo and the source of establishing the Buddhism was the Indian schools. Besides that, the Chinese school of sudden enlightenment, which was somewhat different from the gradual school of Indian Buddhism, also tried to establish its firm feet in the land of snow. However, the Indian Buddhist pundit defeated the Hashang, Chinese teacher of Buddhism and it was a landmark in the history of Buddhism in Tibet because this decided the way in which Tibet would follow the Buddhism in future. However, this is not highlighted in the historical record of Tibet, but this does not undermine its importance.Centuries passed and the Buddhism after one persecution by the Lang dharma, revived. The newer sects came up with fresh ideas, but the older sect (Nyingma) continued to influence not only the folk wisdom, but the aristocrats too were the followers of Nyingma sect at the time of the introduction of the Gelug sect or the Yellow Hat sect by TsongkhaPa. In my present thesis, I have tried an attempt to described both Nyingma and Gelug through the eyes of modern research methodology. Side by side, I kept the descriptive ideas of the sects where it was needed to highlight the ideas of the Buddhism in the said context. But the presence of different practices itself show the comparison. At that juncture, I have only taken the task of illustrating the facts. However, I have tried to describe Buddhism in general and the two sects in particular in their full length.In the first chapter, I have dealt with the History of Buddhism in India which in my opinion needed more than ever because either the material available now days gives one only an idea about how a prince of Sakya clan achieved enlightenment nearly 26 centuries ago. Or it describes the Buddhist philosophy with all of its technicalities and that too in extol and worshiping manner. Surprisingly sometimes, this attracts even the scholars from not only the non-Buddhist fields, but from the discipline itself. I have tried to be cautious while describing the ideas of the sects and therefore, I have tried to put the historical Buddha and his teaching in one chapter in a simplest possible manner. That will create an interest in both the mind of the Buddhist scholars and show the Buddha from the Tibetan point of view that is scarcely done with the use of research methodology. For this, I have started with the life sketch of the prince Siddhartha from his birth to enlightenment and then the important happenings in the life of Lord Buddha. Writing this, I tried to clarified that whom do we are calling Buddha? A Sakya prince or the emanation of supreme God: one is historical personality who, through his penances and mortification got the way to salvation, the other one who out of his great compassion toward humanity emanates himself for the benefit of sentient beings to show them the path of freedom from all sufferings. In my opinion, here lies the difference between Mahayana and Sthaviravda school of Buddhism. The former claims to be the original successor of Buddhism from 6th century BC and asserts that the way prince Siddhartha got enlightenment; everybody can get it and become Arhat. On the other hand, the highest goal of Mahayana is Buddhahood and the supreme Buddha post is not achievable by a human being. The list of Pli canons is also given in this chapter and the name of six contemporary thinkers of Buddha is listed with their respective philosophies. Renunciation, Bodhicitta and the Right view, these 3 are the base of Mahayana theory of unyavda or the theory of Void, which originated though in India, found its firm feet in the land of snow. These points have been dealt in such a manner that while the research methodology was justified, the traditional Buddhist belief was also taken care of and even a common reader can infer the same conclusion that a Buddhist practitioner found after practicing it for a long duration.In the second chapter, I have put forth the History of Buddhism in Tibet with the background of the subject matter of my thesis. This chapter covers the inception of Buddhism in Tibet during 7th century and; from the first dissemination of it up to the establishment of the Gelugpa School by Je TsongkhP. In addition, I have given a short description of the history of Tibet up to the present time for the continuity of the subject matter. The contents of this chapter cover the history of Buddhism chronologically. In the land of snow, it was really a Herculean task for Padmasambhava to establish Buddhism. This work can only be done by the assimilation of the local beliefs and their gods in Buddhism and Padmasambhava has successfully done so with the help of his other Indian companions like Kamalsheela and others along with the royal patronage of King SrongTsan Gampo. A country following Shamanist practices has seen first time the logic-based religion that was most powerful and widespread at that time all over the Asia and its fragrance was crossed the globe. No wonder Padmasambhava is considered as second Buddha among Tibetans. The introduction of Buddhism in Tibet is linked closely with the introduction of literature as the work was got started in the country by the minister of SrongTsan Gampo, the great Thonmi Sambhota. So, a brief history of Tibetan language & literature was inevitable. Therefore, I have given the Tibetan Alphabets and their Sanskrit and Roman equivalent for the record along with the historical background of the Tibetan language. Here one point I want to be noted. While writing this thesis, I face two major difficulties. One was the Tibetan U-Chan fonts for the computer and the second the method of Romanization of Tibetan and Sanskrit words. For the first, I applied two types of U-Chan fonts namely, U-Chan TTF and L Tibetan. For the second one, I have followed the most accepted form and wherever I feel to express my ideas in either script, I did so. That is why the Romanization is not strict way as of Dr. Snell Grove has typed in his works with the diacritic marks or other with equivalents. After this, I took the historical background of the Chinese Hshng Mahayana that advocated sudden enlightenment and its clash with the Indian school of Buddhism, which was in favour of graduated path to salvation; this shows the reason why the graduated path is being practiced in Tibet and not the Chinese counterpart of it. Then I took the destruction of Buddhism in Tibet by Lang dharma and the resurgence of Buddhism after more than 300 years of being in background. Then the Sharma Schools of thought appeared, the latest of which is Gelugpa, which command good favour among the Tibetan till today. The founder of this sect was TsongkhP. I have put the TsongkhP and GelugP in a separate chapter because of its comprehensiveness, which was the demand of my research topic.In the third chapter, the Padmasambhava and Nyingm School has been placed with all of its possible contents. Firstly, I have taken Padmasambhava and the establishment of Buddhism in Tibet, and then the main characteristics and the salient features of this school of thought were placed under the different sub-chapters.In the fourth chapter, I have continued from the previous chapter about Nyingms and dealt with their practices through which they are known. Therefore, I name it after one of the greatest and famous practice, Dzogchen. Hence the chapter is named as, Terton and other practices in Nyingma. Because of the inbuilt nature of Nyingma sect to adopt Tntric practices, I have tried to put light on the Tntric practices specially.After this, in a short chapter, I have tried to explain why the sectarian tendencies came out from a disciplined system like Buddhism that is considered to be the most logical and scientific in its approach. The content of this chapter, though very short in the number of pages, carry very high value to understand the birth of an ism within the ism. Though I have named it, Emergence of Schism in Buddhism, but in this chapter some other general topics were also covered which are the answers to the curiosities in the field of Tibetan Buddhism. For example, I have given a very brief account of the translation work of the Tibetan literature in Tibet and after 1959, in India and abroad.In the sixth chapter, namely TsongkhP and the Gelugp school of Tibet, I have given the salient features and practices of the sect. Why the actual need to establish this sect was felt by its founder TsongkhaPa when he was already mastered all the then time philosophies through other prevalent sects. The role of Rendw in the educational and philosophical life of TsongkhaPa is evident in all the literature, which TsongkhaPa wrote. In fact when we go through the ascetic life of TsongkhaPa, he seems to be much more powerful than his settled life when his name became famous than himself. Wandering in the search of knowledge through debates, asking every established master to impart knowledge, doing penances, these all create a gamut around TsongkhPs personality that every researcher inspire for. This is more relevant today when we see the education has become a means nothing more than for earning the bread. Also, the followers of TsongkhaPa (with due respect) have indulged themselves in the very politics, which TsongkhaPa had forbid in his lifetime.The content of the GelugP School needed more elaborate study to discuss, so I divided it into two chapters and the chapter-VIIth in its succession, I have tried to highlight the philosophy and ethics of GelugPs, which they are famous for. I named this chapter The stages of path and other teachings of GelugP. The biggest contribution in this regard by the founder of this sect, TsongkhaPa was the Lam Rim teachings. TsongkhaPa during his study time engaged in debate with almost all the teacher of prevalent school of Buddhism in Tibet, and found that debates are the best way to develop the intellect of a person. So he stressed very much on study of the books in his Order and hence started the tradition of Lam-Rim teachings. He himself wrote a big volume named Lam-rim Chen-Mo () and tried to put all the philosophical teachings of Buddha that were required to lead a sanctimonious and virtuous life according to Vinaya. When he found the book to be too voluminous to remember, he prepared a précis form of the book and named it Lam-Tso Nam Sum () which became so famous that the Gelugpa or the yellow hats were sometime called the followers of Lam Tso Nam Sum. I have tried to brief the teaching content of Lam Tso Nam Sum in this chapter. In addition, I have given at the end of this chapter, why the Prsngika Mdhyamika () has an upper hand not only over the other three main school of Buddhism but over the Svatntrika Mdhyamika () too. The eighth and the final chapter is conclusion where the findings of the research work have been stated.I have chosen some colour plates to illustrate what is being said in the test of the chapter. I have also taken care of that the entire collection must represent different traditional source and of different type. This I have done to acquaint my thesis with the different architectural and archaeological remains, which though is not part of my thesis, elucidate Buddhism in much exemplified way.At the end, I have added some photographs that will be of helping material and show the historic and religious personalities in visual.Finally, I want to quote averse from the Dhammapada which describes the Buddhassana or the law of Buddha, with the presupposition that if this verse is being taken care of, be it any sect of sub-sect of Buddhism any where at the globe, Buddhism will succeed in achieving its goal.